The textbook deals with international events of our day, indicating the transition of humanity to a new world order. Global transformations and upheavals occurring in all spheres of public life are raising new questions of international politics. The authors of the textbook are convinced that today it is no longer enough to consider it as the interaction of states, interstate alliances and the clash of interests of great powers. The unhindered expansion of information and migration flows covering the world, the diversification of trade, sociocultural and other exchanges, and the massive invasion of non-state actors are inevitably changing our views on international relations. But do these changes mean that international relations are giving way to world politics? The change in the role of the state and the structure of national sovereignty in no way indicates their disappearance, therefore world politics should be considered in unity with international relations.
Step 1. Select books from the catalog and click the “Buy” button;
Step 2. Go to the “Cart” section;
Step 3. Specify the required quantity, fill in the data in the Recipient and Delivery blocks;
Step 4. Click the “Proceed to Payment” button.
At the moment, it is possible to purchase printed books, electronic access or books as a gift to the library on the ELS website only with 100% advance payment. After payment, you will be given access to the full text of the textbook within the Electronic Library or we will begin preparing an order for you at the printing house.
Attention! Please do not change your payment method for orders. If you have already chosen a payment method and failed to complete the payment, you must re-place your order and pay for it using another convenient method.
You can pay for your order using one of the following methods:
- Cashless method:
- Bank card: you must fill out all fields of the form. Some banks ask you to confirm the payment - for this, an SMS code will be sent to your phone number.
- Online banking: banks cooperating with the payment service will offer their own form to fill out. Please enter the data correctly in all fields.
For example, for " class="text-primary">Sberbank Online Mobile phone number and email are required. For " class="text-primary">Alfa Bank You will need a login to the Alfa-Click service and an email. - Electronic wallet: if you have a Yandex wallet or Qiwi Wallet, you can pay for your order through them. To do this, select the appropriate payment method and fill out the fields provided, then the system will redirect you to a page to confirm the invoice.
The most established provisions and conclusions of the world international political science are generalized and systematized; its basic concepts and the most famous theoretical directions are given; gives an idea of the current state of this discipline in our country and abroad. Particular attention is paid to the globalization of world development, changes in the nature of threats to international security, and the characteristics of the new generation of conflicts. For students of higher educational institutions studying in the areas and specialties of “International Relations”, “Regions”, “Public Relations”, “Sociology”, “Political Science”, as well as undergraduates, graduate students and university teachers.
Preface Chapter 1. Object and subject of international political science Chapter 2. The problem of method in the theory of international relations Chapter 3. The problem of patterns of international relations Chapter 4. Traditions, paradigms and disputes in international relations Chapter 5. Modern schools and directions in the theory of international relations Chapter 6 International system Chapter 7. Environment of the system of international relations Chapter 8. Participants in international relations Chapter 9. Goals, means and strategies of participants in international relations Chapter 10. National interests: concept, structure, methodological and political role Chapter 11. International security Chapter 12. Problem legal regulation of international relations Chapter 13. The ethical dimension of international relations Chapter 14. Conflicts in international relations Chapter 15. International cooperation Chapter 16. Social foundations of international order Instead of a conclusion Appendix 1. Some international principles, doctrines, theories. International organizations, treaties and agreements Appendix 2. Internet resources devoted to research in the field of international relations (A.B. Tsrugitt) Name index Subject index
The above diversity has greatly complicated the problem of classifying modern theories of international relations, which in itself becomes a problem of scientific research.
There are many classifications of modern trends in the science of international relations, which is explained by differences in the criteria that can be used by one or another author.
Thus, some of them are based on geographical criteria, highlighting Anglo-Saxon concepts, Soviet and Chinese understanding of international relations, as well as the approach to their study of authors representing the “Third World” (8)
Others build this typology on the basis of the degree of generality of the theories under consideration, distinguishing, for example, global explicative theories (such as political realism and the philosophy of history) and particular hypotheses and methods (including the behaviorist school) (9) Within the framework of such a typology, the Swiss author Philip Briar considers political realism, historical sociology and the Marxist-Leninist concept of international relations to be general theories. As for private theories, among them are: the theory of international actors (Baghat Quran); theory of interactions within international systems (George Modelski, Samir Amin; Karl Kaiser); theories of strategy, conflict and peace studies (Luce-en Poirier, David Singer, Johan Galtwig); integration theories (Amitai Etzioni; Karl Deutsch); theories of international organization (Inis Claude; Jean Siotis; Ernst Haas) (10)
Still others believe that the main dividing line will be the method used by one or another researcher, and, from this point of view, the main attention is paid to the controversy between representatives of the traditional and “scientific” approaches to the analysis of international relations (11,12)
The fourth are based on identifying the central problems characteristic of a particular theory, highlighting the main and turning points in the development of science (13)
Finally, the fifth ones rely on complex criteria. Thus, the Canadian scientist Bagat Korani builds a typology of theories of international relations on the basis of the methods they use (“classical” and “modernist”) and the conceptual vision of the world (“liberal-pluralistic” and “materialistic”).
Examples of various classifications of modern theories of international relations could be continued. Do not forget that it is important to note at least three significant circumstances. First of all, any of such classifications is conditional and is not able to exhaust the diversity of theoretical views and methodological approaches to the analysis of international relations1. Secondly, this diversity does not mean that modern theories have managed to overcome the “blood relationship” with the three main paradigms discussed above. Finally, thirdly, contrary to the contrary opinion that is still encountered today, there is every reason to talk about an emerging synthesis, mutual enrichment, and mutual “compromise” between previously irreconcilable directions.
Based on the above, we will limit ourselves to a brief consideration of such trends (and their varieties) as political idealism, political realism, modernism, transnationalism and neo-Marxism.
“However, they do not set themselves such a goal. Their goal is different - to understand the state and theoretical level achieved by the science of international relations, by summarizing the existing conceptual approaches and comparing them with what has been done previously.
The legacy of Thucydes, Machiavelli, Hobbes, de Do not forget that Watgel and Clausewitz, on the one hand, Vitoria, Greece, Kant, on the other, were directly reflected in the major scientific debate that arose in the USA in the period between the two -The first wars, discussions between realists and idealists. | Idealism in the modern science of international relations also has closer ideological and theoretical sources, such as utopian socialism, liberalism and pacifism of the 19th century. Its main premise is the belief in the necessity and possibility of ending world wars and armed conflicts between states through legal regulation and democratization of international relations, the extension of norms of morality and justice to them. According to this direction, the world community of democratic states, with the support and pressure from public opinion, is quite capable of resolving conflicts that arise between its members peacefully, using legal methods regulation, increasing the number and role of international organizations that promote the expansion of mutually beneficial cooperation and exchange.It is important to note that one of its priority topics is the creation of a collective security system based on voluntary disarmament and mutual renunciation of war as an instrument of international politics. In political practice, idealism found its embodiment in the program for the creation of the League of Nations developed after the First World War by American President Woodrow Wilson (17), in the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), which provided for the renunciation of the use of force in interstate relations, as well as in the Stimson Doctrine (1932), according to which the United States refuses diplomatic recognition of any change if it is achieved through force. In the post-war years, the idealistic tradition found a certain embodiment in the activities of such American politicians as Secretary of State John F. Dulles and Secretary of State Zbigniew Brzezinski (representing, however, not only the political, but also the academic elite of this country), President Jimmy Carter (1976-1980) and President George W. Bush (1988-1992) In the scientific literature, it was represented, in particular, by the book of such American authors as R. Clark and L.B. Dream "Achieving peace through world law." The book proposes a project in stages -
"Sometimes this direction is qualified as utopianism (see, for example: Carg E.N. The Twenty Years of Crisis, 1919-1939. London. 1956.
th disarmament and creation of a system of collective security for the whole world for the period 1960-1980.
It is worth noting that the main instrument for overcoming wars and achieving eternal peace between nations should be a world government, led by the UN and acting on the basis of a detailed world constitution (18). Similar ideas are expressed in a number of works by European authors (19) The idea of a world government was also expressed in papal encyclicals: John XXIII - "Pacem interns" or 04/16/63, Paul VI - "Populorum progressio" from 03/26/67, as well as John Paul II - from 12/2/80, who even today advocates the creation of "political power vested universal competence."
Thus, the idealistic paradigm that has accompanied the history of international relations for centuries retains a certain influence on minds today. Moreover, we can say that in recent years its influence on certain aspects of theoretical analysis and forecasting in the field of international relations has even increased, becoming the basis for practical steps taken by the world community to democratize and humanize these relations, as well as attempts to form a new, consciously regulated world order that meets the common interests of all mankind.
With all this, it should be noted that idealism for a long time (and in some respects to this day1) was considered to have lost all influence and, in any case, to be hopelessly behind the demands of modernity. Indeed, the normative approach that underlies it turned out to be deeply undermined due to the growing tension in Europe in the 1930s, the aggressive policies of fascism and the collapse of the League of Nations, and the outbreak of the world conflict of 1939-1945. and the Cold War in subsequent years. The result was the revival on American soil of the European classical tradition with its inherent advancement to the forefront in the analysis of international relations of such concepts as “strength” and “balance of power,” “national interest” and “conflict.”
It is worth saying that political realism not only subjected idealism to crushing criticism, pointing out, in particular, the fact that the idealistic illusions of statesmen of that time
“In most textbooks on international relations published in the West, idealism as an independent theoretical direction is either not considered or serves as nothing more than a “critical background” in the analysis of political realism and other theoretical directions.
I contributed to a large extent to the outbreak of the Second World War, but also proposed a fairly coherent theory. Its most famous representatives - Reinhold Niebuhr, Frederick Schumann, George Kennan, George Schwarzenberger, Kenneth Thompson, Henry Kissinger, Edward Carr, Arnold Wolfers and others - determined the path of the science of international relations for a long time. The undisputed leaders of this trend were Hans Morgenthau and Raymond Aron.
1 The work of G. Morgenthau “It is worth saying - political relations between nations. The struggle for power,” the first edition of which was published in |48, became a kind of “bible” for many generations (D||political scientists both in the USA itself and in other countries ""JSffaaa. From the position of G. Morgenthau, international relations / are an arena of acute confrontation between states. The basis of all international activities of the latter lies in their desire to increase their power, or strength (power) and reduce the power of others. In this case, the term “power” is understood in the broadest sense: as the military and economic power of the state, the guarantee of its greatest security and prosperity, glory and prestige, the opportunity to spread its ideological principles and spiritual values. Two main ways in which the state secures power for itself, and at the same time two complementary aspects of its foreign policy - military strategy and diplomacy. The first of them is interpreted in the spirit of Clausewitz: as the continuation of politics by violent means. Diplomacy, on the contrary, is a peaceful struggle for power. Let us note the fact that in the modern era, says G. Morgenthau, states express their need for power in terms of “national interest.” The result of each state’s desire to maximally satisfy their national interests will be the establishment on the world stage of a certain equilibrium (balance) of power (strength), which will be the only realistic way to ensure and maintain peace. Actually, the state of the world is the state of balance of power between states.
According to Morgenthau, there are two factors that are capable of keeping states' aspirations for power within some framework - international law and morality. At the same time, to trust them too much in an effort to ensure peace between states would mean falling into the unforgivable illusions of the idealistic school. The problem of war and peace has no chance of being resolved through collective security mechanisms or
through the UN. Projects for harmonizing national interests through the creation of a world community or a world state are also utopian. The only way to hope to avoid a global nuclear war is to renew diplomacy.
In this concept, G. Morgenthau proceeds from six principles of political realism, which he substantiates at the very beginning of his book (20). In a brief summary, they look like this.
1. It is worth saying that politics, like society as a whole, is governed by objective laws, the roots of which are in the eternal and unchanging human nature. Therefore, it is possible to create a rational theory that is able to reflect these laws - although only relatively and partially. It is this theory that makes it possible to separate the objective truth in international politics from subjective judgments about it.
2. The main indicator of political realism is “the concept of interest expressed in terms of power.” It is worth noting that it provides a link between the mind seeking to understand international politics and the facts to be known. It is worth noting that it allows us to understand politics as an independent sphere of human life, not related to the data, aesthetic, economic or religious spheres. Note that this concept allows us to avoid two mistakes. First of all, judgments about the interest of a politician are based on motives, and not on the basis of his behavior. And, secondly, deducing the interest of a politician from his ideological or moral preferences, and not from his “official duties.”
It is worth saying that political realism includes not only a theoretical, but also a normative element: it insists on the need for rational politics. Rational policy is the right policy, since it minimizes risks and maximizes benefits. At the same time, the rationality of a policy also depends on its moral and practical goals.
3. The content of the concept of “interest expressed in terms of power” will not change. It is important to understand that it depends on the political and cultural context in which the formation of the state’s international policy takes place. This also applies to the concepts of “power” and “political balance”, as well as to such an initial concept designating the main character of international politics as the “nation-state”.
It is worth saying that political realism differs from all other theoretical schools primarily in the fundamental question of how to change
modern world. He is convinced that such a change can only be brought about through the skillful use of objective laws that have operated in the past and will operate in the future, and not by subordinating political reality to some abstract ideal that refuses to recognize such laws.
4. It is worth saying that political realism recognizes the moral significance of political action. But at the same time he is aware of the existence of an inevitable contradiction between the moral imperative and the requirements of successful political action. The main moral requirements cannot be applied to the activities of the state as abstract and universal norms. It is worth noting that they must be considered in the specific circumstances of place and time. The state cannot say: “Let the world perish, but justice must triumph!” It is worth noting that it cannot afford suicide. Therefore, the highest moral virtue in international politics is moderation and caution.
5. It is worth saying that political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of any nation with universal moral norms. It is important to note that it is one thing to know that nations are subject to moral law in their politics, and quite another to claim to know what is good and what is bad in international relations.
6. Note that the theory of political realism is based on a pluralistic concept of human nature. A real person is both an “economic man”, and a “moral man”, and a “religious man”, etc. Only a “political man” is like an animal, since he has no “moral brakes”. Only a “moral man” is a fool, because... he lacks caution. Only
*PeJEDi^^fe^yLchelovekom"> can be exceptionally holy, because he has^y^Yn^^desires.
