Alexander Dubchek - First Secretary of the HRC (January-August 1968)

In 1968, for almost eight months, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (Czechoslovakia) experienced a period of profound changes unprecedented in the history of the communist movement. These transformations were the natural result of the growing crisis in this relatively prosperous and developed country, in whose political culture predominantly democratic traditions are deeply rooted. The process of democratization in Czechoslovakia, prepared by the reformist-minded forces within the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, went on almost unnoticed for a number of years for most analysts and politicians in the West and East, including the Soviet leaders. They misinterpreted the nature of the political conflict within the CPC at the end of 1967, which led to the removal in January 1968 of the first secretary of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPC A. Novotny. Instead, A. Dubchek, a graduate of the Higher Party School under the Central Committee of the CPSU, who spoke excellent Russian, was elected.

At the end of March, A. Novotny resigned from the post of President of Czechoslovakia. Instead, on the recommendation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, the hero of the Second World War, General Ludwik Svoboda, was elected to this post, to whom the Soviet leaders also had no objections.

The fall of Novotny was not just the result of the struggle for power within the Czechoslovak leadership, but happened for a number of reasons, including: the economic crisis of 1962-1963, which awakened the desire for economic reforms, the slow progress of the process of political rehabilitation of the repressed, the open dissent of writers and students, the awakening the reformist-minded intellectual strata in the party that have begun to fight for freedom of thought and expression.

The protracted nature of the political crisis, stubborn opposition from Novotny and his supporters to Dubcek, a number of scandalous incidents in 1968 (for example, the sensational escape of General Ian Cheyne to the United States, accompanied by rumors of a failed military coup attempt in favor of restoring Novotny), weakening of censorship - all this contributed to mobilization public support for the new leadership. The leaders of the CPC, interested in reforms, included their pluralistic concept of socialism "with a human face" in the "Program of Action", adopted in April 1968 as the "Magna Carta" of the new Dubcek leadership. In addition, Dubcek allowed the creation of a number of new political clubs, and also abolished censorship; in the field of foreign policy, it was decided to pursue a more independent course, which, however, meets the interests of the Warsaw Pact in general and the policy of the USSR in particular.

The striking speed of events in Czechoslovakia in January-April 1968 created a dilemma for the Soviet leadership. The resignation of the Moscow-oriented supporters of Novotny, and especially the reformist programs of Dubcek's leadership and the revival of press freedom, led, from the Soviet point of view, to a dangerous situation in one of the key countries of Eastern Europe. In addition, the leadership of a number of Warsaw Pact countries was thinking about the increased, in their opinion, vulnerability of the borders and territory of Czechoslovakia, the prospect of its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, which would inevitably undermine the Eastern European military security system.

Potentially, the situation in Czechoslovakia could affect the neighboring Eastern European countries, and the Soviet Union itself. The Czechoslovak slogan "socialism with a human face" called into question the humanity of Soviet socialism. Magna Carta meant a much greater degree of intraparty democracy, the granting of greater autonomy to the state apparatus, other political parties and parliament, the restoration of civil rights (freedom of assembly and association) and a more decisive continuation of political rehabilitation, the restoration of national rights of ethnic minorities within the framework of the federation, economic reform, etc.

Prague. August 1968

The possibility of a "chain reaction" in neighboring socialist countries, where the social upheavals of the recent past were still fresh in memory (the GDR in 1953, Hungary in 1956), led to hostility to the Czechoslovak "experiment" not only of the Soviet, but also of the East German (W. Ulbricht ), Polish (V. Gomulka) and Bulgarian (T. Zhivkov) leadership. J. Kadar (Hungary) took a more restrained position.

The Prague Spring, however, was a different kind of protest than the one faced by Soviet leaders in Hungary in 1956. The Dubcek leadership did not challenge the fundamentals of ensuring the interests of the national security of the USSR, it did not come up with a proposal to revise the foreign policy orientation of Czechoslovakia. There was no doubt about the preservation of membership in the OVD and CMEA. Limited pluralism also did not mean the loss of general control on the part of the Communist Party: power, although somewhat dispersed, would remain in the hands of a reformist party leadership.

From the point of view of the Soviet leadership, the events in Czechoslovakia created problems and were potentially dangerous. Burnt on Hungary, the Soviet leaders for a long time could not determine their course in relation to what was happening in Czechoslovakia. Should the changes that have taken place there since January be abolished or simply limited? What means should be used to influence Czechoslovakia? Should we limit ourselves to political and economic action or resort to armed intervention?

Despite the fact that the Kremlin was unanimous in its negative attitude towards Czechoslovak reformism, there was no inclination towards a military invasion for a long time. Some members of the Soviet leadership engaged in intensive search for a peaceful solution to the problem. This became apparent after March 1968, when the Soviet government began to use a number of means of political and psychological pressure in order to convince Dubcek and his colleagues of the need to slow down the impending changes.

The Soviet side exerted political pressure on the Dubcek leadership during various meetings and negotiations: at a multilateral meeting in Dresden in March, during a bilateral meeting of the leaders of the CPSU and the CPC in Moscow in May, at the unprecedented summit talks between the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPC in Čierna nad Tisou in July, in Bratislava in August 1968. The Czechoslovak delegation refused to attend the meeting of the leaders of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and the USSR in Warsaw (July 1968).

The exacerbation of the situation was also facilitated at first by a restrained reaction, and then by the categorical refusal of the Czechoslovak leadership to accept repeated proposals to station a Soviet military contingent on the territory of Czechoslovakia.

The political pressure was accompanied by psychological pressure: near the borders of Czechoslovakia, large-scale exercises of the internal affairs forces were conducted with the participation of the USSR, the GDR and Poland. Later, this type of psychological influence was used, such as the presence of troops of the Warsaw Pact countries on the territory of Czechoslovakia during and after military exercises in June and July 1968.

In addition, the Soviet leadership did not rule out the possibility of using economic sanctions against Czechoslovakia as a form of pressure. However, despite the reports of the termination of Soviet grain deliveries that appeared at the end of April 1968, there was no real evidence of the use of economic leverage.

| The participation of the USSR in conflicts during the Cold War. Events in Czechoslovakia (1968)

Events in Czechoslovakia
(1968)

Entry of troops into Czechoslovakia (1968), also known as Operation Danube or Invasion of Czechoslovakia - in waters of the Warsaw Pact troops (except Romania) to Czechoslovakiastarted August 21, 1968 and put an end reforms of the Prague Spring.

The largest contingent of troops was allocated from the USSR. The united group (up to 500 thousand men and 5 thousand tanks and armored personnel carriers) was commanded by General of the Army I. G. Pavlovsky.

The Soviet leadership feared that if the Czechoslovak communists carried out an internal policy independent of Moscow, the USSR would lose control over Czechoslovakia. This turn of events threatened to split the East European socialist bloc both politically and strategically. The policy of limited state sovereignty in the countries of the socialist bloc, which, among other things, allows the use of military force if necessary, was called in the West the “Brezhnev doctrine”.

At the end of March 1968 g. The CPSU Central Committee sent out classified information about the situation in Czechoslovakia to party activists. This document said: “... recently, events have been developing in a negative direction. In Czechoslovakia, the actions of irresponsible elements are growing, demanding the creation of an "official opposition", to show "tolerance" to various anti-socialist views and theories. The past experience of socialist construction is incorrectly covered, proposals are made for a special Czechoslovak path to socialism, which is opposed to the experience of other socialist countries, attempts are made to cast a shadow on the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia and the need for an "independent" foreign policy is emphasized. There are calls for the creation of private enterprises, the abandonment of the planned system, and the expansion of ties with the West. Moreover, in a number of newspapers, on radio and television, calls are being propagated for "the complete separation of the party from the state", for the return of Czechoslovakia to the bourgeois republic of Masaryk and Beneš, for the transformation of Czechoslovakia into an "open society" and others ... "

23 march In Dresden, a meeting of the leaders of the parties and governments of six socialist countries - the USSR, Poland, the GDR, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia - took place, at which the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine A. Dubchek was sharply criticized.

