R. Ya. Malinovsky,
Marshal of the Soviet Union
March of tankers Music: Dm. and Dan. Pokrass Words: B. Laskin 1939.
More than seventy years have passed since the Khasan events. They belong to a history that is always ready to teach useful lessons and enrich us with the necessary experience.
In the 1930s, the Soviet Union constantly strove for peaceful relations with neighboring countries in the Far East, including Japan, which was in common interests. However, this policy did not find a response from the then ruling circles of Japan.
The Japanese leaders and the press carried on anti-Soviet propaganda, openly declared the need to prepare for a war against the Soviet Union. General S. Hayashi, who came to power in February 1937, declared at the very first meeting of the government headed by him that "the policy of liberalism towards the communists will be done away with."
Openly anti-Soviet articles began to appear in Japanese newspapers calling for a "march to the Urals."
In May-June 1938, an agitation campaign was launched in Japan around the allegedly "disputed territories" on the border between Manchukuo and Russian Primorye. In early July 1938, the Japanese border troops located west of Lake Khasan were reinforced with field units, which concentrated on the eastern bank of the Tumen-Ula River. And just before the start of the conflict, the Japanese army command threw a division stationed in Korea (numbering about 10 thousand people), a division of heavy artillery and about 2 thousand soldiers of the Kwantung army into the area of the Zaozernaya hill. At the head of this group was Colonel Isamu Nagai, a member of the nationalist Sakura Society, an active participant in Japan's capture of Northeast China in 1931.
The Japanese side explained the preparations for hostilities and the pulling up of their troops to the area of Lake Khasan by the fact that the border zone of the USSR near this lake was allegedly Manchu territory.
On July 15, 1938, the charge d'affaires of Japan in the USSR appeared at the Narkomindel and demanded the withdrawal of Soviet border guards from the heights in the area of Lake Khasan. After the Japanese representative was presented with the Hunchun Agreement between Russia and China of 1886 and a map attached to it, which irrefutably testifies that Lake Khasan and the heights adjacent to it from the west are on Soviet territory and that there are, therefore, no violations in this there is no area, he retreated. However, on July 20, the Japanese ambassador to Moscow, Shigemitsu, repeated his claims to the Hassan area. When it was pointed out to him that such claims were unfounded, the ambassador said: if Japan's demands are not met, it will use force.
Naturally, there could be no question of fulfilling the unjustified territorial claims of the Japanese.
And then in the early morning of July 29, 1938, a Japanese company, under cover of fog, violating the state border of the USSR, with shouts of "Banzai" attacked the Bezymyannaya Hill. The night before, a detachment of 11 border guards arrived at this height, led by the assistant to the head of the outpost, Lieutenant Alexei Makhalin.
... The Japanese chains surrounded the trench more and more tightly, the border guards were running out of ammunition. Eleven soldiers heroically repelled the onslaught of superior enemy forces for several hours, several border guards were killed. Then Alexey Makhalin decides to break through the encirclement with hand-to-hand combat. He rises to his full height and with the words “Forward! For the Motherland! " rushes with the fighters to counterattack.
They managed to break through the encirclement. But of the eleven, six of the Nameless's defenders survived. Alexey Makhalin also died. At the cost of heavy losses, the Japanese managed to gain control of the altitude. But soon a group of border guards and a rifle company under the command of Lieutenant D. Levchenko arrived at the scene of the battle. With a bold bayonet attack and grenades, our soldiers drove the invaders from a height.
At dawn on July 30, enemy artillery brought down dense concentrated fire to the height. And then the Japanese went on the attack several times, but the company of Lieutenant Levchenko fought to the death. The company commander himself was wounded three times, but did not leave the battle. A battery of anti-tank guns of Lieutenant I. Lazarev came to the aid of Levchenko's unit and shot the Japanese with direct fire. One of our gunners was killed. Lazarev, wounded in the shoulder, took his place. The artillerymen managed to suppress several enemy machine guns and almost destroy the enemy company. The battery commander was forced to leave for bandaging with difficulty. A day later, he was again in the ranks and fought until the final success. ... ... Lieutenant Alexei Makhalin was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously).
The Japanese invaders decided to strike a new, and main, blow in the area of the Zaozernaya hill. Foreseeing this, the command of the Posyetsky frontier detachment - Colonel K.E. Grebennik - organized the defense of Zaozernaya. The northern slope of the height was guarded by a detachment of border guards under the command of Lieutenant Tereshkin. In the center and on the southern slope of Zaozernaya there were Lieutenant Khristolyubov's reserve outpost and a detachment of soldiers of the maneuvering group with two crews of heavy machine guns. On the southern bank of Khasan, there was a branch of Gilfan Batarshin. Their task was to cover the command post of the head of the detachment and prevent the Japanese from entering the rear of the border guards. On Bezymyannaya, the group of Senior Lieutenant Bykhovtsev was strengthened. Near the height was the 2nd company of the 119th regiment of the 40th rifle division under the command of Lieutenant Levchenko. Each height was a small, independently operating stronghold. Approximately in the middle between the heights was a group of Lieutenant Ratnikov, covering the flanks with reinforced detachments. Ratnikov had 16 soldiers with a machine gun. In addition, a platoon of small-caliber guns and four light T-26 tanks were attached to it.
However, when the battle began, it turned out that the forces of the border defenders were scanty. The lesson on Bezymyannaya went to the Japanese for the future, and they put into action two reinforced divisions with a total strength of up to 20 thousand people, about 200 guns and mortars, three armored trains, and a battalion of tanks. The Japanese pinned great hopes on their "suicide bombers" who also took part in the battle.