^Tryingly, political realism defends the relative autonomy of these aspects and insists that the knowledge of each of them requires abstraction from the others and occurs in its own terms.
As we will see from the further presentation, not all of the above principles, formulated by the founder of the theory of political realism, G. Morgenthau, are unconditionally shared by other adherents - and, even more so, opponents - of this direction. With all this, his conceptual harmony, the desire to rely on objective laws of social development, the desire for an impartial and strict analysis
the lysis of international reality, different from abstract ideals and the fruitless and dangerous illusions based on them - all contributed to expanding the influence and authority of political realism both in the academic environment and in the circles of statesmen in various countries.
At the same time, political realism has not become the undivided dominant paradigm in the science of international relations. Its transformation into a central link, cementing the beginning of a unified theory, was hampered from the very beginning by its serious shortcomings.
The fact is that, based on the understanding of international relations as a “natural state” of forceful confrontation for the possession of power, political realism, in essence, reduces these relations to interstate ones, which significantly impoverishes their understanding. Moreover, the domestic and foreign policies of the state, in the interpretation of political realists, look like they are not connected with each other, and the states themselves - like a kind of interchangeable mechanical bodies, with an identical reaction to external influences. The only difference is that some states will be strong and others will be weak. It is not without reason that one of the influential adherents of political realism, A. Wolfers, built a picture of international relations, comparing the interaction of states on the world stage with the collision of balls on a billiard table (21) Absolutization of the role of force and underestimation of the importance of other factors, such as spiritual values, sociocultural reality, etc., significantly impoverishes the analysis of international relations and reduces the degree of its reliability. This is all the more true since the content of such key concepts for the theory of political realism as “power” and “national interest” remains quite vague in it, giving rise to debate and ambiguous interpretation. Finally, in this desire to rely on the eternal and unchanging objective laws of international interaction, political realism has essentially become a hostage to its own approach. They did not take into account very important trends and changes that have already occurred, which increasingly determine the nature of modern international relations from those that dominated the international arena until the beginning of the 20th century. It is important to note that at the same time one more circumstance was missed: the fact that these changes require the use, along with traditional ones, of new methods and means of scientific analysis of international relations. Everything ϶ᴛᴏ caused criticism in hell
more political realism on the part of adherents of other sub-khovs, and, above all, on the part of representatives of the so-called modernist movement and diverse theories of interdependence and integration. It would not be an exaggeration to say that this polemic, which actually accompanied the theory of political realism from its first steps, contributed to an increasing awareness of the need to complement the political analysis of international realities with a sociological one.
Representatives of ^modernism*, or the “scientific” trend in the analysis of international relations, most often without touching the initial postulates of political realism, sharply criticized its adherence to traditional methods based mainly on intuition and theoretical interpretation. It is worth saying that the polemic between “modernists” and “traditionalists” reaches a special intensity starting from the 60s, receiving in the scientific literature the name “new great dispute” (see, for example: 12 and 22). The source of this dispute was the persistent the desire of a number of researchers of the new generation (Quincy Wright, Morton Caplan, Karl Deutsch, David Singer, Kalevi Holsti, Ernst Haas and many others) to overcome the shortcomings of the classical approach and give the study of international relations a truly scientific status. Hence the increased attention to the use of mathematics, formalization, modeling, data collection and processing, empirical verification of results, as well as other research procedures borrowed from the exact disciplines and contrasted with traditional methods based on the researcher’s intuition, judgments by analogy, etc. . This approach, which arose in the United States, affected the study of not only international relations, but also other spheres of social reality, being an expression of the penetration into the social sciences of a broader trend of positivism that arose on European soil back in the 19th century.
Indeed, even Sey-Simon and O. Comte made an attempt to apply strict scientific methods to the study of social phenomena. The presence of a solid empirical tradition, methods already tested in such disciplines as sociology or psychology, and a developing technical base that gives researchers new means of analysis, prompted American scientists, starting with C. Wright, to strive to use all this knowledge in the study of international relations. Such a desire was accompanied by a rejection of a priori judgments regarding the influence of certain factors on the nature of inter-
international relations, denying both any “metaphysical prejudices” and conclusions based, like Marxism, on deterministic hypotheses. At the same time, as M. Merle emphasizes (see: 16, pp. 91-92), this approach does not mean that one can do without a global explanatory hypothesis. The study of natural phenomena has developed two opposing models, between which specialists in the field of social sciences hesitate.
From one point of view, Charles Darwin's teaching about the ruthless struggle of species and the law of natural selection and its Marxist interpretation are the same. On the other hand, there is the organic philosophy of G. Spencer, which is based on the concept of constancy and stability of biological and social phenomena. Positivism in the USA followed the second path - the path of likening society to a living organism, whose life is based on the differentiation and coordination of its various functions. From this point of view, the study of international relations, like any other type of social relations, should begin with an analysis of the functions performed by their participants, then moving on to the study of interactions between their carriers and, finally, to problems associated with the adaptation of the social organism to his surroundings. In the heritage of organicism, M. Merle believes, two trends can be distinguished. It is important to note that one of them focuses on the study of the behavior of actors, the other on the articulation of various types of such behavior. Accordingly, the first gave rise to behaviorism, and the second to functionalism and the systems approach in the science of international relations (see: ibid., p. 93)
Having been a reaction to the shortcomings of traditional methods of studying international relations used in the theory of political realism, modernism did not become any homogeneous movement - neither in theoretical nor in methodological terms. What it has in common will be mainly a commitment to an interdisciplinary approach, a desire to apply rigorous scientific methods and procedures, and to increase the number of verifiable empirical data. Its shortcomings consist in the actual denial of the specifics of international relations, the fragmentation of specific research objects, which determines the virtual absence of a holistic picture of international relations, and the inability to avoid subjectivity. Let us note that, nevertheless, many studies by adherents of the modernist trend turned out to be very fruitful, enriching science not only with new techniques, but also very significantly
our conclusions drawn on their basis. We should not forget that it is also important to note the fact that they opened up the prospect of a microsociological paradigm in the study of international relations.
If the debate between adherents of modernism and political realism concerned mainly methods of studying international relations, then representatives of transnationalism (Robert O. Koohane, Joseph Nye), theories of integration (David Mitrany) and interdependence (Ernst Haas, David Mo-urs) criticized the very conceptual foundations of the classical school. At the center of the new “great dispute” that flared up in the late 60s and early 70s was the role of the state as a participant in international relations, the importance of national interest and strength for understanding the essence of what is happening on the world stage.
Supporters of various theoretical movements, which can be conditionally called "transnationalists", put forward a common idea, according to which political realism and the etiotic paradigm are not the character and main trends of international relations and therefore should be discarded. International relations go far beyond interstate interactions based on national interests and power confrontation. The state, as an international actor, is deprived of its monopoly. In addition to states, individuals, enterprises, organizations, and other non-state associations take part in international relations. The diversity of participants, types (cultural and scientific cooperation, economic exchanges, etc.) and “channels” (partnerships between universities, religious organizations, communities and associations, etc.) of interaction between them, displaces the state from the center of international communication , contribute to the transformation of such communication from “international” (i.e. interstate, if we recall the given logical meaning of this term) into “transnational* (i.e. carried out in addition to and without the participation of states) “Rejection of the prevailing intergovernmental approach and the desire to go beyond interstate interactions led us to think in terms of transnational relations,” American scientists J. Nye and R. Koohei write in the preface to their book “Transnational Relations and World Politics.”
Revolutionary changes in the technology of communications and transport, transformation of the situation in world markets, growth in the number
and the importance of transnational corporations have stimulated the emergence of new trends on the world stage. The predominant ones are: the rapid growth of world trade compared to world production, the penetration of modernization processes, urbanization and the development of means of communication into developing countries, the strengthening of the international role of small states and private entities, and finally, the reduction in the ability of great powers to control the state of the environment. The general consequence and expression of all these processes will be an increase in the interdependence of the world and a relative decrease in the role of force in international relations (23) Supporters of transnationalism1 are often inclined to consider the sphere of transnational relations as a kind of international society, to the analysis of which the same methods are applicable that make it possible to understand and explain the processes occurring in any social organism. Based on all of the above, we come to the conclusion that, in essence, we are talking about a macrosociological paradigm in the approach to the study of international relations.
Transnationalism has contributed to the awareness of a number of new phenomena in international relations, which is why many provisions of this trend continue to be developed by its supporters in the 90s. (24) At the same time, it was marked by its undoubted ideological kinship with classical idealism with its inherent tendencies to overestimate the actual significance of the observed trends in changing the nature of international relations. A certain similarity between the provisions put forward by transnationalism and a number of provisions defended by the neo-Marxist movement in the science of international relations will also be noticeable.
Representatives of neo-Marxism (It is worth saying - Paul Baran, It is worth saying - Paul Sweezy, Samir Amin, Arjiri Immanuel, Immanuel Do not forget that Wallerstein, etc.) - a movement as heterogeneous as transnationalism, is also united by the idea of the integrity of the world community and a certain utopianism in assessing its future. At the same time, the starting point and basis of their conceptual constructions is the idea of the asymmetrical interdependence of modern
“Among them we can name not only many scientists from the USA, Europe, and other regions of the world, but also well-known political figures - for example, such as former French President V. Giscard d'Estaing, influential non-governmental political organizations and research centers - for example. Palme Commission, Brandt Commission, Club of Rome, etc.
of the new world and, moreover, about the real dependence of economically underdeveloped countries on industrial states, about the exploitation and robbery of the former by the latter. Based on certain theses of classical Marxism, neo-Marxists imagine the space of international relations in the form of a global empire, the periphery of which remains under the yoke of the center even after the earlier colonial countries gained political independence. This will result in inequality of economic exchanges and uneven development (25)
For example, the “center”, within which about 80% of all world economic transactions are carried out, depends for its development on the raw materials and resources of the “periphery”. At the same time, the countries of the periphery will be consumers of industrial and other products produced outside them. Let us note that in this way they become dependent on the center, becoming victims of unequal economic exchange, fluctuations in world prices for raw materials and economic assistance from developed countries. Therefore, ultimately, “economic growth based on integration into the world market is underdeveloped development (tm)” (26)
In the seventies, a similar approach to the consideration of international relations became the basis for the Third World countries for the idea of the need to establish a new world economic order. Under pressure from these countries, which constitute the majority of member countries of the United Nations, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration and Program of Action in April 1974, and in December of the same year the Charter on the Economic Rights and Responsibilities of States.
Thus, each of the considered theoretical movements has its strengths and weaknesses, each demonstrates certain aspects of reality and finds one or another manifestation in the practice of international relations. It is worth saying that the polemics between them contributed to their mutual enrichment, and, consequently, to the enrichment of the science of international relations as a whole. With all this, it cannot be denied that this controversy did not convince the scientific community of the superiority of any one over the others, nor did it lead to their synthesis. Both of these conclusions can be illustrated using the concept of neorealism as an example.
The term itself demonstrates the desire of a number of American scientists (Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, Joseph Greiko, etc.) to preserve the advantages of the classical tradition and at the same time
namely, to enrich it, taking into account new international realities and the achievements of other theoretical movements. It is significant that one of the longest-standing proponents of transnationalism, Koohane, in the 80s. comes to the conclusion that the central concepts of political realism - “power”, “national interest”, rational behavior, etc. - remain an important means and condition for a fruitful analysis of international relations (27) On the other hand, K. Walz speaks of the need to enrich the realistic approach due to the scientific rigor of the data and the empirical verifiability of the conclusions, the need for which was traditionally rejected by supporters of the traditional view.
The emergence of the school of neorealism in International Relations is associated with the publication of the book by K. Waltz “Note that the theory of international politics”, the first edition of which was published in 1979 (28) Defending the main provisions of political realism (the “natural state” of international relations, rationality in the actions of the main actors, national interest as their main motive, the desire to possess power), its author at the same time criticizes their predecessors for the failure of attempts to create a theory of international politics as an autonomous discipline. He criticizes Hans Morgenthau for identifying foreign policy with international politics, and Raymond Aron for his skepticism regarding the possibility of creating International Relations as an independent theory.
Insisting that any theory of international relations should be based not on particulars, but on the integrity of the world, taking as its starting point the existence of a global system, and not the states that will be its elements, Walz takes a certain step towards rapprochement with transnationalists.
At the same time, the systemic nature of international relations is determined, according to K. Waltz, not by the actors interacting here, not by their inherent main features (related to geographic location, demographic potential, socio-cultural specifics, etc.), but by the properties of the structure of the international system . (For this reason, neorealism is often qualified as structural realism or simply structuralism.) Being a consequence of the interactions of international actors, the structure of the international system at the same time does not amount to a simple sum of such interactions, but represents
is an independent phenomenon capable of imposing certain restrictions on states, or, on the contrary, offering them favorable opportunities on the world stage.
It should be emphasized that, according to neorealism, the structural properties of the international system do not actually depend on any efforts of small and medium-sized states, being the result of interactions between great powers. This means that they are precisely the “natural state” of international relations. As for the interactions between the great powers and other states, they can no longer be characterized as anarchic, since they take on other forms, which most often depend on the will of the great powers.
It is important to note that one of the followers of structuralism, Barry Bazan, developed its main provisions in relation to regional systems, which he considers as intermediate between the global international and state systems (29). The most important feature of regional systems will, from his point of view, be a complex security. The point is that neighboring states are so closely connected with each other in security matters that the national security of one of them cannot be separated from the national security of others.
It is worth noting that the basis of the structure of any regional subsystem is made up of two factors, discussed in detail by the author:
distribution of opportunities between existing actors and relations of friendliness or hostility between them. In this case, both one and the other, B. Bazan shows, are subject to manipulation by the great powers.