After a meeting in Dresden, the Soviet leadership began to develop options for action against Czechoslovakia, including military measures. The leaders of the GDR (W. Ulbricht), Bulgaria (T. Zhivkov) and Poland (V. Gomulka) took a tough position and, to a certain extent, influenced the Soviet leader L. Brezhnev.

The Soviet side did not rule out the option of NATO troops entering the territory of Czechoslovakia, which were conducting maneuvers at the borders of Czechoslovakia under the code name "Black Lion".

Given the evolving military-political situation, spring 1968 the joint command of the Warsaw Pact, together with the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, developed an operation codenamed "Danube".

April 8, 1968 The commander of the airborne forces, General V.F. Margelov, received a directive, according to which he began planning the use of airborne assault forces on the territory of Czechoslovakia. The directive said: "The Soviet Union and other socialist countries, loyal to their international duty and the Warsaw Pact, must send their troops to assist the Czechoslovak People's Army in defending the Motherland from the danger hanging over it." The document also emphasized: “… if the troops of the Czechoslovak People's Army are sympathetic to the appearance of Soviet troops, in this case it is necessary to organize interaction with them and jointly carry out the assigned tasks. If the troops of the ChNA will be hostile to the paratroopers and support the conservative forces, then it is necessary to take measures to localize them, and if this is impossible, to disarm them. "

During april - May Soviet leaders tried to "reason" Alexander Dubchek, to draw his attention to the danger of the actions of anti-socialist forces. At the end of April, Marshal I. Yakubovsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, arrived in Prague to prepare exercises for the troops of the Warsaw Pact countries on the territory of Czechoslovakia.

May 4th there was a meeting between Brezhnev and Dubchek in Moscow, but no mutual understanding was reached there.

May 8 in Moscow a closed meeting of the leaders of the USSR, Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria and Hungary took place, during which a frank exchange of views took place on measures in connection with the situation in Czechoslovakia. Even then, proposals were made for a military solution. However, at the same time, the leader of Hungary, J. Kadar, referring to, said that the Czechoslovak crisis cannot be solved by military means and a political solution must be sought.

At the end of May the government of Czechoslovakia agreed to conduct exercises of the troops of the Warsaw Pact countries called "Shumava", which took place June 20 - 30 with the involvement of only the headquarters of units, formations and signal troops. FROM June 20 to 30 For the first time in the history of the military bloc of socialist countries, 16,000 personnel were brought into the territory of Czechoslovakia. FROM July 23 to August 10, 1968 On the territory of the USSR, the German Democratic Republic and Poland, the rear exercises "Neman" were held, during which there was a redeployment of troops for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Since August 11, 1968, a major air defense exercise "Sky Shield" was held. On the territory of Western Ukraine, Poland and the German Democratic Republic, exercises were held for the signal troops.

July 29 - August 1 a meeting was held in Čierne nad Tisou, in which the full members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, together with President L. Svoboda, took part. The Czechoslovak delegation at the negotiations basically acted as a united front, but V. Bilyak adhered to a special position. At the same time, a personal letter was received from A. Kapek, a candidate for membership in the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPC, with a request to provide his country with "fraternal assistance" from socialist countries.

IN late July the preparation of the military operation in Czechoslovakia was completed, but the final decision on its conduct had not yet been made. August 3, 1968 a meeting of the leaders of six communist parties took place in Bratislava. The statement adopted in Bratislava contained a phrase about collective responsibility in the defense of socialism. In Bratislava, Leonid Brezhnev received a letter from five members of the CPC leadership - Indra, Kolder, Kapek, Shvestka and Bilyak with a request for "effective assistance and support" in order to wrest Czechoslovakia "from the imminent danger of counter-revolution."

Mid august L. Brezhnev twice called A. Dubcek and asked why the personnel reshuffles promised in Bratislava were not taking place, to which Dubcek replied that personnel matters were decided collectively, by the plenum of the Party Central Committee.

16 august In Moscow, at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, a discussion of the situation in Czechoslovakia was held and proposals for the introduction of troops were approved. At the same time, a letter from the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee was adopted. 17 August Soviet Ambassador S. Chervonenko met with the President of Czechoslovakia L. Svoboda and informed Moscow that at the decisive moment the President would be together with the CPSU and the Soviet Union. On the same day, the materials prepared in Moscow for the text of the Appeal to the Czechoslovak people were sent to a group of "healthy forces" in the CPC. It was planned that they would create a Revolutionary Workers 'and Peasants' Government. A draft appeal was also prepared by the governments of the USSR, the GDR, Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary to the people of Czechoslovakia, as well as to the Czechoslovak army.

August 18 a meeting of the leaders of the USSR, the GDR, Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary took place in Moscow. Relevant measures were agreed, including the speech of the "healthy forces" of the CPC with a request for military assistance. In a message to the President of Czechoslovakia Svoboda on behalf of the participants in the meeting in Moscow, one of the main reasons was the receipt of a request for military assistance to the Czechoslovak people from the "majority" of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and many members of the government of Czechoslovakia.

Operation Danube

The political goal of the operation was to change the country's political leadership and to establish a regime loyal to the USSR in Czechoslovakia. The troops were supposed to seize the most important objects in Prague, the KGB officers were supposed to arrest the Czech reformers, and then the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the session of the National Assembly were planned, where the top leadership was to be replaced. At the same time, a large role was assigned to President Svoboda.

Political leadership of the operation in Prague was carried out by a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee K. Mazurov.

The military preparation of the operation was carried out by the Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, Marshal I. I. Yakubovsky, but a few days before the operation began, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, General of the Army I. G. Pavlovsky was appointed its leader.

At the first stage, the main role was assigned to the airborne troops. The air defense forces, the Navy and the strategic missile forces were put on high alert.

TO 20 August a grouping of troops was prepared, the first echelon of which numbered up to 250,000 people, and the total number - up to 500,000 people, about 5,000 tanks and armored personnel carriers. To carry out the operation, 26 divisions were involved, of which 18 were Soviet, not counting aviation. The invasion was attended by the troops of the Soviet 1st Guards Tank, 20th Guards Combined Arms, 16th Air Armies (Group of Soviet Forces in Germany), 11th Guards Army (Baltic Military District), 28th Combined Arms Army (Belarusian Military district), the 13th and 38th combined arms armies (Carpathian military district) and the 14th air army (Odessa military district).

The Carpathian and Central Fronts were formed:
☑ Carpathian front was created on the basis of the command and control of the Carpathian military district and several Polish divisions. It consisted of four armies: the 13th, 38th combined-arms, 8th guards tank and 57th air. At the same time, the 8th Guards Tank Army and part of the forces of the 13th Army began to move to the southern regions of Poland, where Polish divisions were additionally included in their composition. Commander Colonel General Vasily Zinovievich Bisarin.
☑ Central front was formed on the basis of the management of the Baltic Military District with the inclusion of the troops of the Baltic Military District, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the Northern Group of Forces, as well as individual Polish and East German divisions. This front was deployed in the GDR and Poland. The Central Front included the 11th and 20th Guards Combined Arms and 37th Air Armies.

Also, the Southern Front was deployed to cover the active group in Hungary. In addition to this front, operational group Balaton (two Soviet divisions, as well as Bulgarian and Hungarian units) was deployed in Hungary to enter Czechoslovakia.

In general, the number of troops brought into Czechoslovakia was:
☑ USSR - 18 motorized rifle, tank and airborne divisions, 22 aviation and helicopter regiments, about 170,000 people;
☑ Poland - 5 infantry divisions, up to 40,000 people;
☑ GDR - motorized rifle and tank divisions, up to 15,000 people in total (according to publications in the press, it was decided to abandon the introduction of GDR units into Czechoslovakia at the last moment, they played the role of a reserve at the border;
☑ from Czechoslovakia there was an operational group of the NNA GDR of several dozen servicemen);
☑ Hungary - 8th motorized rifle division, separate units, total 12,500 people;
☑ Bulgaria - 12th and 22nd Bulgarian motorized rifle regiments, with a total strength of 2,164 people. and one Bulgarian tank battalion, armed with 26 T-34 vehicles.