On the night of July 31, the Japanese regiment, supported by artillery, attacked Zaozernaya. The defenders of the hill opened fire in return, and then counterattacked the enemy and threw him back. Four times the Japanese rushed to Zaozernaya and each time were forced to retreat with losses. A powerful avalanche of Japanese troops, although at the cost of heavy losses, managed to push our soldiers back and reach the lake.
Then, by decision of the government, units of the First Maritime Army entered the battle. Its soldiers and commanders, fighting heroically together with the border guards, after fierce military clashes on August 9, 1938, cleared our territory of the Japanese invaders.
Aviators, tankmen, and artillerymen also made a significant contribution to the overall success of repelling the enemy. Accurate bombing strikes fell on the heads of the invaders, dashing tank attacks plunged the enemy to the ground, destroyed compelling and powerful artillery volleys.
The campaign of Japanese troops to Lake Khasan ended ingloriously. After August 9, the Japanese government had no choice but to enter into negotiations on the cessation of hostilities. On August 10, the USSR government offered the Japanese side an armistice. The Japanese government accepted our terms, agreeing also to set up a commission to resolve the disputed border issue.
For the massive heroism shown in the battles near Lake Khasan, thousands of Soviet soldiers were awarded high state awards, many became Heroes of the Soviet Union.
The settlements, streets, schools, ships were named after the heroes. The memory of the valiant warriors is still preserved in the hearts of Russians, in the hearts of the Far East.
60 years separate us from the time of the conflict at Lake Khasan. But even today this event continues to attract the attention of political and military leaders, historians in our country and abroad ..
In the conflict near Lake Khasan, Russian troops not only for the first time after the civil war entered into battle with an experienced cadre army of the enemy. The provocative actions of the Japanese had a long-range scope: a local conflict for the Japanese General Staff could only become a prelude to larger-scale actions. Maybe - to war.
Hence the enduring significance of the victorious successes on Hassan, which is rightly noted today, sixty years later. And then, in the thirties, this victory also contributed to the intensification of the national liberation war of the Chinese people against the Japanese invaders: during the battles on Hassan, the Japanese army practically stopped its offensive on the Chinese front.
The military-political side of this conflict was no less important. The defeat of the imperial army was the first of a number of reasons that kept Japan from opposing the USSR during the Second World War. As noted in the documents of that time: “Our firm position in these events made the presumptuous adventurers in Tokyo and Berlin come to their senses. ... ... It is indisputable that by this the Soviet Union rendered the greatest service to the cause of peace. "
However, just as the sea is reflected in a drop of water, the Khasan events highlighted not only the positives, but also a number of negative moments characteristic of the state of the country and the army in those years.
Yes, the fighters and commanders of the Far East fought heroically, did not retreat, but the lack of preparation for battles, confusion during them should have made them think on the eve of future formidable trials. “We now not only know the price of our enemy, but also saw those shortcomings in the combat training of the Red Army and border troops, which were not noticed by many before the Khasan operation. We will make a huge mistake if, based on the experience of the Khasan operation, we will not be able to move to the upper class of the ability to defeat the enemy, ”- this is how the experts assessed the incident without delay. However, not all of Hasan's lessons were learned: June 1941 turned out to be so tragically similar to the first days of the battles at Khasan, so much of what preceded them coincides! In the light of Hasan, the catastrophic situation that had developed in the command echelons of the Red Army by 1939 is assessed in a new way; it is enough to analyze the actions of the command personnel in the operation. And, perhaps, today, in 60 years, we understand this more clearly, more comprehensively.
And yet the events on Khasan, with all their complexity and ambiguity, clearly demonstrated the military might of the USSR. The experience of battles with the regular Japanese army seriously helped the training of our soldiers and commanders during the battles on Khalkin Gol in 1939 and in the Manchurian strategic operation in August 1945.
To understand everything, you need to know everything. The time has come to rediscover Hasan - for serious research by scientists, historians, ethnographers, writers, and all Russian people. And not for the duration of the holiday campaign, but for years to come.
On September 4, 1938, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 0040 was issued on the reasons for the failures and losses of the Red Army troops during the Khasan events.
In the battles on Lake Khasan, Soviet troops lost about a thousand people. Officially 865 killed and 95 missing. True, most researchers claim that this figure is inaccurate.
The Japanese claim to have lost 526 killed. True orientalist V.N. Usov (Doctor of Historical Sciences, Chief Researcher at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences) argued that there was a secret memorandum for Emperor Hirohito, in which the number of losses of Japanese troops significantly (one and a half times) exceeded the officially published data.
The Red Army gained experience in conducting hostilities with Japanese troops, which became the subject of study in special commissions, directorates of the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense, the USSR General Staff and military educational institutions and was practiced during exercises and maneuvers. The result was an improvement in the preparation of subunits and units of the Red Army for combat operations in difficult conditions, an improvement in the interaction of subunits in battle, and an improvement in the operational and tactical training of commanders and staffs. The experience gained was successfully applied on the Khalkhin-Gol River in 1939 and in Manchuria in 1945.
The hostilities near Lake Khasan confirmed the increased importance of artillery and contributed to the further development of Soviet artillery: if during the Russo-Japanese war, losses of Japanese troops from Russian artillery fire amounted to 23% of the total losses, then during the conflict at Lake Khasan in 1938, losses of Japanese troops from artillery fire of the Red Army accounted for 37% of the total losses, and during the hostilities near the Khalkhin Gol River in 1939 - 53% of the total losses of Japanese troops.
Errors were corrected.
In addition to the unpreparedness of the units, as well as the Far Eastern Front itself (about which in more detail below), other shortcomings also emerged.
The concentrated fire of the Japanese on the T-26 command tanks (which differed from the linear handrail antenna of the radio station on the tower) and their increased losses - led to the decision to install handrail antennas not only on the command tanks, but also on the linear tanks.