Using the methodology proposed in this way, the Danish researcher M. Mozaffari used it as the basis for analyzing the structural changes that occurred in the Persian Gulf as a result of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait and the subsequent defeat of Iraq by allied (and essentially American) troops (30) As a result, he came to the conclusion about the operationality of structuralism, about its advantages compared to other theoretical directions. With all this, Mozaffari also shows the weaknesses inherent in neorealism, among which he names the provisions on the eternity and immutability of such characteristics of the international system as its “natural state”, the balance of power as a way of stabilization, its inherent static nature (see: ibid., p 81)
due to its own advantages than to the heterogeneity and weakness of any other theory. And the desire to maintain maximum continuity with the classical school means that most of its inherent shortcomings remain the lot of neorealism (see: 14, pp. 300, 302). An even more severe sentence is passed by the French authors M.-C. Smooey and B. Badie, according to their theories of international relations, remaining captive of the Western-centric approach, were unable to reflect the radical changes taking place in the world system, as well as “predict neither accelerated decolonization in the post-war period, nor the outbreak of religious fundamentalism, nor the end of the Cold War , nor the collapse of the Soviet empire. In short, nothing that relates to sinful social reality" (31)
Dissatisfaction with the state and capabilities of the science of international relations has become one of the main motivations for the creation and improvement of a relatively autonomous discipline - the sociology of international relations. The most consistent efforts in this direction have been made by French scientists.
Russian theory
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
WHAT SHOULD SHE BE?*
A.P. Tsygankov
We, Russians, have not done anything for humanity precisely because we do not have, or at least did not have, a Russian view.
K.S. Aksakov
There is a need to turn to the study of reality in all its contradictions and the creation of our own theory, which would cease to see deviations and pathology in local features that cannot be accommodated in Western schemes.
Introduction
The Russian science of international relations is entering a special period of its development. For more than twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet state, a significant path has been passed, a rich array of empirical and theoretical material has been mastered, a number of interesting concepts and approaches have been developed* 1. At the same time, in the development of Russian international studies, considerable problems have also emerged related to those characteristic of the stage of formation of scientific research. discipline with ideological and material difficulties. Empirical research is still developing sluggishly, while theoretical work suffers from excessive abstraction. The general crisis of the system of social sciences in Russia, partly associated with the collapse of the Marxist paradigm, says
* A significant part of the ideas in the article is discussed in detail in: .
1 The development of Russian international studies was analyzed in more detail in: , .
HELL. Bogaturov
also on the development of international research. The world has changed significantly, leaving behind the period of unipolar globalization and revealing a whole series of new economic, political and ethnocultural fault lines2. Are we ready to comprehend it? Do we have the necessary methodological and theoretical tools for this? Are Russian international affairs experts able to respond to the new challenges of the time?
This article proposes to comprehend new world realities along the paths of development of the Russian theory of international relations (RTIR). At a turning point in global development, theory could take the initiative in identifying the most important areas of empirical analysis and foreign policy practice. Unfortunately, RTMO is still in the process of formation, often being torn apart
2 A detailed analysis of new phenomena in international relations was undertaken in Russia in recent works: , .
MATERIALS FOR DISCUSSION
contradictions and struggle between mutually exclusive approaches. Among Russian international theorists, representatives of universalist and isolationist thinking have emerged. If the former believe that the main thing is to integrate as quickly as possible into the Western professional community of international affairs, the latter view this path as disastrous, seeing in it a rejection of their own value system and calling for intellectual autarky. The well-known dispute between Westerners and Pochvenniks is reflected in the discussion of the ways of development of RTMO.
In inviting the reader to discuss possible ways of developing RTMO, I proceed from the need to overcome these extremes. In part, such an overcoming would be possible as a result of narrowing the gap between the teaching of international relations (IR) and Russian political thought that has developed in Russian university practice. While political scientists and philosophers study the history of political thought, including domestic thought, international experts most often take courses on the basics of Western theory of international relations. These areas need each other for further development, but are separated into different departments and faculties. The development of international studies in Russia requires a deep knowledge of one's own intellectual roots, which is impossible without studying Russian thought. Without movement in this direction, the normal discussion between Westerners and soil scientists for the development of RTMO will gravitate towards excessive ideological
66 COMPARATIVE POLITICS 2 (15) / 2014
logization, complicating the development of theory. If the indicated gap is overcome, then in Russia, over time, conditions could arise for the formation of a national school in the global TMO. Such a school would arise at the intersection of international relations and the history of Russian thought.
In development of this idea, the article examines the trends of Westernization and ethnocentrism in the global TMO, as well as the essence of a new theoretical dispute about the possibility of forming a universal theory of knowledge of the world. Against this global background, I propose to consider the issue of the formation of RTMO, the growth points of which I see in the ways of turning to the traditions of Russian thought. In criticizing universalist positions, I in no way want to be understood as an isolationist. The danger of isolationism, although it has weakened over the last twenty years, has not yet been overcome, as evidenced by the actively developing conspiracy theories and pseudoscientific research outside academic structures. At best, the isolationist trend will delay the already protracted development of answers to questions about Russian identity and the related development of RTMO. At worst, it will return us to dogmatism that stifles creative thought.
It is obvious to me that any TMO can develop fruitfully only in the process of active dialogue between Russian researchers and their colleagues in Western and non-Western countries. I hope that it is in the course of such a dialogue that the originality of Russian thought will emerge, for, as Vladimir Solovyov wrote, “we inevitably impose
MATERIALS FOR DISCUSSION
our national imprint on everything we do." I also hope that, while reflecting on their contribution to the global intellectual community, Russian theorists will not forget about their responsibility for shaping the desired image of the future of the country and the world as a whole. After all, any social theory presupposes not only an analysis of facts, but also the creative construction of an image of society with its characteristic system of meanings and values.
Westernization and ethnocentrism in TMO
Social cognition has long occupied the minds of social scientists. Discussions on this topic ebb and flow periodically, reflecting the ambivalence of belief in the universality and progressive growth of knowledge. In the twentieth century, discussions began with theorists of the so-called “logical positivism,” formulated by the followers of the Vienna Circle in Europe. The next major stage was the correction of logical positivism by Karl Popper with his “critical rationalism” and the desire to change the principles of testing scientific knowledge. The founder of critical rationalism, in particular, argued that knowledge cannot be scientific if it is formulated as non-falsifiable, i.e. unless principles and conditions are proposed under which the previous hypothesis will be considered invalid. Then came the time of Thomas Kuhn's "scientific revolutions". Kuhn made a strict distinction between “normal science” and scientific revolutions and pointed out the need to understand the social group conditions that dictate
those who transition from one “paradigm” of normal science to another. Thus, the researcher came closer than his predecessors to the principles of the sociology of knowledge, a number of which were formulated in Europe long before him by Karl Mannheim and Max Weber.
According to the latter, the interpretation of social knowledge does not exclude, but presupposes an understanding of the sociocultural features of its formation. Discussions on the methodology of scientific knowledge continue, but most representatives of the international affairs community agree with the principle of social conditioning of knowledge. Today, few people believe in the scientistic principles of “logical positivism” formulated within the Vienna Circle. And positivism itself has become more complex and interesting, going far beyond the limits of “logical positivism” and generally accepting criticism of the theory of absolute and universal truth. Social science is not and cannot be free from ideology in the sense in which sociologists Mannheim and Weber understood it following Karl Marx. Being part of public consciousness, social science actively reproduces and produces national ideologies and myths. Social sciences cannot completely free themselves from these myths, although it is impossible not to strive for this.
Due to the indicated dependence of cognition on the characteristics of the cultural and ideological context, many social theories are ethnocentric at their core. In anthropology and sociology, ethnocentrism is used
COMPARATIVE POLITICS 2 (15) / 2014
MATERIALS FOR DISCUSSION
usually defined as a belief in the “natural” superiority of one’s own culture in relation to others3. Ethnocentric theory protects the values of one's culture and is based on the moral superiority of one cultural community over others. In this case, others are perceived as insufficiently civilized and posing a potential threat. Experts in the development of science, including social science, have come to the conclusion that such a belief is formed in the course of historical development and is rooted in the institutional, social and civilizational structures of society. Less ethnocentric theories define “their” moral values as open to revaluation, rather than absolute and unchangeable. At the same time, they view alternative communities not so much as a threat, but as a source of new knowledge.
Theories of international relations are also not free from ethnocentrism and are often based on the rigid assumptions of the culture that gave rise to them. As the American political scientist Stanley Hoffman rightly noted, international relations is an “American social science,” reflecting and theoretically consolidating the vision of the world through the prism of Western civilization. The British internationalist Edward Carr expressed himself even more categorically, defining Western science of international relations as “the best way to govern the world from a position of strength.” It is obvious that no science is outside of time.
3 A good review of the literature is contained in: .
68 COMPARATIVE POLITICS 2 (15) / 2014
nor space. The Western understanding of international relations was formulated in relation to the realities of Western civilization and is not necessarily applicable to the rest of the world. In a world represented by the diversity of cultural, ethnic, religious and regional traditions, it is generally difficult to imagine a unified understanding of international relations.
It is no coincidence that many theories developed within the Western intellectual tradition are poorly suited to explain events occurring outside a given part of the world. Let us recall, for example, that an attempt to introduce the theory of “shock therapy” as a model of the transition to a market economy in Russian conditions ended with the recognition of the need for its (at least) modification. Widespread theories of democratic transition also turned out to be far from universal and demonstrated the need to adapt to non-Western sociocultural conditions. Experts remember that a similar fate befell the theory of modernization. Finally, the theory of democratic peace is also ethnocentric. According to this theory, democracies do not fight each other. However, the social roots of democracy may differ and do not always contribute to the establishment of peace. Thus, some of the democratizing regimes of Eurasia turned out to be militaristic, including in relation to each other.
Not all theories of international relations are equally ethnocentric, but all are, in one way or another, a reflection of national character and social
MATERIALS FOR DISCUSSION
cultural specifics of the country and cannot be mechanically transferred to another cultural soil. Therefore, the prospects for creating a kind of global international theory remain vague, because national cultural differences have not disappeared and continue to determine the behavior of participants in world politics. Consequently, the most important question for international experts is not only the question of whether international theory is possible, but also the question of its national cultural identity and the possibility of developing such a theory outside the Western “center.” If international theory is unable to formulate universally valid laws of behavior in world politics, then such a theory can strive to solve a more modest task - identifying national-cultural characteristics and traditions in the world system, based on the understanding of such a system as global-pluralistic, and not globally -universalist.
New theoretical debate: is our knowledge about the world universal?
In light of the above, the recent and ongoing debate in the theory of international relations is of particular interest. Its meaning is connected both with criticism of the ethnocentrism of Western theory and with clarifying the question of whether a universal theory of social knowledge about the world is possible. This dispute is a continuation and logical development of the already existing disputes in the TMO.
The previous debates can be summarized as a movement from polemics among Western experts to a gradual
connecting representatives of the critical movement and scientists working outside the Western region to the theory of international relations. In the first third of the twentieth century. A discussion actively developed between idealists who advocated the prohibition of wars through international law and realists who denied such a possibility. In the middle of the century, the discussion about the principles of world order was supplemented by a dispute about research methodology. Many international experts have become believers in modernist or quantitative methods of collecting and analyzing information about the world. In this dispute, modernists were opposed by traditionalists, or supporters of traditional historical and legal approaches. Finally, in the last third of the century, representatives of the critical and poststructuralist movement became more active, attacking the mainstream for its conservatism and inability to rethink international relations in connection with the emergence and development of new social movements in the world. Postmodernists, feminists, Marxists and others have questioned the traditional rationalist-oriented TMO and its methods of understanding the processes taking place in the world. In the 1980s The response to the challenge of poststructuralism in Europe and the United States was the emergence of a constructivist movement that began to study social norms, ideas and identities4.
At the beginning of the twentieth! V. the groundwork of representatives of the post-structuralist direction
4 On disputes in the theory of international relations, see: .
COMPARATIVE POLITICS 2 (15) / 2014
MATERIALS FOR DISCUSSION
These developments have made it possible for scholars to question the monopoly of Western knowledge of international relations. Already in the last quarter of the twentieth century, through the efforts of Hayward Alker and his followers, the question of political hegemony and intellectual provincialism of American theories of IR was acutely raised. Later, these efforts led to the activation of supporters of the pluralization of processes of cognition of the world. Arlene Tickner, Ole Waver, and David Blaney, who teach international relations at Columbia, Continental Europe, and the United States respectively, have initiated a series of books on the development of TIR in various parts of the world. Hélène Pelerin edited a French-language book on overcoming Anglo-American centrism in international relations. John Hobson published an important book analyzing the colonial Eurocentrism of Western theories of international relations. In addition, among IR theorists there has been increased interest in the problems of civilization, civilizational identity and their influence on the formation of views about the world.
The new dispute in theory is unfolding against the backdrop of growing changes in the socio-political practice of international relations. Like any other debate in the social sciences, the debate about overcoming Westernization and the Western colonial legacy is difficult to understand without understanding its social roots. The roots of this dispute should be sought in the gradual emergence of a new world order, which is based on the collapse of the unipolar world.
70 COMPARATIVE POLITICS 2 (15) / 2014
significant dominance in the world of the United States and Western civilization in general. This process, begun by the terrorist attack of Islamic radicals by al-Qaeda in September 2001, was continued by the rise of China and other non-Western powers, which undermined the economic dominance of the West, and was expressed both in the material weakening of Western civilization and the steady decline of its monopoly on the use of force in world. First, the Russian-Georgian armed conflict, and then the civil war in Syria, demonstrated the inability of the United States and its allies to limit the use of force by others (including against close partners), as well as to mobilize for its use in the face of opposition from Russia, China and other major powers
Against this socio-political background, a debate is developing between new supporters of universal knowledge about the world and defenders of a pluralistic vision of the world and TMO. Universalists proceed from the ontological unity of the world, which requires the formation of uniform rational standards for its comprehension. Representatives of the liberal and realist trends in the Western TMO believe that a global peace has taken place, with common principles of behavior of states and the settlement of international disputes characteristic of it. For liberals, we are talking about the formation of international institutions, while realists focus on the military-power dimension of the world order and the leading role of the United States in maintaining an optimal international balance of power for the West. But both of them are convinced that
MATERIALS FOR DISCUSSION
the unity of the world implies the unity of the principles of its knowledge, and ontological universalism must be complemented by epistemological universalism. As for the attempts of China and other non-Western cultures to form their own approaches or schools of TMT, they are seen as untenable, since they question the principles of the universality of scientific knowledge (analysis, verification, etc.) and, therefore, tend to self-isolate. For example, American researcher Jack Snyder expressed his readiness to study Confucianism as a necessity for understanding Chinese strategic culture, but denied him the right to act as the philosophical basis of a special Chinese school in TMO.