The date for the entry of troops was set for the evening of August 20, when the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was held. On the morning of August 20, 1968, a secret order was read out to the officers about the formation of the Danube High Command.

General of the Army I. G. Pavlovsky was appointed commander-in-chief, whose headquarters was deployed in the southern part of Poland. Both fronts (Central and Carpathian) and the "Balaton" operational group, as well as two Guards airborne divisions, were subordinate to him. On the first day of the operation, five divisions of military transport aviation were assigned to the Danube Commander-in-Chief to ensure the landing of the landing divisions.

Chronology of events

At 22 hours 15 minutes on August 20 the troops received the signal "Vltava-666" to start the operation. IN 23:00 August 20 in the troops intended for the invasion, a combat alert was declared. A signal to move was transmitted to all fronts, armies, divisions, brigades, regiments and battalions via closed communication channels. On this signal, all the commanders had to open one of the five secret packages they kept (the operation was developed in five versions), and burn the four remaining ones in the presence of the chiefs of staff without opening them. The opened packages contained an order for the start of Operation Danube and for the continuation of hostilities in accordance with the Danube-Canal and Danube-Canal-Globus plans.

“Orders for cooperation for the operation“ Danube ”were developed in advance. White stripes were applied to the military equipment participating in the invasion. All military equipment of Soviet and allied production without white stripes was subject to "neutralization", preferably without shooting. In the event of resistance, bandless tanks and other military equipment were to be destroyed without warning and without commands from above. When meeting with NATO troops, they were ordered to stop immediately and not fire without an order.

The entry of troops was carried out in 18 places from the territory of the GDR, Poland, USSR and Hungary. Parts of the 20th Guards Army from the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (Lieutenant General Ivan Leontyevich Velichko) entered Prague, which established control over the main objects of the capital of Czechoslovakia. At the same time, two Soviet airborne divisions were landed in Prague and Brno.

IN 2 a.m. August 21 At the Ruzyne airfield in Prague, advanced units of the 7th Airborne Division landed. They blocked the main objects of the airfield, where the Soviet An-12 with the landing force and military equipment began to land. The seizure of the airfield was carried out using a deceitful maneuver: a Soviet passenger plane flying up to the airfield requested an emergency landing due to alleged damage on board. After clearance and landing, the paratroopers from the plane captured the airport control tower and ensured the landing of the landing aircraft.

On the news of the invasion in Dubchek's office, the CPC Presidium urgently convened in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The majority - 7 to 4 - voted in favor of a Presidency statement condemning the invasion. Only Presidium members Kolder, Bilyak, Shvestka and Rigo spoke according to the original plan. Barbirek and Piller supported Dubcek and O. Chernik. The calculation of the Soviet leadership was on the preponderance of "healthy forces" at the decisive moment - 6 against 5. The statement also contained a call for an urgent convocation of the party congress. Dubcek himself, in his radio appeal to the inhabitants of the country, urged citizens to remain calm and prevent bloodshed and the actual repetition of the Hungarian events of 1956.

TO 4:30 am August 21st the building of the Central Committee was surrounded by Soviet troops and armored vehicles, Soviet paratroopers broke into the building and arrested those present. Dubchek and other members of the Central Committee spent several hours under the control of the paratroopers.

IN 5:10 am August 21st a reconnaissance company of the 350th Guards Parachute Regiment and a separate reconnaissance company of the 103rd Airborne Division landed. Within 10 minutes, they captured the Turany and Namesti airfields, after which a hasty landing of the main forces began. According to eyewitnesses, transport planes landed at airfields one after another. The landing party jumped off without waiting for a complete stop. By the end of the runway, the plane was already empty and immediately picked up speed for a new takeoff. With a minimum interval, other planes with troops and military equipment began to arrive here. Then the paratroopers, in their military equipment and in captured civilian vehicles, went into the interior of the country.

TO 9:00 am August 21st In Brno, paratroopers blocked all roads, bridges, exits from the city, radio and television buildings, the telegraph office, the main post office, administrative buildings of the city and region, a printing house, railway stations, as well as the headquarters of military units and enterprises of the military industry. The ChNA commanders were asked to remain calm and orderly. Four hours after the landing of the first paratrooper groups, the most important objects in Prague and Brno were under the control of the Allied forces. The main efforts of the paratroopers were directed at seizing the buildings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Churches, the government, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, as well as the buildings of the radio station and television. According to a previously developed plan, columns of troops were sent to the main administrative and industrial centers of Czechoslovakia. Formations and units of the allied forces were deployed in all major cities. Particular attention was paid to the protection of the western borders of Czechoslovakia.

At 10 a.m. Dubcek, Prime Minister Oldřich Chernik, Chairman of the Parliament Josef Smrkowski (English) Russian, members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Josef Špaczek and Bohumil Szymon, and the head of the National Front Frantisek Kriegel (English) Russian. KGB officers and StB officers who collaborated with them were taken out of the building of the Central Committee of the CPC, and then they were taken to the airfield in Soviet armored personnel carriers and taken to Moscow.

By the end of the day on August 21 24 divisions of the Warsaw Pact countries occupied the main objects on the territory of Czechoslovakia. The troops of the USSR and its allies occupied all points without the use of weapons, since the Czechoslovak army was ordered not to resist.

Action by the HRC and the population

In Prague, protesters tried to obstruct the movement of troops and equipment; all street signs and signs were knocked down, all maps of Prague were hidden in shops, while the Soviet military had only outdated maps from the war. As a result, control over radio, television and newspapers was delayed. The "healthy forces" took refuge in the Soviet embassy. But they could not be persuaded to form a new government and hold a plenum of the Central Committee. The media have already declared them traitors.

At the call of the President of the country and Czech Radio, the citizens of Czechoslovakia did not provide armed resistance to the invasion troops. Nevertheless, everywhere the troops met passive resistance from the local population. Czechs and Slovaks refused to provide the Soviet troops with drink, food and fuel, changed road signs to hinder the advance of troops, took to the streets, tried to explain to the soldiers the essence of the events taking place in Czechoslovakia, appealed to the Russian-Czechoslovak brotherhood. The citizens demanded the withdrawal of foreign troops and the return of the leaders of the party and government taken to the USSR.

On the initiative of the Prague City Committee of the CPC, early underground sessions of the XIV Congress of the CPC began on the territory of the plant in Vysočany (district of Prague), however, without delegates from Slovakia who did not have time to arrive.

Representatives of the conservatively-minded group of delegates at the congress were not elected to any of the leading posts in the CPC.

Losses of the parties

There was practically no fighting. There were isolated cases of attacks on the military, but the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of Czechoslovakia did not offer resistance.

According to modern data, 108 citizens of Czechoslovakia were killed and more than 500 wounded during the invasion, the vast majority of them civilians. On the first day of the invasion alone, 58 people were killed or mortally wounded, including seven women and an eight-year-old child.

The largest number of civilian casualties was in Prague in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Czech Radio building... Perhaps some of the victims were undocumented. For example, witnesses report the shooting of Soviet soldiers at a crowd of Prague residents on Wenceslas Square, as a result of which several people died and were wounded, although the data on this incident were not included in the reports of the Czechoslovak security service. There are numerous testimonies of the deaths of civilians, including among minors and the elderly, in Prague, Liberec, Brno, Kosice, Poprad and other cities of Czechoslovakia as a result of the unmotivated use of weapons by Soviet soldiers.