"Charter of the military sanitary service of the Red Army" 1933 (UVSS-33) did not take into account some of the features of the theater of military operations and the situation, which led to an increase in losses. The battalion doctors were too close to the combat formations of the troops and, moreover, were involved in organizing the work of the company sections to collect and evacuate the wounded, which entailed heavy losses among the doctors. Following the results of the battles, changes were made to the work of the military medical service of the Red Army.
Well, about the organizational conclusions of the meeting of the Main Supreme Council of the Red Army and the order of the NKO of the USSR, I will quote the story of comrade andrey_19_73 :
. Hasan's Results: Organizational Conclusions.
On August 31, 1938, a meeting of the Main Military Council of the Red Army was held in Moscow. It summed up the results of the July battles in the area of Lake Khasan.
At the meeting, the report of the People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal K.E. Voroshilov "On the position of the troops of the Palace of Culture (note - the Far Eastern Red Banner) front in connection with the events on Lake Khasan." The reports of the commander of the Far Eastern Fleet V.K. Blucher and the head of the political department of the front, brigade commissar P.I. Mazepova.
VC. Blucher
P.I. Mazepov
The main result of the meeting was that it decided the fate of the hero of the Civil War and the battles on the CER, Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasily Blucher.
He was blamed for the fact that in May 1938 he "questioned the legality of the actions of the border guards on Lake Khasan." Then com. The Far Eastern Front sent a commission to investigate the incident at Zaozernaya Hill, which discovered that the border was violated by Soviet border guards to a shallow depth. Blucher then sent a telegram to the People's Commissar of Defense, in which he concluded that the conflict was caused by the actions of our side and demanded the arrest of the head of the border section.
There is an opinion that a telephone conversation even took place between Blucher and Stalin, in which Stalin asked the commander a question: “Tell me, Comrade Blucher, honestly, do you have a desire to really fight the Japanese? . ".
Blucher was also accused of disorganizing the command and control of troops and, as "unworthy and discredited militarily and politically", removed from the leadership of the Far Eastern Front and left at the disposal of the Main Military Council. Subsequently arrested on October 22, 1938. November 9 V.K. Blucher died in prison during the investigation.
Brigcommissar P.I. Mazepov got off with a "slight fright". He was removed from office early. Political Directorate of the Far Eastern Front and was appointed with demotion, the head of the political department of the Military Medical Academy. CM. Kirov.
The outcome of the meeting was the order of the NKO of the USSR No. 0040, issued on September 4, 1938, on the reasons for the failures and losses of the Red Army troops during the Khasan events. The order also determined the new staff of the front: in addition to the 1st EDKVA, another combined-arms army, the 2nd OKA, was deployed in the front zone.
Below is the text of the order:
ORDER
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR
On the results of the consideration by the main military council of the issue of the events on Lake Khasan and measures for the defense training of the Far Eastern theater of military operations
Moscow city
On August 31, 1938, under my chairmanship, a meeting of the Main Military Council of the Red Army was held, consisting of members of the military council: vols. Stalin, Shchadenko, Budyonny, Shaposhnikov, Kulik, Loktionov, Blucher and Pavlov, with the participation of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Comrade Molotov and deputy. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Comrade Frinovsky.
The main military council considered the issue of the events in the area of Lake Khasan and, after hearing the explanations of the front commander, Comrade. Blucher and deputy. member of the military council of the KDfront comrade. Mazepova, came to the following conclusions:
1. The combat operations near Lake Khasan were a comprehensive test of the mobilization and combat readiness not only of those units that directly took part in them, but also of all the troops of the KD Front without exception.
2. The events of these few days revealed huge flaws in the state of the CD Front. The combat training of troops, headquarters and commanding officers of the front was at an unacceptably low level. The military units were torn apart and incapable of combat; the supply of military units is not organized. It was found that the Far Eastern theater was poorly prepared for the war (roads, bridges, communications).
The storage, conservation and accounting of mobilization and emergency supplies, both in front-line warehouses and in military units, turned out to be in a chaotic state.
In addition to all this, it was revealed that the most important directives of the Main Military Council and the People's Commissar of Defense were criminally not carried out by the front command for a long time. As a result of such an unacceptable state of the front troops, we suffered significant losses in this relatively small clash - 408 killed and 2807 wounded. These losses cannot be justified either by the extreme difficulty of the terrain on which our troops had to operate, nor by the three times the Japanese losses.
The number of our troops, participation in the operations of our aviation and tanks gave us such advantages that our losses in battles could be much smaller.
And only thanks to the laxity, disorganization and combat unpreparedness of military units and the confusion of the command and political personnel, from the front to the regimental, we have hundreds of killed and thousands of wounded commanders, political workers and soldiers. Moreover, the percentage of losses of the command-political staff is unnaturally high - 40%, which once again confirms that the Japanese were defeated and thrown out of our border only thanks to the fighting enthusiasm of soldiers, junior commanders, middle and senior command-political staff, ready to sacrifice themselves, protecting honor and inviolability of the territory of his great socialist homeland, as well as thanks to the skillful leadership of operations against the Japanese comrade. Stern and the correct leadership of Comrade. Rychagova by the actions of our aviation.
Thus, the main task set by the Government and the Main Military Council to the troops of the KD Front - to ensure full and constant mobilization and combat readiness of the front troops in D [alnem] In the [East] - was unfulfilled.
3. The main shortcomings in the training and organization of troops, revealed by the hostilities near Lake Khasan, are:
a) it is unacceptable to take the fighters out of the combat units for all kinds of outside work.