Attempts to formulate alternative schools of theorizing are criticized not only by Western realists and liberals, but also by some representatives of the poststructuralist trend in TMR. Not being supporters of Westernization and Western-type universalism, they nevertheless speak out in defense of the same unified principles of scientific verification, doubting the productivity of both the formation of national schools in TMR and the very dialogue of “Western” and “non-Western” approaches. For example, for the British researcher Kimberly Hutchins, the very opposition of the “Western” to the “non-Western” excludes the possibility of dialogue and, as a result, is unable to give anything except endless mutual criticism, new opposition and strengthening of provincialism.
As for the critics of the global universalist vision, they re-
accept the pluralization of TMO as a natural reflection of the pluralization of the world itself with its diversity of power, social and cultural relations. The roots of this position are not difficult to identify in the works of representatives of various directions of social and international political thought. Thus, some representatives of the realist school, like the already cited Carr, believe that knowledge is not free from politics, but, on the contrary, is included in the system of power relations in the world. Consequently, the objectivity of knowledge is hampered by the inequality of the parties, and claims to universalism in fact tend to consolidate the power interests and positions of the strong. Proponents of Frankfurt critical theory, like Jürgen Habermas, go even further, considering progressive theory as the basis for the social and political transformation of society. As for the already mentioned representatives of the sociology of knowledge, the analysis of the sociocultural boundaries of universalism and the social context of the functioning of ideas remains immutable for them. Finally, theorists working in the postcolonial tradition see in the desire for universalism an inability to understand the Other and a desire to dominate him5 * *.
Does this mean that critics of universalism refuse to participate in the formation of a unified TMO? Some of them will probably be prepared to make statements like Friedrich Nietzsche and the representatives of French postmodernism, according to which not only
5 A more detailed analysis of the literature contains
lives in: .
COMPARATIVE POLITICS 2 (15) / 2014
MATERIALS FOR DISCUSSION
God, but the author also died, which means that the texts no longer carry any meaning. Some will speak out in favor of the impossibility of unified knowledge, pointing to the age-old confrontation between great powers in world politics. However, many continue to assume the importance of maintaining the overall TME as a fundamental scientific reference point. For them, a global-pluralistic vision of the world not only does not exclude, but also presupposes the desire for common epistemological guidelines, however, the presence of a dialogue of different approaches is perceived as an indispensable condition for such aspiration. It is also necessary to be aware that there are many serious obstacles on the path to the formation of a unified TMO, which include, in particular, narrowed standards of rationality and epistemology. Recent studies by TMR methodologists have shown that the very understanding of science in IR should be significantly expanded6. There are also proposals to expand epistemological boundaries, going beyond the boundaries of academic social science and showing openness to various philosophical research aimed at producing knowledge about the world.
Does RTMO exist?7
The debate about the nature of knowledge about the world continues among the Russians.
6 American researcher Patrick Jackson identified the functioning of four scientific traditions: neopositivism, critical realism, reflexivism and analyticism, see: .
7 In this section I draw in part on a survey I conducted of Russian international theorists. The survey results will be presented in more detail in a separate article.
72 COMPARATIVE POLITICS 2 (15) / 2014
Russian IR theorists. Today we can talk about the formation of two polar positions.
Firstly, in Russian discussions the voices of universalists are clearly heard, whose position is close to the position of Western supporters of a globally universal TMR, already described above. Critically assessing the state of Russian science of international relations, Russian universalists associate it with insufficiently active efforts to connect to global science. Some of them consider the stage of mastering the world experience of studying IR to be largely completed, but at the same time they do not see in Russian research the diversity and discussions necessary for theoretical development, complaining about the dominance of realist and geopolitical approaches. The majority is convinced that the development of world experience is still ahead, because only integration into the international professional community can lead Russian science out of the dead ends of isolationist development and attempts to form “our own” theories8. It is not surprising that the attitude of representatives of this group towards the idea of creating a Russian school of IR is negative. It reveals unsupported ambitions, tendencies towards epistemological isolationism and attempts to exert ideological pressure on science, similar to the Soviet one.
Secondly, there is an isolationist streak in Russian academic and political discussions.
8 A. Makarychev’s response to the survey questionnaire. Published with permission of the author.
MATERIALS FOR DISCUSSION
a position that is the object of criticism from universalists. We are talking about those representatives of Russian thought inside and outside the academic community who remain convinced that everything Russia needs for its intellectual development has basically already been created, and mainly by the Russians themselves. We have already written about the tendency towards isolationism in Russian IR science, rooted in the Russian superiority/inferiority complex. In the Russian intellectual community there are many who are convinced both of their possession of the truth and of the need to develop purely Russian science in order to the importance of confronting the “hostile” West. It is curious that, while rejecting Western post-structuralist approaches as alien to the Eurasian and Orthodox values of Russia, representatives of this group actively borrow Western traditionalist geopolitical theories. A recent example of the creativity of representatives of this group is the recent book “International Relations” by the founder of the neo-Eurasian direction of Russian geopolitics, Alexander Dugin. The author of the book demonstrates knowledge of various directions of TMO, however, in constructing his theory of a multipolar world, he relies on Samuel Huntington, Zbigniew Brzezinski and other traditionalist theorists of geopolitical and geocultural thought.
The identified positions are polar opposites, not fully covering the essence of the problem that RTMO faces.
Over a twenty-year period of development, Russian international theorists have proposed and developed a number of original approaches and concepts in understanding world trends and foreign policy9. Therefore, it is legitimate to say that today RTMO has emerged as a scientific direction. At the same time, the serious difficulties that this direction is experiencing in its development are also obvious. It is difficult to disagree with universalists that these difficulties are partly related to the still weak integration of Russian scientists into the global community of international relations specialists. This topic has many intellectual, institutional and financial facets, each of which must be seriously discussed. But it is also necessary to recognize that intellectual adaptation to the conditions of the global world is unlikely to be successful without mobilizing one’s own traditions of social thinking. Russian international affairs specialists should pay attention to Russia's own and long-developing roots of thinking about peace. This aspect of the problem deserves special mention, especially since its solution is unlikely to require the mobilization of significant financial resources.
It seems to me that over the past few centuries Russia has developed a huge, albeit scattered, body of theoretical knowledge, which may well become the basis for the formation of a Russian school in TMO. From a historical point of view, RTMO
9 For more details, see: .
COMPARATIVE POLITICS 2 (15) / 2014 73
MATERIALS FOR DISCUSSION
has already developed as a system of thinking about the world. This situation falls under the definition of TMO, which was proposed at one time by Alker and his colleagues and according to which international theory is a system of scientific and culturally rooted ideas and thoughts about the world. Western ideas about the world, which are based on the concept of the absence of a legitimizing center (anarchy), also fall under this definition, however, the theory of anarchy loses the aura of universality given to it by a significant part of Western international experts, while maintaining its significance within this community of scientists. Outside the Western world, variants of international theory of a different nature have developed and continue to develop. It seems that there are no serious grounds to extend beyond the theories of international relations the ideas about the world of Muslim, Orthodox and other theologians and thinkers who place at the center the problem of values and proper behavior. Moreover, these ideas are based not only on social scientists, but also on practicing diplomats and politicians.
As for RTMO, it has developed not one, but three noteworthy traditions of international relations theorists10. Its representatives are oriented, respectively, towards imitation of the West (Westernism), the preservation of independent statehood (power-ism) and an original system of cultural values (Third Ageism). By tradition I mean continuity
10 See more details in: .
74 COMPARATIVE POLITICS 2 (15) / 2014
the diversity of ideas about the development of international relations, developing over several centuries of Russian history. Each of the traditions or schools of thinking has developed its own images of Russia and the world system, which, despite all historical modifications, have retained their internal continuity and differences from each other.
Characteristic, for example, are the differences between the Westerners, the Great Powers and the Third Romans in their understanding of freedom, the state and the world system. Russian Westernism is convinced of the priority value of freedom, which it understands as the liberation of the individual and which it finds in the West, but not in Russia. Convinced of the irresistible desire for individual liberation, Westerners consider Western civilization to be the most developed and viable, and the rest of the world to be developing in the direction of reproducing the basic values of the West. The primary task of the state, therefore, is to create conditions of freedom, promoting the prosperity and development of the individual. Such ideas differ significantly from those formed within the boundaries of two other traditions of Russian international theory - stateism and third-worldism. The sovereigns interpret freedom as political independence, insisting on the priority of a strong and powerful state. Since they perceive the world as an endless struggle for power, the great powers are convinced that without a strong state, Russia will not be able to survive and survive. Finally, for those who see an independent culture and civilization in Russia (Third
MATERIALS FOR DISCUSSION
Rome), all other goals are secondary. Not political freedom and independence, but spiritual liberation should, in their opinion, be considered as the main domestic and international priority.
None of the traditions represented is internally homogeneous, and each develops in controversy with each other and is influenced by various representatives of Western thought. For example, earlier Westernism developed under the influence of Catholic thought, and later, depending on its varieties, under the influence of Charles Montesquieu, Immanuel Kant, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and other European philosophers. The powers that be were also significantly influenced by Western ideas, and many of them admired the European diplomacy of Clemens Metternich and Otto Bismarck, as well as the American diplomacy of Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Even the original Third Roman tradition of Russian thinking was significantly influenced by Western ideas - from German romanticism to American theorists of the pluralism of civilizations.
Today, for the further development of RTMO, the body of theoretical knowledge accumulated by Russian thought should be more actively mobilized.
Necessity
and the possibility of developing RTMO
For the further development of RTMO, new intellectual guidelines, resources and development impulses are needed. First of all, the Russian international affairs community needs a discussion about the need to form
of the national school in the global TMO. Regardless of the results, the very fact of holding such a discussion could be an impetus for the development of RTMO. Russian IR science largely continues to live by borrowing Western theories, without asking the question about the nature and consequences of such borrowing. Meanwhile, the need to learn from the West (and not only from it) does not negate, but presupposes the need to reflect on the possibilities and limits of such borrowing in the interests of preserving the historically formed Russian identity and value system.
The need for further development of the “Russian view” (Aksakov) is determined by a number of features of the geographical, sociocultural and political-economic position of Russia in the world. Firstly, the development of RTMO cannot but be left imprinted by the deep originality of the country, which has become an alloy of a number of characteristics: predominantly Orthodox religion, breadth of space and geopolitical challenges along the perimeter of long land borders, intercivilizational cultural position, pre-Westphalian imperial roots, semi-periphery in system of global economic relations, anti-bourgeoisism of mass social strata and much more. Secondly, the need to develop RTMO is dictated by the realities of global competition. If Carr was right that Western international relations theory teaches the West the art of governing the world from a position of strength, then the development of international theory outside the United States and Europe is
COMPARATIVE POLITICS 2 (15) / 2014
MATERIALS FOR DISCUSSION
an indispensable condition for achieving global political balance. It has long been said that those who do not want to feed their army will feed someone else’s. The reluctance to invest the necessary resources in the development of TMO will inevitably result in Russians losing their independent system of views and values. Such a system has been formed in Russia over the centuries, more than once helping it respond to international challenges. Today, such a challenge is the emergence of a multipolar world. If the Russian leadership claims to make a significant contribution to the formation of this world, then there is no alternative to the formation of a national international theory.
In this regard, two hypotheses can be formulated regarding the development of RTMO and national social science in conditions of increased global information openness. First: the more unique the country’s culture, the more active the efforts of the intellectual class will be to create and develop a national model of soft power and the development of social sciences in order to adapt to the conditions of the global world. Second: the stronger the pressure to borrow foreign cultural ideas (and with them values), the more significant should be the country’s material resources spent on preserving its own intellectual autonomy and resisting the danger of ideological colonization.
It seems that Russia can and should play an important role in the process of forming a global pluralistic theory of international relations. Those who doubt the validity of such a statement may
76 COMPARATIVE POLITICS 2 (15) / 2014
point out that international relations as a teaching subject and scientific discipline has been developing in Russia relatively recently, only since the end of the Cold War, and, therefore, is much less developed than disciplines such as political science, sociology or economics. But the youth of the teaching discipline of international relations does not mean that thinking about the world is something fundamentally new for Russians. These reflections, developed over many centuries, should be considered a cumulative contribution to RTMO. If they do not seem to someone to be completely coherent and systematized, then shouldn’t these reflections be taken as a basis for the development of a national theory of international relations?
The RTMO that is being formed today will have to turn to its Russian roots, which are deep and varied. At the same time, it is important to take into account not only the sociocultural uniqueness of the social sciences, but also the desire to overcome contextual dependence, which is organic for any theory. Any theory is strong in its attempts to rise above the description and identify general trends in the development of the subject. Consequently, it should be developed not only on the basis of national disputes, but also through its constant comparison with the development processes of other schools of international theory. The optimal path for Russia is dialogue with the dominant and critical directions of international theory in the West and East. It is especially important to compare Russian thoughts about the world with Western concepts and theories,
MATERIALS FOR DISCUSSION
since the latter are the most systematized and analytically developed. The development of Western intellectual heritage is the most important condition for the development of Russian social science. Such development has been and will always be a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for the progress of Russian knowledge.
Thus, the path to the formation of Russian international theory largely lies through the reconstruction of intellectual traditions of thinking about the world, starting from the time of the emergence of the Russian state. The presence of such traditions in a state with a thousand-year history is hardly subject to any doubt. Russians have been thinking and arguing for centuries about how to interact with the world, asking questions about national borders, the nature of the Eurasian environment and the system of international relations, the specifics of obtaining knowledge about the world, the nature of violence and the principles of the relationship between man and nature. All these and many other questions relate to the subject of international relations, and therefore, it is quite possible to try to reconstruct the options for understanding them in Russian conditions.
