Crisis in Poland 1980 1981. Martial law in Poland (1981-1983). Historical significance of this struggle

" Assessments of the events of that era vary greatly both within Poland and beyond its borders. During martial law, repression took place in the country: as a result of clashes with the police, more than 30 people. died. But in general, the scale of repression, as well as the reaction of the opposition itself during this period, was moderate and even somewhat muted, given the brewing consumer crisis in the country. The Catholic Church of Poland played a key role in preventing the escalation of the conflict on both sides.

Start of operation

Pro-Western unrest in the Polish trade union environment began to be felt more and more acutely, especially in the context of the impending consumer crisis. General Wojciech Jaruzelski, at that time 1st Secretary of the PUWP, head of government and minister of defense, understood that the main destabilizing threat came from the Solidarity organization, which enjoyed the support of the population. On the morning of December 12, 1981, Wojciech Jaruzelski called the leadership of the USSR and said the following: “... on the night of December 12-13 of this year. Martial law will be introduced throughout the entire territory of the People's Republic of Poland. I place full responsibility for this step on myself..."

On the night of December 12-13, 1981, telephone communications were cut off throughout Poland. As a result, the leaders of the opposition anti-communist movement Solidarity instantly found themselves isolated. Tanks and armored personnel carriers appeared on the streets. A statement by General Jaruzelski was broadcast on television that “the hands of the adventurers must be tied before they push the Fatherland into the abyss of a fratricidal war.” The general also announced the creation of the Military Council of National Salvation ( English).

Causes

results

As a result of this military action, the local trade union committees of Solidarity were significantly weakened, and many leaders were simply intimidated. But in general, Solidarity continued to operate under the leadership of Lech Walesa, who temporarily chose a policy of non-resistance, well known to the Poles since the partition of the country. A striking manifestation of the ongoing underground activity even at this time was the systematic publication of periodicals, leaflets and bulletins. The publishers were secretly supported by the Catholic Church, which maintained a strong position in Polish society.

On July 17, 1986, the Polish government adopted an amnesty law; in the period until February 21, 1987, 1,200 participants in anti-government protests (of which 225 were serving sentences in prison) took advantage of it.

US economic sanctions against Poland

Immediately after the introduction of martial law, the US government imposed economic sanctions against Poland and the USSR. The following year, 1982, Poland was stripped of its most favored nation trade status and its bid to join the International Monetary Fund was blocked. The 1984 amnesty opened the door to the normalization of economic relations between the two countries. On February 20, 1987, President Reagan announced the lifting of remaining sanctions and the restoration of normal trade.

The sanctions had a negative impact on the Polish economy (the Polish government claimed that they cost the Polish economy $15 billion between 1981 and 1985). The losses were partially offset by Soviet loans, which totaled 3.4 million [ specify] dollars, and an increase in supplies of raw materials and energy.

Modern estimates

In 2005-2008 They tried to bring Jaruzelski to trial for introducing a dictatorship.

Notes

Literature

  • Lavrenov S.A., Popov I.M. The Soviet Union in local wars and conflicts. - M.: Astrel, 2003. - P. 391-409. - ISBN 5-271-05709-7

The beginning of political transformations. 1956 was a turning point for Poland. Even a relatively tough authoritarian regime could not break Polish political traditions and political identity, which was based on the idea of ​​complete independence of the country and the possibility of choosing its own path of development. A period began that was characterized by alternating tendencies of liberalization and reaction. Gomulka's government carried out a number of reforms: cooperativization became voluntary, most cooperatives were dissolved, land was returned to individual peasants, limited private initiative was allowed in the economy, pressure on the press was eased, workers were given the opportunity to participate in the management of enterprises, and relations with the Catholic Church improved. However, already at the end of the 1950s, resistance from party circles significantly neutralized the results of the reforms. Censorship has again intensified in the country, an anti-religious campaign and a campaign against farms have begun, and industrial self-government has been practically eliminated. In 1968, student protests were suppressed, and Poland took part in the invasion of Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia. In 1970, the authorities forcibly suppressed labor unrest in Gdańsk, Gdynia and Szczecin, resulting in casualties (about 70 killed and 1,000 injured). Gomułka was forced to resign. A large number of intellectuals emigrated from Poland.

After the unrest was suppressed, the authorities were again forced to make compromises. The government of Edward Terek normalized relations with the Catholic Church

and placed emphasis on the social component of economic development - housing construction, increasing wages, and the like. At the same time, Gierek sought to modernize Polish industry, strengthening its export component. To finance all these programs, the government began to borrow financially from capitalist countries. It was not possible to repay the debts, and in the mid-1970s an economic crisis began in Poland. Social problems in 1976 again led to labor unrest. The arrests of labor opposition activists aroused the indignation of the opposition-minded intelligentsia, who, to protect workers, created the Committee for Public Self-Defense (KOS) in 1978, which became the organizational core of the opposition forces. Of great importance for the growth of nationally-tinged opposition sentiments was the election in 1978 of the Pole Karol Wojtyla, John Paul II, as Pope, who made a triumphal visit to Poland. In 1980, as a result of rising prices for consumer goods, the most massive protests of workers began, who created workers' strike committees and a single Inter-factory Committee, one of the leaders of which was Gdansk shipyard worker Lech Walesa. The committee put forward 22 economic and political demands to the authorities, which included not only higher wages and lower food prices, but also the rights to independent trade unions and strikes. The strikers received support from the opposition intelligentsia from the KOS (reformed into the KOS-Committee for the Protection of Workers - KOS-KOR). The government was forced to enter into a negotiation process with the workers and their consultants, as a result of which most of the opposition's demands were satisfied in August 1980, and in September Terek was replaced by Stanislav Kanya.

Having achieved concessions, the opposition increased pressure on the regime. Workers left the state trade unions en masse and joined the independent trade union Solidarity, which was headed by Walesa. Strikes paralyzed the economy. In September 1981, Solidarity issued a sensational call for workers in Eastern Europe to form free trade unions and fight for freedom. Solidarity demanded the introduction of industrial self-government for workers, and in December raised the question of participation in the elections, thereby threatening the PUWP monopoly on power. A more radical nationalist organization, the Confederation of Independent Poland, opposed the USSR.