Total from August 21 to September 20, 1968 combat losses of the Soviet troops amounted to 12 dead and 25 wounded and injured. Non-combat losses for the same period - 84 dead and dead, 62 wounded and injured. Also, as a result of a helicopter crash in the area of \u200b\u200bTeplice, 2 Soviet correspondents were killed. It should be noted that the surviving helicopter pilot, fearing that he would have to bear responsibility for the accident, fired several bullets from a pistol at the helicopter, and then stated that the helicopter was shot down by the Czechoslovakians; this version was official for some time, and correspondents K. Nepomnyashchy and A. Zvorykin appeared, including in the internal materials of the KGB, as victims of "counter-revolutionaries".

August 26, 1968 near the city of Zvolen (Czechoslovakia) crashed An-12 from the Tula 374 VTAP (captain N. Nabok). According to the pilots, the plane with a load (9 tons of butter) was fired upon from the ground from a machine gun at an altitude of 300 meters during the landing approach and, as a result of damage to the 4th engine, fell, not reaching the runway several kilometers. 5 people were killed (burned alive in the resulting fire), the radio operator survived. However, according to Czech historians and archivists, the plane crashed into the mountain.

Near the settlement of Zhandov near the town of Ceska Lipa, a group of citizens, blocking the road to the bridge, impeded the movement of the Soviet T-55 tank of Sergeant Major Yu. I. Andreev, who at high speed was catching up with the convoy that had gone ahead. The foreman decided to turn off the road so as not to crush people and the tank fell off the bridge along with the crew. Three servicemen were killed.

The losses of the USSR in equipment are not exactly known. In the parts of the 38th Army alone, 7 tanks and armored personnel carriers were burned in the first three days on the territory of Slovakia and North Moravia.

Known data on the losses of the armed forces of other countries - participants in the operation. So, the Hungarian army lost 4 soldiers perished (all - non-combat losses: accident, illness, suicide). The Bulgarian army lost 2 people - one sentry was killed at the post by unknown assailants (while a machine gun was stolen), 1 soldier shot himself.

Subsequent events and international assessment of the invasion

IN early September troops were withdrawn from many cities and towns of Czechoslovakia to specially designated locations. Soviet tanks left Prague on September 11, 1968. On October 16, 1968, an agreement was signed between the governments of the USSR and Czechoslovakia on the conditions for the temporary stay of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia, according to which part of the Soviet troops remained on the territory of Czechoslovakia "in order to ensure the security of the socialist community." October 17, 1968 a phased withdrawal of part of the troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia began, which was completed by mid-November.

IN 1969 year in Prague, students Jan Palach and Jan Zajic committed self-immolation at monthly intervals in protest against the Soviet occupation.

As a result of the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia, the process of political and economic reforms was interrupted. At the April (1969) plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine G. Husak was elected first secretary. The reformers were removed from office, and repressions began. Several tens of thousands of people left the country, including many representatives of the country's cultural elite.

On the territory of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet military presence remained until 1991 year.

August 21 representatives of the group of countries (USA, Great Britain, France, Canada, Denmark and Paraguay) made a speech in the UN Security Council with a demand to bring the "Czechoslovak question" to a meeting of the UN General Assembly.

The representatives of Hungary and the USSR voted against. Then the representative of Czechoslovakia demanded that this issue be removed from UN consideration. The governments of four socialist countries - Yugoslavia, Romania, Albania (which withdrew from the Warsaw Pact Organization in September), the PRC, as well as a number of communist parties of Western countries - condemned the military intervention of the five states.

Possible motivations of the reasons for the introduction of troops and the consequences

By the official version of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the ATS countries (except Romania): the government of Czechoslovakia asked the allies in the military bloc to provide armed assistance in the fight against counter-revolutionary groups, which, with the support of hostile imperialist countries, were preparing a coup d'etat with the aim of overthrowing socialism.

Geopolitical aspect: The USSR stopped the possibility on the part of the satellite countries to revise the unequal interstate relations that ensure its hegemony in Eastern Europe.

The military-strategic aspect: the voluntarism of Czechoslovakia in foreign policy during the Cold War threatened the security of the border with NATO countries; before 1968 year, Czechoslovakia remained the only country of the Internal Affairs Directorate, where there were no military bases of the USSR.

Ideological aspect: the ideas of socialism "with a human face" undermined the idea of \u200b\u200bthe truth of Marxism-Leninism, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the leading role of the communist party, which, in turn, affected the power interests of the party elite.

Political aspect: the harsh reprisal against democratic voluntarism in Czechoslovakia gave members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee the opportunity, on the one hand, to deal with the internal opposition, on the other, to increase their authority, and in the third, to prevent the disloyalty of the allies and demonstrate military power to potential opponents.

As a result of Operation Danube, Czechoslovakia remained a member of the East European socialist bloc. The Soviet grouping of troops (up to 130 thousand people) remained in Czechoslovakia until 1991. The agreement on the conditions for the stay of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia became one of the main military and political results of the deployment of troops from five states, which satisfied the leadership of the USSR and the Department of Internal Affairs. However, Albania withdrew from the Warsaw Pact as a result of the invasion.

The suppression of the Prague Spring increased the disenchantment of many Western leftists with the theory of Marxism-Leninism and contributed to the growth of ideas of "Eurocommunism" among the leadership and members of Western communist parties - which subsequently led to a split in many of them. The communist parties of Western Europe have lost mass support, since the impossibility of "socialism with a human face" was practically shown.

Milos Zeman was expelled from the Communist Party in 1970 for disagreeing with the introduction of Warsaw Pact troops into the country.

It is argued that Operation Danube has strengthened the position of the United States in Europe.

Paradoxically, a forceful action in Czechoslovakia in 1968 hastened the arrival in relations between East and West during the period of the so-called. "Detente", based on the recognition of the territorial status quo that existed in Europe and the conduct of Germany under Chancellor Willy Brandt of the so-called. "New eastern policy".

Operation Danube obstructed possible reforms in the USSR: “For the Soviet Union, the strangulation of the Prague Spring was associated with many grave consequences. The imperial "victory" in 1968 cut off the oxygen to the reforms, strengthening the position of dogmatic forces, strengthening the great power features in Soviet foreign policy, and contributed to the strengthening of stagnation in all spheres. "

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

With the onset of the Khrushchev Thaw in the Soviet Union, a number of serious socio-political changes were outlined, which were supposed to turn the established opinion about the USSR as a country with a totalitarian regime. Despite the fact that many of the innovations and reforms introduced into the social and political life of the country outwardly looked reformist and democratic, the essence of the Soviet system of government did not change. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union, aimed at expanding spheres of influence and maintaining the conquered positions, remained unchanged. The methods of foreign policy influence on the policy of the satellite countries and political regimes in the third world countries have also been preserved. All means were used, from political blackmail to threats to use military force.

All the charm of the love of the Soviet Union and the care of brothers in the socialist camp at the end of the 60s of the XX century was fully felt by Czechoslovakia. This country, despite the socialist path of development, made an attempt to follow its own path of development. The result of such courage was an acute political crisis that broke out in the country, which was ended by an armed invasion - the introduction of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia.

The beginning of Operation Danube - the end of fraternal friendship

The month of August is one of the most significant months for history, especially in the turbulent 20th century. In this month, with chronological accuracy, significant events take place that influence the subsequent course of history, changing the fate of peoples. In 1968, August was no exception. On the late night of August 21, 1968, one of the largest military operations began in Europe since 1945, codenamed "Danube".

The scene of action was the central European state of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, which until that moment was one of the main pillars of the socialist camp. As a result of the invasion of the troops of the countries of the Warsaw Pact, Czechoslovakia was occupied. The Prague Spring, a revolutionary period in the country's history, was stifled through the use of brute military force. All reforms carried out in the country and were of a revolutionary nature were curtailed. The military intervention in Czechoslovakia became a serious rift that split the unity of the socialist camp.

It must be said that the socialist front was united in this impulse. Protest and disagreement with the ongoing methods were expressed by those countries that tried to conduct a balanced foreign policy, distancing themselves from the excessive tutelage of the USSR. Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania opposed the introduction of the troops of the Internal Affairs Department into Czechoslovakia. In general, after these events, the Albanian leadership set a course for secession from the members of the Warsaw Pact Organization.