RTMO: image of the desired future
International theory in Russia should be built based on an understanding of the current conditions for the development of the country and the world and what solutions were proposed by Russian thought in similar conditions. Three existing, relatively long-term conditions for global development can be identified. Firstly, this is the political and eco-
nomic instability of the world. Secondly, this is the need for new foreign technologies and investments in the national economy, dictated by the tasks of Russian modernization. Thirdly, the ongoing crisis of Russian identity and the weakening of the system of Russian values. Each of these conditions has been discussed in Russian international theory, with different traditions and schools offering their own ways of responding to them. The powers that be paid attention to the developing system of alliances and poles in the world, the Westerners talked about modernization, and the Third Romans talked about the revival of values. Although a full synthesis of the recommendations of various traditions would be impossible - the conceptual and ideological differences between them are too deep - modern international theory should strive for the most integral understanding of the noted conditions. Only such integration can become a reliable compass for movement in a global world.
In conclusion, I will outline just one of the possible syntheses of various traditions of Russian thinking in order to form an image of the desired global future. From the point of view of the three noted conditions for Russian development, the optimal combination would be a combination of moderate isolationism and pragmatic cooperation with the outside world in order to create conditions for internal modernization and overcome the value crisis. The first two conditions indicate the need for international thought to develop possibilities for creating an inexpensive security system and spheres of global relevance.
COMPARATIVE POLITICS 2 (15) / 2014
MATERIALS FOR DISCUSSION
attracting investment into the Russian economy. The third condition indicates the need to create sufficient material and ideological space for a broad discussion of the issue of values. The question of which of the Russian values should be mobilized and developed in modern conditions for the development of Russia and the world should become central in Russian international theory. I think that in discussing this issue it is important to understand the relative independence of one’s value system from the values of other peoples and civilizations. Russian values and cultural orientations cannot be summarized in the concepts of “West”, “Eurasia”, “Euro-East”, etc. These concepts tend to belittle the cultural purpose of Russia, a country with centuries of experience, a special geopolitical identity and a mission to maintain cultural, civilizational and political balance in the world. It is also obvious that Russian values are deeper than the orientations defined by the elites and relate to the people as a whole, who are the main subject and goal of all reforms and foreign policy initiatives undertaken by the authorities.
At the same time, there is no reason to oppose one system of value orientations to another: in a transcontinental country, such as Russia, Westernism can be combined and even organically combined with fruitful cooperation with other parts of the world system. Russia can move closer to both the West and the East, while remaining Russia. Awareness of oneself as a civilization with an independent system of political
78 COMPARATIVE POLITICS 2 (15) / 2014
economic, historical and cultural values does not mean that Russia does not have common values with other countries and regions. Civilizations not only compete, but also intersect and actively interact with each other. Russia, as a country located at the geographical intersection of the West, East and Asia, has special opportunities for dialogue with others. Value systems can be built at various levels. In some aspects it will be easier for Russia to find a common language with some countries, and in others with others. For example, there will be inevitable friction with Western countries on issues of human rights and liberal democracy, but Russia has much in common with the West in terms of a shared history, culture and desire to create a responsible state. Similar value hierarchies should be built in relations with other countries. In general, the world of values will not resemble the Huntingtonian picture of the clash of civilizations, but a complex picture of their mutual intersection and hierarchical interaction.
In terms of content, Russian values should be formulated not as contradicting the ideals of statism or Westernism, but as making their implementation possible on a broader cultural and civilizational basis. Statehood and the desire for democracy must be integrated into the Russian system of values as necessary, although not sufficient, conditions. Democracy should not be abandoned, but built into its cultural and semantic context and system
MATERIALS FOR DISCUSSION
national priorities. By the way, outside Western countries, democracy plays a significant role, but is rarely at the center of state development. Indeed, along with democracy and the protection of fundamental rights of citizens, the state is obliged to guarantee stability, the implementation of significant social programs and security from external threats.
Over time, based on widespread discussion, a new concept of Russian values will be developed. Bearing in mind what has already been done in Russian original theory, it is obvious that such a concept will take into account the ideas of spiritual freedom, social justice
and transethnic unity. Once formulated, Russian values will not only become a guide to practical action, but will also be written into Russian foreign policy doctrine as subject to protection and dissemination, just as the values of liberal democracy are spelled out in US foreign policy doctrine. Over time, it will become possible to focus not only on upholding, but also actively disseminating Russian values in the world. Without such an orientation, foreign policy is doomed to be ideologically defensive, responding to the challenges of Western and other civilizations.
Bibliography
1. Bogaturov A.D. Ten years of development paradigm / A.D. Bogaturov // Pro et Contra. 2000. T. 5. No. 1. P. 201.
2. Dugin A.G. International relations: paradigms, theories, sociology / A.G. Dugin. M., 2013.
3. Kavelin K.D. Our mental structure / K.D. Kavelin. M., 1989. P. 623.
4. Konyshev V., Sergunin A. Theory of international relations: the eve of a new “great debate”? / V. Konyshev, A. Sergunin // Polis. 2013. No. 2.
5. Lebedeva M.M. Russian research and education in the field of international relations: 20 years later / M.M. Lebedeva. Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). M., 2013. pp. 12-13.
6. Megatrends: The main trajectories of the evolution of the world order in the 21st century. / ed. T.A. Shakleina, A.A. Baykova. M., 2013.
7. Russian science of international relations: new directions / ed. A.P. Tsygankova and P.A. Tsygankova. M., 2005.
8. Modern international relations / ed. A.V. Torkunov. M., 2012.
9. Soloviev V.S. Works: in 2 volumes / V.S. Soloviev. M., 1989. T. 1. P. 297.
10. Tsygankov A., Tsygankov P. Crisis of the idea of a democratic world / A. Tsygankov, P. Tsygankov // International processes. 2005. T. 3. No. 3.
11. Tsygankov A., Tsygankov P. Sociology of international relations / A. Tsygankov, P. Tsygankov. M., 2008.
12. Tsygankov A.P. International relations: traditions of Russian political thought / A.P. Tsygankov. M., 2013.
13. Tsygankov A.P., Tsygankov P.A. Main trends in the development of Russian TMO. Chapter 1 / A.P. Tsygankov, P.A. Tsygankov. Russian science of international relations.
14. Tsygankov P. Theory of international relations / P. Tsygankov. M., 2005.
15. Acharya A. Dialogue and Discovery: In Search of International Relations Theory Beyond the West // Millennium: Journal of International Studies 39, 3, 2011.
17. Alker H.R. Dialectical Foundations of Global Disparities // International Studies Quarterly, vol. 25, No. 1, 1982.
COMPARATIVE POLITICS 2 (15) / 2014 79
MATERIALS FOR DISCUSSION
32. Hoffmann S. An American Social Science: International Relations // Daedalus 106, 3, 1977.
34. Inayatullah N. and D.L. Blaney. Knowing Encounters: Beyond Paroichialism in International Relations Theory // The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory / Ed. by Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil. Boulder, 1996.
36. International Relations Scholarship around the World, ed. by A.B. Tickner and O. W$ver. London, 2009; Thinking International Relations Differently, ed. by A.B. Tickner and D.L. Blaney, 2012; Claiming the International, ed. by A.B. Tickner and D.L. Blaney, 2013.
40. Makarychev A. and V. Morozov. Is “Non-Western Theory” Possible? The Idea of Multipolarity and the Trap of Epistemological Relativism in Russian IR // International Studies Review 2013. Vol. 15. R 332, 335.
42. Non-Western International Relations Theory, ed. by A. Acharya and B. Buzan. London, 2010.
80 COMPARATIVE POLITICS 2 (15) / 2014
MATERIALS FOR DISCUSSION
Russian theory of international relations: what should it be?
Tsygankov Andrey Pavlovich, Professor, Department of International Relations and Political Science, San Francisco State University, Ph.D.
Annotation. In the development of Russian international studies, a number of problems arise related to the weak development of empirical research and the excessive abstractness of theoretical work. The article proposes to comprehend the development of the Russian theory of international relations (RTIR) to overcome new economic, political and ethnocultural fault lines. RTMO is still in the process of formation, often torn apart by contradictions and struggle between mutually exclusive universalist and isolationist approaches. The article raises the question of the need to overcome extreme approaches by narrowing the gap between the teaching of international relations (IR) and Russian political thought. The development of international studies in Russia requires a deep knowledge of one's own intellectual roots, which is impossible without studying Russian thought.
Key words: MO, RTMO, universalist approach, isolationist approach, Russian political thought.
Russia International Relations Theory: What Should it be Like?
Andrei Tsygankov, Professor Chair of International Relations and Political Science, San Francisco State University, Ph.D.
Abstract. Russian IR theory faces many difficulties including underdevelopment of empirical research and overall abstract approach of theoretical studies. The article suggests to reconsider the development of the Russian IR theory in order to face the new economic, political and ethno-cultural challenges. The formation of Russian IR theory is still underway, and it is characterized by contradictions and the presence of mutually exclusive universalist and isolationist approaches. The article raises the question of overcoming the extreme approaches in the IR theory through reducing the gap between the teaching of IR and Russian political thought. The article concludes that the development of IR in Russia requires deep knowledge of its intellectual roots, thus the study of the Russian political thought becomes the necessity.
Key words: IR, Russian International relations theory, universalism, solationalism, Russian political thought.
COMPARATIVE POLITICS 2 (15) / 2014 81
MATERIALS FOR DISCUSSION
1. Bogatyrov A.D. Desiat’ let paradigm osvoyeniya // Pro et Contra. 2000. T. 5. No. 1.
2. Dugin A.G. Mezhdunarodnyie otnosheniya: paradigmyi, teorii, sotsiologiya. M., 2013.
3. Kavelin K.D. Nash umstvennyi stroi. Moscow, 1989.
4. Konishev V., Sergunin A. Teoriya mezhdunarodnikh otnosheniy: kanun novikh “velikikh deba-tov”? // Polis. 2013. No. 2.
5. Lebedeva M.M. Rossiyskiye issledovaniya I obrazovaniye v oblasti mezhdunarodnikh otnosheniy: 20 let spustia. Rossiyskyi council po mezhdunarodnim delam (RSMD). Moscow, 2013.
6. Megatrendi: Osnovniye traektorii evolutsiyi mirovogo pоriadka v XXI century / eds. TA. Shakleina, A.A. Baikov. Moscow, 2013.
7. Rossiyskaya nauka mezhdunarodnikh otnosheniy: noviye napravleniya. Eds. A.P. Tsygankov, PA. Tsygankov. Moscow, 2005.
8. Modernity mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya / ed. A.V. Torkunov. Moscow, 2012.
9. Soloviyev V.S. Sochineniya v dvukh tomakh. Moscow, 1989.
10. Tsygankov A., Tsigankov P. Krizis ideiy demokraticheskogo mira // Mezhdunarodnuye protsessi. 2005. Vol. 3. No. 3.
11. Tsygankov A., Tsigankov P. Sotsiologiya mexhdunarodnikh otnosheniy. Moscow, 2008.
12. Tsygankov A.P. Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya: traditions russkoi politicheskoi misli. Moscow, 2013.
13. Tsygankov A.P., Tsygankov P.A. Osmovniye tendentsiyi v razvitiyi rossiyskoy TMO. Glava 1 / Ros-siyskaya nauka mezhdunarodnikh otnosheniy.
14. Tsygankov P Teoriya mezhdunarodnikh otnosheniy. Moscow, 2005.
15. Acharya A. Dialogue and Discovery: In Search of International Relations Theory Beyond the West // Millennium: Journal of International Studies 39, 3, 2011.
16. Alker H.R. and T.J. Biersteker. The Dialectics of World Order: Notes for a Future Archeologist of International Savior Faire // International Studies Quarterly. 1984. Vol. 28. No. 2.
17. Alker H.R. Dialectical Foundations of Global Disparities // International Studies Quarterly, vol. 25, No. 1, 1982/
18. Alker H.R., Biersteker T.J. and Inoguchi T. From Imperial Power Balancing to People’s Wars / International/Intertextual Relations / ed. by J. Der-Derian and M.J. Shapiro. New York, 1989.
19. Alker, H. R., T. Amin, T. Biersteker, and T. Inoguchi. How Should We Theorize Contemporary Macro-Encounters: In Terms of Superstates, World Orders, or Civilizations? // “Encounters Among Civilizations”, Third Pan-European International Relations Conference, SGIR-ISA, Vienna, Austria, September 16-19, 1998.
20. Anglo-America and its Discontents: Civilizational Identities beyond West and East, ed. by Peter J. Katzenstein. London, 2012.
21. Aydinli E. and J. Mathews. Are the Core and Periphery Irreconcilable? The Curious World of Publishing in Contemporary International Relations // International Studies Perspectives. 2000. 1, 3.
22. Bilgin P. Thinking past ‘Western’ IR // Third World Quarterly. 2008. Vol. 29. No. 1.
23. Carr E.H. The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. London, 2001, p. xii.
24. Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives, ed. by Peter J. Katzenstein. London, 2009.
25. Claiming the International, ed. by A.B. Tickner and D.L. Blaney, 2013.
27. Doyle M.W. Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism and Socialism. New York, 1997.
28. Habermas J. Theory and Practice. Boston, 1973.
29. Hagmann J. and Biersteker T.J. Beyond the published discipline: Towards a critical pedagogy of international studies // European Journal of International Relations. 2012. 18.
30. Harding S. Is Science Multicultural? Postcolonialism, Feminism, and Epistemologies. Bloomington, 1998, p. 12.
31. Hobson J.M. The Eurocentric conception of world politics western international theory, 1760-2010. Cambridge, 2012.
32. Hoffmann S. An American Social Science: International Relations. // Daedalus 106, 3, 1977.
33. Hutchings K. Dialogue between Whom? The Role of the West/Non-West Distinction in Promoting Global Dialogue in IR // Millennium: Journal of International Studies. 2011. Vol. 39. No. 3.
82 COMPARATIVE POLITICS 2 (15) / 2014
MATERIALS FOR DISCUSSION
34. Inayatullah N. and D.L. Blaney. Knowing Encounters: Beyond Paroichialism in International Relations Theory // The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory / ed. by Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil. Boulder, 1996.
35. International Relations - Still an American Social Science? Toward Diversity in International Thought, ed. by R.M.A. Crawford and D.S. Jarvis. Albany, 2001.
