As everyone knows Russian (Eastern) Front of the First World War, which will be considered in great detail below, is the second most important land front of the PMV, on which with August 1, 1914 until December 1917, the Russian army was fighting against the combined forces of Germany and Austria-Hungary. In terms of the length and scale of individual battles, the Russian front of the WWI is, however, in first place among other land theaters of military operations of the Great War. During the first quarter of the World War, several of the greatest battles took place on the Eastern Front (they are shown in the largest type below), but after that, combat activity in the east decreased many times. During the second quarter of the war, only one truly great battle took place. After that, there was an almost complete lull on the Russian front. You can look at the full chronology of events below on this page, and see for yourself that since the fall of 1916, Russia has almost stopped participating in the War.
In this series of articles (this almost book) will be fully, comprehensively, systematically, from a unified point of view, without obvious and implicit contradictions and, if possible, impartially, all the main events on the Russian front of the First World War of 1914-1918 will be considered. (All campaigns, all major operations, all important battles on the Eastern Front, but not only! There is a lot of this about the Russian front of WWI that will not be told anywhere else!) The cycle turned out to be very large, and how could it be otherwise if in It reflected all the important events on the Eastern Front of WWI in order to understand how Russia in the First World War came not only to a military defeat, but also to an internal crisis, and then to disintegration.
Since the cycle is called "Russian Front of the First World War", it will first of all consider the participation of the Russian Imperial Army in WWI, and it will be said only in passing about the events in the rear. That is, it tells about how the Russian army entered the World War, how it won victories, how it suffered defeats, how it changed in the course of hostilities, how it was defeated, how it tried to revive, how it eventually disintegrated and disintegrated. And most importantly, here it will be traced how the combat effectiveness of the Russian army gradually fell during that war, which led Russia to withdraw from the First World War.
The cycle presents preparation for WWI in Eastern Europe; the state of the Russian army at the beginning of that war; the entire 1914 campaign of the year (including little-known operations on the flanks of the Russian front), the entire 1915 campaign that was catastrophic for Russia (special attention should be paid to the battles of spring and summer); the entire campaign of 1916 (together with the autumn events in Romania, which became another failure of the Russian army); all the events of 1917 (not only at the front). The story ends with the conclusion of an armistice, the Brest-Litovsk Peace and further events are not considered.
Reading is not easy. But we made it so that, in principle, not everything could be read, and starting from anywhere, skipping either the introductory parts of the operations, or their chronology, or conclusions. As a rule, each campaign on the Russian Front in our cycle is independent and does not require reading the previous parts.
Attention! All dates are adjusted to Gregorian
(modern) calendar. They differ from the Julian dates adopted in the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 20th century by 13 days upwards.
The general chronology of the First World War can be viewed.
Before the war.
(Preparing for World War on the Eastern Front; taken only from 1910 to 1914)
Year 1914. Russians dominate the Eastern Front.
Summer campaign.
The first two and very important operations of the Russian army at the beginning of the First World War, which, unfortunately, did not become decisive.
Autumn campaign.
During this period, the Russian army, having completed the mobilization and transportation of troops to the Army in the Field, received overwhelming numerical and qualitative advantage over the enemy. And as a result, she was able to move west to Krakow and Warta.
Early winter.
(Precarious balance on the Russian front, temporary transition to trench warfare.)
Winter Campaign 1915.
Year 1916. "Positional" war on the Eastern Front.
Detailed decision § 25-26 on history for students of grade 8, authors N.V. Zagladin 2014
- Gdz on History for grade 8 can be found
Questions and tasks to illustrate paragraph p. 224
Question 1. Why were there many more victims of the gas attack than from hand-to-hand fights?
There were more victims of the gas attack than from hand-to-hand fights, as the spreading gas clouds rose upward and moved forward with a light wind.
Question 2. What do you think, what resonance was caused in the society by the information about the first gas attack, as well as photographs of the victims of mustard gas?
The first gas attack caused fear in the society, rumors about the invincibility of the German army.
After the Ypres gas attack, both sides very quickly managed to develop gas masks of various designs, and further attempts to use chemical weapons no longer took large masses of troops by surprise.
p. 1 questions and tasks to paragraph paragraph p. 226
Question 1. Based on the materials of the paragraph, thematic map (p. 234), prepare a description of each year of the war according to an approximate plan:
1) Countries that took part in hostilities and re-entered the war on the side of the Entente or Germany.
2) Leading front / fronts and battles that influenced the course of the entire war or military campaign.
3) New weapons, military equipment, tactics, first used in battles.
4) The results of the year for the Entente countries and the alliance of the Central Powers, the balance of forces and the prospects of the belligerents on the eve of a new military campaign.
The war consisted of five campaigns. During the first campaign in 1914, Germany invaded Belgium and northern France, but was defeated at the Battle of the Marne. Russia captured part of East Prussia and Galicia (East Prussian operation and Battle of Galicia), but was then defeated by the German and Austro-Hungarian counteroffensive. As a result, there was a transition from maneuvering to positional forms of struggle.
The 1915 campaign is associated with the entry of Italy into the war, the failure of the German plan to withdraw Russia from the war, and bloody fruitless battles on the Western Front.
During this campaign, Germany and Austria-Hungary, concentrating their main efforts on the Russian front, carried out the so-called Gorlitsky breakthrough and drove out Russian troops from Poland and parts of the Baltic, but in the Vilna operation they were defeated and were forced to go over to positional defense.
On the Western Front, both sides fought strategically. Private operations (at Ypres, Champagne and Artois) were not successful, despite the use of poisonous gases.
On the Southern Front, Italian troops launched an unsuccessful operation against Austria-Hungary on the Isonzo River. German-Austrian troops managed to defeat Serbia. Anglo-French troops successfully carried out the Thessaloniki operation in Greece, but were unable to capture the Dardanelles. On the Transcaucasian Front, as a result of the Alashkert, Khamadan and Sarykamysh operations, Russia reached the approaches to Erzurum.
The 1916 campaign is associated with the entry into the war of Romania and the waging of a grueling trench warfare on all fronts. Germany again shifted efforts against France, but did not succeed in the Battle of Verdun. The operations of the Anglo-French troops on Somna were also unsuccessful, despite the use of tanks.
On the Italian front, the Austro-Hungarian forces launched the Trentino offensive, but were driven back by the Italian counteroffensive. On the Eastern Front, the troops of the Southwestern Russian Front conducted a successful operation in Galicia on a wide front up to 550 km long (Brusilov Breakthrough) and advanced 60-120 km, occupied the eastern regions of Austria-Hungary, which forced the enemy to transfer up to 34 divisions to this front from the Western and Italian fronts.
On the Transcaucasian front, the Russian army carried out the Erzurum and then the Trebizond offensive operations, which remained incomplete.
The decisive Battle of Jutland took place on the Baltic Sea. As a result of the campaign, conditions were created for the seizure of the strategic initiative by the Entente.
The 1917 campaign is associated with the entry into the war of the United States, the revolutionary withdrawal of Russia from the war and the conduct of a number of successive offensive operations on the Western Front (Operation Nivelle, operations in the Messines region, on Ypres, near Verdun, at Cambrai). These operations, despite the use in them of large forces of artillery, tanks and aviation, practically did not change the general situation in the Western European theater of military operations. In the Atlantic at this time, Germany launched an unlimited submarine war, during which both sides suffered heavy losses.
The 1918 campaign was characterized by a transition from positional defense to a general offensive by the armed forces of the Entente. First, Germany launched the Allied March offensive in Picardy, private operations in Flanders, on the Aisne and Marne rivers. But due to lack of strength, they did not receive development.
From the second half of 1918, with the entry into the war of the United States, the Allies prepared and launched retaliatory offensive operations (Amiens, St. surrender (the Armistice of Compiegne).
As a result of the First World War, the German, Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires were liquidated. Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire were divided, and Russia and Germany, having ceased to be monarchies, were cut back territorially and economically. The First World War accelerated the development of social processes, was one of the prerequisites for the revolutions in Russia, Germany, Hungary, Finland. As a result, a new military-political situation was created in the world.
In total, the First World War lasted 51 months and 2 weeks. It covered the territories of Europe, Asia and Africa, the waters of the Atlantic, the North, Baltic, Black and Mediterranean seas. This is the first military conflict on a global scale, in which 38 of the 59 independent states that existed at that time were involved. Two-thirds of the world's population took part in the war. The number of the fighting armies exceeded 37 million people. The total number of people mobilized into the armed forces was about 70 million. The length of the fronts was up to 2.5-4 thousand km. The casualties of the parties amounted to about 9.5 million killed and 20 million wounded.
In the war, new types of troops were developed and widely used: aviation, armored troops, anti-aircraft troops, anti-tank weapons, and submarine forces. New forms and methods of armed struggle began to be used: army and front-line operations, breaking through the fortifications of the fronts. New strategic categories have emerged: operational deployment of the Armed Forces, operational cover, border battles, and the initial and subsequent periods of the war.
p. 3 questions and tasks to paragraph paragraph p. 229
Question. What were the economic consequences of the war?
The First World War broke out between two military blocs: the Entente (England, France, Russia, etc.) and the Triple Alliance (Germany, Turkey, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, etc.). In general, 34 out of 56 sovereign states that existed at that time took part in it. The main reason for the war was the struggle for the redistribution of the already divided world, due to the search for sales markets and sources of raw materials for the young capitalist countries, primarily Germany and the United States, which had no colonies.
World War II made unprecedented demands on the economy. She absorbed 1/3 of the material values of mankind. The military expenditures of the belligerent powers increased more than 20 times, exceeding 12 times the available reserves of gold. However, of the countries participating in hostilities, only the United States and Japan were able to increase their national wealth - by 40 and 25%, respectively. At the same time, the United States, through the sale of weapons, concentrated about half of the world's gold reserves. The First World War brought colossal human losses, totaling about 36 million people. The structure of the economies of the countries turned out to be deformed as a result of the excessively bloated military sector, while the cessation of hostilities required new expenditures on solving disarmament problems. The gold standard system collapsed as a result of the devaluation of national currencies. The environmental consequences associated with the use of chemical weapons were no less significant. In addition, in many countries that participated in the war, there was a restructuring of the socio-economic and political system. The Turkish and Austro-Hungarian empires collapsed, and the monarchies were overthrown in Russia and Germany during the revolutions.