From a technical point of view, Operation Danube can be considered a model of tactical and strategic planning. The country's territory was occupied by large military contingents in just three days. Even taking into account the fact that the invasion troops did not meet organized resistance from the Czechoslovak People's Army, losses during such a large-scale operation were extremely small. The Soviet units participating in Operation Danube lost 36 people killed and wounded, excluding non-combat losses. The occupation of Czechoslovakia for the civilian population was not so peaceful. 108 people became victims of direct armed clashes with the occupation forces, more than half a thousand were injured.

In this case, not without provocation. In addition to the fact that troops ready to invade were concentrated on the borders of Czechoslovakia, the beginning of the operation had to be carried out in secret and covertly. A Soviet passenger plane made an emergency landing at the airport of the Czechoslovak capital at night, from the cabin of which, to the surprise of the airfield service personnel, armed paratroopers began to disembark. After the capture group captured all the main nodes and control points of the airport, Soviet transport planes began to land on the runway one after another. Soviet transport planes, loaded with military equipment and military personnel, arrived every 30 seconds. From that moment on, the fate of the Prague Spring was sealed.

At the same time, after receiving a signal about the successful start of the operation, Soviet troops, army units of the National People's Army of Germany, units and mechanized units of the Polish Army, People's Army of Bulgaria and Hungary invaded the territory of Czechoslovakia. The invasion was carried out from three directions. Columns of the NPA and the Polish Army came from the North. Soviet troops invaded Czechoslovakia from the East through Transcarpathia. Troops of the Hungarian People's Army and parts of the Bulgarian army advanced from the southern flank. Thus, the "rebellious republic" was engulfed in dense steel tongs.

It is important to note that at the very last moment the army units of the German Democratic Republic were barred from participating in the invasion. The Soviet leadership did not want to have an analogy with the Wehrmacht's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938. German troops were ordered to stop at the border, being in constant combat readiness. Polish, Hungarian and Bulgarian units performed an auxiliary function, controlling the peripheral regions of the country and a section of the border of Czechoslovakia with Austria. The main tasks in the course of Operation Danube were solved by Soviet troops, which were consolidated into two fronts - Carpathian and Central. The total number of Soviet troops involved in the invasion was about 200 thousand soldiers and officers.

Tactically, the Soviet Union allocated large forces to participate in Operation Danube. In total, 18 Soviet divisions took part in the operation, including tank, airborne and motorized rifle divisions. From the air, the troops had serious air support. Only the helicopter and aviation units of the frontal aviation numbered 22 regiments. The number of Soviet tanks was unprecedented, approximately 5,000 vehicles used for the operation! The total number of army units and subdivisions of the armed forces of the countries that took part in Operation Danube was about half a million people.

An interesting motive was used by the leaders of the countries that took part in the invasion. The Prague Spring was declared an attempt by the counter-revolutionary forces to take revenge, the aim of which was to eliminate the socialist gains of the Czechoslovak people. In this regard, the USSR and other countries of the socialist camp are forced to come to the aid of the people of fraternal Czechoslovakia in defending their conquests.

The true causes of the conflict

Since the end of the Second World War, Czechoslovakia has been the sphere of interests of the Soviet Union. To ensure the strength of the socialist camp, the Warsaw Pact Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) were created. All this was supposed to keep the countries and states of socialist orientation in the orbit of the political influence of the USSR. Based on this, any changes in the political structure of government, changes in the foreign policy of the allied countries caused a sharp reaction in the Kremlin. The events in Hungary in 1956 are a vivid confirmation of this. Even then, the Soviet Union had to use force to suppress the outbreak of popular unrest.

By 1968, Czechoslovakia found itself in a similar situation. By this time, a difficult internal political situation had matured in the country, which seriously undermined the hegemony of the ruling Czechoslovak Communist Party. The correct Soviet course of development was replaced by Alexander Dubchek, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia A. Novotny. His main political position was based on a radical renewal of party policy in relation to the leadership of the country's social and political life and the economy.

The first steps in this direction looked optimistic. Weakened censorship, simplified the policy of doing business in the country. The country was on the verge of dramatic economic reforms. At first glance, the declared position looked progressive and modern, however, according to the curators from Moscow, such steps could cause a gradual departure of Czechoslovakia from the socialist path of development. In the intentions of the Czechoslovak communists, the Soviet leaders saw a desire to pursue rapprochement with the West. They were not going to silently contemplate what was happening in the Soviet Union, so a long diplomatic game began. The leaders of the GDR and Poland supported the unrest and feelings of the Soviet leadership regarding the events in Czechoslovakia. The leaders of Yugoslavia, Albania and the Socialist Republic of Romania, Joseph Broz Tito, Enver Hoxha and Nicolae Ceausescu, opposed interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, as well as in the future against the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia.

By the way: The last two leaders later became dictators and managed to stay in power for a significant period. Enver Hoxha died a natural death in 1985. Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu was convicted by a military tribunal and shot in the 1989 revolution.

The events that took place in Czechoslovakia in those days could have an extremely negative impact on the social and political life of neighboring countries. The situation in Poland was unsettled. The events of 12 years ago have not yet been forgotten in Hungary. The slogan declared by the Czechoslovak communists - "Let's build socialism with a human face" undermined the basic foundations of the socialist system. The liberal policy pursued in the party leadership of Czechoslovakia, in its goals and objectives, diverged from the line of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The Czechoslovak experiment could become a detonator that could provoke a subsequent chain reaction in the socialist camp. This could not be allowed either in the Kremlin or in other capitals of the Eastern European socialist states.

Aims and methods of pressure on Czechoslovakia

The Soviet leadership, having fresh memories of the events in Hungary in 1956, made every effort to resolve the Czechoslovak crisis in a peaceful manner. It was originally a giveaway game. The Soviets were ready to make significant political concessions to the new Czechoslovak leadership in exchange for adherence to the ideals of socialist internationalism and a restrained policy towards the West. The military aspect was not considered at first. Czechoslovakia was an important element of the united ATS strategy, an active participant in the CMEA, and a major economic partner of the USSR. According to the party leadership of the USSR, using military force against its main ally was unacceptable. This option was considered as the most extreme case, when all the mechanisms and means of a peaceful political settlement will be exhausted.

Despite the fact that most members of the Politburo spoke out against the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia, the military received clear instructions on the development of a strategic operation for the invasion of the armed forces of the ATS countries into the territory of Czechoslovakia. The information that followed that Czechoslovakia was not going to make concessions in its position only convinced the Soviet leadership of the timeliness of the preparatory operations. An extraordinary congress of the CPC is scheduled for September 9; on August 16, the Politburo, by a majority vote, decided to use the armed forces to suppress the counter-revolutionary rebellion in the fraternal republic.

In order to whitewash itself in the eyes of the socialist community and distribute responsibility to other political players, the Soviet leadership specially held a meeting of the ATS member countries on August 18 in Moscow. The leaders of the Eastern European countries attending the meeting supported the initiative of the Soviet leadership.

The official version for the provision of military assistance was the appeal of a group of public and party leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Central Committee of the CPSU to other fraternal parties with a request for military-political international assistance. The appeal hinted at the counter-revolutionary activities of the current party leadership of Czechoslovakia and the need to urgently change the country's leadership by any means. For the Czechoslovak side, preparations for the introduction of troops did not come as a surprise. The Ministry of Defense of Czechoslovakia, other party leaders of the country were informed that a large-scale military-police action was planned.

Finally

Naturally, 50 years after the well-known events, it is safe to say that there was no counter-revolutionary rebellion in Czechoslovakia. The communists were in power in the country, civil society was loyal to the leading role of the party in the development of the state. The only thing you can focus on is the different approaches to achieving the goal. The course of reforms declared by the Czechoslovak leadership is very similar in content to the events that took place in the Soviet Union 20 years later, during the Perestroika era.