36. International Relations Scholarship around the World, ed. by A.B. Tickner and O. W ver. London, 2009; Thinking International Relations Differently, ed. by A.B. Tickner and D. L. Blaney, 2012; Claiming the International, ed. by A.B. Tickner and D.L. Blaney, 2013.
37. Jackson P.T. The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics. London, 2011.
38. Knutsen O. A history of international relations theory. Manchester, 1997.
39. La Perspective en Relations internationals / ed. Helene Pellerin. Montreal, 2010.
40. Makarychev A. and V. Morozov. Is “Non-Western Theory” Possible? The Idea of Multipolarity and the Trap of Epistemological Relativism in Russian IR // International Studies Review 2013. Vol. 15. R. 332, 335.
41. Nayak M. and E. Selbin. Decentering International Relations. London, 2010.
42. Non-Western International Relations Theory, edited by A. Acharya and B. Buzan. London, 2010.
43. Shani G. Toward a post-Western IR: The Umma, Khalsa Panth, and critical International Relations theory // International Studies Review. 2008. Vol. 10. No. 4.
44. Sinicization and the Rise of China: Civilizational Processes Beyond East and West, ed. by Peter J. Katzenstein. London, 2012.
45. Snyder J. Some Good and Bad Reasons for a Distinctively Chinese Approach to International Relations Theory // Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 28, 2008, p. 10.
46. Thinking International Relations Differently, ed. by A.B. Tickner and D.L. Blaney, 2012.
47. Tickner A. Core, periphery and (neo)imperialist International Relations // European Journal of International Relations. 2013. 19.
48. Tsygankov A.P. and Tsygankov P.A. National Ideology and IR Theory: Three Reincarnations of the “Russian Idea” // European Journal of International Relations 2010. Vol. 16. No. 4.
49. Tsygankov A.P. Self and Other in International Relations Theory: Learning from Russian Civilization Debates // International Studies Review. 2008. Vol. 10. No. 4.
50. Van der Dennen J. M.G. Ethnocentrism and In-group / Out-group Differentiation: A Review and Interpretation of the Literature // The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism. Evolutionary Dimensions of Xenophobia, Discrimination, Racism and Nationalism, ed. by Vernon Reynolds, Vincent Falgar and Ian Vine. London & Sydney, 1987.
51. Waever O. The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations // International Organization. 1998. Vol. 52. No. 4.
COMPARATIVE POLITICS 2 (15) / 2014 83
The above diversity has greatly complicated the problem of classifying modern theories of international relations, which in itself is becoming a problem of scientific research.
There are many classifications of modern trends in the science of international relations, which is explained by differences in the criteria used by certain authors.
Thus, some of them are based on geographical criteria, highlighting Anglo-Saxon concepts, Soviet and Chinese understanding of international relations, as well as the approach to their study of authors representing the “Third World” (8).
Others build their typology based on the degree of generality of the theories under consideration, distinguishing, for example, global explicative theories (such as political realism and philosophy of history) and particular hypotheses and methods (which include the behaviorist school) (9). Within the framework of such a typology, the Swiss author Philippe Briar classifies political realism, historical sociology and the Marxist-Leninist concept of international relations as general theories. As for private theories, among them are: the theory of international actors (Baghat Quran); theory of interactions within international systems (George Modelski, Samir Amin; Karl Kaiser); theories of strategy, conflict and peace studies (Luce-en Poirier, David Singer, Johan Galtwig); integration theories (Amitai Etzioni; Karl Deutsch); theories of international organization (Inis Claude; Jean Siotis; Ernst Haas) (10).
Still others believe that the main dividing line is the method used by certain researchers, and, from this point of view, the main attention is paid to the controversy between representatives of traditional and “scientific” approaches to the analysis of international relations (11,12).
The fourth are based on identifying the central problems characteristic of a particular theory, highlighting the main and turning points in the development of science (13).
Finally, the fifth ones rely on complex criteria. Thus, the Canadian scientist Baghat Korani builds a typology of theories of international relations based on the methods they use (“classical” and “modernist”) and the conceptual vision of the world (“liberal-pluralistic” and “materialistic”).
Czech-structuralist"). As a result, he identifies such trends as political realism (G. Morgenthau; R. Aron; X. Bal), behaviorism (D. Singer; M. Kaplan), classical Marxism (K. Marx; F. Engels; V.I. Lenin ) and neo-Marxism (or the school of “dependence”: I. Wallerstein; S. Amin; A. Frank; F. Cardozo) (14). Similarly, Daniel Colyar focuses on the classical theory of the “state of nature” (i.e. political realism); theory of "international community" (or political idealism); Marxist ideological movement and its numerous interpretations; doctrinal Anglo-Saxon current, as well as the French school of international relations (15). Marcel Merle believes that the main directions in the modern science of international relations are represented by traditionalists - heirs of the classical school (Hans Morgenthau; Stanley Hoffmann; Henry Kissinger); Anglo-Saxon sociological concepts of behaviorism and functionalism (Robert Cox; David Singer;
Morton Kaplan; David Easton); Marxist and neo-Marxist (Paul Baran; Paul Sweezy; Samir Amin) movements (16).
Examples of various classifications of modern theories of international relations could be continued. It is important, however, to note at least three significant circumstances. Firstly, any of such classifications is conditional and is not able to exhaust the diversity of theoretical views and methodological approaches to the analysis of international relations1. Secondly, this diversity does not mean that modern theories have managed to overcome their “blood relationship” with the three main paradigms discussed above. Finally, thirdly, contrary to the contrary opinion that still occurs today, there is every reason to talk about an emerging synthesis, mutual enrichment, mutual “compromise” between previously irreconcilable directions.
Based on the above, we will limit ourselves to a brief consideration of such trends (and their varieties) as political idealism, political realism, modernism, transnationalism and neo-Marxism.
“However, they do not set themselves such a goal. Their goal is different - to understand the state and theoretical level achieved by the science of international relations, by summarizing the existing conceptual approaches and comparing them with what has been done previously.
The legacy of Thucydes, Machiavelli, Hobbes, de Watgel and Clausewitz, on the one hand, and Vitorius, Greece, Kant, on the other, was directly reflected in the major scientific debate that arose in the United States during the period between the two World Wars, discussions between realists and idealists. | Idealism in the modern science of international relations also has closer ideological and theoretical origins, which include utopian socialism, liberalism and pacifism of the 19th century. Its main premise is the belief in the necessity and possibility of ending world wars and armed conflicts between states through legal regulation and democratization of international relations, the extension of norms of morality and justice to them. According to this direction, the world community of democratic states, with the support and pressure from public opinion, is quite capable of resolving conflicts that arise between its members peacefully, using legal methods regulation, increasing the number and role of international organizations that promote the expansion of mutually beneficial cooperation and exchange.One of its priority topics is the creation of a collective security system based on voluntary disarmament and mutual renunciation of war as an instrument of international politics. In political practice, idealism found its embodiment in the program for the creation of the League of Nations developed after the First World War by American President Woodrow Wilson (17), in the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), which provided for the renunciation of the use of force in interstate relations, as well as in the Stimson Doctrine (1932), according to which the United States refuses diplomatic recognition of any change if it is achieved through force. In the post-war years, the idealistic tradition found a certain embodiment in the activities of such American politicians as Secretary of State John F. Dulles and Secretary of State Zbigniew Brzezinski (representing, however, not only the political, but also the academic elite of his country), President Jimmy Carter (1976-1980) and President George W. Bush (1988-1992). In scientific literature it was represented, in particular, by books by such American authors as R. Clark and L.B. Dream “Achieving peace through world law.” The book proposes a project in stages -
"Sometimes this direction is qualified as utopianism (see, for example: E. N. Carr, The Twenty Years of Crisis, 1919-1939. London. 1956.
th disarmament and creation of a system of collective security for the whole world for the period 1960-1980. The main instrument for overcoming wars and achieving eternal peace between nations should be a world government, led by the UN and acting on the basis of a detailed world constitution (18). Similar ideas are expressed in a number of works by European authors (19). The idea of a world government was also expressed in papal encyclicals: John XXIII - “Pacem interns” or 04/16/63, Paul VI - “Populorum progressio” from 03/26/67, as well as John-Paul II - from 12/2/80, which is still advocated today for the creation of "political power endowed with universal competence."
Thus, the idealistic paradigm that has accompanied the history of international relations for centuries retains a certain influence on minds today. Moreover, we can say that in recent years its influence on some aspects of theoretical analysis and forecasting in the field of international relations has even increased, becoming the basis for practical steps taken by the world community to democratize and humanize these relations, as well as attempts to form a new, consciously regulated world order that meets the common interests of all mankind.
At the same time, it should be noted that idealism for a long time (and in some respects to this day1) was considered to have lost all influence and, in any case, to be hopelessly behind the demands of modernity. Indeed, the normative approach that underlies it turned out to be deeply undermined due to the growing tension in Europe in the 1930s, the aggressive policies of fascism and the collapse of the League of Nations, and the outbreak of the world conflict of 1939-1945. and the Cold War in subsequent years. The result was the revival on American soil of the European classical tradition with its inherent advancement to the forefront in the analysis of international relations of such concepts as “strength” and “balance of power”, “national interest” and “conflict”.
Political realism not only subjected idealism to crushing criticism, pointing out, in particular, the fact that the idealistic illusions of statesmen of that time
“In most textbooks on international relations published in the West, idealism as an independent theoretical direction is either not considered or serves as nothing more than a “critical background” in the analysis of political realism and other theoretical directions.
I contributed to a large extent to the outbreak of the Second World War, but also proposed a fairly coherent theory. Its most famous representatives - Reinhold Niebuhr, Frederick Schumann, George Kennan, George Schwarzenberger, Kenneth Thompson, Henry Kissinger, Edward Carr, Arnold Wolfers and others - determined the path of the science of international relations for a long time. The undisputed leaders of this trend were Hans Morgenthau and Raymond Aron.
1 Work by G. Morgenthau “Political relations between nations. The Struggle for Power,” the first edition of which was published in |48, has become a kind of “bible” for many generations (political scientists both in the USA and in other countries ""JSffaaa. From the point of view of G. Morgenthau, international relations represent an arena of intense confrontation between states. At the core of all the international activities of the latter lies their desire to increase their power, or strength, and reduce the power of others. At the same time, the term “power” is understood in the broadest sense: as military and economic power of the state, a guarantee of its greatest security and prosperity, glory and prestige, opportunities for the dissemination of its ideological principles and spiritual values.The two main ways in which the state secures power for itself, and at the same time two complementary aspects of its foreign policy are military strategy and diplomacy The first of them is interpreted in the spirit of Clausewitz: as the continuation of politics by violent means.Diplomacy, on the contrary, is a peaceful struggle for power. In the modern era, says G. Morgenthau, states express their need for power in terms of “national interest.” The result of the desire of each state to maximally satisfy its national interests is the establishment on the world stage of a certain equilibrium (balance) of power (strength), which is the only realistic way to ensure and maintain peace. Actually, the state of the world is a state of balance of power between states.
According to Morgenthau, there are two factors that can keep states' aspirations for power within some limits - international law and morality. However, to trust them too much in an effort to ensure peace between states would mean falling into the unforgivable illusions of the idealistic school. The problem of war and peace has no chance of being resolved through collective security mechanisms or
through the UN. Projects for harmonizing national interests through the creation of a world community or a world state are also utopian. The only way to hope to avoid a global nuclear war is to renew diplomacy.
In his concept, G. Morgenthau proceeds from six principles of political realism, which he substantiates at the very beginning of his book (20). Briefly summarized, they look like this:
1. Politics, like society as a whole, is governed by objective laws, the roots of which are in the eternal and unchanging human nature. Therefore, it is possible to create a rational theory that is able to reflect these laws - although only relatively and partially. This theory allows us to separate objective truth in international politics from subjective judgments about it.
2. The main indicator of political realism is “the concept of interest expressed in terms of power.” It provides a link between the mind seeking to understand international politics and the facts to be known. It allows us to understand politics as an independent sphere of human life, not reducible to the ethical, aesthetic, economic or religious spheres. Thus, this concept allows us to avoid two mistakes. First, judgments about a politician's interest are based on motives rather than on the basis of his behavior. And, secondly, deriving the interest of a politician from his ideological or moral preferences, and not from his “official duties.”
Political realism includes not only a theoretical but also a normative element: it insists on the need for rational politics. Rational policy is the right policy because it minimizes risks and maximizes benefits. At the same time, the rationality of a policy also depends on its moral and practical goals.
3. The content of the concept of “interest expressed in terms of power” is not unchanged. It depends on the political and cultural context in which the formation of the state’s international policy occurs. This also applies to the concepts of “power” and “political balance”, as well as to such an initial concept denoting the main character of international politics as the “nation-state”.
Political realism differs from all other theoretical schools primarily in the fundamental question of how to change
modern world. He is convinced that such change can only be brought about through the skilful use of objective laws that have operated in the past and will operate in the future, and not by subordinating political reality to some abstract ideal that refuses to recognize such laws.
4. Political realism recognizes the moral significance of political action. But at the same time he is aware of the existence of an inevitable contradiction between the moral imperative and the requirements of successful political action. The main moral requirements cannot be applied to the activities of the state as abstract and universal norms. They must be considered in the specific circumstances of place and time. The state cannot say: “Let the world perish, but justice must triumph!” It cannot afford suicide. Therefore, the highest moral virtue in international politics is moderation and caution.
5. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of any nation with universal moral standards. It is one thing to know that nations are subject to moral law in their policies, and quite another to pretend to know what is good and what is bad in international relations.
6. The theory of political realism is based on a pluralistic concept of human nature. A real man is an “economic man”, a “moral man”, a “religious man”, etc. Only a “political man” is like an animal, because he has no “moral brakes”. Only a “moral man” is a fool, because... he lacks caution. Only
*PeJEDi^^fe^yLchelovekom"> can only be a saint, because he has ^y^Yn^^desires.
^Thinking about this, political realism defends the relative autonomy of these aspects and insists that the knowledge of each of them requires abstraction from the others and occurs in its own terms.