On October 12, 1981, the PZPR was headed by Defense Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski. On December 13, 1981, Jaruzelski introduced martial law in Poland. The leadership of the country passed from civilian authorities to the Military Council of National Salvation. Solidarity leaders were arrested. Poland received loans from the Soviet Union, which allowed for a slight improvement in its economic situation. The situation stabilized for a while. In 1983, martial law was lifted and then a political amnesty was declared. At the same time, Solidarity continued to operate illegally.

The events of 1980-1983 led to the fact that Solidarity refused to cooperate with the authorities - the coexistence of the regime and the opposition became impossible. At the same time, the authorities were unable to achieve the complete elimination of the political rival, fearing nationwide unrest, while the opposition increased its influence.

The only way to solve the problem was to carry out economic reforms that would improve living standards and reduce social tension. However, attempts at reform by the Jaruzelski government in the mid-1980s encountered resistance from its own bureaucracy.

Perestroika in the USSR gave impetus to changes throughout Eastern Europe, including Poland. The economic crisis that erupted in 1988 once again brought workers on strike. The government entered into negotiations with Walesa. An agreement was reached to end the strikes in exchange for the legalization of Solidarity and liberalization of the regime. By this time, the leaders of Solidarity had moved from the ideas of “democratic socialism” that they put forward in 1980-1981 to liberalism.

Negotiations in 1989 between representatives of the opposition and the regime were carried out within the framework of the so-called “round table” of political parties and public organizations. The Round Table became the main source of legitimate regime change. Moreover, the round table was intended as a tool for reform, not for eliminating the regime. The negotiation process significantly reduced the potential for conflict between the opposition and the regime, which contributed to a peaceful and, most importantly, relatively legitimate transformation of the political system.

As a result of the agreement reached in April 1989 at the round table of the PUWP, Solidarity, the Catholic Church and other organizations, Solidarity was given the opportunity to take part in limited elections to the Sejm, and Jaruzelski became the president of the PPR. In addition, the Catholic Church gained official status, and the PUWP monopoly in the media began to be overcome. The leadership of the USSR, in the wake of perestroika and warming relations with the USA and NATO, did not interfere with the processes taking place in Poland.

The parliamentary elections on June 4, 1989 ended in the triumph of Solidarity - the Civil Committee it created won in all the districts where elections were held (some seats were reserved for the PUWP and its allies). On August 24, the Democratic and Peasant Parties, previously subordinate to the PUWP, went over to the Solidarity side in the Sejm. This coalition elected the leader of the Catholic Solidarity faction, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, as head of government. In July 1990, Mazowiecki removed all communists from the government, and Jaruzelski resigned.

Thirty years ago, in the summer of 1980, the Polish proletariat held the world's breath. A gigantic strike movement spread throughout the country: several hundred thousand workers went on wildcat strikes in many cities, causing the ruling class of the whole world to tremble.

What happened in August 1980?

After the announcement of an increase in meat prices, workers at a number of enterprises spontaneously went on strike. On the first of July, workers in Tczew (a city near Gdansk) and Ursus (one of the districts of Warsaw) rose up to fight. General meetings were held in Ursus, a strike committee was elected and collective demands were put forward. In the following days, the strike spread to Warsaw, Lodz, Gdansk and other cities. The government tried to prevent the movement from expanding by quickly making concessions such as increasing wages. In mid-July, workers in Lublin, an important railway crossing point, went on strike. Lublin is located on the railway line that connects Russia with East Germany. In 1980, it was a vital supply route for Russian troops in the GDR. The workers' demands were: no reprisals against strikers, withdrawal of police from factories, increased wages and free elections to trade unions.

What was the power of the workers?

Workers learned lessons from the 1970 and 1976 strikes. They clearly saw that the official apparatus of the trade union was on the side of the Stalinist state every time the workers put forward their demands. That is why they took the initiative into their own hands. Without waiting for instructions from above, the workers united, held meetings and directly chose the time and place of the struggle.

General demands were formulated and put forward at mass meetings. A strike committee was formed. However, in the beginning, economic demands were in the foreground.

The workers were extremely determined. They did not want a repeat of the violent suppression of struggles as in 1970 and 1976. In the industrial center of Gdańsk-Gdynia-Sopot, the Inter-Factory Strike Committee (IZK) was created. 400 delegates were elected, two from each enterprise. In the second half of August there were between 800 and 1000 delegates. Every day general meetings were held at the Lenin shipyard. Loudspeakers were installed so that everyone could follow the discussion in the strike committee and negotiations with government representatives. Microphones were then installed outside the MZK meeting room so that workers during the general meeting could directly intervene in the committee's discussions. In the evening, the delegates (many of them recording the debates on tape) returned to their workplaces and made reports to general meetings of their factories.

These funds were used to ensure that the largest number of workers could take a direct part in the struggle. Delegates were responsible to the general meetings and could be recalled at any time. All these methods were directly opposed to the methods of the trade unions.

While the workers of Gdańsk-Gdynia-Sopot organized themselves into general meetings, the movement spread to other cities. To sabotage the establishment of communications between workers in different regions of the country, the government cut off telephone communications on August 16. In response, the workers threatened to expand the strike, and the authorities were forced to concede, restoring communications.

Then the general meetings decided to create workers' squads. Alcohol consumption is quite common in Poland, but a collective decision was made to ban its use at meetings. The workers understood that in their confrontation with the government they needed a clear mind.

When the government threatened reprisals against Gdansk, Lublin railway workers warned that if their classmates were physically attacked, and if even one worker was harmed, they would close the strategically most important route connecting Russia with East Germany.

Workers were mobilized in almost all the main cities of the country. It became clear to more than half a million of them that they were the only force capable of resisting the authorities. And they knew where their strength lay:

In the rapid spread of the movement, and not in a closed struggle that wears out, as in 1970 and 1976;

In self-organization, in the ability to take the initiative into one’s own hands, and not rely on trade unions;

In the creation of general assemblies, within the framework of which they could unite their forces, exercise collective control over the movement and organize the most massive participation in negotiations with the government in front of all comrades.