The results of the First World War were not at all happy for Germany. By signing the Treaty of Versailles in June 1919, she suddenly lost all the colonies that belonged to her at that time, lost the lion's share of her territory, and was forced to pay numerous compensation to countries that suffered damage during the war. In addition, the country's standing army was severely limited, and most of the fleet passed into the hands of the victorious countries.
The Mudross truce, concluded by Turkey with the Entente countries, was also fatal. The Ottoman Empire, already slowly disintegrating over the past decades, lost half of the remaining territories - Armenia, Palestine, Syria, Arabia - and finally ceased to exist.
p. 4 questions and tasks to paragraph paragraph p. 231
Question 1. Explain why the militaristic sentiments that prevailed in European society on the eve of the First World War were replaced by anti-war ones within two years.
The exhaustion of the warring parties, the unrest in the army, the economic crisis all led to a change in the mood from militaristic to anti-war. The war has brought Europe to a dead end and there are no goals for which it is worth continuing the bloodshed.
Question 2. What factors led to the socio-political crisis and caused the rise of social movements in the countries participating in the First World War?
War, severance of economic ties, economic devastation gave rise to revolutions, political crises and revolutionary processes. There were no revolutions in the victor countries - Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, USA, etc., but they also did not avoid social and political upheavals.
Revolutions took place in Russia and the defeated countries - Germany, the former Austria-Hungary, Turkey, in which, moreover, a complex of unsolved problems of social development remained. The rising masses strove to end the war, to free themselves from the ruling regimes, which were blamed for disaster and devastation.
An important feature of this period was the widespread involvement of huge masses of the population in political life. The "age of the masses" began. The participation of the masses in organized political and social movements was a great progress.
Questions and tasks to paragraph p. 235
Question 1. Using the data in the table on p. 233, define:
Which countries have made the largest mobilization of their populations to participate in the First World War;
Which countries suffered the maximum losses while participating in the hostilities of 1914-1918?
The most large-scale mobilizations of their population have produced
Entente: Russia, France.
Central Powers: Germany, Austria-Hungary.
Countries with the highest losses: Russia, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary.
Question 2. What, in your opinion, are the social and moral and psychological consequences of the fact that in the First World War 70.4 million people were under arms, 9.5 million were killed, 37.6 million became disabled or survived the humiliation of captivity?
History has never known bloodshed of this magnitude. The horror of what is happening, the presence of death out of nowhere cause aggression and a negative mental state in a situation where desires do not match the available possibilities .. All this causes such anger that will result in outbreaks of aggression and violence in peacetime after the First World War. Compared to 1913, there is a growing increase in cases of domestic violence: street fights, domestic violence, industrial conflicts, etc.
In many ways, this will allow researchers to talk about the readiness of the population for totalitarianism and violent, repressive practices.
Question 3. For additional sources, prepare a presentation on monuments and memorable dates that remind mankind of the First World War and its lessons (optional).
The first gas attack had the following psychological effect - surprise, then terror and panic.
Question 1. The interests of which countries were satisfied in the armistice agreement? The interests of which countries participating in the First World War are not represented in this document?
The armistice agreement satisfied the interests of the Entente countries.
Question 2. Why do you think this agreement emphasizes the role of the United States in the disarmament of Germany?
The demand for general disarmament was among the "Fourteen Points" put forward by US President W. Wilson as the terms of the peace treaty, on the basis of which Germany surrendered on November 11, 1918. The terms of the armistice deprived Germany of the fleet, submarines, military aircraft and heavy weapons, as well as forced to demilitarization of the east bank of the Rhine.
The Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919 consolidated these results by limiting the size of the German army to 100 thousand people, and the Navy - to six large warships of the old classes and a certain number of smaller ships. These unilateral measures were explained by the desire of the Entente powers to prevent the revival of German military power and to take the first step towards general disarmament. The desire for general disarmament was recorded in Art. 8 of the Charter of the League of Nations, article 10 of which also contained the principle of global collective security.
Question 3. Why in post-war Germany the terms of the armistice were considered unfair and revanchist sentiments flared up there again?
Germany's newly formed democratic government viewed the Treaty of Versailles as a "dictated peace." Although France, which suffered more financially than other members of the Big Four, insisted on tough terms, the peace treaty ultimately did not help resolve the international conflicts that triggered the First World War. On the contrary, it served as an obstacle to the establishment of cooperation between European countries and exacerbated the main problems, primarily leading to the war.
Questions and assignments to section 6 p. 235
Question 1. The topic "The world on the way to the First World War and its historical lessons" is presented with a selection of illustrations from the textbook for § 24-26. Make a preliminary outline of the topic with bright and expressive paragraph and sub-paragraph headings.
"The World on the Way to the First World War."
Chronological framework - from 1891. to 1914
Treaties concluded between the future participants in the world war, wars and conflicts that preceded it.
The main international contradictions that emerged by the beginning of the twentieth century. Aggravation of the struggle for the redivision of the already divided world.
Causes of the war. The reason for the war.
The goals of the participants in the war.
The nature of the war.
The course of the war.
Results of the war.
Historical lessons.
Question 2. In modern times, Europe has more than once become the field of the "battle of the peoples". Recall, for example, the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), or the Seven Years War (1756-1763), or the battles of Austerlitz (1805), Leipzig (1813), Waterloo (1815). How was the First World War different from them? How has the world changed by the end of the New Age?
By the end of the New Age, there is a process of transition from "traditional" to "industrial" society, which is caused by the beginning of the industrial revolution in Europe. Manufacturing was gradually replaced by the factory. In the development of the countries of Europe and North America, such factors as the rapid change in technical achievements and technologies, economic competition, alienation of a person from the results of labor, and the struggle of workers for their rights became increasingly evident. Already in the 19th century, the sharply increased stratum of hired workers began to exert a significant influence on the policies of the ruling elites. The central problem of the social development of industrial countries is the contradictions between the bourgeoisie, which received huge profits, and the powerless and exploited working class. The struggle between these social groups determined the nature of the development of capitalist relations throughout the 19th century. Only by the end of the century did the working class become a powerful, organized political force, with which neither the state nor the bourgeoisie could but reckon. The successes of the industrial civilization contributed to the strengthening of faith in the omnipotence of human forces, in the possibility of transforming the surrounding world at their own discretion, the idea of constant progressive, progressive development of civilization. The most important phenomenon of modern history was the spread of elements of Western civilization throughout the world. The beginning of this process was laid by the Great Geographical Discoveries, which transferred enormous wealth into the hands of Europeans. Europe asserted its hegemony in the world through open expansion. The most developed countries carried out active colonial conquests, exterminating and oppressing the local population, imposing their political, economic and cultural norms and traditions on them. By the end of the 19th century, European civilization already dominated the entire world. The vast territories of Asia and Africa, which were colonies of European powers, were used by the latter as a source of raw materials and a market for their products.
Plan
Introduction
1 Before the war
1.1 Features of the theater of operations
1.2 Side plans and troop deployment
2 Campaign of 1914
2.1 East Prussian operation
2.2 Battle of Galicia
2.3 Warsaw-Ivangorod operation
2.4 Lodz operation
2.5 Results of the 1914 campaign
3 Campaign of 1915
3.1 Battles in the Carpathians
3.2 Siege of Przemysl
3.3 Masurian and Prasnysh battles
3.4 Gorlitsky breakthrough
3.5 The Great Retreat
3.6 Vilna operation
3.7 Results of the 1915 campaign
4 Campaign of 1916
4.1 Naroch operation
4.2 Brusilov breakthrough
4.2.1 Lutsk Breakthrough
4.2.2 The attack on Kovel
4.2.3 Results of the Brusilov Breakthrough
4.3 Romania's entry into the war
4.4 Romanian Campaign
4.5 Results of the 1916 campaign
5 Campaign of 1917
5.1 February Revolution
5.2 June offensive
5.3 Operations of 1917 and the Kornilov revolt
5.4 October Revolution
5.5 Results of the 1917 campaign
6 1918
6.1 Bucharest Peace Treaty
Bibliography
Eastern Front of World War I
Introduction
Austria-Hungary:
1,150,000 killed and deceased, all the reasons,
2,000,000 wounded,
2,000,000 prisoners
World War I Western Europe Eastern Europe Italy Balkans Caucasus and Middle East Africa China and Oceania War at sea Eastern Front of World War I East Prussia Galicia Warsaw-Ivangorod Przemysl Lodz Masuria Carpathians Prasnysh Gorlice Great retreat Vilno Naroch Baranovichi Brusilov offensive
The Eastern Front is one of the fronts of the First World War (1914-1918).
On the Eastern Front, hostilities took place between Russia and Romania (since 1916) - on the one hand (the Entente), and the Central Powers - on the other. The Eastern Front was much longer than the Western Front. For this reason, the war on the eastern front was less positional in comparison with the western front. The largest battles of the First World War took place on the Eastern Front. After the October coup, when Soviet power was established in Russia with the support of the Austro-German bloc, hostilities on the Eastern Foron were suspended. The government of Soviet Russia concluded a truce with the Central Powers and began to prepare for the signing of a separate peace treaty. On February 8, 1918, the Central Powers signed the Brest Peace Treaty with the Ukrainian People's Republic, and on March 3, 1918, with Soviet Russia. Russia was deprived of vast territories and had to pay reparations. Romania, finding itself in isolation, was also forced to sign peace with Germany and its allies on May 7, 1918. Until the end of the World War, the Central Powers, despite defeats on other fronts, continued to hold significant forces in the territories occupied by the Brest-Litovsk Peace as occupation forces.
1. Before the war
1.1. Features of the theater of operations
The eastern front of the World War covered vast territories in Eastern Europe: the western border region of Russia, East Prussia, the eastern part of the provinces of Poznan and Silesia, as well as Galicia. From the west, the theater of military operations was limited by the Vistula River, the fortresses of Danzig, Thorn, Poznan, Breslau and Krakow; from the south - the Carpathian Mountains and the Romanian border; from the east - the line Petersburg - Velikiye Luki - Smolensk - Gomel - Kiev and the Dnieper; from the north - the Baltic Sea. The length of the theater along the front from the Baltic Sea to the Russian-Romanian border was about 850-900 km (along the Königsberg-Chernivtsi line), the depth was 750 km (from the Baranovichi-Rovno line to Breslavl).