As we will see from the further presentation, not all of the above principles, formulated by the founder of the theory of political realism, G. Morgenthau, are unconditionally shared by other adherents - and, even more so, opponents - of this direction. At the same time, its conceptual harmony, the desire to rely on objective laws of social development, the desire for an impartial and strict analysis
the lysis of international reality, which differs from abstract ideals and the fruitless and dangerous illusions based on them - all this contributed to expanding the influence and authority of political realism both in the academic environment and in the circles of statesmen in various countries.
However, political realism has not become the undivided dominant paradigm in the science of international relations. Its transformation into a central link, cementing the beginning of a unified theory, was hampered from the very beginning by its serious shortcomings.
The fact is that, based on the understanding of international relations as a “natural state” of forceful confrontation for the possession of power, political realism essentially reduces these relations to interstate relations, which significantly impoverishes their understanding. Moreover, the domestic and foreign policies of the state in the interpretation of political realists look like they are not connected with each other, and the states themselves - like a kind of interchangeable mechanical bodies, with an identical reaction to external influences. The only difference is that some states are strong and others are weak. It is not without reason that one of the influential adherents of political realism, A. Wolfers, built a picture of international relations, comparing the interaction of states on the world stage with the collision of balls on a billiard table (21). Absolutizing the role of force and underestimating the importance of other factors, such as spiritual values, sociocultural realities, etc., significantly impoverishes the analysis of international relations and reduces the degree of its reliability. This is all the more true since the content of such key concepts for the theory of political realism as “power” and “national interest” remains quite vague in it, giving rise to debate and ambiguous interpretation. Finally, in its desire to rely on the eternal and unchanging objective laws of international interaction, political realism has essentially become a hostage to its own approach. They did not take into account very important trends and changes that have already occurred, which increasingly determine the nature of modern international relations from those that dominated the international arena until the beginning of the 20th century. At the same time, one more circumstance was missed: the fact that these changes require the use, along with traditional ones, of new methods and means of scientific analysis of international relations. All this caused criticism in hell
more political realism on the part of adherents of other sub-khovs, and, above all, on the part of representatives of the so-called modernist movement and diverse theories of interdependence and integration. It would not be an exaggeration to say that this polemic, which actually accompanied the theory of political realism from its first steps, contributed to an increasing awareness of the need to complement the political analysis of international realities with a sociological one.
Representatives of ^modernism*, or the “scientific” trend in the analysis of international relations, most often without affecting the initial postulates of political realism, sharply criticized its adherence to traditional methods based mainly on intuition and theoretical interpretation. The debate between “modernists” and “traditionalists” has reached a particular intensity since the 60s, receiving in the scientific literature the name “new great controversy” (see, for example: 12 and 22). The source of this dispute was the persistent desire of a number of researchers of the new generation (Quincy Wright, Morton Caplan, Karl Deutsch, David Singer, Kalevi Holsti, Ernst Haas and many others) to overcome the shortcomings of the classical approach and give the study of international relations a truly scientific status. Hence the increased attention to the use of mathematics, formalization, modeling, data collection and processing, empirical verification of results, as well as other research procedures borrowed from the exact disciplines and contrasted with traditional methods based on the researcher’s intuition, judgments by analogy, etc. . This approach, which arose in the United States, affected the study of not only international relations, but also other spheres of social reality, being an expression of the penetration into the social sciences of a broader trend of positivism that arose on European soil back in the 19th century.
Indeed, even Sey-Simon and O. Comte made an attempt to apply strict scientific methods to the study of social phenomena. The presence of a solid empirical tradition, methods already tested in such disciplines as sociology or psychology, and an appropriate technical base that provides researchers with new means of analysis, prompted American scientists, starting with C. Wright, to strive to use all this baggage in the study of international relations. Such a desire was accompanied by a rejection of a priori judgments regarding the influence of certain factors on the nature of inter-
international relations, denying both any “metaphysical prejudices” and conclusions based, like Marxism, on deterministic hypotheses. However, as M. Merle emphasizes (see: 16, pp. 91-92), this approach does not mean that one can do without a global explanatory hypothesis. The study of natural phenomena has developed two opposing models, between which specialists in the field of social sciences also hesitate. On the one hand, this is the teaching of Charles Darwin about the ruthless struggle of species and the law of natural selection and its Marxist interpretation. On the other hand, there is the organic philosophy of G. Spencer, which is based on the concept of constancy and stability of biological and social phenomena. Positivism in the USA followed the second path - the path of likening society to a living organism, whose life is based on the differentiation and coordination of its various functions. From this point of view, the study of international relations, like any other type of social relations, should begin with an analysis of the functions performed by their participants, then moving on to the study of interactions between their carriers and, finally, to problems associated with the adaptation of the social organism to to your surroundings. In the heritage of organicism, M. Merle believes, two trends can be distinguished. One of them focuses on the study of the behavior of actors, the other on the articulation of various types of such behavior. Accordingly, the first gave rise to behaviorism, and the second to functionalism and the systems approach in the science of international relations (see: ibid., p. 93).
Having been a reaction to the shortcomings of traditional methods of studying international relations used in the theory of political realism, modernism did not become any homogeneous movement - neither in theoretical nor in methodological terms. What it has in common is mainly a commitment to an interdisciplinary approach, a desire to apply rigorous scientific methods and procedures, and to increase the number of verifiable empirical data. Its shortcomings consist in the actual denial of the specifics of international relations, the fragmentation of specific research objects, which determines the virtual absence of a holistic picture of international relations, and the inability to avoid subjectivity. Nevertheless, many studies by adherents of the modernist trend turned out to be very fruitful, enriching science not only with new techniques, but also with very significant
our conclusions drawn on their basis. It is also important to note the fact that they opened up the prospect of a microsociological paradigm in the study of international relations.
If the debate between adherents of modernism and political realism concerned mainly methods of studying international relations, then representatives of transnationalism (Robert O. Koohane, Joseph Nye), integration theories (David Mitrany) and interdependence (Ernst Haas, David Mo-urs) criticized the very conceptual foundations of the classical school. At the center of the new “great dispute” that flared up in the late 60s and early 70s was the role of the state as a participant in international relations, the importance of national interest and strength for understanding the essence of what is happening on the world stage.
Proponents of various theoretical movements, which can be conventionally called “transnationalists,” have put forward the general idea that political realism and its inherent statist paradigm do not correspond to the nature and basic trends of international relations and therefore should be discarded. International relations go far beyond interstate interactions based on national interests and power confrontation. The state, as an international actor, loses its monopoly. In addition to states, individuals, enterprises, organizations, and other non-state associations take part in international relations. The diversity of participants, types (cultural and scientific cooperation, economic exchanges, etc.) and “channels” (partnerships between universities, religious organizations, communities and associations, etc.) of interaction between them displaces the state from the center of international communication , contribute to the transformation of such communication from “international” (i.e., interstate, if we recall the etymological meaning of this term) into “transnational” (i.e., carried out in addition to and without the participation of states). “The rejection of the prevailing intergovernmental approach and the desire to go beyond interstate interactions led us to think in terms of transnational relations,” American scientists J. Nye and R. Koohei write in the preface to their book “Transnational Relations and World Politics.”
Revolutionary changes in the technology of communications and transport, transformation of the situation in world markets, growth in the number
and the importance of transnational corporations have stimulated the emergence of new trends on the world stage. The predominant ones are: the rapid growth of world trade compared to world production, the penetration of modernization processes, urbanization and the development of means of communication into developing countries, the strengthening of the international role of small states and private entities, and finally, the reduction in the ability of great powers to control the state of the environment. The general consequence and expression of all these processes is the increasing interdependence of the world and the relative decrease in the role of force in international relations (23). Supporters of transnationalism1 often tend to view the sphere of transnational relations as a kind of international society, the analysis of which is applied by the same methods that make it possible to understand and explain the processes occurring in any social organism. Thus, in essence, we are talking about a macrosociological paradigm in the approach to the study of international relations.
Transnationalism has contributed to the awareness of a number of new phenomena in international relations, so many of the provisions of this movement continue to be developed by its supporters in the 90s. (24). At the same time, it was marked by its undoubted ideological kinship with classical idealism with its inherent tendencies to overestimate the real significance of the observed trends in changing the nature of international relations. Some similarity between the provisions put forward by transnationalism and a number of provisions defended by the neo-Marxist movement in the science of international relations is also noticeable.
Representatives of neo-Marxism (Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy, Samir Amin, Arjiri Immanuel, Immanuel Wallerstein, etc.), a movement as heterogeneous as transnationalism, are also united by the idea of the integrity of the world community and a certain utopianism in assessing its future. At the same time, the starting point and basis of their conceptual constructions is the idea of the asymmetrical interdependence of modern
“Among them we can name not only many scientists from the USA, Europe, and other regions of the world, but also well-known political figures - for example, such as former French President V. Giscard d'Estaing, influential non-governmental political organizations and research centers - for example. Palme Commission, Brandt Commission, Club of Rome, etc.
of the new world and, moreover, about the real dependence of economically underdeveloped countries on industrial states, about the exploitation and robbery of the former by the latter. Based on some theses of classical Marxism, neo-Marxists imagine the space of international relations in the form of a global empire, the periphery of which remains under the yoke of the center even after the previously colonial countries gained their political independence. This manifests itself in unequal economic exchanges and uneven development (25).
For example, the “center”, within which about 80% of all world economic transactions are carried out, depends for its development on the raw materials and resources of the “periphery”. In turn, periphery countries are consumers of industrial and other products produced outside them. Thus, they become dependent on the center, becoming victims of unequal economic exchange, fluctuations in world prices for raw materials and economic assistance from developed countries. Therefore, ultimately, “economic growth based on integration into the world market is underdeveloped development™” (26).
In the seventies, a similar approach to the consideration of international relations became the basis for the Third World countries for the idea of the need to establish a new world economic order. Under pressure from these countries, which constitute the majority of member countries of the United Nations, the UN General Assembly adopted a corresponding declaration and program of action in April 1974, and in December of the same year, the Charter on the Economic Rights and Responsibilities of States.
Thus, each of the considered theoretical movements has its own strengths and shortcomings, each reflects certain aspects of reality and finds one or another manifestation in the practice of international relations. The controversy between them contributed to their mutual enrichment, and, consequently, to the enrichment of the science of international relations as a whole. At the same time, it cannot be denied that this controversy did not convince the scientific community of the superiority of any one over the others, nor did it lead to their synthesis. Both of these conclusions can be illustrated using the concept of neorealism.
This term itself reflects the desire of a number of American scientists (Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, Joseph Greiko, etc.) to preserve the advantages of the classical tradition and at the same time
namely, to enrich it, taking into account new international realities and the achievements of other theoretical movements. It is significant that one of the longest-standing proponents of transnationalism, Koohane, in the 80s. comes to the conclusion that the central concepts of political realism - “power”, “national interest”, rational behavior, etc. - remain an important means and condition for a fruitful analysis of international relations (27). On the other hand, K. Walz speaks of the need to enrich the realistic approach due to the scientific rigor of data and empirical verifiability of conclusions, the need for which was usually rejected by supporters of the traditional view.
The emergence of the school of neorealism in International Relations is associated with the publication of the book by K. Waltz “The Theory of International Politics”, the first edition of which was published in 1979 (28). While defending the main provisions of political realism (“the natural state” of international relations, rationality in the actions of the main actors, national interest as their main motive, the desire to have power), its author at the same time criticizes his predecessors for the failure of attempts to create a theory of international politics as an autonomous discipline. He criticizes Hans Morgenthau for identifying foreign policy with international politics, and Raymond Aron for his skepticism regarding the possibility of creating International Relations as an independent theory.
Insisting that any theory of international relations should be based not on particulars, but on the integrity of the world, taking as its starting point the existence of a global system, and not the states that are its elements, Walz takes a certain step towards rapprochement with transnationalists.
At the same time, the systemic nature of international relations is determined, according to K. Waltz, not by the actors interacting here, not by their inherent basic features (related to geographic location, demographic potential, socio-cultural specifics, etc.), but by the properties of the structure of the international system. (In this regard, neorealism is often qualified as structural realism or simply structuralism.) Being a consequence of the interactions of international actors, the structure of the international system at the same time is not reduced to a simple sum of such interactions, but represents
is an independent phenomenon capable of imposing certain restrictions on states, or, on the contrary, offering them favorable opportunities on the world stage.
It should be emphasized that, according to neorealism, the structural properties of the international system do not actually depend on any efforts of small and medium-sized states, being the result of interactions between great powers. This means that they are the ones who characterize the “natural state” of international relations. As for interactions between great powers and other states, they can no longer be characterized as anarchic, because they take on other forms, which most often depend on the will of the great powers.
One of the followers of structuralism, Barry Bazan, developed its main provisions in relation to regional systems, which he views as intermediate between the global international and state systems (29). The most important feature of regional systems, from his point of view, is the security complex. The point is that neighboring states are so closely connected with each other in security matters that the national security of one of them cannot be separated from the national security of others. The basis of the structure of any regional subsystem is made up of two factors, discussed in detail by the author:
distribution of opportunities between existing actors and relations of friendliness or hostility between them. At the same time, both one and the other, B. Bazan shows, are subject to manipulation by the great powers.
Using the methodology proposed in this way, the Danish researcher M. Mozaffari used it as the basis for an analysis of the structural changes that occurred in the Persian Gulf as a result of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait and the subsequent defeat of Iraq by allied (and essentially American) troops (30). As a result, he came to the conclusion about the operationality of structuralism and its advantages compared to other theoretical directions. At the same time, Mozaffari also shows the weaknesses inherent in neorealism, among which he names the provisions on the eternity and immutability of such characteristics of the international system as its “natural state”, the balance of forces as a way of stabilization, its inherent static nature (see: ibid., R. 81).
due to its own advantages than to the heterogeneity and weakness of any other theory. And the desire to maintain maximum continuity with the classical school means that most of its inherent shortcomings remain the lot of neorealism (see: 14, pp. 300, 302). An even more severe sentence is passed by the French authors M.-C. Smooey and B. Badie, according to whom the theories of international relations, remaining captive of the Western-centric approach, were unable to reflect the radical changes taking place in the world system, as well as “predict neither accelerated decolonization in the post-war period, nor the outbreak of religious fundamentalism, nor the end of the Cold War , nor the collapse of the Soviet empire. In short, nothing that relates to sinful social reality” (31).