Expansion of the movement was the best weapon and manifestation of solidarity. The workers did not limit themselves to declarations of support for their comrades, but took the initiative and joined the struggle. This made it possible to dramatically change the balance of power. As long as the workers remained united and waged mass struggle, the authorities could not use repression against them. During the summer strikes, when workers remained united, not a single worker was physically harmed. The Polish bourgeoisie understood that it was dangerous to use repression in such a situation, so it was decided to weaken the working class from within.

The bourgeoisie's answer: isolation

The danger to other governments posed by the workers' struggle in Poland can be judged by the reaction of neighboring countries.

The borders between Poland and East Germany, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union were immediately closed. And the bourgeoisie had good reasons for such a step! In Czechoslovakia, in the coal mining region near the city of Ostrava, miners, following the Polish example, also went on strike. Labor unrest also began in Romanian mining regions and in the Russian city of Tolyatti. And although there were no strikes in direct solidarity with workers from Poland in Western Europe, the proletarians of many countries raised the slogans of their Polish class comrades. In Turin, Italy, in September 1980, during a workers' demonstration, one could hear the slogan: “Gdansk sets an example for us!”

How the movement was sabotaged

Although initially the influence of trade unions was insignificant, members of the "free trade unions" blocked the labor struggle willy-nilly.

If at the time of the emergence of the movement the negotiations were open, then it was stated that “specialists” were needed who were able to go into the details of negotiations with the government. After this, most workers could no longer follow the progress of the negotiations, much less take part in them. The loudspeakers stopped broadcasting the debate, their operation was stopped due to “technical” problems. Lech Walesa, a member of the "free" trade union, was crowned the leader of the movement, and the enemy of the workers donned the garb of the "free" trade unions. The new organization began to distort the workers' demands. If at first economic and political class demands were at the top of the list, Lech Walesa and the “free” trade union changed the order, and the main demand was the recognition of independent trade unions, and thus relegated general demands to the background. They acted in line with the old “democratic” tactics: defending the interests of the trade union instead of defending the interests of the workers.

The signing of the agreement in Gdańsk on 31 August showed that the movement was in decline, even if strikes were still ongoing in some other places. The first point of the agreement allowed the activities of a “free and self-governing” trade union, which was called “Solidarity”. Fifteen members of the presidium of the Interfactory Strike Committee made up the leadership of Solidarity.

Although workers understood quite well that official trade unions were part of the state, most of them shared the illusion that the newly formed Solidarity would not be corrupt and would defend the interests of workers. They did not have the experience of Western workers, who had experienced first-hand the anti-proletarian character of “free” trade unions and had been opposing them for decades.

Walesa announced that he wanted to make Poland a second Japan, as a result of which everyone would supposedly prosper. And many workers, due to ignorance of the realities of capitalism in the West, found themselves captive to such illusions. Their example shows the great influence that democratic ideology had on this part of the world proletariat. The "democratic" poison, which had a strong effect in Western countries, was even more powerful in countries like Poland, after several decades of Stalinism. The Polish and world bourgeoisie understood this very well: it was the use of democratic illusions that allowed the bourgeoisie and the Solidarity trade union to pursue anti-worker policies and unleash the repressions that were necessary to suppress the proletarian movement.

In the autumn of 1980, workers went on strike again, opposing the agreements in Gdansk, as they saw their situation worsening, even if they supposedly had a “free” trade union on their side. In this situation, Solidarity showed its true colors. Shortly after the end of the mass strike, Walesa flew everywhere in a military helicopter, calling on workers not to resume strikes and to calm down, since the strikes, according to him, were pushing the country into the abyss.

From its very inception, Solidarity sabotaged the labor movement. Each time, if an opportunity presented itself, it snatched the initiative from the hands of the working people, preventing the start of a new struggle.

In December 1981, the Polish bourgeoisie was finally able to begin open repression against the workers. Solidarity laid the foundation for the political disarmament of the workers. In the summer of 1980, as previously mentioned, not a single worker was harmed by government action because the movement was expanding, workers were self-organized and not under the influence of the union, so they were not restrained and could control the struggle themselves. By the end of 1981 the situation had changed. Self-organization was replaced by a trade union, which slowed down the labor struggle. In December, more than 1,200 workers were killed and tens of thousands were imprisoned or exiled.

Later, the former leader of Solidarity, Lech Walesa, became the President of Poland. Prior to this, he had already established himself as a successful defender of the interests of the Polish state as a trade union leader.

Historical significance of this struggle

Despite the fact that 30 years have passed since then, and many workers who participated in the strike struggle of that time found themselves unemployed or were forced to emigrate in search of a piece of bread, their experience is invaluable for the entire working class. IKT already wrote in 1980 that the struggle in Poland is an important step in the global proletarian struggle, and therefore it is of enormous importance.

Historical events of this magnitude have long-term consequences. The mass strikes in Poland proved conclusively that class struggle could force the bourgeoisie to put aside its aggressive militaristic plans. The struggle of the workers of Poland showed that the proletariat of the Eastern Bloc would not agree to be obedient cannon fodder for the glory of “socialism.” Their resistance, and the resistance of workers in other countries of this bloc, prevented the leadership of the “socialist camp” from solving economic problems through military expansion. These strikes became one of the decisive factors in the collapse of the Eastern imperialist union.

ICT, 01:08:2010

On December 12, 1970, the Polish leadership announced a huge increase in food prices. The next day, the Gdansk Shipyard stopped working, then other enterprises in the city. The Stalinist regime responded with brutal repressions. The state security forces opened fire to kill. On December 16, shots were fired at shipyard workers coming out of gate number 2; on December 17, shots were fired at in the city of Gdynia; on December 18, at shipbuilders going to work, in Elbląg and Szczecin... According to official data, 45 people were killed on the Polish Coast, 1,165 were injured, and arrested there were about 3 thousand. However, this did not end the strikes. After the “December events” there was a change in party and government leadership. Gomulka was replaced by Gierek. The latter was forced to make enormous efforts to force workers to return to work. Just a few years later, all promises made to workers were broken, and in 1976 prices were raised again. The workers responded to this with strikes, which were again suppressed by repression.

They were not, strictly speaking, a trade union, but were a small group of workers associated with the KOR (Committee for the Defense of Workers), created by democratic opposition intellectuals after the 1976 repressions, and called for the legalization of independent trade unions.