The relief of the theater was predominantly flat and convenient for the deployment and use of a large number of troops.
In the western part of Russia there was a developed system of fortified fortresses, on which the Russian army could rely on defense and offensive. By the beginning of the war, new fortresses with the latest weapons were built: Kovno, Osovets, Novogeorgievsk, Brest-Litovsk, and the Grodno fortress was under construction.
In Germany, a large number of fortresses were created and improved, which the German command intended to use not only for defense, but also for an offensive deep into Russia. There were fortresses Königsberg, Danzig, Thorn and a number of fortifications on the Vistula: Marienburg, Graudenz, Kulm, Fordon and the Letzen fortification in the Masurian Lakes system.
Austria-Hungary also had a number of first-class fortresses: Krakow, Przemysl and a fortified camp near Lvov.
1.2. Side plans and troop deployment
At the beginning, Germany, implementing the Schlieffen plan, deployed its main forces (7 armies) on the Western Front, concentrating in the East, against Russia, only one army - the 8th. The 8th Army included 4 army corps. German troops, using the terrain features, did not occupy a continuous front, but were located in separate centers (along the corps) in fortified areas on the main directions. In total, the German command deployed on the Eastern Front 15 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions, 1,044 guns (including 156 heavy ones), a total of about 200 thousand people, under the command of Colonel-General Pritwitz. The main task of the German army was the defense of East Prussia and assistance to the Austro-Hungarian troops, which, according to the plan of the German command, were to play a major role in the fight against Russia.
Austria-Hungary deployed 3 armies (1st, 3rd and 4th) and a separate army group of General Hermann Köves against Russia.
General Bruderman's 3rd Army was deployed in the Lvov area, a total of 6 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions, 288 guns. General Auffenberg's 4th Army occupied the Przemysl area. The 4th Army included 9 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions, 436 guns. The 1st Army, under the command of General Dunkl, deployed on the San River. A total of 9 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions, 450 guns.
The group of General Kövess, a total of 10 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions, 448 guns deployed on the right flank of the Austrian forces in the Tarnopol region.
The 2nd Austrian army was initially directed to the Balkans, against Serbia, but was later transferred to Galicia against the Russian troops.
By the beginning of hostilities, the Austro-Hungarian command deployed 35.5 infantry and 11 cavalry divisions against Russia, a total of 850 thousand people, 1728 guns. According to the plan of the Austrian command, the Austrian troops with swift strikes, with the assistance of German troops from the north, must encircle and defeat the Russian troops in Western Poland.
Russian troops deployed in two main directions - in the north-west (against Germany) and south-west (against Austria-Hungary). Also, operational formations of the Russian troops were created - the fronts. On the northwestern front, under the command of General Zhilinsky, 2 armies (1st and 2nd) were deployed. A total of 17.5 infantry and 8.5 cavalry divisions, 1104 guns, a total of about 250 thousand people.
Against Austria-Hungary, on the southwestern front (commanded by General Ivanov), 4 Russian armies (3rd, 4th, 5th and 8th) were deployed. In total, by the beginning of hostilities, the troops of the southwestern front had 34.5 infantry and 12.5 cavalry divisions, a total of about 600 thousand people and 2099 guns. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich became the commander-in-chief of the Russian army
Military operations in the east began somewhat later than in the west. German troops in East Prussia had defensive goals.
Russian mobilization schedules No. 19 and No. 20 ordered the North-Western and South-Western fronts to go over to the offensive and transfer the war to the territory of Germany and Austria-Hungary, respectively, within two weeks from the date of the declaration of war. 1st Army P.K. Rennenkampf was ordered to march on August 14, cross the border on August 17, bypass the Masurian Lakes from the north and cut off the Germans from Konigsberg. 2nd army gen. A. V. Samsonova was supposed to act on August 16, cross the border on August 19, bypass the Masurian Lakes from the west and prevent the withdrawal of German troops over the Vistula.
Although the Austro-Hungarian army had an offensive mission, due to the regrouping of the 2nd Army's troops from the Serbian front, it also needed time for the final deployment.
2. Campaign of 1914
2.1. East Prussian operation
The beginning of the East Prussian operation.
The first operation on the eastern front was the East Prussian operation. Russian troops, who had the task of defeating the 8th German Army and capturing East Prussia, went on the offensive in order to divert large German forces from the Western Front and prevent Germany from crushing the French army and withdrawing France from the war.
The offensive in East Prussia was led by Russian troops with two armies, 1st and 2nd, under the command of Generals Rennenkampf and Samsonov. The operation began on August 17, when units of the 1st Russian army crossed the Russian-German state border and invaded East Prussia from the west. On August 20, the 2nd Russian army entered the territory of East Prussia from the south, delivering the main blow to the flank and rear of the 8th German army.
Battle of Tannenberg
The commander of the German forces, General Pritwitz, decided to restrain the 2nd Army with one corps, and to inflict the main blow with three corps on the 1st Army.
At dawn on August 20, near the city of Gumbinnen, the 1st German corps under the command of General François suddenly attacked the advancing troops of the 1st Russian army. Fierce fighting ensued. Both sides suffered heavy casualties, but the Germans retreated. The 17th corps under the command of General Mackensen, advancing south of Gumbinnen, was completely defeated in the oncoming battle and, having lost 50% of its personnel, was forced to retreat under the onslaught of Russian troops. After these setbacks, the 1st Reserve Corps of General von Belov, who came up later, was also forced to withdraw. German troops were defeated at Gumbinnen.
This defeat created a real threat of encirclement of the 8th Army and Pritwitz gave the order for a general retreat of German troops from East Prussia and a withdrawal across the Vistula. However, the German Headquarters opposed this and, contrary to Schlieffen's plan, which assumed, in any unfavorable development of events on the Eastern Front, in no case to withdraw troops from the Western Front in order to guarantee the defeat of France and avoid a war on two fronts, decided not to surrender East Prussia and to transfer troops from the Western Front (2 corps and a cavalry division) to help the 8th Army, which had the most dire consequences for Germany. On August 21, Pritwitz was dismissed. General Hindenburg was appointed commander of the 8th Army, and General Ludendorff was appointed chief of staff.
Parade of Horse Guards and Horse Guards in Insterburg.
The decision was made, leaving 2.5 divisions against the 1st Russian army of Rennemkampf, quickly, along the rockade railway through Konigsberg, transfer the main forces of the 8th army against the 2nd Russian army of Samsonov and try to defeat it before it joins with parts of the 1st Army.
At this time, the Russian command, having discovered a rapid retreat of German troops in front of the front of the 1st Army, decided that the Germans were retreating beyond the Vistula, and considered the operation completed, and changed its initial tasks for it. The main forces of the 1st Army of Rennenkampf were directed not towards the 2nd army of Samsonov, but to cut off Konigsberg, where, according to the assumption of the front commander, a part of the 8th army took refuge, and to pursue the Germans "retreating to the Vistula". The commander-in-chief of the 2nd Army Samsonov, in turn, decided to intercept the Germans "retreating to the Vistula" and insisted before the front command on transferring the main attack of their army from the northern direction to the north-western directions and between them formed a huge gap of 125 km.
The new command of the 8th German army decided to take advantage of the resulting gap between the Russian armies in order to inflict flank attacks on the 2nd army of Samsonov, to encircle and destroy it.
On August 26, German troops attacked the 6th corps of the 2nd army, the Russians lost 7,500 people and retreated in complete disarray, the right flank of the army was open, but General Samsonov did not receive information about this and continued the offensive. At the same time, the Germans attacked the left flank of the Russian army, which also retreated. As a result, communication with the flank corps was lost, and the command of the army was disorganized. Under these conditions, the 2nd Army began to retreat. The retreat of the five advanced Russian divisions took place under increasing pressure from the German corps advancing on the flanks. The Russian retreat became disorderly, and about 30,000 men with 200 guns were surrounded. On the night of August 30, General Samsonov shot himself.
Thus, the losses of the 2nd Army amounted to 6,000 killed, about 20,000 were wounded (almost all were taken prisoner), 30,000 prisoners (together with the wounded who were taken prisoner - 50,000), 230 guns were captured. 10 generals were killed, 13 were taken prisoner. The total losses of the 2nd Army in killed, wounded and prisoners - 56,000 people. These events are called the Battle of Tannenberg.
After the defeat of the 2nd Army, the German command decided to attack the 1st Army, which was blocking Konigsberg, and expel it from East Prussia. Battles unfolded in the Masurian Lakes region. Here the Russian army was also forced to retreat. By September 15, the Russian armies were completely driven out of the territory of the German Empire, the East Prussian operation was completed.
During this operation, the Russian army suffered a heavy defeat, losing about 80,000 killed, wounded and prisoners. German troops lost about 60,000 killed, wounded and captured. The Russian troops failed to complete the assigned task of capturing East Prussia. However, Russian troops were able to draw off part of the German forces from the Western Front, thereby fulfilling their allied duty. In many ways, this helped the Allied forces to win the most important victory on the Marne.
2.2. Battle of Galicia
Simultaneously with the offensive in East Prussia, Russian troops launched an offensive in Galicia against the Austro-Hungarian army. Russian troops consisting of five armies (3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th) launched a decisive offensive against four Austrian armies. At the beginning of the battle, the strategic situation was not in favor of the Russian troops.
Austro-Hungarian infantry.
On August 23, units of the 4th Russian army were ordered to attack the enemy near the city of Krasnik. However, the 1st Austrian army of General Dunkl on the morning of August 23 attacked the Russian troops, which were forced to retreat. Further, the Austrians tried to cover the right flank of the 4th Army, however, during stubborn battles, the Russian troops retreated to Lublin and took up defenses. Fierce battles with varying success took place here until September 2.
At Zamoć, the 5th Russian army advanced in the direction of Komarov, but here the 4th Austrian army managed to push the Russian troops, which were forced to retreat, and fierce battles were also fought here with varying success. However, hostilities in the Komarov area did not bring results to the Russians, and the commander of the 5th Army, General Plehve, gave the order to withdraw his army.