The main military council, knowing about these facts, back in May of this year. by his resolution (protocol No. 8), he categorically forbade squandering the Red Army soldiers for all sorts of chores and demanded that they return to the unit by July 1 of this year. all fighters on such missions. Despite this, the front command did nothing to return fighters and commanders to their units, and a huge shortage of personnel continued to exist in the units, the units were disorganized. It was in this state that they set out on alert to the border. As a result of this, during the period of hostilities, we had to resort to knitting together from different subunits and individual fighters of the unit, allowing harmful organizational improvisation, creating an impossible confusion, which could not but affect the actions of our troops;
b) the troops went to the border on a combat alert completely unprepared. The emergency stock of weapons and other military equipment was not planned in advance and prepared for handing over to the units, which caused a number of egregious outrages during the entire period of hostilities. The head of the front department and the commanders of the units did not know what, where and in what condition weapons, ammunition and other combat supplies were available. In many cases, whole art [Illerian] batteries ended up at the front without shells, spare barrels for machine guns were not fitted in advance, rifles were given out without shooting, and many fighters and even one of the rifle divisions of the 32nd division arrived at the front without rifles and gas masks at all. Despite the huge reserves of clothing, many soldiers were sent into battle in completely worn-out shoes, half-bare feet, a large number of Red Army men were without greatcoats. The commanders and staffs lacked maps of the combat area;
c) all types of troops, especially the infantry, discovered the inability to act on the battlefield, maneuver, combine movement and fire, apply to the terrain, which in this situation, as well as in general in the conditions of D [alniy] V [East], teeming with mountains and hills, is the alphabet of combat and tactical training of troops.
Tank units were used ineptly, as a result of which they suffered heavy losses in materiel.
4. The commanders, commissars and chiefs of all levels of the KD Front, and above all the commander of the KDF, Marshal Blucher, are guilty of these major shortcomings and of the excessive losses incurred by us in a relatively small military clash.
Instead of honestly devoting all his energies to eliminating the consequences of the sabotage and combat training of the KD Front and truthfully informing the People's Commissar and the Main Military Council about the shortcomings in the life of the front troops, Comrade Blucher systematically, from year to year, covered up his knowingly bad work and inactivity with reports of successes, the growth of combat training of the front and its general prosperous state. In the same spirit, he made a many-hour report at a meeting of the Main Military Council on May 28-31, 1938, in which he concealed the true state of the KDF troops and argued that the front troops were well prepared and in all respects combat-ready.
The numerous enemies of the people sitting next to Blucher skilfully hid behind his back, carrying on their criminal work to disorganize and disintegrate the troops of the KD Front. But even after the exposure and removal of the traitors and spies from the army, Comrade Blucher was unable or did not want to really implement the cleansing of the front from the enemies of the people. Under the flag of special vigilance, he left, contrary to the instructions of the Main Military Council and the People's Commissar, hundreds of positions of commanders and chiefs of units and formations unreplaced, thus depriving military units of leaders, leaving headquarters without workers, unable to perform their tasks. Comrade Blucher explained this situation by the absence of people (which does not correspond to the truth) and thereby cultivated an indiscriminate distrust of all commanding and commanding personnel of the KD Front.
5. The leadership of the commander of the CD Front, Marshal Blucher, during the period of hostilities at Lake Khasan was completely unsatisfactory and bordered on deliberate defeatism. All his behavior during the time preceding the hostilities, and during the battles themselves, was a combination of duplicity, indiscipline and sabotage of an armed rebuff to Japanese troops that had seized part of our territory. Knowing in advance about the impending Japanese provocation and about the decisions of the Government in this regard, announced by Comrade. Litvinov to Ambassador Shigemitsu, having received on July 22 a directive from the People's Commissar of Defense to bring the entire front into combat readiness, - Comrade. Blucher limited himself to issuing appropriate orders and did nothing to check the preparation of troops to repel the enemy and did not take effective measures to support the border guards with field troops. Instead, on July 24, out of the blue, he questioned the legality of the actions of our border guards at Lake Khasan. In secret from a member of the military council, comrade Mazepov, his chief of staff, comrade Stern, deputy. People's Commissar of Defense Comrade Mehlis and Deputy. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, Comrade Frinovsky, who were at that time in Khabarovsk, Comrade Blucher sent a commission to the Zaozernaya Hill and, without the participation of the head of the border station, investigated the actions of our border guards. The commission created by such a suspicious order discovered that our border guards “violated” the Manchurian border by 3 meters and, therefore, “established” our “guilt” in the outbreak of the conflict on Lake Khasan.
In view of this, Comrade Blucher sends a telegram to the People's Commissar of Defense about this alleged violation of the Manchurian border by us and demands the immediate arrest of the head of the border station and other "perpetrators of provoking a conflict" with the Japanese. This telegram was also sent by Comrade Blucher in secret from the comrades listed above.
Even after receiving instructions from the Government to stop fussing with all kinds of commissions and investigations and on the exact implementation of the decisions of the Soviet Government and orders of the People's Commissar, Comrade Blucher does not change his defeatist position and continues to sabotage the organization of the armed resistance to the Japanese. It got to the point that on August 1 of this year, when talking over a direct wire, Comrades. Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov with Comrade Blucher, Comrade. Stalin was forced to ask him a question: “Tell me, Comrade Blucher, honestly, do you have a desire to really fight the Japanese? I would think that you should leave immediately. "
Comrade Blucher withdrew from all leadership of the hostilities, covering up this self-withdrawal by sending Comrade. Stern to the area of hostilities without any specific tasks and powers. Only after repeated instructions from the Government and the People's Commissar of Defense to end the criminal confusion and eliminate disorganization in troop command and control, and only after the People's Commissar appointed Comrade. Stern as the commander of a corps operating at Lake Khasan, a special repeated requirement for the use of aviation, which Comrade Blucher refused to enter into battle under the pretext of fearing defeat for the Korean population, only after Comrade Blucher ordered to go to the scene of events, Comrade Blucher took over the operational leadership. But with this more than strange leadership, he does not set clear tasks for the troops to destroy the enemy, interferes with the combat work of commanders subordinate to him, in particular, the command of the 1st Army is actually removed from the leadership of its troops without any reason; disorganizes the work of the front-line command and slows down the defeat of the Japanese troops stationed on our territory. At the same time, Comrade Blucher, having left for the scene, in every possible way avoids establishing continuous communication with Moscow, despite his endless calls by the People's Commissar of Defense on a direct wire. For three whole days, with a normally working telegraph connection, it was impossible to get a conversation with Comrade Blucher.