Dissatisfaction with the state and capabilities of the science of international relations has become one of the main motivations for the creation and improvement of a relatively autonomous discipline - the sociology of international relations. The most consistent efforts in this direction have been made by French scientists.
3. French sociological school
Most of the works published in the world devoted to the study of international relations still today bear the undoubted stamp of the predominance of American traditions. At the same time, it is also indisputable that since the beginning of the 80s, the influence of European theoretical thought, and in particular the French school, has become increasingly noticeable in this area. One of the famous scientists, Sorbonne professor M. Merle, noted in 1983 that in France, despite the relative youth of the discipline studying international relations, three major directions have formed. One of them is guided by the “empirical-descriptive approach” and is represented by the works of such authors as Charles Zorgbib, Serge Dreyfus, Philippe Moreau-Defargue and others. The second is inspired by the Marxist principles on which Pierre-François Gonidek, Charles Chaumont and their followers at the School are based Nancy and Reims. Finally, a distinctive feature of the third direction is the sociological approach, which received its most vivid embodiment in the works of R. Aron (32).
In the context of this work, one of the most significant features of modern
of the French school in the study of international relations. The fact is that each of the theoretical movements discussed above - idealism and political realism, modernism and transnationalism, Marxism and neo-Marxism - also exist in France. At the same time, they are refracted here in the works of the historical and sociological direction that brought the greatest fame to the French school, which left their mark on the entire science of international relations in this country. The influence of the historical-sociological approach is felt in the works of historians and lawyers, philosophers and political scientists, economists and geographers dealing with problems of international relations. As domestic experts note, the formation of the basic methodological principles characteristic of the French theoretical school of international relations was influenced by the teachings of philosophical, sociological and historical thought in France at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, and above all Comte’s positivism. It is in them that one should look for such features of French theories of international relations as attention to the structure of social life, a certain historicism, the predominance of the comparative historical method and a certain skepticism regarding mathematical research techniques (33).
At the same time, in the works of certain specific authors, these features are modified depending on the two main trends of sociological thought that had already emerged in the 20th century. One of them is based on the theoretical heritage of E. Durkheim, the second is based on the methodological principles formulated by M. Weber. Each of these approaches is formulated with utmost clarity by such major representatives of the two lines in the French sociology of international relations, such as, for example, Raymond Aron and Gaston Boutoul.
“Durkheim’s sociology,” writes R. Aron in his memoirs, “did not touch me either as a metaphysician, which I aspired to become, or as a reader of Proust who wanted to understand the tragedy and comedy of people living in society” (34). “Neo-Durkheimism,” he argued, is something like Marxism in reverse: while the latter describes class society in terms of the omnipotence of the dominant ideology and downplays the role of moral authority, the former expects to give morality its lost superiority over minds. However, denying the presence of a dominant ideology in society is the same utopia as the ideologization of society. Different classes cannot separate
the same values, just as totalitarian and liberal societies cannot have the same theory (see: ibid., pp. 69-70). Weber, on the contrary, attracted Aron because while objectifying social reality, he did not “reify” it, did not ignore the rationality that people attach to their practical activities and their institutions. Aron points to three reasons for his adherence to the Weberian approach: Weber’s characteristic assertion about the immanence of the meaning of social reality, closeness to politics and concern for epistemology, characteristic of the social sciences (see: ibid., p. 71). The oscillation central to Weber's thought between multiple plausible interpretations and the only correct explanation of a particular social phenomenon became the basis for Aron's view of reality, permeated with skepticism and criticism of normativism in the understanding of social - including international - relations.
It is therefore quite logical that R. Aron views international relations in the spirit of political realism - as a natural or pre-civil state. In the era of industrial civilization and nuclear weapons, he emphasizes, wars of conquest become both unprofitable and too risky. But this does not mean a radical change in the main feature of international relations, which is the legality and legitimacy of the use of force by their participants. Therefore, Aron emphasizes, peace is impossible, but war is also incredible. This leads to the specificity of the sociology of international relations: its main problems are determined not by the minimum social consensus that is characteristic of intra-social relations, but by the fact that they “unfold in the shadow of war.” For it is conflict, and not its absence, that is normal for international relations. Therefore, the main thing that needs to be explained is not the state of peace, but the state of war.
R. Aron names four groups of main problems in the sociology of international relations applicable to the conditions of traditional (post-industrial) civilization. Firstly, it is “clarification of the relationship between the weapons used and the organization of armies, between the organization of the army and the structure of society.” Second, "the study of which groups in a given society benefit from conquest." Thirdly, the study “in every era, in every specific diplomatic system, of that set of unwritten rules, more or less observed values that characterize wars and
conduct of the communities themselves in relation to each other.” Finally, fourthly, an analysis of “the unconscious functions that armed conflicts perform in history” (35). Of course, most of the current problems of international relations, Aron emphasizes, cannot be the subject of flawless sociological research in terms of expectations, roles and values. However, since the essence of international relations has not undergone fundamental changes in the modern period, the above problems retain their significance today. New ones can be added to them, arising from the conditions of international interaction characteristic of the second half of the 20th century. But the main thing is that as long as the essence of international relations remains the same, as long as it is determined by the pluralism of sovereignties, the central problem will remain the study of the decision-making process. From here Aron draws a pessimistic conclusion, according to which the nature and state of international relations depend mainly on those who lead states - on “rulers”, “whom one can only advise and hope that they will not be crazy.” And this means that “sociology applied to international relations reveals, so to speak, its boundaries” (see: ibid., p. 158).
At the same time, Aron does not abandon the desire to determine the place of sociology in the study of international relations. In his seminal work, Peace and War Among Nations, he identifies four aspects of such study, which he describes in the corresponding sections of this book: “Theory,” “Sociology,” “History,” and “Praxeology” (36).
The first section defines the basic rules and conceptual tools of analysis. Using his favorite comparison of international relations with sports, R. Aron shows that there are two levels of theory. The first is intended to answer questions about “which techniques players are entitled to use and which are not; how they are distributed on different lines of the playing court; what they are doing to increase the effectiveness of their actions and to destroy the enemy’s efforts.” Within the rules that answer such questions, numerous situations can arise, which may be random, or may be the result of actions pre-planned by the players. Therefore, for each match, the coach develops an appropriate plan that clarifies the task of each player and his actions in certain typical situations,
which may develop on the site. At this - the second - level of the theory, it defines recommendations that describe the rules for the effective behavior of various participants (for example, goalkeeper, defender, etc.) in certain circumstances of the game. In this section, strategy and diplomacy are identified and analyzed as typical types of behavior of participants in international relations, the set of means and goals characteristic of any international situation, as well as typical systems of international relations are considered.
The sociology of international relations is built on this basis, the subject of which is primarily the behavior of international actors. Sociology is called upon to answer the question of why a given state behaves in the international arena in this particular way and not in some other way. Its main task is the study of the determinants and patterns, material and physical, as well as social and moral variables that determine the policies of states and the course of international events. It also analyzes issues such as the nature of the influence of the political regime and/or ideology on international relations. Their clarification allows the sociologist to derive not only certain rules of behavior for international actors, but also to identify social types of international conflicts, as well as formulate laws for the development of some typical international situations. Continuing the comparison with sports, at this stage the researcher no longer acts as an organizer or coach. Now he solves problems of a different kind. How do matches unfold not on the chalkboard, but on the playing field? What are the specific features of the techniques used by players from different countries? Is there Latin, English, American football? How much of a team's success is due to technical virtuosity and how much is due to the moral qualities of the team?
It is impossible to answer these questions, Aron continues, without turning to historical research: one must monitor the progress of specific matches, changes in techniques, and the variety of techniques and temperaments. A sociologist must constantly turn to both theory and history. If he does not understand the logic of the game, then he will in vain follow the actions of the players and will not be able to understand the meaning of the tactical design of a particular game. In the section on history, Aron describes the characteristics of the world system and its subsystems, analyzes various models of deterrence strategies in the nuclear age, and traces the evolution of diplomatic
matter between the two poles of the bipolar world and within each of them.
Finally, in the fourth part, dedicated to praxeology, another symbolic character appears - the arbiter. How should we interpret the provisions written in the rules of the game? Did a violation of the rules actually occur under certain conditions? Moreover, if the referee “judges” the players, then the players and spectators, in turn, silently or noisily, inevitably “judge” the referee himself, the players of one team “judge” both their partners and rivals, etc. All these judgments oscillate between an assessment of performance ("he played well"), an assessment of punishment ("he acted according to the rules") and an assessment of sportsmanship ("this team behaved in accordance with the spirit of the game"). Even in sports, not everything that is not prohibited is morally justified. This is especially true for international relations. Their analysis also cannot be limited only to observation and description, but requires judgments and assessments. Which strategy can be considered moral and which can be considered reasonable or rational? What are the strengths and weaknesses of seeking peace through the rule of law? What are the advantages and disadvantages of trying to achieve it by establishing an empire?
As already noted, Aron’s book “Peace and War between Nations” played and continues to play a significant role in the formation and development of the French scientific school, and in particular the sociology of international relations. Of course, followers of his views (Jean-Pierre Derrienic, Robert Boeck, Jacques Unzinger, etc.) take into account that many of the positions expressed by Aron belong to their time. However, he himself admits in his memoirs that he “did not achieve his goal by half,” and to a large extent this self-criticism concerns the sociological section, and in particular the specific application of laws and determinants to the analysis of specific problems (see: 34, pp. 457-459). However, his very understanding of the sociology of international relations, and most importantly, the rationale for the need for its development, has largely retained its relevance today.
Explaining this understanding, J.-P. Derrienic (37) emphasizes that since there are two main approaches to the analysis of social relations, there are two types of sociology:
deterministic sociology, continuing the tradition of E. Durkheim, and the sociology of action, based on the approaches developed by M. Weber. The difference between them is quite arbitrary, because actionalism does not deny causality, but determinism
nism is also “subjective”, because it is a formulation of the researcher’s intention. Its justification lies in the necessary distrust of the researcher in the judgments of the people he studies. Specifically, this difference lies in the fact that the sociology of action proceeds from the existence of reasons of a special kind that must be taken into account. These reasons are decisions, that is, a choice between many possible events, which is made depending on the existing state of information and specific evaluation criteria. The sociology of international relations is the sociology of action. It proceeds from the fact that the most essential feature of facts (things, events) is their endowment with meaning (which is associated with the rules of interpretation) and value (associated with evaluation criteria). Both depend on information. Thus, at the center of the problems of the sociology of international relations is the concept of “decision”. Moreover, it should proceed from the goals that people pursue (from their decisions), and not from the goals that they should pursue according to the sociologist (i.e., from interests).
As for the second trend in the French sociology of international relations, it is represented by the so-called polemology, the main provisions of which were laid down by Gaston Boutoul and are reflected in the works of such researchers as Jean-Louis Annequin, Jacques Freund, Lucien Poirier and others. based on polemology - a comprehensive study of wars, conflicts and other forms of “collective aggressiveness” using methods of demography, mathematics, biology and other exact and natural sciences.
The basis of polemology, writes G. Butul, is dynamic sociology. The latter is “that part of that science which studies the variations of societies, the forms they take, the factors which determine or correspond to them, and the means of their reproduction” (38). Based on the position of E. Durkheim that sociology is “history comprehended in a certain way,” polemology proceeds from the fact that, firstly, it was the war that gave birth to history, since the latter began exclusively as the history of armed conflicts. And it is unlikely that history will ever completely cease to be “the history of wars.” Secondly, war is the main factor in that collective imitation, or, in other words, dialogue and cultural borrowing, which plays such a significant role in social change. This is, first of all, “violent imitation”: war does not allow states and peoples to plan
to repent in autarky, in self-isolation, therefore it is the most energetic and most effective form of contact of civilizations. But in addition, this is also a “voluntary imitation” associated with the fact that peoples passionately borrow from each other types of weapons, methods of waging war, etc. - right down to the fashion for military uniforms. Thirdly, wars are the engine of technical progress: thus, the incentive for the Romans to master the art of navigation and shipbuilding was the desire to destroy Carthage. And today, all nations continue to exhaust themselves in pursuit of new technical means and methods of destruction, shamelessly copying each other in this. Finally, fourthly, war is the most noticeable of all conceivable transitional forms in social life. It is the result and source of both disturbance and restoration of balance.
Polemology must avoid the political and legal approach, remembering that “polygy is the enemy of sociology,” which it constantly tries to subjugate, to make it its servant - just as theology did in relation to philosophy in the Middle Ages. Therefore, polemology actually cannot study current conflicts, and therefore, the main thing for it is the historical approach.
The main task of polemology is the objective and scientific study of wars as a social phenomenon that is observable in the same way as any other social phenomenon and which, at the same time, is capable of explaining the causes of global changes in social development throughout human history. At the same time, it must overcome a number of methodological obstacles associated with the pseudo-evidence of wars; with their seeming complete dependence on the will of people (while we should be talking about changes in the nature and correlation of social structures); with a legal illusion that explains the causes of wars by factors of theological (divine will), metaphysical (protection or expansion of sovereignty) or anthropomorphic (likening wars to quarrels between individuals) law. Finally, polemology must overcome the symbiosis of sacralization and politicization of wars associated with the connection of the lines of Hegel and Clausewitz.
What are the main features of the positive methodology of this “new chapter in sociology,” as G. Butul calls the polemological direction in his book (see: ibid., p. 8)? First of all, he emphasizes that polemology has for its
goals, a truly huge source base, which is rarely available to other branches of sociological science. Therefore, the main question is in what directions to classify the countless facts of this huge body of documentation. Butul names eight such areas: 1) description of material facts according to the degree of their decreasing objectivity; 2) description of types of physical behavior, based on the ideas of war participants about their goals;
3) the first stage of explanation: the opinions of historians and analysts;
4) second stage of explanation: theological, metaphysical, moralistic and philosophical “views and doctrines; 5) selection and grouping of facts and their primary interpretation; 6) hypotheses regarding the objective functions of war; 7) hypotheses regarding the periodicity of wars; 8) social typology wars - i.e. the dependence of the main characteristics of war on the typical features of a particular society (see: ibid., pp. 18-25).