Simultaneously with these battles, on the left wing of the southwestern front, the 3rd Russian army was also leading an offensive. Austrian units offered sluggish resistance. Continuing the offensive, the 8th Army on August 23 crossed the Seret River, which the Austro-Hungarian command decided not to defend, and then Strypa. The Austrians did not expect that the Russians would create a powerful grouping east of Lvov, it was planned that the army of Bruderman and the Keves group would be sufficient for defense. On August 26, on the Zolotaya Lipa River, a battle took place between the 3rd Austrian and 3rd Russian armies, in these battles the Russian troops were successful and forced the enemy to retreat. Austro-Hungarian troops took up defenses on the Gnilaya Lipa River, however, here, after fierce battles, Russian troops continued their offensive. Parts of the 8th Army of General Brusilov defeated the 12th Austro-Hungarian Corps and created a threat to cover the entire Austro-Hungarian grouping located south of Lvov. Under these conditions, the Austrians began a general retreat. Russian troops began pursuing the retreating enemy, on August 21, Russian troops occupied Lvov, on August 22, Galich.
Meanwhile, the defending 4th and 5th Russian armies received reinforcements. On August 21, General Ivanov gave the order for a general offensive by the Russian armies of the southwestern front. On September 2-4, the 4th Russian army defeated Kummer's group. At the same time, the 10th corps of the Dunkl army was defeated. The commander of the Austrian army, Konrad, decided to launch a counterattack in the direction of Rava-Russkaya, for which he allocated additional forces (creating superiority over the Russians, three armies against two). However, in heavy battles near Rava-Russkaya, Russian troops stopped the Austrian offensive.
Eastern Front, September 1914.
On September 11, the Austrians stopped their offensive and began to retreat across the San River. By September 8, Russian troops occupied almost the entire eastern part of Western Galicia, almost the entire Bukovina and laid siege to Przemysl. The Russian army approached the Carpathians, intending to launch an offensive into Hungary. In this tremendous battle, the Austrian troops suffered a crushing defeat: their losses amounted to 400,000 people, including 100,000 prisoners; during the fighting, Russian troops captured 400 guns. The Russian army also suffered significant losses - 230,000 people killed, wounded and captured. The plans of the German command to keep the entire Eastern Front with the forces of only the Austro-Hungarian army failed.
2.3. Warsaw-Ivangorod operation
Eastern Front, autumn 1914.
After the Austro-Hungarian army was defeated in the Battle of Galicia, an unfavorable situation developed for the Central Powers on the Eastern Front. Under these conditions, Germany came to the aid of Austria, transferring part of its forces south to Silesia. A new German 9th Army was formed under the command of General Mackensen. To prevent the alleged invasion of Russian troops into Silesia, the German command decided to strike from the areas of Krakow and Czestochowa to Ivangorod and Warsaw. The German 9th Army was supported by General Dunkl's 1st Austro-Hungarian Army. Russian troops had four armies in this direction: 2nd, 4th, 5th and 9th.
On September 28, General Mackensen's 9th Army launched an offensive on Warsaw and Ivangorod. On October 8, the Germans reached the Vistula,
Russian troops in Warsaw.
By October 12, the Germans managed to occupy the entire left bank of the Vistula to Warsaw. However, pulling up reinforcements, the Russians managed to hold back the attacks of the Germans. Attacks by Mackensen's army were repelled on the line of Warsaw forts. The Russian army on the left bank of the Vistula held the bridgeheads of Ivangorod, Warsaw and the bridgehead at Kozienice.
While the Germans were bogged down in fierce fighting on the outskirts of Warsaw, on October 9, General Ivanov gave the order to start the offensive. The 4th and 5th Russian armies began to cross the Vistula: the 5th army north of Warsaw, and the 4th on the Kozienicky bridgehead (south of Warsaw), in order to strike the flank and rear of the advancing German grouping. In order to eliminate the Kozenitsky bridgehead and prevent the Russians from crossing the Vistula, the commander of the German troops on the Eastern Front, General Hindenburg, brought in a reserve corps into battle, but the Russians repulsed all attacks in Kozenitsky positions and by October 20 sent 2 army corps to the bridgehead.
Unable to throw off the Russian troops from the bridgehead in the Vistula, Hindenburg transferred the Kozenitsa direction to the 1st Austrian army and threw all the German units to the assault on Warsaw. The Austrians tried to eliminate the Kosenitsky bridgehead, but were defeated in a meeting battle and began to retreat. Having suffered heavy losses, the 1st Austro-Hungarian Army withdrew to the west, which caused a wide gap between it and the main forces of the Austrians. The troops of the 9th Russian army rushed into this gap of the Austrian front, going out to the flank and rear of the 1st Austrian and 9th German armies. The Germans and Austrians were threatened with complete defeat.
On October 27, the German command gave the order to stop attacks on Warsaw and retreat to their original positions. The Austro-German troops began a hasty retreat.
2.4. Lodz operation
Immediately after the end of the Warsaw-Ivangorod battle on the Eastern Front, the operation began at Lodz. The Russian command intended, with the forces of three armies (1st, 2nd and 5th), to invade the territory of the German Empire and launch an offensive inland. Wishing to turn the tide on the Eastern Front in their favor, as well as disrupt the Russian offensive, the German command decides to launch a preemptive strike. The 9th German army from the Thorn area was supposed to strike at the joint between the 1st and 2nd Russian armies, break through the front, go to the rear of the Russian troops and encircle the 2nd and 5th Russian armies.
Lodz operation
In addition to the 9th German Army, other formations of the German army were to take part in the offensive: the 3rd German Cavalry Corps, the Breslau and Posen corps, the group of forces of General Voyrsh (the Guards Reserve Corps and 2 infantry divisions), as well as 2 - the Austro-Hungarian army, which were supposed to pin down and hold back the offensive of the Russian troops.
On November 11, units of the 9th Army struck at the junction of the 1st and 2nd Russian armies, on November 12, the Germans attacked the positions of the Russians with large forces, which were forced to retreat. Then, until November 15, there were fierce battles between two Russian corps and units of the 9th German army, during these battles the Russian troops managed to defend their positions. On November 15-19, a stubborn battle went on along the entire front, at the same time the Russian and German commanders regrouped their troops, trying to find weaknesses in the enemy's defense.
In the course of these battles, the Germans finally found an open gap in the Russian defense northeast of Lodz, and formed a strike group under the lump. Schaeffer (3 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions), inflicted a powerful blow there, as a result encircling the city from the west, north and east. However, to completely blockade Lodz, the Germans did not have enough strength, and soon the German shock group of Schaeffer itself was under the threat of encirclement. On November 22, Schaeffer's group, having received an order to retreat, began to withdraw. By November 24, having lost 70% of the personnel in killed and captured, German troops from an almost complete encirclement broke through to the north.
The ód operation had an uncertain outcome. The German plan to encircle the 2nd and 5th Russian armies failed, however, the Russian offensive on the territory of the German Empire was also thwarted. After the completion of the operation, the commanders of the Russians of the 1st Army Rennekampf and the commander of the 2nd Army Scheidemann were removed from their posts.
2.5. Results of the 1914 campaign
The main outcome of the 1914 campaign was the collapse of the German blitzkrieg plan. The German army was unable to defeat neither the Russian army in the East, nor the allied armies in the West. The active actions of the Russian army thwarted these plans. In this regard, the German command made a decision already at the end of 1914 to transfer additional forces to the East.
In 1914, the Russian army was forced to leave the western part of Poland, but occupied a significant part of Galicia and Bukovina. Where the Galician General Government was created. The Russian command intended to seize the passes in the Carpathians in winter in order to invade the plain part of Hungary in the spring.
From the end of 1914, a positional front line was established on the Eastern Front.
3. Campaign of 1915
Russian artillery on the eastern front
Not having achieved the fulfillment of the plans in the West in 1914, the German command decides to transfer the main forces to the Eastern Front and deliver a powerful blow to Russia in order to withdraw it from the war. The German command planned to take the Russian army into giant "pincers". For this, a series of powerful flanking attacks from East Prussia and Galicia were supposed to break through the defenses of the Russian army and encircle its main forces in Poland.
3.1. Battles in the Carpathians
Carpathian operation. January-March 1915.
At the end of 1914, the Russian command made a decision with the forces of the Southwestern Front (3 armies: 3rd, 8th and 9th) to force the Carpathians and invade the flat territory of Hungary. The main role in the upcoming offensive was played by General Brusilov's 8th Army. However, the Austrian command also planned an offensive in the Carpathians in order to unblock the fortress of Przemysl besieged by Russian troops.
At the end of January, the Austro-German troops (3 Austro-Hungarian armies and the southern German army) launched an offensive, delivering two strikes: one from Uzhgorod to Sambor, the other from Munkach to Stryi. The offensive of Brusilov's 8th Army, which began at the same time, led to a series of heavy oncoming battles on the mountain passes. Russian troops, faced with a numerically superior enemy, took up defenses on the mountain passes.
In February, the Russian command transfers additional reserves to the Carpathians and forms the 9th Army of General Lechitsky. The entire March was spent in continuous battles on the left flank of the Russian 3rd Army and on the entire front of the 8th Army. Here, on the shortest direction from Hungary to Przemysl, with the aim of liberating it, the Austro-Germans persistently attacked. The soldiers fought waist-deep in the snow, with both sides taking heavy casualties daily.
However, after Przemysl surrendered to Russian troops, the liberated 11th Army, which led the siege, strengthened the Russian troops in the Carpathians. The Austro-Germans stopped their offensive.
3.2. Siege of Przemysl
After the end of the Battle of Galicia, on September 17, 1914, Russian troops approached the largest Austrian fortress in Galicia - Przemysl. Przemysl was a first-class fortress with a large garrison under the command of General Kusmanek. On October 5 - 7, Russian troops stormed the fortress, but all attacks were repulsed with heavy losses. In addition, on October 8, Austro-Hungarian troops approached the fortress and Russian troops were forced to lift the siege.
However, after the defeat of the Austro-German troops in the Warsaw-Ivangorod battle, the Austro-Hungarians again retreated, and the fortress was again surrounded by Russian troops. The fortress was besieged by the 11th Russian army of General Selivanov, not having sufficient forces and means, the Russian command did not make senseless assault attempts, but led the siege of the fortress.