All this operational "activity" of Marshal Blucher was completed by the issuance of an order on August 10 to conscription into the 1st Army of 12 ages. This illegal act was all the more incomprehensible because the Main Military Council in May of this year, with the participation of Comrade Blucher and at his own suggestion, decided to call in wartime in D [aln] V [East] only 6 ages. This order from Comrade Blucher provoked the Japanese to announce their mobilization and could drag us into a big war with Japan. The order was immediately canceled by the People's Commissar.
Based on the instructions of the General Military Council;
I ORDER:
1. In order to eliminate all major shortcomings in the combat training and condition of the KDF military units as soon as possible, replace the unfit and militarily and politically discredited command and improve the conditions of leadership, in the sense of bringing it closer to military units, as well as strengthening measures for defense training Far Eastern theater as a whole, - to disband the management of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front.
2. To remove Marshal Comrade Blucher from the post of commander of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front and leave him at the disposal of the Main Military Council of the Red Army.
3. To create two separate armies from the troops of the Far Eastern Front, with direct subordination to the People's Commissar of Defense:
a) the 1st Separate Red Banner Army as part of the troops in accordance with Appendix No. 1, subordinating the Pacific Fleet to the military council of the 1st Army in operational terms.
Office of the army to deploy - Voroshilov. The army should include the entire Ussuri region and part of the Khabarovsk and Primorsk regions. The dividing line with the 2nd Army - along the river. Bikin;
b) the 2nd Separate Red Banner Army as part of the troops in accordance with Appendix No. 2, having subordinated the Amur Red Banner Flotilla to the military council of the 2nd Army in operational terms.
Office of the army to deploy - the city of Khabarovsk. The army should include the Nizhne-Amurskaya, Khabarovskaya, Primorskaya, Sakhalin, Kamchatka regions, the Jewish Autonomous Region, the Koryaksky, Chukotka national districts;
c) the personnel of the front-line directorate to be disbanded to staff the directorates of the 1st and 2nd Separate Red Banner armies.
4. Approve:
a) Commander of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army - Comrade Commander Comrade Stern G.M., a member of the military council of the army - divisional commissar comrade. Semenovsky F.A., chief of staff - brigade commander comrade. Popova M.M .;
b) Commander of the 2nd Separate Red Banner Army - Comrade Commander Comrade. Koneva I.S., a member of the military council of the army - brigade commissar comrade Biryukova N.I., chief of staff - brigade commander com. Melnik K.S.
5. The newly appointed commander of the armies to form the directorates of the armies according to the attached draft states No. ... (note - not attached)
6. Before the arrival in Khabarovsk of the commander of the 2nd Separate Red Banner Army of the corps commander comrade. I. S. Koneva in the temporary command to enter the division commander comrade. Romanovsky.
7. To begin the formation of armies immediately and complete by September 15, 1938.
8. To the head of the command and control department of the Red Banner Army, use the personnel of the disbanded directorate of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front to staff the directorates of the 1st and 2nd Separate Red Banner armies.
9. The Chief of the General Staff should give appropriate instructions to the commanders of the 1st and 2nd armies on the distribution of warehouses, bases and other [his] front [new] property between the armies. At the same time, keep in mind the possibility of using the chiefs of the branches of the Red Army and their representatives, who are currently in the Far East, to quickly carry out this work.
10. The Military Council of the 2nd Separate Red Banner Army by October 1 of this year. to restore control of the 18th and 20th rifle corps with the deployment of 18 sk - Kuibyshevka and 20 sk - Birobidzhan.
To restore these corps directorates to turn the disbanded directorates of the Khabarovsk operational group and the 2nd Army of the KD Front.
11. To the Military Councils of the 1st and 2nd Separate Red Banner Armies:
a) immediately proceed to restore order in the troops and ensure, as soon as possible, their full mobilization readiness, report to the military councils of the armies about the measures taken and their implementation to the People's Commissar of Defense once every five days;
b) ensure the full implementation of the orders of the People's Commissar of Defense Nos. 071 and 0165 - 1938. Report on the progress of these orders every three days, starting from September 7, 1938;
c) it is strictly forbidden to take away soldiers, commanders and political workers for various types of work.
In cases of extreme necessity, the military councils of the armies are allowed, only with the approval of the People's Commissar of Defense, to involve military units in work, provided they are used only in an organized manner, so that whole subunits headed by their commanders and political workers are at work, always maintaining their full combat readiness. for which the subdivisions must be replaced by others in a timely manner.
12. The commander of the 1st and 2nd Separate Red Banner armies should inform me about the progress of the formation of directorates by telegraph in cipher code 8, 12 and 15 September.
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K. VOROSHILOV Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Army Commander 1st Rank SHAPOSHNIKOV
Having occupied Northern Manchuria, Japan considered (under favorable conditions) the possibility of transferring hostilities to the border regions of the USSR. To check the combat state of the OKDVA units, Japanese troops periodically organized provocations on the Soviet-Chinese border. Japanese aviation defiantly invaded the airspace of the USSR, mainly for reconnaissance purposes. From June 11 to June 29, 1937, her planes violated the air borders in Primorye 7 times, staying over Soviet territory from 2 to 12 minutes.