Political portraits. Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov Medvedev Roy Alexandrovich

Crisis in Poland. 1980–1981

The economic and political situation in Poland, relatively stable in the 1970s, began to deteriorate suddenly and rapidly from the first months of 1980. In the summer there were strikes at many enterprises in Poland. Particularly alarming to Soviet leaders was the Lublin railway strike, which was called just three weeks before the start of the Moscow Olympics and blocked one of the most important railway lines leading from the GDR to the Soviet Union. Polish leaders, however, tried in every possible way to downplay the scale of the discontent that gripped the country, presenting the strikes in the Lublin Voivodeship as an unfortunate misunderstanding. First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP Edward Terek, going on vacation to Crimea at the end of July, took with him more than 35 representatives of the Polish authorities. According to the testimony of one of the former workers of the CPSU Central Committee, Vladimir Voronkov, the conversation between Brezhnev and Terek in Crimea, both in content and tone, was quite ordinary and did not differ from the previous “Crimean meetings” of these leaders. Terek was only “reproached” for the fact that, when deciding to increase meat prices, Polish leaders did not calculate the possible social consequences and did not organize the necessary explanatory work, which caused short-term strikes. Brezhnev asked Terek not to forget about the growing ideological confrontation between socialism and capitalism in recent years and, hinting at projects of some political reforms being developed in Poland, declared the unacceptability of political pluralism for socialist countries. Unlike Brezhnev, who spent most of the day on the beach and in the sea, Terek rarely went to the sea and looked depressed and gloomy. He did not watch the Western action films so beloved by the owner of the dacha and clearly avoided the usual society and its entertainment here. On the other hand, Terek contacted Warsaw several times a day via HF. The service staff and security could not help but see these oddities in the behavior of the guest and, according to the established procedure here, reported everything to their management. These reports, naturally, went to both Brezhnev and Andropov.

The situation in Poland continued to deteriorate, and the code messages that Yu. Andropov received daily from the KGB resident in Poland, General Vitaly Pavlov, became increasingly alarming. On the evening of August 14, Andropov received a message about the beginning of a strike at the large Gdansk shipyard. Lenin. The Workers' Defense Committee (WDC), which had been formed earlier in Poland, managed to involve the entire 16,000-strong workforce of the enterprise in the strike. The leader of the action was 36-year-old electrician Lech Walesa, a father of six children, a deeply religious Catholic and a gifted speaker. Another ciphergram said that the Polish authorities began to move airborne units to Gdansk. The workers, however, did not give rise to military and police intervention. Their behavior surprised even the Western correspondents who flocked to the coast. “If Marx came to life today,” wrote one journalist, “he would not believe his eyes.” Indeed, angry workers in the socialist country stopped the work of ports, factories and factories along the entire Baltic coast. Moreover, the main form of their behavior was not manifestations and demonstrations, but collective prayers. In Gdansk, thousands of strikers and members of their families, kneeling on both sides of the shipyard. Lenin, prayed and sang psalms in front of a portrait of a Pole, the Pope, decorated with flowers. Terek, who urgently returned to Warsaw, turned to banking consortiums of capitalist countries with a request for new rescue loans.

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the PUWP clearly did not know what to do. The strikes expanded, capturing other cities and provinces; The independent trade union movement “Solidarity” was also quickly formed. It was necessary to make more and more concessions, but the leaders of Solidarity, having won one victory, immediately put forward new demands, including political ones. On August 20 or 21, E. Terek invited his closest associate Stanislaw Kania, Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP, responsible for party control over the security forces of Poland, and the Minister of Internal Affairs of Poland Stanislaw Kowalczyk. Terek asked them to hold a meeting with Lieutenant General V. Pavlov and hint at “the need to strengthen the Soviet military presence in Poland.” When Kani asked what was meant by the word “strengthening,” Terek remarked with irritation: “The Soviet comrades themselves know what it is and how to do it...” The meeting of Kani and Kovalchik with Pavlov took place on the same day, and information about the position and proposals the three most influential figures in the Polish leadership were immediately sent to Moscow. Soviet leaders were concerned, but were in no hurry to respond or make a decision. Some sources contain evidence that L. I. Brezhnev, having read V. Pavlov’s report, remarked: “Russia has not yet fought on two fronts. And he won't fight. We've made a mess, now let them sort it out themselves. And we will look and, if necessary, correct it.”

On August 25, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee formed a special commission of the Central Committee for Poland (the so-called “Suslov commission”). It included M. Suslov, A. Gromyko, Yu. Andropov, D. Ustinov, K. Chernenko, M. Zimyanin, K. Rusakov and a number of other members of the Central Committee. Polish events were thus placed on a par with Afghan events. However, few members of the Politburo thought about the Afghan option for solving Polish problems. On September 5, 1980, the urgently convened VI Plenum of the PUWP Central Committee decided to remove E. Terek from the post of First Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee, electing Stanislav Kania in his place. These changes were presented to the country's public not as a turn in policy, but as a result of the illness of the former leader. Speaking at the plenum, S. Kanya said: “I accept the duties of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP under unusual circumstances. Comrade Terek, who has led our party for the last 10 years, is seriously ill. Due to his illness, this is not the time to evaluate his activities. I am confident that these assessments will be fair... We wish him a speedy recovery.” Stanislav Kanya was not popular in the country, but did not cause irritation in society. Many in Poland said: “Better Kanya than Vanya,” hinting at the danger of Soviet intervention. Solidarity ideologists, however, did not believe in the possibility of Soviet occupation. “I am convinced,” KZR leader Jacek Kuroń wrote in November, “that there will be no intervention... I believe, and I am not alone in this, that an invasion of Poland would be extremely costly for the Russians and that they do not want it at all.” The same was the opinion of the KGB think tanks and Andropov himself. The head of the information and analytical department of the PSU, General N. Leonov, recalled: “Every morning I had to report to the head of intelligence telegrams that we recommended for distribution to members of the Politburo, the secretariat of the Central Committee and departments. One day, when the pile of recommended telegrams included two or three that covered the situation in Poland, Kryuchkov, without looking up from reading, asked: “What do you think, Leonov, will stabilization among the Poles now begin?” I took more air into my lungs and very sadly, although with conviction, said: “No, I think that the opposition won, it won the main thing - the people. And power itself will fall into her hands someday.”