After a long siege, when the city ran out of food supplies, General Kusmanek made an attempt to lift the siege, but all attacks of the Austrian troops were repulsed. After that, the command of the fortress decided to surrender. Before that, the artillery of the fortress shot all the ammunition, and the fortifications of the fortress were blown up. On March 23, 1915, Przemysl capitulated. Nine generals (including Kusmanek), 93 staff officers, 2204 chief officers, 113,890 soldiers surrendered to Russian captivity, and Russian troops captured about 900 guns.
3.3. Masurian and Prasnysh battles
Battle of Masuria
The first operation of the strategic German plan for 1915 was the August operation. The German command planned to break through the Russian front with a blow from East Prussia. The main blows were delivered by General Eichhorn's 10th Army from the north, and General Belov's 8th Army from the west (a total of 15 infantry and 2.5 cavalry divisions) in converging directions towards the city of Augustow, in order to encircle and destroy the 10- the Russian army of General Sievers.
At the end of 1914, 7 German corps and 6 cavalry divisions were transferred from France to the Eastern Front. By this time, and in Germany, it was possible to create reserves - 4 corps. They were also transferred to the Eastern Front. These troops formed General Eichhorn's new 10th Army.
On February 7, 1915, the 8th German army attacked the left flank of the 10th army, the next day, units of the 10th German army attacked the right flank of the Russian troops. The Germans managed to break through the front. The left-flank corps of the Russian army staunchly held back the 8th German army, preventing it from reaching the Augustow area. However, on the right flank, the German troops managed to move forward, the retreating right-flank corps exposed the flank of the 20th corps of General Bulgakov, which came under a powerful blow from the Germans and was surrounded in the Augustow area.
For 10 days, units of the 20th corps tried to break out of the encirclement, chaining significant forces of the German troops to themselves. After fierce battles in the snow-covered Mazurian forests, the remnants of the 20th corps, having used up all the ammunition, were forced to surrender. Thanks to the courage of the soldiers of the 20th corps, three corps of the 10th army were able to avoid the encirclement and retreated. The Germans won a tactical victory, but they failed to encircle the 10th Army.
After that, at the end of February, the German command resumed the offensive in East Prussia, the 8th and 12th German armies attacked the positions of the 1st and 12th Russian armies. After heavy fighting on February 24, two German corps occupied the city of Prasnysh. However, the Russian troops, having received reserves (2 corps), attacked and drove the Germans out of Prasnysh. On March 2, Russian troops resumed their offensive in the Suwalki area and defeated parts of the 8th and 12th armies. By March 30, German troops were finally driven out into the territory of the German Empire.
3.4. Gorlitsky breakthrough
Eastern front. Summer 1915.
After flanking attacks against the Russian army from East Prussia, the Austro-German command was preparing to inflict a flank attack from Galicia. The breakthrough of the Russian front in Galicia was planned to be carried out between the Vistula and the Carpathians, in the region of Gorlice. The place of the breakthrough was not chosen by chance. Here the Russian army did not have large forces, there were no large natural barriers, and in the event of a breakthrough of the front, the escape routes of the Russian group in the Carpathians were cut off and the threat of encirclement of the entire left flank of the South-Western Front was created.
To carry out the operation at Gorlice, the Austro-German command concentrated the 11th German army (it was transferred from the Western Front) and the 4th Austro-Hungarian army, and other Austro-German formations also participated in the operation. The task of the Austro-Germans was to break through the Russian front, encircle the 3rd Russian army that was defending here and further attack on Przemysl and Lvov. On the 35-km section of the breakthrough, the German-Austrian troops concentrated 10 infantry and 1 cavalry division (126 thousand people, 457 light and 159 heavy guns, 96 mortars and 260 machine guns).
The Russian command did not pay due attention to the danger of the Austro-German offensive in the Gorlice area. All the attention of the Russian command was focused on the completion of the Carpathian operation. In the 3rd Russian army (over 18 infantry and 6 cavalry divisions), there were only 5 infantry divisions in the direction of the breakthrough (60,000 men, 141 light and 4 heavy guns, 100 machine guns). Thus, in the area of the breakthrough, the Central Powers created a multiple superiority in manpower and equipment. In addition, at this time in the Russian army there was an acute issue with ammunition, often the Russian artillery had nothing to respond to enemy shelling.
The offensive began on May 2, 1915, after a powerful artillery barrage. Russian troops desperately defended themselves, but still retreated by 2-5 km. The Russian command believed that the Austro-Germans would inflict the main blow in the Carpathians, and in the Gorlice area they were conducting a diversionary maneuver, so the reserves of the 3rd Army were not provided. After 6 days of fierce fighting, the Austro-Germans managed to break through the Russian front and advance to a depth of 40 km. Having suffered heavy losses, the 3rd Army, by May 15, retreated to the Novo-Miasto, Sandomir, Przemysl, Stryi line.
3.5. Great retreat
Withdrawal of Russian armies from Poland.
On May 24, bringing up heavy artillery, August von Mackensen resumed the offensive. On June 3, Austro-German troops captured Przemysl, and on June 22 they took Lvov. After that, the Austro-German troops continued to develop the offensive, going deep into the rear of the Russian army. The Russian Headquarters, in order to avoid the encirclement of the Russian armies in Poland, began a strategic retreat to the East.
Fighting in Galicia resumed with renewed vigor on July 15, after heavy fighting, Russian troops retreated to the Ivangorod - Lublin - Holm line. On July 22, German troops crossed the Vistula. On July 22 (August 4), Russian troops left Warsaw and Ivangorod, on August 7 (20), the Novogeorgievsk fortress fell. In connection with the blow of the German troops in the Narev direction, the Russian troops withdrew to the Osovets - Wlodawa line. On August 22, after a heroic defense, Russian troops left Osovets, on August 26 the Russians retreated from Brest-Litovsk, on September 2 Grodno was abandoned .. By the fall, the front stabilized on the line Riga - Dvinsk - Baranovichi - Pinsk - Dubno - Tarnopol.
Archduke Friedrich commander of the Austro-Hungarian army in Przemysl. Summer 1915.
At this time, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Nikolai Nikolaevich was sent as commander to the Caucasian Front, and the Emperor Nicholas II assumed command of the army, General Alekseev became the chief of staff.
During the summer of 1915, the Russian army, under the onslaught of superior Austro-German forces, during a strategic retreat, left Austrian Galicia, part of the Baltic states, and Russian Poland. However, thanks to the retreat, the Russian armies escaped encirclement and defeat. The plan of the German command to defeat the Russian army and withdraw Russia from the war failed.
The big retreat was a severe moral shock for the soldiers and officers of the Russian army. Russian general Anton Denikin later wrote:
3.6. Vilna operation
Withdrawal of the Russian armies and the Vilna operation.
After the German troops took the Russian fortress of Kovno on August 22, the 10th German army continued to advance in order to bypass Vilna and encircle the 10th Russian army. Here fierce oncoming battles ensued, in which the Russian troops were able to hold their positions. The German offensive was abandoned.
After that, the Germans, having changed the plan, on September 8, began an offensive between the 10th and 5th Russian armies. On September 9, the Germans managed to break through the Russian defenses north of Vilkomir. This breakthrough was named Sventsiansky. The German command threw significant cavalry formations into the breakthrough. The German cavalry group (4 cavalry divisions) rushed along the Russian rear. On September 14, German troops occupied Vileika and approached Molodechno. German cavalrymen reached Minsk and even cut the Smolensk-Minsk highway. However, by this time, the onslaught of the German cavalry, deprived of the support of infantry and artillery, weakened. On September 15-16, Russian troops launched a counterattack on the German cavalry and threw it back to Lake Naroch. By October 2, the Sventsiansky breakthrough was eliminated, and the front stabilized on the line Lake Drysvyaty - Lake Naroch - Smorgon - Delyatin.
3.7. Results of the 1915 campaign
The 1915 campaign of the year was difficult for the Russian army. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers were killed, wounded and taken prisoner. The Russian army left vast territories: Galicia, Bukovina, Poland, part of the Baltic states, Belarus.
However, the Austro-Germans failed to fulfill the main task of defeating the Russian army and withdrawing Russia from the war. The Russian army, although it suffered heavy losses, escaped encirclement and retained its combat effectiveness. The German command, in turn, considered that the Russian army had suffered heavy losses and was no longer capable of active operations. In the fall, the German command begins the transfer of troops from East to West, planning to deliver a decisive blow to France and end the war. A positional calm was established on the Eastern Front.
4. Campaign of 1916
Eastern front. 1916 year.
Having failed to achieve decisive success on the Eastern Front, the German General Staff decided to shift the main blow to the Western Front, for the final defeat of France. The Austrians tried to withdraw Italy from the war. The Central Powers did not plan active actions against Russia in 1916. In turn, the Allies in the Entente were preparing a coordinated offensive in both the West and the East. The Russian army was recovering from the consequences of the retreat of 1915, and the country was putting industry on a war footing.
4.1. Naroch operation
After the start of the German offensive in the West, the commander-in-chief of the French army, Joffre, turned to the Russian command with a request to carry out an offensive in March in order to draw off part of the German forces to himself. The Russian command went to meet the ally and decided to conduct an offensive operation in Belarus against German troops in March. On February 24, the commander of the western Russian front, General Evert, was tasked with inflicting a strong blow on the German troops, with the forces of the 1st, 2nd and 10th armies.
On March 16, General Alekseev gave the order to go over to the offensive of the Russian armies at Lake Naroch in Belarus. Here the defense was occupied by the 10th German army. After a lengthy artillery preparation, the Russian troops went on the offensive. To the south of Lake Naroch, the 2nd Russian army wedged into the defenses of the 10th army by 2-9 km. Fierce battles unfolded. German troops with difficulty held back the numerous attacks of Russian troops.
The German command, realizing the danger of the situation at Naroch, decided to pull the reserves to the dangerous area. The German command also knew that in May the allied forces would launch a general offensive on three fronts: Western, Eastern and Italian. However, the Germans mistook the Russian offensive at Naroch for a general offensive. The Germans were forced to stop attacks on the French fortress of Verdun and transfer 4 divisions from the West to the Naroch region. This ultimately helped the Germans hold their positions, and the Russian troops were unable to break through the defenses.
In fact, this operation was a distraction, in the summer the German command was expecting the main blow on its front, and the Russian carried out the so-called. Brusilov breakthrough on the Austrian front, which brought colossal success, and put Austria-Hungary on the brink of military defeat.