On April 11, 1938, the airspace of the Soviet Union was violated by a large group of Japanese aircraft, one of which was shot down by anti-aircraft fire from the border troops. Pilot Maeda was captured. During his interrogation, it became clear that the Japanese side was carefully studying air routes in the border strip in the Soviet Far East in case hostilities began.
Providing effective assistance to the Republic of China during, the armed forces of the USSR fought for almost a year (by the forces of military advisers and volunteers, up to 4 thousand people) with the Japanese troops on the territory of China. A full-scale war between the Soviet Union and Japan was only a matter of time. In the second half of the 1930s. the general staff of the Japanese ground forces had already prepared a plan for a military invasion of the USSR in three directions - eastern (seaside), northern (Amur) and western (Khingan). A special stake was placed on the use of air forces. According to the General Staff of the Red Army, in the event of the outbreak of hostilities, Japan could quickly concentrate up to 1,000 ground aircraft near our borders.
Expecting the possibility of such a scenario, the Soviet military leadership took appropriate measures. On July 1, 1938, the OKDVA, additionally reinforced with personnel and military equipment, was transformed into the Red Banner Far Eastern Front (KDF, 2 armies) and the Northern Group of Forces of the Central Subordination. Marshal of the Soviet Union V.K.Blyukher became the commander of the Far Eastern Front, his deputy for aviation -. The 2nd Air Army was created from the Far Eastern aviation.
In the 20th of July 1938, an increased activity of Japanese troops in the coastal region was noticed, accompanied by rifle and machine-gun shelling of the Soviet border area. Our border guards were instructed to use weapons in the event of a direct violation of the border. Units of the 1st Primorsky Army of the Far Eastern Front were put on high alert.
Meanwhile, the Japanese side for the attack on the USSR chose the Posiet region in the Primorsky Territory, at the junction of the borders of the USSR, the puppet state of Manchukuo and Korea, seeking to seize the disputed territories (Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya heights) in the area of Lake Khasan.
On July 29, 1938, an armed conflict broke out. In the following days, regardless of losses, the enemy managed to capture the dominant heights, which he quickly turned into heavily fortified positions.
The commander of the Far Eastern Fleet was tasked with crushing the enemy in a short time and liberating the border zone he had captured (without invading the adjacent territory of Manchukuo). For the conduct of hostilities in the air, an advanced aviation group was created: 21 attack aircraft R-5 SSS of the 2nd shap (Shkotovo airfield or Shkotovskaya Valley), 15 I-15 fighters of the 40th IAP (Avgustovka), 12 36th sbap (Knevichi ) and 41 I-15 (11 - from and 30 - from the 48th IAP, Zaimka Filippovsky airfield).
On August 1, our aviation with the forces of 4 squadrons (40 I-15, 8 R-Zet) inflicted an assault bomb attack on the Japanese troops, causing them minor damage. This was followed by other raids by bomber, assault and fighter aircraft. To combat Soviet aircraft, the Japanese side used only 2 anti-aircraft batteries (18-20 guns) located on the territory of Manchukuo, which damaged 3 Soviet vehicles (1 I-15, 2 SB) with their fire. The next day, our air raids continued.
Fearing retaliatory actions from the Japanese Air Force, in accordance with the order of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army dated August 4, 1938, No. Lake Khasan "in large air defense points of the Far East and Transbaikalia, it was prescribed: "To set up artillery and machine-gun units in positions, relocate fighter aircraft to operational airfields and raise the VNOS system, trusting the connection of VNOS posts with command posts and airfields of the fighter unit."
On August 5, one of the submarines of the Pacific Fleet received unverified information about 98 Japanese bombers approaching Vladivostok. The air defense of the city was urgently brought to full combat readiness. Up to 50 fighters were raised into the air. Fortunately, the information turned out to be false.
The task was also set to provide field airfields, rifle, cavalry and tank units stationed in camps or bivouacs with air defense means. For this purpose, 5 anti-aircraft divisions were involved (32nd, 39th, 40th rifle divisions; 39th and 43rd rifle corps).
The measures taken were based on the presence of the Japanese side of the aviation group (up to 70 aircraft) in the area of the lake. Hasan. However, she was almost never involved in battles. As a result, the 69th Fighter Aviation Brigade, armed and reoriented to conduct aerial reconnaissance, protect its aviation and bombard enemy positions.
On August 4-9, Soviet troops, actively supported from the air by aviation, managed to defeat the Japanese-Manchu grouping in the area of Lake Khasan and squeeze it out of the territory of the USSR. On August 11, the conflict was settled, which was officially recognized in Tokyo.
During the period of hostilities near Lake Khasan, Soviet aviation made 1003 sorties, of which: - 41, SB - 346, I-15 -534, SSS - 53, R-Zet - 29, I-16 - 25. 4265 were dropped on the enemy bombs of various calibers (with a total weight of about 209 tons), spent 303,250 rounds.
Japanese anti-aircraft artillery shot down 1 SB and 1 I-15 (Lieutenant Soloviev). 29 aircraft had minor holes and damage from anti-aircraft gun and machine-gun fire, of which 18 were I-15, 7 were SB and 4 were TB-3RN. Two more I-15 fighters were considered lost for non-combat reasons. Pilot Koreshev crashed the fighter while landing at an unfamiliar airfield - the plane fell into a ditch and copied it. Another car was crushed by an unsuccessful landing on the airfield.
The reluctance of the Japanese side to use its air force in the armed conflict was probably caused by the danger of air strikes from the Soviet bomber aviation not only in the area of Lake Khasan, but also on the territory of Japan.