Some time passed, and Andropov invited several people from intelligence for a frank conversation about the situation in Poland. At the table were the head of intelligence, his deputy, who was responsible on the operational line for the work area in Eastern Europe, the head of the corresponding department and two representatives of the information and analytical department, including me... I honestly and frankly outlined our understanding of the situation in Poland, drew attention that my report does not contradict the information that is regularly sent to the Politburo through intelligence. I remember I ended my short speech with the words: “The party and government in Poland are losing control of the situation. If the current trends in the development of the internal political situation continue, an explosion is inevitable, and it could happen in the very near future, measured in a few months.” The conversation took place in the fall of 1980. There was silence at the table. Andropov looked detachedly out the window and asked:

– What do you think power in Poland is based on now?

– Practically on three pillars: party functionaries, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the army. The social base has been thinned to the extreme...

After asking a few more questions, Andropov summed up the conversation in an unexpected way:

– Let’s assume that today we had neither winners nor losers. We need to think about how to stabilize the situation in Poland for a long period, but proceed from the fact that the limit of our interventions abroad has been exhausted.

It couldn't have been clearer. For the participants in that conversation, it became clear that the so-called “Brezhnev Doctrine,” which provided for the use of the armed forces of the USSR to maintain the socialist system in the European countries of the Warsaw Pact, had already died. The Soviet Union no longer had the strength for such operations.”

The General Staff of the Soviet Army was nevertheless preparing a large-scale plan for the occupation of Poland “just in case.” Approximate calculations showed that for the rapid success of such an operation from a purely military point of view, it would be necessary to use at least 30 divisions stationed in the western regions of the country, and part of the troops located in the GDR and Czechoslovakia. These plans did not only exist on paper. From December 8 to December 21, 1980, the largest joint military exercise “Soyuz-80” in the entire history of the socialist community was held in close proximity to the Polish borders. Although the exercises formally ended on December 21, USSR Defense Minister D. Ustinov verbally ordered Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor Kulikov, commander of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, to continue carrying out additional military training tasks. Obviously, the talk was about pressure on the Polish leadership and society.

The Polish opposition responded to this move by the Soviet Union with an impressive demonstration of its influence in the country. A monument to the victims of the regime was erected in Gdansk. Three giant steel crosses decorated with anchors symbolized the victims of the labor unrest of 1956, 1970 and 1976. The anchors symbolized the sea that feeds the workers of the coast, they also recalled the German occupation, when the anchor was a symbol of the Resistance. There were four inscriptions on the monument: a list of victims of the regime, a blessing from Pope John Paul II, a psalm and a stanza from a poem by Czeslaw Milosz, written by him in 1950: “You, who brought pain to the common man, you, who laugh at his pain, you should not feel in safety". Hundreds of thousands of people gathered for the unveiling of the monument on December 16, 1980. The leaders of the PUWP were also invited, and they could not help but come to the ceremony. This is how the special correspondent of the French Le Monde, Bernard Guetta, described this event: “It seems that all of Poland has gathered here in Gdansk thanks to Solidarity... Already twenty times since August, incredible things have happened in the country. And yet, what remains incredible are these three giant steel crosses that seem ineradicable and reach high into the sky to confirm their strength, these words written in gold on the wall of the shipyard: “They gave their lives so that you could live with dignity.” Is it possible to imagine a monument to the victims of 1956 in Budapest, to the victims of the Wall in East Berlin, to the victims of Stalin in the USSR, to the victims of the Slansky trial in Prague? Here history tells the truth, calmly and without hatred. He speaks simply, because a people deprived of history cannot be free, cannot forgive and turn to the future...

At 16.50 representatives of the party, church and trade union appear. Those gathered met with silence the member of the Politburo and the chairman of the State Council, the secretary of the voivodeship committee of the party, the secretary of the Central Committee, the minister of culture and the deputy prime minister. The crowd applauds Lech Walesa, the bishops and the commander of the Polish navy.

At exactly 5 p.m., shipyard sirens sound. It's cold, it's raining. Miners' standards, Our Lady banners and national flags flap in the wind as if in salute. The crowd gathered in front of the monument and on the neighboring streets was cut into even squares by the yellow helmets of shipbuilders mobilized for law enforcement. The orchestra and choir perform a sad, beautiful composition specially composed by Krzysztof Penderecki. Then the roll call of the dead. Actor Daniel Olbrychski, illuminated by spotlights in the night, reads the names of the victims one after another. After each name, the crowd says: “He is with us!”

Relatives of the victims, including a woman shaking in tears, cut the cord holding up the symbolic sail covering the monument. Lech Walesa lights the Eternal Flame, which will burn between three crosses. 17 hours 25 minutes. The ceremony is over."

It was impossible to cope with such a movement. However, both the Central Committee of the PUWP and the Kremlin could not yet understand and accept this. From the very first months of 1981, Solidarity began to rapidly expand its ranks. Solidarity organizations arose not only in cities, but also in villages, in student groups. By February 1981, 11 million Poles, that is, the majority of the country's adult population, had become members of the Solidarity trade union. Essentially, a regime of dual power was formed in Poland, which, of course, could not last long.

Stanislav Kanya not only could not, but also did not want to use force against Solidarity; he was looking for a compromise and was clearly playing a double game in relation to the Kremlin. The Polish Minister of Defense, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, also took part in this game. He admitted this later in memoirs and interviews. “We had to play a kind of double game,” said the general. – It was a difficult game, not without tricks. By the way, the game was two-sided.”