4.2. Brusilov breakthrough
Lutsk breakthrough
Eastern front. 1916 year.
The Entente countries planned for the summer of 1916 a general offensive in the three main theaters of military operations against the Austro-German troops. As part of this plan, British troops conducted operations near the Somme, French troops fought in the Verdun area, and the Italian army was preparing a new offensive in the Isonzo area. Russian troops were to launch a decisive offensive along the entire length of the front. In the offensive, the Russian command planned to use all three fronts (North, West and South-West).
The main blow was delivered by the forces of the Western Front (comm. General AE Evert) from the Molodechno area to Vilno. Most of the reserves and heavy artillery were transferred to Evert. The Northern Front (comm. General A. N. Kuropatkin) delivered an auxiliary blow from Dvinsk - also to Vilno. The Southwestern Front (comm. General A. Brusilov) was ordered to advance on Lutsk-Kovel, in the flank of the German grouping, towards the main attack of the Western Front. To increase the superiority in forces in April-May, the Russian units were re-equipped to the full strength.
Brusilov breakthrough
Fearing that the Austro-German troops would go over to the offensive earlier, in order to forestall the attacks of the Russian troops, the Headquarters ordered the troops to be ready for the offensive ahead of schedule. However, the Austro-Germans did not plan any active actions against the Russian troops.
On May 15, 1916, the Austrian army launched a major offensive against the Italian army in Trentino. The Italian army, having suffered heavy losses, retreated. In this regard, Italy turned to Russia with a request to help the offensive of the armies of the Southwestern Front, in order to pull off the Austro-Hungarian units from the Italian front. Going to meet the ally, the Russian command postponed the start of the offensive. On May 31, the Southwestern Front was supposed to go on the offensive against the Austro-Hungarian army, but the main blow was still inflicted by the troops of the western front against the Germans.
In preparation for the operation, the commander of the Southwestern Front, General Brusilov, decided to make one breakthrough at the front of each of his four armies. Because of this, the enemy was deprived of the opportunity to transfer reserves in a timely manner to the direction of the main attack. The main blow to Lutsk and Kovel was delivered by the 8th army of General Kaledin, auxiliary strikes were delivered by the 7th, 9th and 11th armies. Against these armies were 4 Austro-Hungarian and 1 German armies. The Russians managed to create an advantage over the enemy several times in manpower and equipment. The offensive was preceded by thorough reconnaissance, training of troops, equipment of engineering bridgeheads, which brought the Russian positions closer to the Austrian ones.
On June 3, 1916, a powerful artillery preparation began, which led to a strong destruction of the first line of defense. On June 5, units of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 11th Russian armies (a total of 594,000 people and 1,938 guns) went on the offensive against the Austro-Hungarian troops (a total of 486,000 people and 1,846 guns). Russian troops managed to break through the front in 13 places. On June 7, units of the 8th Army occupied Lutsk, and by June 15th, the 4th Austro-Hungarian Army had actually been defeated. The Russians took 45,000 prisoners, 66 guns and other trophies. The breakthrough in the sector of the 8th Army reached 80 km along the front and 65 km in depth. The 11th and 7th armies broke through the front, but due to counter-attacks they could not develop the offensive. The 9th Army also broke through the front, defeating the 7th Austrian Army, taking almost 50,000 prisoners. On June 15, units of the 9th Army stormed the fortified Austrian fortress of Chernivtsi. The 9th Army, pursuing the retreating enemy, occupied most of Bukovina.
The attack on Kovel
The threat of the capture of Kovel (the most important center of communications) by the Russian troops forced the Austro-German command to hastily transfer additional forces to this direction. 2 German divisions arrived from the Western Front, and 2 Austro-Hungarian divisions from the Italian. On June 16, the Austro-Germans launched a counterattack on Kaledin's 8th Army, but were defeated and were driven back across the Styr River.
Russian infantry.
At this time, General Evert's Russian Western Front was postponing the start of the offensive. Only on June 15, units of the Russian Western Front launched an offensive with limited forces, however, having failed, they returned to their original positions. General Evert began a new regrouping of forces, because of which the offensive of the Russian troops in Belarus was postponed to the beginning of July.
Applying to the changing timing of the offensive of the Western Front, Brusilov gave the 8th Army all new directives - either offensive or defensive in nature, to develop an attack now on Kovel, then on Lvov. Finally, the Headquarters decided on the direction of the main attack of the Southwestern Front and set it the task: not to change the direction of the main attack to Lvov, but continue to advance northwest, to Kovel, towards Evert's troops aimed at Baranovichi and Brest.
On June 24, the Anglo-French allies began their operation on the Somme to break through the German front. On July 3, the Russian Western Front launched an offensive, and on July 4, the South-Western Front resumed the offensive, with the task of capturing Kovel. Brusilov's troops managed to break through the German front, occupy a number of settlements and reach the Stokhod River. In some places, the Russian troops managed to cross the river, but the Russian troops were unable to overcome this obstacle. Having pulled up significant forces, the Austro-Germans created a strong defensive line here. Brusilov was forced to stop the offensive and regroup his forces. The offensive of the Northern and Western Russian fronts ended in failure. Russian attacks were repulsed with heavy losses, this allowed the German command to transfer all reserves to Galicia, against Brusilov.
In July, the Russian command transfers its reserves to the Southwestern Front and creates the Special Army of General Bezobrazov. The 3rd, 8th and Special armies were ordered to defeat the enemy in the Kovel area and occupy the city. On July 28, the offensive resumed, the Russian units launched a decisive offensive, winning a number of victories in oncoming battles, however, the Austro-Germans also managed to inflict a number of sensitive counterattacks. During these battles, Russian troops managed to capture 17,000 prisoners and 86 guns. As a result of these battles, Russian troops advanced 10 km. However, the Russian troops failed to break through the powerful enemy defenses on the Stokhod River and take Kovel. At the same time, the 7th and 11th armies in the Lvov direction broke through the enemy's defenses. The Austro-German command had to transfer all available reserves to Galicia. However, the Russian troops continued their offensive, the 11th Army occupied Brody, and reached the approaches to Lvov. The 7th Army managed to take Galich, and the 9th Army, operating in Bukovina, also won a number of victories and took Stanislav.
Results of the Brusilov breakthrough
By the end of August, the offensive of the Russian armies stopped due to the increased resistance of the Austro-German troops, the increased losses and fatigue of the personnel. The consequences of the Brusilov breakthrough exceeded the expectations of the Entente command. Russian troops inflicted a crushing defeat on the Austro-German troops. The Russians managed to advance 80-120 km. Brusilov's armies liberated Volhynia, occupied Bukovina and a significant part of Galicia. Austria-Hungary and Germany lost more than 1,500,000 people killed, wounded and captured. Russian troops captured 581 guns, 1795 machine guns, 448 bomb and mortars. The Austro-Hungarian army suffered heavy losses, which greatly undermined its combat effectiveness. To repel the Russian offensive, the Central Powers transferred 31 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions from the Western, Italian and Thessaloniki fronts to Galicia. This forced the German command to stop attacks on Verdun, and the Austrians stopped the offensive in Trentino, which saved the Italian army from defeat. Under the influence of the victory of the Russian armies in Galicia, Romania entered the war on the side of the Entente. Russian troops lost about 500,000 killed, wounded and captured.
From the point of view of military art, the offensive of the Russian troops in the summer of 1916 marked the emergence of a new form of breaking through the front (simultaneously in several sectors), put forward by Brusilov, which developed in the last years of the First World War.
4.3. Romania's entry into the war
Kaiser: “So, you are against me too! Remember that Hindenburg is on my side. "
King of Romania: "Yes, but freedom and justice are mine"
British poster.
Both coalitions tried to draw new countries into the war on their side. In 1915, Bulgaria took the side of the Central Powers, Italy took the side of the Entente. For a long time, the coalitions tried to drag Romania into the war on their side. However, the Romanian government was in no hurry and waited for the most favorable conditions for entering the world war. Romania leaned to the side of the Entente, because it was in a state of conflict with Austria-Hungary, wanting to annex the ethnic Romanian lands that were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire: Transylvania, Bukovina and Banat.
After the Brusilov breakthrough, when the Russian army achieved great success, and the Austro-Hungarian army suffered a crushing defeat, the Romanian government made the final decision to enter the war on the side of the Entente. The Entente countries assured Romania that after the war Bucharest will be able to annex not only the lands inhabited by Romanians, but also other territories with Serbian, Ukrainian and Hungarian populations.
The beginning of the Romanian campaign
On August 27, Romania declared war on Austria-Hungary and entered World War I on the side of the Entente. The Entente camps were very pleased with the acquisition of a new ally. However, the optimistic attitude of many political and military leaders regarding Romania's entry into the war against the background of the real state of the Romanian army was in no way justified. The army was poorly prepared, there was no rear service, there was not enough weapons, especially artillery. At the same time, there was practically no railway network in Romania. The Romanian army fielded 23 divisions against Austria-Hungary, intending to invade Transylvania.
4.4. Romanian campaign
The teachings of the Romanian army.
In August, the Romanian army (about 400,000 people) invaded the territory of Austria-Hungary, Transylvania, and advanced 80 km. However, the very first major city on the way of the Romanian army, Sibiu, highlighted the weaknesses of the Romanian troops. Due to problems with logistical support, the Romanian army stopped its offensive, which was used by the 1st Austro-Hungarian army thrown against the Romanian troops. The strategic initiative passed to the Austrian troops, which were joined by the 9th German army.
The Austro-German troops quickly drove the Romanian units out of Transylvania, while the Austro-German-Bulgarian troops under the command of General Mackensen launched an offensive against the Romanian army and from Bulgaria. Also in Dobrudja, the 3rd Bulgarian army began an offensive. To help the Romanian troops, the Russian command allocated 50,000 people under the command of General Zayonchkovsky. The Romanian command hoped that the Russian troops would repel the Bulgarian invasion of Dobrudja and launch a counter-offensive. On September 15, the Russian-Romanian armies launched a counterattack. However, the Russian-Romanian counteroffensive ended in failure. The Russian-Romanian troops were thrown back 100 km to the north, and by the end of October the Bulgarians were able to capture Constanta. On October 23, Mackensen's troops crossed the Danube, the Austro-German-Bulgarian troops attacked Bucharest in three directions.
Austro-German counteroffensive.