According to the publication: 100 years of the Russian Air Force (1912 - 2012)/ [Dashkov A. Yu., Golotyuk VD]; under total. ed. V.N.Bondareva. - M.: Russian Knights Foundation, 2012. - 792 p. : ill.
Notes:The thirties of the XX century were extremely difficult for the whole world. This applies to both the internal situation in many states of the world and the international situation. Indeed, in the world arena during this period, global contradictions developed more and more. One of them was the Soviet-Japanese conflict at the end of the decade.
Background of the battles for Lake Hasan
The leadership of the Soviet Union is literally obsessed with internal (counter-revolutionary) and external threats. And this idea is largely justified. The threat is clearly unfolding in the west. In the east in the mid-1930s, China was occupied which is already casting predatory glances over Soviet lands. So, in the first half of 1938, powerful anti-Soviet propaganda was unfolding in this country, calling for a "war against communism" and for an open seizure of territories. Such aggression of the Japanese is facilitated by their newly acquired coalition partner - Germany. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the Western states, England and France, in every possible way postpone the signing of any treaty with the USSR on mutual protection, hoping thereby to provoke the mutual destruction of their natural enemies: Stalin and Hitler. This provocation is quite spread
and on Soviet-Japanese relations. In the beginning, the Japanese government is increasingly beginning to talk about contrived "disputed territories". In early July, Lake Khasan, located in the border zone, becomes the center of events. Here the formations of the Kwantung Army begin to concentrate more and more densely. The Japanese side justified these actions by the fact that the border zones of the USSR, located near this lake, are the territories of Manchuria. The latter region, in general, was not historically Japanese in any way, it belonged to China. But China in previous years was itself occupied by the imperial army. On July 15, 1938, Japan demanded the withdrawal of Soviet border formations from this territory, arguing that they belonged to China. However, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted harshly to such a statement, providing copies of the agreement between Russia and the Celestial Empire dated 1886, where the corresponding cards were attached, proving the correctness of the Soviet side.
The beginning of the battles for Lake Hasan
However, Japan did not intend to retreat at all. The inability to reasonably substantiate her claims to Lake Khasan did not stop her. Of course, the Soviet defense was also strengthened in this area. The first attack followed on July 29, when a Kwantung Army company crossed and attacked one of the heights. At the cost of significant losses, the Japanese managed to capture this height. However, already on the morning of July 30, more significant forces came to the aid of the Soviet border guards. For several days, the Japanese unsuccessfully attacked the defenses of their opponents, losing a significant amount of equipment and manpower every day. The Battle of Lake Khasan was completed on 11 August. On this day, a truce was announced between the troops. By mutual agreement of the parties, it was decided that the interstate border should be established in accordance with the agreement between Russia and China of 1886, since no later agreement on this matter existed at that time. Thus, Lake Khasan became a silent reminder of such an inglorious campaign for new territories.
CHRONOLOGY OF THE KHASSAN ARMED CONFLICT
- June 13. In Manchukuo, fearing arrest, the State Security Commissioner of the 3rd rank, the head of the Far Eastern Regional NKVD, Genrikh Lyushkov, fled.
- 3 July. The Japanese company launched a demonstration attack on V. Zaozernaya.
- July 8. By order of the head of the border detachment V. Zaozernaya is occupied by a permanent outfit of 10 people and a reserve outpost of 30 people. Digging of trenches and installation of barriers began.
- July 11. VC. Blucher ordered to move a company of the 119th rifle division to the area of Hasan Island to support the border guards.
- July 15 (according to other sources July 17). Sergeant Major Vinevitin shot and killed the Japanese Matsushima Sakuni, who, together with a group of Japanese infiltrated Soviet territory. A camera with pictures of the area was found with him c. Zaozernaya. To help Lieutenant P. Tereshkin, a reserve outpost was assigned under the command of Lieutenant Khristolyubov.
- July 15. The Japanese side lodged a protest against the presence of forty Soviet servicemen on Japanese territory in the Chang-Chu-Fun area (the Chinese name for the Zaozernaya hill).
- July 17th. The Japanese begin the transfer of the 19th division to the conflict zone.
- July 18 at 19:00. At the section of the Quarantine outpost in groups of two or three, twenty-three men violated our line with a package from the Japanese border command demanding to leave Japanese territory.
- July 20. Up to 50 Japanese people swam in the lake, two of them watched. Up to 70 people arrived by freight train to Homuyton station. The Japanese ambassador Shigemitsu in an ultimatum presented territorial claims and demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Zaozernaya heights. Minister of War Itagaki and Chief of General Staff Prince Kanyin presented to the emperor an operational plan for ousting Soviet troops from the top of Zaozernaya Hill with the forces of two infantry regiments of the 19th Division of the Japanese Korean Army without the use of aviation.
- July 22. The Soviet government sent a note to the Japanese government in which it resolutely rejected all Japanese claims.
- July 23. The transfer of violators to the Japanese side took place. The Japanese have once again protested the violation of the border.
- July 24. The Military Council of the KDF issued a directive on the concentration of reinforced battalions of the 119th Rifle Division, the 118th Rifle Division and a squadron of 121 Kav. regiment in the area of the District and bringing the front troops into high combat readiness. Marshal Blucher sent to V. Zaozernuyu commission, which found a violation of the border line by 3 meters by a trench of border guards.
- July 27. Ten Japanese officers went out to the border line in the area of Bezymyannaya Hill, apparently for the purpose of reconnaissance.
- July 28th. Subdivisions of the 75th regiment of the 19th infantry division of the Japanese took up positions in the area of Hasan Island.
- July 29, 15:00. Before the Japanese company, they attacked the outpost of Lieutenant Makhalin at the height of Bezymyannaya, with the help of the squads of Chernopyatko and Batarshin that arrived in time and the cavalrymen of Bykhovets, the enemy was repulsed. Lieutenant Levchenko's 2nd 119th regiment company, two T-26 tank platoons (4 vehicles), a small-caliber cannon platoon and 20 border guards under the command of Lieutenant Ratnikov are coming to the rescue.