On the night of August 21, 1968, the temporary entry of troops of the USSR, the People's Republic of Bulgaria (now the Republic of Bulgaria), the Hungarian People's Republic (now Hungary), the German Democratic Republic (GDR, now part of the Federal Republic of Germany) and the Polish People's Republic (now the Republic of Poland) to the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (Czechoslovakia, now the independent states of the Czech Republic and Slovakia) in accordance with the then understanding of the leadership of the Soviet Union and other participating countries of the essence of international assistance. It was carried out with the aim of "defending the cause of socialism" in Czechoslovakia, preventing the loss of power by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC), and a possible withdrawal of the country from the socialist community and the Warsaw Pact Organization. (ATS).

By the end of the 1960s, Czechoslovak society was faced with a complex of problems that could not be solved within the framework of the Soviet-type socialist system. The economy suffered from the disproportionate development of industries, the loss of traditional sales markets; democratic freedoms were virtually absent; national sovereignty was limited. Demands for radical democratization of all aspects of life were growing in Czechoslovak society.

In January 1968, the President of Czechoslovakia and the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Antonin Novotny were removed. The leader of the Communist Party was elected representative of the liberal wing of the Communist Party, Alexander Dubcek, and Ludvik Svoboda became the president of Czechoslovakia. In April, the program of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was published, which proclaimed a course for the democratic renewal of socialism, and provided for limited economic reforms.

Initially, the leadership of the USSR did not interfere in the internal party problems of the Communist Party of China, but the main features of the proclaimed "new model" of socialist society (synthesis of a planned and market economy; relative independence of state power and public organizations from party control; rehabilitation of victims of repression; democratization of political life in the country, etc. ) ran counter to the Soviet interpretation of Marxist-Leninist ideology and aroused alarm among the leadership of the USSR. The possibility of a "chain reaction" in the neighboring socialist countries caused hostility to the Czechoslovak "experiment" not only of the Soviet, but also of the East German, Polish and Bulgarian leaders. A more restrained position was taken by the Hungarian leadership.

From a geopolitical point of view, a dangerous situation arose for the USSR in one of the key countries of Eastern Europe. As a result of Czechoslovakia's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, the Eastern European system of military security would inevitably undermine.

The use of force was considered by the Soviet leadership as the last alternative, but nevertheless, in the spring of 1968, it decided on the need to carry out measures to prepare its armed forces for operations on the territory of Czechoslovakia.

The deployment of troops was preceded by numerous attempts at political dialogue during inter-party meetings between the leadership of the CPSU and the CPC, mutual visits of government delegations, multilateral meetings of the leaders of Czechoslovakia and socialist countries. But political pressure did not produce the expected results. The final decision to send troops to Czechoslovakia was made at an enlarged meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on August 16, 1968 and approved at a meeting of the leaders of the Warsaw Pact member states in Moscow on August 18, based on an appeal by a group of party and state leaders of Czechoslovakia to the governments of the USSR and other ATS countries with a request for international assistance. The action was planned as a short-term one. The operation to bring in troops received the code name "Danube", and the general leadership of it was entrusted to General of the Army Ivan Pavlovsky.

Direct training of troops began on August 17-18. First of all, they prepared for long marches of equipment, replenished stocks of material resources, worked out work cards, and carried out other activities. On the eve of the introduction of troops, Marshal of the Soviet Union Andrei Grechko informed the Minister of Defense of Czechoslovakia Martin Dzur about the impending action and warned against resistance from the Czechoslovak armed forces.

The operation to bring troops into Czechoslovakia began on August 20 at 23.00, when the alert was announced in the military units involved.

On the night of August 21, the troops of the USSR, Poland, the GDR, Hungary and Bulgaria crossed the Czechoslovak border from four directions with surprise. The movement of troops was carried out in radio silence, which contributed to the secrecy of the military action. Simultaneously with the introduction of ground forces to the airfields of Czechoslovakia, contingents of airborne troops were transferred from the territory of the USSR. At two o'clock in the morning on August 21, units of the 7th Airborne Division landed at an airfield near Prague. They blocked the main facilities of the airfield, where Soviet military transport aircraft An-12 with a landing force and military equipment began to land at short intervals. The paratroopers were to take control of the most important state and party facilities, primarily in Prague and Brno.

The rapid and coordinated entry of troops into Czechoslovakia led to the fact that, within 36 hours, the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries established full control over Czechoslovak territory. The entered troops were stationed in all regions and major cities. Particular attention was paid to the protection of the western borders of Czechoslovakia. The total number of troops directly taking part in the operation was about 300 thousand people.

The 200,000-strong Czechoslovak army (about ten divisions) offered practically no resistance. She remained in the barracks, carrying out the order of her Minister of Defense, and remained neutral until the end of events in the country. The population, mainly in Prague, Bratislava and other large cities, showed discontent. The protest was expressed in the construction of symbolic barricades on the path of the advancement of tank columns, the operation of clandestine radio stations, the distribution of leaflets and appeals to the Czechoslovak population and military personnel of allied countries.

The leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was actually arrested and taken to Moscow. However, the political goals of the action initially failed. The plan of the Soviet leadership to form a "revolutionary government" of Czechoslovak leaders loyal to the USSR failed. All strata of society in Czechoslovakia strongly opposed the presence of foreign troops in the country.

On August 21, a group of countries (USA, England, France, Canada, Denmark and Paraguay) addressed the UN Security Council with a demand to bring the "Czechoslovak question" to a meeting of the UN General Assembly, seeking a decision on the immediate withdrawal of troops from the Warsaw Pact countries. The representatives of Hungary and the USSR voted against. Later, the representative of Czechoslovakia demanded to remove this issue from the UN. The situation in Czechoslovakia was also discussed in the NATO Permanent Council. The governments of the socialist-oriented countries - Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania, and China - condemned the military intervention of five states. In these conditions, the USSR and its allies were forced to look for a way out of this situation.

On August 23-26, 1968, negotiations were held in Moscow between the Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders. Their result was a joint communique, in which the timing of the withdrawal of Soviet troops was made dependent on the normalization of the situation in Czechoslovakia.

At the end of August, the Czechoslovak leaders returned to their homeland. In early September, the first signs of stabilization were outlined. The result was the withdrawal of the troops of the countries participating in the action from many cities and towns of Czechoslovakia to specially designated places of deployment. Aviation was concentrated on designated airfields. The withdrawal of troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia was hampered by the persisting internal political instability, as well as increased NATO activity near the Czechoslovak borders, which was expressed in the regrouping of the bloc's troops stationed on the territory of the FRG in the immediate vicinity of the borders of the GDR and Czechoslovakia, in conducting various kinds of exercises. On October 16, 1968, an agreement was signed between the governments of the USSR and Czechoslovakia on the conditions for the temporary stay of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia "in order to ensure the security of the socialist community." In accordance with the document, the Central Group of Forces (TSGV) was created - an operational territorial formation of the Armed Forces of the USSR, temporarily stationed in the territory of Czechoslovakia. The headquarters of the CGV was located in the town of Milovice near Prague. The combat composition included two tank and three motorized rifle divisions.

The signing of the treaty became one of the main military-political results of the deployment of troops of five states, which satisfied the leadership of the USSR and the Department of Internal Affairs. On October 17, 1968, a phased withdrawal of allied forces from the territory of Czechoslovakia began, which was completed by mid-November.

The action of the troops of the Warsaw Pact countries, despite the absence of hostilities, was accompanied by losses on both sides. From August 21 to October 20, 1968, as a result of hostile actions by citizens of Czechoslovakia, 11 Soviet servicemen were killed, 87 people were wounded and injured. In addition, they died in accidents, with careless handling of weapons, died from diseases, etc. another 85 people. According to the government commission of Czechoslovakia, in the period from August 21 to December 17, 1968, 94 Czechoslovak citizens were killed, 345 people were injured of varying severity.