The refusal of military intervention and intervention in Poland did not at all mean that the Soviet leadership had come to terms with the possible loss of Poland as a member of the Warsaw Pact and the socialist community. According to V. Voronkov, in a face-to-face conversation with S. Kanya, Brezhnev said: “If we see that you are being overturned, then we will enter.” An employee of the Polish sector from the CPSU Central Committee, who translated the conversation between the two leaders, told V. Voronkov about this. Stanislav Kanya also wrote about this phrase in his memoirs, although in a different edition. “Okay,” said Brezhnev. – We will not send troops. But if the situation becomes complicated, we will enter. But we won’t go in without you.” Kanya admits that the last words puzzled him greatly. The Politburo Commission on Poland created a special working group at the level of its deputies, which developed a plan for total pressure on the Polish leadership and society. This political and ideological pressure was expressed in the form of constant telephone calls and meetings in Moscow and Warsaw. Mikhail Suslov spent several days in Poland and the Secretary of the Central Committee Mikhail Zimyanin spent several weeks. Letters were sent from Moscow to friends about the threat to socialism and about the “intrigues of imperialism” in Poland. These letters were addressed to the leadership of communist and workers' parties in other countries. The Polish leadership also knew about these messages. The Polish economy was heavily dependent on trade and supplies from the USSR and on Soviet loans. The country especially needed Soviet foreign currency loans. Under the Terek regime, the debt to the West increased many times, and now there were not enough funds to pay interest. This gave the Soviet Union important levers of economic pressure on Poland. Moscow has its own saying: “No need for tanks, just banks.” Military pressure was also applied almost continuously. Back in January 1981, it was decided to hold large command and staff exercises in Poland in the spring. Reporting on this at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, D. Ustinov said: “We plan to conduct maneuvers in Poland in March. It seems to me that these maneuvers should be raised somewhat, that is, in other words, make it clear that we have forces at the ready.”

My memories of the events of 1980–1981. Not only E. Terek, S. Kanya and W. Jaruzelski were left in Poland, but also the KGB resident in Warsaw, Lieutenant General V. G. Pavlov. Vitaly Pavlov’s book “I Was a KGB Resident in Poland” was published in Polish back in 1994. In Russia in 1998, V. Pavlov’s book “Leaders of Poland through the Eyes of an Intelligence Officer” appeared in bookstores. The authors of these memoirs are not always unanimous in their assessments; one can often find different versions about certain events. However, all participants or witnesses to the Polish crisis of 1980–1981 note the low activity in the “Suslov Commission” of both Suslov himself and Gromyko and, on the contrary, the greater activity of Andropov and Ustinov. According to V. Pavlov, in the late autumn and winter of 1980/81, Andropov called him in Warsaw almost every day. Several times Pavlov was called to Andropov for a report, and also as an intermediary during meetings of the KGB Chairman with the Ministers of Internal Affairs of Poland: first with Stanislav Kowalczyk, then with Miroslav Milevsky, and from August 1981 with Czeslaw Kiszczak. Andropov treated these Polish ministers differently. For example, he was irritated by the lack of professionalism and political shortsightedness of S. Kowalczyk, who had headed the Polish police and security agencies since 1973 and was considered a close ally of E. Terek. “I had the opportunity,” writes Pavlov, “to witness several meetings between S. Kovalchik and the Chairman of the KGB. In the process, S. Kovalchik gave very limited, shallow political assessments of the situation in the country and turned out to be completely helpless in the field of professional characterization of ensuring the state security of the country.

At the same time, I saw that he had great respect for Yu.V. Andropov and his statements. And since the Chairman, through government information, was very well versed in Polish problems, his recommendations, expressed in a very tactful manner, were important for S. Kowalczyk, and through him, E. Terek. At the same time, after each conversation with S. Kovalchik, the Chairman of the KGB asked me in bewilderment why the Polish minister had not understood the affairs and tasks of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and remained so ignorant of the specifics of activities to ensure state security?

My answer boiled down to the fact that this is happening because S. Kovalchik in the real sense is not a political figure, but a simple party worker, and at a low government level. He was a good assistant and executor for E. Terek in Katowice, and remained so in Warsaw, as a minister.” Andropov was also not a professional intelligence officer or counterintelligence agent. However, explaining to Pavlov his position and his responsibility, he once said: “Since I was appointed to head such a department, everything else is my competence. I act as I see fit. If I don’t do what I need to do, they will replace me, but no one should take care of me, much less tell me what and how to do.”

Miroslav Milevsky, according to Pavlov, was not only a skilled politician, but also the most trained professional who had previously led Polish foreign intelligence. But Czeslaw Kiszczak, who took the post of Minister of Internal Affairs in August 1981, was also an experienced professional who worked for many years in military counterintelligence. The main topic in Andropov's conversations With Polish ministers asked about their attitude towards the leaders of the Polish opposition. We know that Andropov did not favor dissidents in the Soviet Union, but he tried to avoid mass repressions by using various forms of pressure on the opposition. He “taught” this to his Polish colleagues. General V. Pavlov testifies: “At the beginning of August 1981, I accompanied Ch. Kishchak during his visit to Yu. Andropov to establish personal contact as a minister. Then a very detailed conversation took place between the Chairman of the KGB and the new Minister of Internal Affairs of the People's Republic of Poland. Ch. Kishchak spoke in detail about the situation that had arisen in the country by this time and shared his plans in the event of the introduction of martial law. After listening to the minister, Andropov gave him the same recommendations that he had already made when meeting with M. Milevsky as Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs six months earlier: not to follow the path of mass repression.

“We must approach this,” he said, “very carefully. Arrest one hundred people and you will immediately create many hundreds of enemies from among their family members and close friends. It is better to subtly remove the “key figures”. At the same time, Yu. V. Andropov gave an example from his observations of the work of timber raftsmen in Karelia. When there was a log jam on the river, the rafters carefully selected the “key” log and deftly pulled it out. And that’s it, many hundreds of other logs began to dissolve and the jam was cleared. This is how,” Andropov said, “it’s better to act.” Don’t get carried away with the numbers, because the more people you arrest, the more noise there will be in the West.”