- July 29. The third reinforced battalion of the 118th Rifle Corps was ordered to move to the Paksekori-Novoselki area.
- July 29 24 hours. 40th RD receives an order to move to the area of Khasan Island from Slavyanka.
- July 30. 32nd RD moves to Khasan from the Razdolny area.
- July 30 23:00. The Japanese ferry reinforcements across the Tumangan River.
- July 31 3-20. With forces of up to two regiments, the Japanese begin attacks on all heights. With artillery support, the Japanese launched four attacks. Under pressure from a superior enemy, by order of the Soviet troops leave the border line and retreat beyond about. Khasan at 7-00 from Zaozernaya, at 19-25 from Bezymyannaya, the Japanese pursue them, but then return beyond Khasan Island and consolidate on the western coast of the lake and on the lines conventionally connecting the lake tops and the existing border line.
- July 31 (day). 3 Sat 118th Rifle Corps, with the support of border guards, drove the enemy out of the eastern and southern shores of the lake.
- August 1. The Japanese hastily fortify the captured territory, equip artillery positions and firing points. There is a concentration of 40 rifle divisions. Due to muddy roads, the units are late.
- August 1 13-35. Stalin ordered Blucher to immediately drive the Japanese out of our territory via a direct wire. First air raid on Japanese positions. At the beginning, 36 I-15 and 8 R-Zet attacked Zaozernaya with fragmentation bombs (AO-8 and AO-10) and machine gun fire. At 15-10 24 SB bombed in the area of Zaozernaya and the road to Digashel with high-explosive bombs of 50 and 100 kg. (FAB-100 and FAB-50). At 16-40, fighters and attack aircraft bombed and shelled the height of 68.8. At the end of the day, SB bombers dropped a large number of small fragmentation bombs on Zaozernaya.
- August 2. An unsuccessful attempt to knock out the enemy with 40 rifle divisions. Troops are prohibited from crossing the state border line. Heavy offensive battles. The 118th rifle regiment and a tank battalion stopped in the south at the height of Machine-Gun Hill. 119 and 120 joint ventures stopped at the approaches to Bezymyannaya. The Soviet units suffered heavy losses. The first air raid at 7-00 had to be postponed due to fog. At 8-00 24 SB struck the western slopes of Zaozernaya. Then the six R-Zet worked on the positions of the Japanese on the Bogomolnaya hill.
- August 3rd. Under heavy enemy fire, the 40th Rifle Division retreated to its original positions. People's Commissar Voroshilov decides to entrust the command of the hostilities near Khasan to the Chief of Staff of the KDF G.M. Stern, appointing him commander of the 39th Rifle Corps, effectively removing Blucher from the command.
- August 4th. The Japanese ambassador announced his readiness to start negotiations on the settlement of the border conflict. The Soviet side presented a condition to restore the position of the parties on July 29, the Japanese rejected this demand.
- 5th of August. Approach 32 SD. An order was given for a general offensive on August 6 at 16-00. The Soviet command makes the final reconnaissance of the area.
- August 6 15-15. In groups of several dozen aircraft, 89 SB bombers began bombing the Bezymyannaya, Zaozernaya and Bogomolnaya hills, as well as the positions of the Japanese artillery on the adjacent side. An hour later, 41 TB-3RNs continued bombing. In conclusion, FAB-1000 bombs were used, which produced a strong psychological effect on the enemy. Fighters effectively suppressed enemy anti-aircraft batteries during the entire operation of the bombers. After the bombardment and artillery preparation, the assault on the Japanese positions began. 40th SD and 2 MSBR attacked from the south, 32nd SD and 2 MSBR tank battalion from the north. The offensive was carried out under continuous enemy artillery fire. The swampy terrain did not allow the tanks to turn into a battle line. The tanks moved in a convoy at a speed of no more than 3 km / h. Parts of the 95th joint venture reached the barbed wire by 21-00. They were repulsed by black, but strong fire. The Zaozernaya height was partially freed.
- August 7. Numerous Japanese counterattacks, attempts to regain lost positions. The Japanese are bringing new units to Hasan. The Soviet command reinforces the grouping with the 78th Kazan Red Banner and 176th Rifle Division of the 26th Zlatoust Red Banner Rifle Division. After reconnaissance of the positions of the Japanese, in the morning the fighters as attack aircraft processed the border strip, in the afternoon the 115 SB bombed the artillery positions and the accumulation of infantry in the near rear of the Japanese.
- 8 August. 96th joint venture went to the northern slopes of V. Zaozernaya. Aviation continuously assaults enemy positions. The hunt goes even for individual soldiers, the Japanese do not risk showing themselves in the open. Fighters are also used for reconnaissance of Japanese positions. By the end of the day, Voroshilov's telegram prohibited the massive use of aviation.
- August 9. Soviet troops were ordered to go over to the defensive at the lines they had reached.
- August 10. Fighters were used to suppress Japanese artillery. Effective interaction between aviation and heavy artillery. The Japanese artillery practically stopped firing.
- August 11, 12 o'clock. Fire cease. Aviation is prohibited from crossing the border line.
- Japanese invasion of Mongolia. Khalkin-Gol
The crossing of Soviet troops through the flooded areas to the bridgehead at Lake Khasan.
Cavalrymen on patrol.
View of disguised Soviet tanks.
The Red Army soldiers are on the attack.
Red Army soldiers at a halt.
Artillerymen during a break between battles.
Soldiers set the banner of victory on the Zaozernaya hill.
A Soviet tank is crossing the Khalkhin-Gol River.