On November 29, an offensive began on Bucharest, the Romanians, having collected the last reserves, tried to launch a counterstrike, but could not achieve any results. On December 7, Mackensen's troops entered Bucharest. Romanian troops retreated to the north of the country, losing 8 more divisions. In the face of total disaster, the Russian command sent reinforcements to thwart Mackensen's advance into southern Ukraine.
In December 1916, the Romanian Front was created in the Russian army. It included the remnants of the Romanian troops, as well as the Russian armies: Danube, 6th, 4th and 9th. Thus, the Romanian army was defeated, the country's territory was occupied, and the Russian army had to allocate additional funds in order to close the sector of the newly formed Romanian front. By the end of 1916, after the retreat of the Russian-Romanian troops to the north, the front line on the Eastern Front finally stabilized.
4.5. Results of the 1916 campaign
The 1916 campaign was successful for the Russian army. During the summer offensive, the Russian army inflicted a heavy defeat on the Austro-German troops, occupied large territories, providing great support to its allies. Germany was unable to fulfill its strategic plan to defeat France largely thanks to the Russian army. Romania also entered the war on the Eastern Front, but its army was defeated, most of the territory was occupied, and the Russian command urgently had to form a new Romanian front to protect its southern borders.
During the campaign of 1916, a radical change took place in the war in favor of the Entente countries, the initiative completely passed into their hands. The defeat of Germany and its allies, who suffered huge irreparable losses, was only a matter of time.
5. Campaign of 1917
German caricature of Mikhail Alexandrovich and the decay of the Russian army. 1917 year
At the end of February (old style) - beginning of March 1917, a revolution took place in Russia. On March 2 (15), 1917, Nicholas II abdicated in favor of his brother Mikhail Alexandrovich. However, on March 3 (16), 1917, he renounced the Russian crown, leaving it to the Constituent Assembly to determine the form of government in Russia.
After that, a Provisional Government was formed in Russia, headed by Prince G. Ye. Lvov. The interim government immediately announced that Russia would continue the war "to a victorious end" and did not plan to conclude a separate peace treaty with Germany. Instead of Nicholas II, MV Alekseev became the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army.
On March 1 (14), the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies issued the famous Order No. 1, which created soldiers' committees, undermined the power of officers in the army and thereby destroyed discipline. The Provisional Government recognized Order No. 1 and began to enforce it in military units. The disintegration of the Russian army began, which began to rapidly lose its combat effectiveness. According to the data cited by N.N. Golovin in his book, “in the army, the average morbidity per month since the beginning of the revolution increased by 120%, although there were no epidemic diseases in the army and the sanitary condition continued to remain favorable, the average number of registered deserters per month from the beginning of the revolution increased by 400%. In addition, from March 1917 there began a huge "leak" of soldiers from the front and a refusal to go to the front from the rear under a variety of pretexts. "
Fraternization with enemy soldiers became widespread. Anti-war Bolshevik and anarchist newspapers and even German propaganda publications were freely distributed in the army. The decline in discipline among the soldiers was accompanied by sharp post-revolutionary changes in the high command of the army. The generals who participated in the conspiracy against Nicholas II were promoted to the highest posts, while the generals loyal to the tsar were removed from their posts and dismissed from the army.
On June 4, at the insistence of the Minister of War and Naval Kerensky, the Provisional Government removed General Alekseev from the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief, replacing him with General Brusilov.
After the Provisional Government announced the continued participation of Russia in the war, the Russian command set about organizing an offensive, which, by agreement with the allies, should have been launched in the spring of 1917. However, the chaos and decay that reigned in the Russian troops made it impossible to carry out the offensive on schedule. It was postponed until the end of June.
Fraternization on the Eastern Front. 1917 year
According to the plans of the Russian command, the main role in the offensive was to be played by the troops of the southwestern front. The 11th and 7th armies advanced in the direction of Lvov, and the 8th army - on Kalush. Troops of the northern, Romanian and western fronts carried out auxiliary strikes.
On June 29, 1917, artillery preparation began in the sector of the southwestern front. On July 1, the 7th and 11th armies went over to the offensive. In some areas, Russian troops managed to capture the first lines of trenches and move forward. But then the offensive stopped. The troops began to discuss orders and hold meetings, and refused to continue the offensive. As a result, because of this, the offensive was terminated on July 3.
Eastern front. 1917 year.
On July 6, the 8th Army launched an offensive in the Galich - Stanislav sector in the direction of Kalush. Having broken through the defenses, the Russian army captured over 7,000 prisoners and 48 guns. Then she took Stanislav, Galich and Kalush. However, soon the Austro-German command prepared and launched a counterattack on the right flank of the southwestern front. On July 19, having broken through the front of the 11th Army, the Austro-Germans continued their offensive, which entailed the withdrawal of parts of the 7th and 8th armies. In the course of these battles, the complete collapse of the Russian army was revealed. Whole units withdrew from the front line without orders. The Austro-German troops, meeting insignificant resistance, advanced through Galicia and on July 28, Russian troops stopped on the line of Brody, Zbarazh, the Zbruch River.
Also, the offensive of the Russian-Romanian troops began on the Romanian front. Initially, the Russian-Romanian troops managed to break through the front and won a number of victories. However, soon after the failures of the Russian troops on other fronts, the offensive was suspended. On August 6, the Austro-Germans launched a counterattack, fierce battles ensued. However, the Russian-Romanian troops managed to hold their positions, and on August 13, the fighting ceased. After that, the front stabilized again, and combat operations here ceased until the end of the war.
In this battle, the Russian army lost about 130,000 killed, wounded and captured.
Thanks to the June offensive, General L.G. Kornilov took off, who was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army on July 18.
5.3. Operations of 1917 and the Kornilov mutiny
General Kornilov in front of the troops. 1917 year.
In addition to the June offensive in 1917, other operations took place on the Eastern Front. German troops managed to carry out a successful landing operation and capture the Moonsund archipelago. Also, after the Riga operation, which was unsuccessful for the Russian army, German troops occupied Riga. The commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Kornilov, was dissatisfied with the democratization of the army, which undermined the combat capability of the Russian troops. After the defeat at Riga, General Kornilov decided to openly oppose the policy of the Provisional Government.
Immediately after the fall of Riga, he moved the 3rd Cavalry Corps from the front to Petrograd. However, Kornilov's plan failed, the general's mutiny was suppressed, and he himself was arrested. Kerensky was appointed the new commander-in-chief of the Russian army. Kornilov's attempt to stop the disintegration of the army ended in failure, the Provisional Government continued the previous course of domestic policy. However, soon the power in the country was seized by the Bolsheviks, who openly announced the end of the war and the signing of a peace treaty with Germany.
German troops in Riga, September 1917.
On October 25 (November 7), 1917, a Bolshevik coup took place in Russia. The provisional government was overthrown, power in the country passed to the Bolsheviks. Controlled by the Bolsheviks, the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies proclaimed a Decree on Peace and announced the withdrawal of Soviet Russia from the war. The Soviet government appealed to all the belligerent powers with an appeal to conclude a democratic peace without annexations and indemnities, but this proposal was ignored by the Entente countries. Then the Bolshevik government instructed the commander of the army, Duhonin, to cease hostilities on the Eastern Front unilaterally and send proposals for an armistice to the countries of the Quadruple Alliance. However, he refused to do so. After that, Dukhonin was removed from command. Warrant Officer Warrant Officer Krylenko was appointed commander-in-chief. Arriving at Headquarters, in Mogilev, Krylenko removed Dukhonin from command and arrested him. Dukhonin was stabbed to death by Krylenko's guards right on the platform of the Mogilev station. On December 15, in Brest-Litovsk, a separate armistice agreement was signed between the German and Soviet delegations. On December 22, negotiations began between the delegations.
5.5. Results of the 1917 campaign
Kornilov revolt
In 1917, two revolutions took place in Russia that changed the history of the country. Nicholas II abdicated and the monarchy fell. After the beginning of the democratization of the army in early 1917, its actual disintegration began. Despite the fact that the Russian army was still conducting large-scale operations in 1917, by the end of the year it ceased to exist. Also, the collapse of the army was accompanied by the collapse of the state. The Russian Empire ceased to exist.
The Bolsheviks, who came to power in October, promulgated the peace decree and began separate peace negotiations. This meant Russia's withdrawal from the war unilaterally.
Leon Trotsky and the German delegation
On December 15, 1917, in Brest-Litovsk, the Soviet government concluded a separate armistice agreement with Germany and its allies. Peace talks began on 22 December. On January 9, the Soviet delegation was presented with proposals providing for significant territorial concessions. Germany, thus, demanded that the Bolsheviks fulfill their earlier obligations for their support in their seizure of power in Russia. A split occurred in the Bolshevik leadership. Lenin categorically advocated the satisfaction of all the demands of Germany. Trotsky proposed to drag out the negotiations. The Left SRs and some Bolsheviks proposed not to make peace and continue the war with the Germans, which not only led to confrontation with Germany, but also undermined the position of the Bolsheviks in Russia, since their popularity in the army was based on the promise of an exit from the war. On January 28, 1918, the Soviet delegation with the slogan "We end the war, but we do not sign peace" broke off the negotiations. In response, on February 18, German troops launched an offensive along the entire front line. At the same time, the German-Austrian side tightened the peace conditions. On March 3, the predatory Brest Peace Treaty was signed, according to which Russia was losing about 1 million square meters. km (including Ukraine) and pledged to demobilize the army and navy, transfer ships and infrastructure of the Black Sea Fleet to Germany, pay an indemnity of 6 billion marks, recognize the independence of Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland.
The Fourth Extraordinary Congress of Soviets, controlled by the Bolsheviks, despite the resistance of the "Left Communists" and the Left SRs, who regarded the conclusion of peace as a betrayal of the interests of the "world revolution" and national interests, due to the complete inability of the Red Army to resist even a limited offensive of German troops and the need for a respite to strengthen Bolshevik regime March 15, 1918 ratified the Brest Peace Treaty. The German army freely occupied the Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine. On the territory of these countries, governments were created, depending on Germany. The government of the Central Rada in Ukraine, which did not meet the hopes of the occupiers, was dispersed, in its place on April 29 a new government was formed headed by Hetman Skoropadsky.