The topic of the opposition in Poland and its “key figures” also dominated the Soviet-Polish summit, which took place on March 4, 1981, immediately after the end of the 26th Congress of the CPSU. The entire Polish party delegation, led by Kania and Jaruzelski, was present at this meeting. On the Soviet side there were Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko and Ustinov. The conversation lasted more than two hours and at times was in a raised voice. V.I. Voronkov later recalled: “I had the opportunity to witness this meeting. It struck me not so much with its content - the leaders of the CPSU expressed their complaints unchanged from meeting to meeting - but with the aggressive, rude unceremoniousness of the Soviet masters. Kania and Jaruzelski were scolded in turn as guilty schoolchildren, clearly trying to intimidate them. They were accused of allowing the creation of a mass anti-communist party in Poland, of allowing Solidarity to attract the working class into its ranks, of losing power as a result of the “rotten” policy of compromise with the “class enemy”, of not listening to “advice” "Moscow. At some point in the conversation, a clearly overexcited Ustinov jumped up from his seat, leaned over the table towards Kanya and, breaking into a scream, began to ask menacingly: “Comrade Kanya, how long are you going to deceive us? Why do Kuron, Michnik, Buyak travel around the country and not sit where they should - in prison? Why do you condone Western interference in your internal affairs? Our patience is running out! We have someone to rely on in Poland! You have two weeks to restore order in Poland!”

Kanya clearly did not expect such pressure. He turned noticeably pale, but did not lose his composure. Having immediately assured Brezhnev that he would imprison these gentlemen tomorrow, immediately upon returning to Warsaw, and thereby knocking out the most serious accusations against him, he began to present his thoughts on the situation in Poland in a rather monotonous and lengthy manner. The intensity of the conversation had clearly faded; Kanya played like a skilled psychologist.” Kanya, of course, could not fulfill his promise, and did not try. Although Solidarity actually served as an opposition political party, claiming power in the country, formally it was a legal trade union, with which the country’s authorities had already entered into several agreements. Solidarity included more than one million members of the PUWP. Moreover, about 20% of the members of the Central Committee of the PUWP were also members of this trade union. Lenin wrote in 1920 that communists should work even in reactionary trade unions and, in general, always be where the masses are. Solidarity actively supported the church - from the Polish cardinal to the Pope. In Poland this circumstance could not be ignored. Moreover, it was not Kuron or Bujak who played the main role in the workers' opposition of 1981. The leader and symbol of the opposition was Lech Walesa.

The opposition movement in Poland hardly affected the Polish army, which enjoyed traditional and great respect. There were no noticeable fluctuations in other power structures. This circumstance suggested that martial law could be introduced in Poland without the intervention of the Soviet armed forces. Some preparations were made for this. Back in February 1981, the Polish Sejm approved General W. Jaruzelski as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Poland. The general retained the post of Minister of National Defense, which allowed him to concentrate greater power in his hands. The new prime minister instructed the heads of the security forces to complete the development of a joint action plan in the shortest possible time in the event of a state of emergency being introduced in the country. However, there was no consensus on this matter in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the PUWP. The Central Committee of the PUWP had several groups, each of which enjoyed significant influence in the country and in the party. Analysts from the CPSU Central Committee classified as “revisionists”, people ideologically close to Solidarity, a group of members of the PUWP Central Committee, headed by Mieczyslaw Rakovski, editor-in-chief of the magazine “Politics” - the organ of the PUWP Central Committee. Kania and Jaruzelski were classified as “centrists,” people committed to both socialism and nationalism, who believed that “a Pole will always be able to come to an agreement with another Pole.” In Moscow, such activists of the PUWP as S. Kociolok and S. Olshovsky were classified as principled communists, loyal internationalists, or “leftists.” At the head of this group in 1981 was Tadeusz Grabski, an experienced economist and recent factory director from the Katowice Voivodeship. However, the “leftists” from the PUWP did not enjoy any significant influence in the country. Even within the party itself, only a few tens of thousands of people supported them. For a party that had 3 million 70 thousand members and candidates at the end of 1980, this was very little.

Regarding the support of the Politburo. Who can it rely on? Their army is 400 thousand people, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 100 thousand and reservists - 300 thousand, thus 800 thousand people. But it must be said that between Kanya and Jaruzelski there are many differences in views on certain issues. Comrade Jaruzelski again expressed a request for his release from the post of prime minister. We popularly explained to him that it is necessary to remain in this post and fulfill the duties assigned to him with dignity...”

There is no need to write here about all the meetings and negotiations between Soviet and Polish leaders that took place in May, June-July, and August. The IX Extraordinary Congress of the PUWP, held in July 1981, weakened the representation of the “left” or “healthy forces” in the party leadership and, on the contrary, increased the influence of “opportunists” and “revisionists”. The economic and social situation worsened. Hunger marches took place in cities across the country, including Warsaw, and a warning strike in Poland on August 5 involved 60% of all day shift workers. The First Congress of the independent trade union “Solidarity” was scheduled for September. The day before, it was announced that large-scale exercises of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states would begin on the territory of Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states, in close proximity to the Polish border. The action was carried out under the name “West-81”, it was personally led by Marshal of the USSR D. Ustinov. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers took part in the exercises, a lot of equipment, and tanks and artillery in many cases fired live shells. The defense ministers of Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia acted as observers. But Ustinov paid the most attention to Jaruzelski.

After the Solidarity congress, hostility towards S. Kane in the Kremlin grew so much that the issue of his removal was discussed almost openly in both Moscow and Warsaw. On October 18, 1981, Kanya was relieved of his duties as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP. This decision was by no means unanimous. About 100 members of the Central Committee of the PUWP voted for Kani’s resignation, and about 80 voted against it. General W. Jaruzelski was elected first secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP. All state power in Poland was now concentrated in the hands of a popular general in the country. However, Jaruzelski was not only a communist and internationalist, but also a Polish patriot, and he clearly did not intend to unconditionally carry out all the instructions of Moscow. The situation around Poland was discussed at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on October 29. All members of the Politburo spoke in favor of increasing political and economic pressure on Poland, but were against military intervention; Yu. Andropov, in particular, said: “Polish leaders are talking about military assistance from fraternal countries. However, we need to stick to our line - not to send our troops into Poland.” The next day, at a meeting of the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense, D. Ustinov also stated: “Under no circumstances, even if the Polish leadership asks, will we send Soviet and other troops into Poland.” This did not prevent the Allied Forces headquarters from conducting another military-tactical exercise in November on Polish territory at the Zhigansky training ground and scheduling a new large military exercise for December 24, also on Polish territory.