As a result of the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia, a radical change in the course of the Czechoslovak leadership took place. The process of political and economic reforms in the country was interrupted.

In the second half of the 1980s, the process of rethinking the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia began. In the "Statement of the leaders of Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and the Soviet Union" of December 4, 1989 and in the "Statement of the Soviet government" of December 5, 1989, the decision on the entry of allied forces into Czechoslovakia was recognized as erroneous and condemned as unjustified interference in the internal affairs of a the state.

On February 26, 1990, an agreement was signed in Moscow on the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia. By this time, the CGV was located in 67 settlements in the Czech Republic and in 16 in Slovakia. The combat strength included over 1.1 thousand tanks and 2.5 thousand infantry fighting vehicles, more than 1.2 thousand artillery pieces, 100 aircraft and 170 helicopters; the total number of military personnel was over 92 thousand people, civilian personnel - 44.7 thousand people. In July 1991, the TSGV was abolished in connection with the completion of the withdrawal of troops to the territory Russian Federation.

On August 21, 1968, the Soviet airborne troops carried out a successful operation to capture key points in the capital of Czechoslovakia.

No matter how much you feed the wolf, he looks into the forest. No matter how much you feed a Czech, Pole, Hungarian or Lithuanian, he will still look to the West. From the very moment of the formation of the socialist camp, concern for its well-being was entrusted to the country that liberated these countries from fascism. The Russian peasant ate gray bread so that the East German could spread his favorite sort of marmalade on a bun. The Russian peasant drank Solntsedar so that the Hungarian could drink his favorite Tokay wines. The Russian peasant was shaking to work in a crowded tram so that the Czech could ride his beloved Skoda or Tatra.

But neither the Germans, nor the Hungarians, nor the Czechs appreciated any of this. The first staged the Berlin Crisis in 1953, the second - in 1956, the notorious events in Hungary, and the third - in 1968 the so-called Prague Spring.

It was to eliminate this unrest that the Danube operation was carried out.

At 2 am on August 21, 1968, the advance units of the 7th Airborne Division landed at the Ruzyne airfield in Prague. They blocked the main facilities of the airfield, where Soviet An-12s with a landing party and military equipment began to land. The seizure of the airfield was carried out using a deceptive maneuver: a Soviet passenger plane approaching the airfield requested an emergency landing due to alleged damage on board. After clearance and landing, the paratroopers from the plane captured the control tower and ensured the landing of the landing aircraft.

At 5 o'clock. 10 minutes. a reconnaissance company of the 350th parachute regiment and a separate reconnaissance company of the 103rd airborne division landed. Within 10 minutes, they captured the Turani and Namesti airfields, after which a hasty landing of the main forces began. According to eyewitnesses, transport planes landed at airfields one after another. The landing party jumped off without waiting for a complete stop. By the end of the runway, the plane was already empty and immediately picked up speed for a new takeoff. With a minimum interval, other planes with troops and military equipment began to arrive here.

On military equipment and captured civilian vehicles, the paratroopers went deep into the territory, and by 9.00 they blocked all roads, bridges, exits from the city, radio and television buildings, telegraph, main post office, administrative buildings of the city and region, printing house, railway stations in Brno , as well as the headquarters of military units and enterprises of the military industry. The ChNA commanders were asked to remain calm and orderly.

Four hours after the landing of the first paratrooper groups, the most important objects in Prague and Brno were under the control of the Allied forces. The main efforts of the paratroopers were directed at seizing the buildings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Churches, the government, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, as well as the buildings of the radio station and television. According to a previously developed plan, columns of troops were sent to the main administrative and industrial centers of Czechoslovakia. Formations and units of the allied forces were deployed in all major cities. Particular attention was paid to the protection of the western borders of Czechoslovakia.

The 200,000-strong Czechoslovak army, like 30 years before that when the country was captured by the Germans, offered practically no resistance. However, among the population, mainly in Prague, Bratislava and other large cities, there was discontent with what was happening. The public outcry was expressed in the construction of barricades on the path of the advancement of tank columns, the actions of clandestine radio stations, the distribution of leaflets and appeals to the Czechoslovak population and military personnel of allied countries. In some cases, there were armed attacks on servicemen of a contingent of troops deployed in Czechoslovakia, throwing bottles with a combustible mixture on tanks and other armored vehicles, attempts to disable communications and transport, destruction of monuments to Soviet soldiers in cities and villages of Czechoslovakia.

On August 21, a group of countries (USA, England, France, Canada, Denmark and Paraguay) addressed the UN Security Council with a demand to bring the "Czechoslovak issue" to a meeting of the UN General Assembly, seeking a decision on the immediate withdrawal of troops from the Warsaw Pact countries. The representatives of Hungary and the USSR voted against. The governments of the socialist-oriented countries - Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania and China - condemned the military intervention of five states.

On October 16, 1968, an agreement was signed between the governments of the USSR and Czechoslovakia on the conditions for the temporary stay of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia, according to which part of the Soviet troops remained on the territory of Czechoslovakia "in order to ensure the security of the socialist community." The agreement contained provisions on respect for the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia and non-interference in its internal affairs. The signing of the treaty became one of the main military-political results of the deployment of troops from five states, which satisfied the leadership of the USSR and the Department of Internal Affairs.

On October 17, 1968, a phased withdrawal of allied forces from the territory of Czechoslovakia began, which was completed by mid-November.

Despite the fact that during the introduction of the troops of the Warsaw Pact countries, there were no hostilities, there were losses. For example, during the redeployment and deployment of Soviet troops (from August 20 to November 12), as a result of the actions of hostile individuals, 11 servicemen, including one officer, died; wounded and injured 87 Soviet servicemen, including 19 officers.

Many now ask the question, why was it necessary to keep all these Czechs, Poles, Germans and Hungarians in the socialist camp? But if we let all of them lie under the West, American military bases would immediately be on our borders. And therefore, in Poland we had to keep the Northern Group of Forces, in the GDR - the Western, in Hungary - the Southern, and in Czechoslovakia - the Central.

MEMORIES OF THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE OPERATION

Lev Gorelov (in 1968 - the commander of the 7th Guards Airborne Division):

There is no such thing in the airborne forces' charters, it is not intended to fight in cities. In the regulations of the combined arms, where infantry, there is also nothing - "features of the conduct of hostilities" ...

What to do? The guys from the villages, some of them weren't even in the houses, they don't know what a multi-storey building is.

I have collected retired veterans who once took settlements during the war. We are writing a temporary instruction for taking home. Houses are like houses, not on a global scale, but as a large house to take. We are withdrawing a division, regiments, and the regiments stood separately, and in each city, there are microdistricts. So here we are at dawn, until people come home from work, we trained there - we worked out the capture of the settlement. And this tactic is different: an assault detachment, a support detachment, fire support, cover squads - this is a whole new tactic for the paratroopers, and for everyone. Taking a settlement means creating assault groups. I have been training for a month, they say: "The divisional commander is crazy, what is it, everyone was taken out, from morning till night, until the arrival of the working class, they are storming ..."

What saved us from bloodshed? Why did we lose 15 thousand of our young children in Grozny, but not in Prague? And here's why: there were detachments ready, ready in advance, Smarkovsky was in charge, an ideologist. They formed detachments, but they did not give out weapons, weapons on alarm - come, take your weapon. So we knew, our intelligence knew where these warehouses were. We seized the warehouses in the first place, and then we took over the Central Committee, the General Staff, and so on, the government. We threw the first part of our forces into warehouses, then everything else.

In short, at 2 hours 15 minutes I landed, and at 6 hours Prague was in the hands of the paratroopers. The Czechs woke up in the morning - to arms, and our guards were standing there. All.

- That is, there was no resistance?