The political and economic situation in Poland in November 1981 continued to become more complicated. In addition to the official protests of the Soviet authorities regarding various kinds of demonstrative actions of Solidarity, unofficial but very harsh messages were also sent to Jaruzelski with reproaches for conniving at “anti-Sovietism” and almost “betraying the cause of socialism.” However, there was no frankness on either side. Jaruzelski's request to send one of the members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee to Poland was rejected. When asked by Jaruzelski whether Poland could count on military assistance from the Soviet Union if the situation in the country became critical, Brezhnev did not give a clear answer. Grocery stores in Poland were empty; only vinegar was available in abundance. Products were issued on cards, but not in a complete set. The junction was approaching. On December 10, another Politburo meeting was held in Moscow to discuss Polish problems. Speaking at this meeting, Yu. Andropov said: “I would like to say that our position, as it was formulated at the last meeting of the Politburo and previously expressed repeatedly by Leonid Ilyich, is absolutely correct and we should not deviate from it. In other words, we take the position of international assistance, we are concerned about the current situation in Poland, but as for carrying out Operation X, this must entirely be the decision of the Polish comrades, as they decide, so be it. We will not insist on this and we will not dissuade... If Comrade Kulikov really said about sending troops, then I think he did it wrong. We can't take risks. We do not intend to send troops into Poland. This is the correct position, and we need to adhere to it to the end. I don’t know what the situation will be with Poland, but even if Poland is under the rule of Solidarity, it will be one thing. And if capitalist countries fall on the Soviet Union, and they already have a corresponding agreement with various kinds of economic and political sanctions, then it will be very difficult for us. We must take care of our country and the strengthening of the Soviet Union. This is our main line... We can tell the Poles that we treat Polish events with understanding. This is a well-established formulation, and there is no reason for us to change it. At the same time, we will have to somehow extinguish the mood of Jaruzelski and other Polish leaders regarding the introduction of troops. There can be no entry of troops into Poland. I think that we can instruct our ambassador to visit Jaruzelski and inform him about this.”

After a sleepless night from December 11 to 12, 1981 and a meeting with the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army, General Florian Sawicki and the Minister of Internal Affairs of the People's Republic of Poland C. Kiszczak, Jaruzelski decided to introduce martial law in the country. Jaruzelski's speech on this occasion took place on the night of December 13th.

By all criteria for such actions, the actions of the security forces in Poland were fast and effective. Almost all Solidarity leaders were detained and interned in the first hours of martial law. The crisis of power was overcome, but only for a few years. In 1989, Solidarity won the parliamentary elections, and in December 1990, L. Walesa was replaced as President of the Republic of Poland by W. Jaruzelski, who, as far as can be judged, retained the authority and respect of the Polish people.

In connection with the publication of his book “Martial Law. Why..." Wojciech Jaruzelski said in an interview with the Polish weekly Przeględ Tygodnowy: "If I had not decided to introduce martial law in December 1981, then a Soviet armed intervention would have taken place. This is already a proven fact. The PPR leadership took this forced and dramatic step because it considered it expedient to solve the internal Polish problem on its own.” Having admitted the great guilt of the leadership he led (and noting that it should not fall entirely on his shoulders), Jaruzelski noted: “By introducing martial law in the country, I wanted first of all to save it from disaster, from Soviet armed intervention, to protect the beginning of economic reforms who were making their way in Poland in those years.” We see today from previously secret documents of the CPSU Central Committee that the Soviet leadership did not intend to occupy Poland even if Solidarity had seized power. However, based on the behavior and statements of Soviet leaders, a completely different conclusion could be drawn in 1981, and Jaruzelski was sincerely convinced that he was saving the country from a bloody conflict with unpredictable consequences. Before him was the lesson of Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968 and Afghanistan 1979. But Soviet leaders also remembered these lessons.

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In the mid-70s, an economic recession began, coinciding with the aggravation of the problem of external debt, in terms of the magnitude of which Poland was ahead of all socialist countries. This led to a severe financial and economic crisis in Poland in the 1980s. There were difficulties with food. Rumors of government corruption spread, affecting Edward Gierek himself.

The national currency depreciated. Protest demonstrations led by the Solidarity movement took place in the country. Managers of industrial enterprises and local authorities began to simply bide their time, awaiting developments. Meanwhile, the country's economy was collapsing. Products were now sold to the population using ration cards. General Wojciech Jaruzelski was forced in December 1981 to introduce martial law in the country, which remained in effect until July 1983.

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When Poland transitioned to a market economy, it was a country in which 18% of GDP was produced by the private sector of the economy (counting cooperatives - 28%). The cooperatives were not the same as in the USSR during the period of perestroika, but much more stable, having already existed for many years and having real experience of working, albeit in preferential, but still market conditions. At that time, about a quarter of the country's economy was completely market and was ready for economic reforms. Polish economist J. Rostovsky recalled that in the 80s of the last century, about 35-45% of Poles’ income began to come from income received from private economic activity.

At the end of the 80s, the country's budget did not allow for an increase in pensions and salaries for civil servants, and they remained at a low level. The bulk of budget revenues went to servicing the huge external debt, which during the 80s approximately doubled, exceeding a total of $41 billion. And this does not count the debt of 5.6 billion transferable rubles to the USSR.

As a result, the Rakovsky government allowed at the end of 1988 the “transfer into private hands” of state-owned enterprises. And those who participated in this received various kinds of benefits, and as a result, literally a year (before the start of the post-communist stage of reforms), the number of joint-stock companies in the country increased sharply. The new private sector soon played an important role in accelerating the country's economic development. The communist elite lost its political illusions and was forced to take a realistic look at the current situation in the country. The communists did not have the strength to save the economy from collapse, and this made them politically unviable.

Poland emerged from the crisis by taking the following measures:

Price liberalization;

State permission for private access to all areas of economic activity (January 1989 - January 1990);

Introducing new budget restrictions on state-owned enterprises and reducing inflation to the level of a normal economy through fiscal and monetary policies, as well as attracting new budget revenues (January 1990);

Measures to increase the convertibility of the national currency for current account transactions and eliminate controls on foreign trade (January 1990).

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With growing business confidence in the country's financial stability, it ensured an influx of foreign investment. The fall of the zloty already in 1992 was replaced by a steady growth of the national currency, and since 1995, the annual influx of investment into the country began to be measured in double digits.



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