- Only in the Central Committee. This means that 9 Czechs in the Central Committee were killed by ours. The fact is that they went through the basements and came out on the opposite side, the corridor is long, you know, these are office premises. And our guard stood in Dubchik's office, and the machine-gunner sat 50 meters before this office and saw - these were walking, running with machine guns. Aim and gave a burst. He then discharged the entire belt from a machine gun, kills them, and then the Czechs were taken away by helicopter. Where they buried, I don't know.

NIKOLAY MESHKOV (senior sergeant of the motorized rifle regiment pp 50560):

The regiment commander, Colonel Klevtsov, a combat commander, a participant in the Great Patriotic War, as well as a participant in the Hungarian events, said: “I was taught by the bitter experience of the Hungarian events, because of the orders“ not to shoot ”many soldiers were killed. And we have been ordered to defend the socialist gains in Czechoslovakia and we will defend them with weapons in our hands, and for each shot from their side, we will respond in kind. "

The first 50 kilometers passed without incident. Driving at about 2 am some settlement where one of the Czechoslovak military units was located, we saw that the soldiers were withdrawing tanks and vehicles on a combat alert. We heard the first bursts of machine-gun, about 40 kilometers before Prague. Each of us immediately found his helmet, half of the soldiers went down inside the APC. All the soldiers attached the horn to their submachine gun and put them on a combat platoon. The soldier's jokes were set aside.

The city greeted us warily. There are no signs around, the streets are narrow. Everywhere there are 10-15-storey buildings. The tank in such a place looked like a matchbox. Almost a kilometer later, the first obstacle stood in the way of the cars - a barricade of cars and buses, all Soviet-made. Our column stopped. From some building, from above, an automatic fire began. Bullets clattered across the armored personnel carrier's armor, and we were blown into the car like a wind. In response, we also opened fire from machine guns. No harm done. The lead tank was ordered to fire a blank charge to clear the road. The shot rang out suddenly, breaking the silence of the early morning. A barricade of cars flew apart, some of the cars turned over and caught fire. The column moved on.

… The road ran along the river, and there were high-rise buildings on the left. The road was very narrow, two tanks, being on it, could not part. A kilometer and a half later, at a bend, a crowd of armed people appeared, covering themselves with small children. They opened fire on us. The front tank began to move to the right, so as not to run over the children, broke through the parapet and fell into the river. None of the crew got out, everyone died, but at the cost of their lives they saved the kids. Then people began to flee to their homes, and we drove the armed militants back with fire. Three of them were killed, and we had two wounded and a dead crew ...

Even on the way to Prague there were two barricades of cars and buses, and also all the equipment was Soviet, where did they get so much of it? A BAT with a cleaner moved forward of the column and cleared the barricades like a heap of rubbish. We were fired three more times from our houses ... An APC caught fire behind us, another 40 meters later, soldiers were jumping out of their cars. A mixture in cellophane was dropped from the windows on the armored personnel carrier, when the cellophane burst upon impact, the mixture immediately ignited like gasoline, the commanders said that this fire could not be extinguished ... Having reached the government residence with losses at about 7 am and surrounded it from all sides, we did not saw not a single paratrooper, they were not. As it turned out later, for some reason they were delayed for almost three hours, and they got to their destination with whatever they could. In general, the motorbike convoy on which they arrived was 100 units. But they were immediately taken to other lines, their task was carried out by our unit.

On the northern side was a regiment of Germans, next to them were the Hungarians, and a little further the Poles.

By 8 a.m. the city woke up as if on cue, stunned by explosions, submachine guns and machine guns. All allied troops entered the city 6 hours earlier than expected.

The city began to live on a military life, military patrols appeared. The shooting in the city did not stop, but increased with each passing hour. We already clearly distinguished where our machine gun was beating, and where the stranger was, the shots of our cannons and the explosions of other people's shells. Only the fan of bullets could not be distinguished, it is the same in flight. The first picketers and students appeared. They staged a strike, then went on to storm, we could barely hold back the onslaught. The howitzer was seized, we recaptured the gunners with a platoon.

... A case remained in my memory: Czechs who spoke Russian well came out of the crowd and offered us to get out of their land in an amicable way. A crowd of 500-600 people became a wall, as if on command, we were separated by 20 meters. From the back rows they raised four people in their arms, who were looking around. The crowd was quiet. They were showing something with their hands to each other, and then instantly pulled out short-barreled submachine guns, and 4 long lines thundered. We didn't expect such a trick. 9 people dropped dead. Six were wounded, the Czechs who were shooting disappeared instantly, and the crowd was dumbfounded. A soldier in front, whose friend had been killed, unloaded the clip into the crowd. All dispersed, carrying away their dead and wounded. So the first death came to our "gunners". In the future, we became smarter, they took all the strikers in a ring, and checked everyone for weapons. There was not a single case that we did not seize it, 6-10 units each time. We transferred people with weapons to the headquarters, there we dealt with them.

A week of fighting and shooting left its mark. One morning, waking up in the morning, I looked in the mirror and saw that I had gray whiskey. The worries and death of comrades made themselves felt ... Somewhere on the fifth day in the morning, a kilometer away from us, a machine gun struck with heavy fire. Bullets clattered against the walls, pouring streams of sand. Everyone fell to the ground and covered their heads with their hands, began to crawl. The command was received to suppress the firing point. The machine gun beat, not allowing to raise the head, the bullets, ricocheting on the cobblestones, made a buzzing sound from which the heart sank. I felt something hot in my right leg, crawled around the corner, took off my boot. It was torn, all the footcloth was covered in blood. The bullet sliced \u200b\u200bthrough the boot and cut the skin on the leg, essentially a scratch. I rewound it in a bag and gave it an injection. There was no pain as such, I was lucky. Took the baptism of fire. The guys from the second company, and they were grenade launchers, suppressed the firing point. With one salvo of a grenade launcher, the 4-storey building, from where the fire was fired, became 3-storey, one storey completely disappeared. After such a shot, I am proud of the power of our weapon.

... Somewhere on the twentieth day of hostilities, the fighting began to subside, there were only minor skirmishes, although there were killed and wounded.

I will describe one more case. One day in September 1968, our company was sent to unload food for the army. 4 railway refrigerators arrived, loaded with pork and beef carcasses, 2 wagons of butter, sausages, stewed meat and cereals. Before unloading, our doctors checked the food for suitability, it turned out that all the meat and the rest of the food were poisoned, although all the seals and documents were accompanied by the egg. The train was driven further from the city, into the field. The military dug trenches. In chemical protection, we unloaded food into the pits, poured diesel fuel and set it on fire. Everyone was razed to the ground ... There was a real war ...

Alexander Zasetsky (in 1968 - radio platoon commander, lieutenant):

The Czech people greeted us in different ways: the adult population is calm but wary, while the youth is aggressive, hostile and defiant. She was well "processed" by hostile propaganda. At that time Prague was full of immigrants from the West, they were then caught and expelled. There were mainly attacks, shooting, arson of cars and tanks from young people. Two barrels of fuel were attached to our tanks above the engine compartment, so they jumped onto the tank, pierced the barrels and set them on fire. The tank was on fire. Then there was an order - to remove the barrels. Of course, there were also casualties. Radio operator Lenya Pestov worked with me on the helicopter, sorry I don’t know from which part. A few days later, when he was not visible, he asked - where is Lenya? They say he was killed. The helicopters we flew were fired upon repeatedly. Some were knocked down. People were dying. I remember they shot down a helicopter with journalists. Two journalists and the pilot were killed.

Although I remember other moments of my military life with pleasure. Near our location there was a manor, there was a large luxurious garden. Autumn. Everything is ripe, a lot of fruits. To avoid the temptation to eat from the garden, the commander organized the guard of this estate. When everything calmed down a bit, an elderly Czech arrives in a three-wheeled car and asks for permission to harvest a crop in the garden. "If there is anything left," as he put it. Imagine his surprise when he saw that everything was intact, everything was in order, and a detachment of soldiers was assigned to help him to clean up. The touched elderly Czech burst into tears and thanked for a long time.