The occupying forces of Germany in the east, including the territory of Romania, are estimated at 1,045 thousand bayonets, Turkey (the "East" group) - about 30 thousand bayonets.
6.1. Bucharest Peace Treaty
After the withdrawal of Russia from the war, the Romanian government decided to also sign a peace treaty with the Central Powers. The terms of the contract were difficult for Romania. On May 7, a peace treaty was signed in Bucharest. Romania was deprived of strategically important border regions rich in timber and oil in favor of the victors. Southern Dobrudja was transferred to Bulgaria. Over Northern Dobrudja, which was the subject of disputes between Turkey and Bulgaria, joint administration of the states of the Quadruple Alliance was established. Romania also pledged to pass all the troops of the Central Powers through its territory.
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The eastern theater of military operations was the longest: it ran from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. Here the armies of the Russian Empire (and later Romania, which joined it) confronted the combined forces of Germany and Austria-Hungary (and, to a much lesser extent, Bulgaria).
Soon after the start of the war - August 17, 1914 - the 1st and 2nd armies of the Russian North-Western Front, without waiting for the end of mobilization, entered East Prussia and struck at the 8th German army. Already on August 20, German troops were defeated at Gumbinnen, after which the 8th Army began to retreat. The high command of the German army appointed Paul von Hindenburg as the new commander of the 8th Army and began the transfer of troops from the Western Front. The Schlieffen plan, which the Germans were going to implement, collapsed in September 1914, and France, which was targeted by the main attack of the Germans, was saved. Taking advantage of the mistakes of the Russian command, the Germans were able to carry out a quick regrouping of troops and defeat the 2nd Russian army at Tannenberg.
In August - September 1914, the troops of the Russian Southwestern Front inflicted a crushing defeat on the Austro-Hungarian troops and occupied almost all of Galicia. With the aim, on the one hand, to provide assistance to their ally, and on the other, to destroy the Russian troops on the Polish ledge, German troops in September-November conducted a successive offensive against Warsaw (Warsaw-Ivangorod operation) and Lodz (Lodz operation). However, after heavy losses, they had to retreat to their original positions, without achieving their goals.
1915-1916 YEARS
In 1915, Germany made an attempt to withdraw Russia from the war, shifting its main efforts from the West to the Eastern Front. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the Russian industry was not able to switch to the production of ammunition as quickly as the French or German industry, and a "shell famine" began in the Russian army. Nevertheless, Russian troops were able to continue offensive operations in the Carpathians, and on March 23 they achieved the surrender of the Austrian fortress of Przemysl, where about 115 thousand people surrendered.
In February 1915, Germany launched an offensive in the Masurian Lakes region (August operation), during which it was able to defeat the 10th Russian army. But the attempt to build on the success in the Battle of Prasnysh in February - March ended in complete failure.
In May, a strong grouping of German and Austro-Hungarian troops broke through the front in the Gorlice-Tarnoe area. The situation at the front was critical, the entire Russian front was under threat. The Russian armies began a difficult general strategic retreat from Galicia and Poland. Although the Russian troops also had to leave part of the territory of Belarus and Lithuania, the German troops were unable to achieve the main goal - the withdrawal of Russia from the war. By the fall, the front stabilized on the line Riga - Dvinsk - Baranovichi - Pinsk - Dubno - Tarnopol.
The main event of 1916 was the offensive of the Southwestern Front of General Alexei Brusilov, as a result of which the Austro-Hungarian army suffered a severe defeat, and Austria-Hungary was on the verge of complete disaster. Under the impression of these victories, on August 26, Romania entered the war on the side of the Entente, but by November it was defeated, and the Russian army had to hold an extra 300 km of the front. The Russian troops failed to build on the success achieved in previous battles - they got bogged down in bloody battles near Kovel.
By the beginning of 1917, the situation on the Eastern Front was developing in favor of Russia: the Austro-Hungarian army could not recover from the defeat, Germany was at the limit of its strength. The Russian army was preparing for a decisive offensive.
1917-1918 YEARS
On March 15, 1917, Emperor Nicholas II was overthrown from the throne and power passed to the Provisional Government formed by "public circles". At the same time, the Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies was formed in Petrograd. Under the influence of anti-war agitation and with the connivance of the government, soldiers' committees began to seize power in the army, the army began to decay rapidly, and mass fraternization began at the front. Organized by the Provisional Government and the new supreme commander-in-chief Brusilov, the June offensive ended in failure. Having collapsed the army, the Provisional Government also lost the remnants of its power - on November 7, 1917, power in Petrograd was seized by the Bolsheviks, who almost immediately adopted the Peace Decree, announcing their desire to leave the war. An armistice was signed on December 5, 1917. The hostilities practically ceased, and peace negotiations began. On March 3, 1918, Soviet Russia signed the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, effectively capitulating to the countries of the German coalition.
BATTLE FOR GALICIA
In the course of large-scale battles in Galicia in August - September 1914, Russian troops inflicted a severe defeat on Austria-Hungary and occupied Eastern Galicia and most of Bukovina, putting the enemy on the brink of disaster.
In accordance with the plan of military operations developed before the war, the Russian Southwestern Front (commander General of artillery Nikolai Ivanov; Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Mikhail Alekseev) in the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 8th armies had to cross the Galician border and, starting attack on Lvov in two directions, to encircle the main forces of the enemy. For its part, the Austro-Hungarian High Command (commander of the Archduke Friedrich; Chief of the Field General Staff, General of the Infantry Baron Franz Konrad von Götzendorf), having 1, 3 and 4 armies on the Eastern Front, as well as the Kummer and Kewess groups, was going strike the enemy between the Vistula and the Bug in the northern direction. The 3rd Army covered the Lvov area.
BATTLES UNDER DYE AND TOMASHOV
These two battles are traditionally combined into a single Lublin-Kholm operation, and in general it did not turn out very well for the Russian army. First, on August 23-25, near Krasnik, developing an offensive on Przemysl, the 4th Russian army of General from Infantry Baron Anton Salz (109 thousand people with 426 guns) unexpectedly faced General Viktor Dunkl, who struck her on the flank of the 1st Austro-Hungarian army (228 thousand people with 468 guns). The forces were unequal, and after fierce fighting, the Salz army on August 25 withdrew and consolidated 20-45 km west, south and southeast of Lublin (on the same day, General Alexei Evert was entrusted with the duties of the commander of the 4th Russian army). Bypassing the Russian flank, as originally planned by Dunkl, he failed.
In the offensive, which began on August 25, near Tomashov, the commander of the 4th Austro-Hungarian Army, General of the Infantry Moritz von Auffenberg (250,000 men with 462 guns), attempted to bypass the 5th Russian Army of Cavalry General Pavel Pleve (147,000 men with 456 guns). Although at the first stage the Austrians were successful and the situation was quite serious for Plehve, he managed to eliminate the threat of encirclement with a series of strikes by August 31. After that, Plehve decided not to risk it and to withdraw his troops on the same line with the 4th Army - to the line Vyslavice - Grubieshov - Vladimir-Volynsky, which was completed on September 3. Despite the advantage they had, the Austro-Hungarians did not manage to defeat the Russian armies, and the successes achieved were too expensive and required the weakening of other sectors of the front.
THE FALL OF LVOV AND GALICH
The military situation on the left wing of the Southwestern Front developed in a completely different way. Here, on August 18, the 8th army of the general from the cavalry of Alexei Brusilov went on the offensive, and the next day the 3rd army of the general from the infantry of Nikolai Ruzsky. The Austro-Hungarian command, which had abandoned almost all its reserves at Lublin, was now paying for the mistakes: the 3rd Army of General of the Cavalry Rudolf Bruderman (from which the group of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand was also removed) and the group of General of the Infantry Hermann Kewess von Kewessgaz (which represented The advance units of the 2nd Army, which was urgently being transferred from the Balkans), did not have enough strength to defend Galicia. In fact, until August 25, the Russian troops did not meet much resistance, having covered 90-100 km (3rd Army) and 130-150 km (8th Army).
On August 26, the 3rd Austro-Hungarian Army tried to stop the 3rd Russian army on the Zolotaya Lipa River, but on August 28 the Austrians were overturned and retreated, trying to gain a foothold on the turn of the Rotten Lipa River. For some time the Austro-Hungarians tried to stabilize the situation at the front, but on August 31 their troops were finally defeated. Brusilov's troops began to enter the rear of the enemy's Lvov grouping. The incipient retreat of the Austro-Hungarian army turned into a stampede. On September 3, Russian troops entered Lviv, the next day - in Galich.
BATH
Meanwhile, to strengthen the right wing of the Southwestern Front, a new - the 9th - army of the infantry general Platon Lechitsky was formed there, and the 4th and 5th armies received the necessary reinforcements. Despite the fact that in the battles of September 2-4, the 4th Russian army defeated the group of cavalry general Heinrich Kummer, Konrad von Goetzendorf still continued to believe that he could cope with the situation. Having transferred his 4th army to the Lvov direction, he tried to push back the 3rd and 8th Russian armies. On September 10, Austro-Hungarian troops attacked Gorodok and Ravu-Russkaya. The battles here were fierce, but the very next day it became clear that the Austro-Hungarians were completely exhausted. Konrad was ordered to curtail the offensive and retreat across the San River. Galicia was surrendered.
K.A. Pakhalyuk
East Prussian Front of World War I
(short essay)
Two offensives and three defeats - this is how deplorable for the Russian troops is the result of the battles on the fields of East Prussia in 1914-15. All three armies, which at different times fought here, were forced to leave the province, having suffered heavy losses ...
If the Triple Alliance was based on military-political agreements between Germany and Austria-Hungary, then military agreements between Russia and France became the foundation of the Entente. They were originally formalized in the form of secret military conventions concluded in 1891-1893. and provided, in the event of full mobilization and an attack on one of the parties by the powers of the Triple Alliance (first of all, Germany), immediate support from the other.
Subsequently, nine Russian-French conferences were held on joint actions in the event of war. In general terms, the main position of our ally was reduced to: 1) emphasizing the danger from Germany; 2) the demand to direct the main blow against East Prussia; 3) the demand to accelerate the mobilization and concentration of our forces on the border, in particular on the East Prussian. The plans were mainly based on the assumption that was later justified that Germany would deliver the main blow in the West, leaving insignificant forces in the east (although other options were not excluded). Indeed, the German Schlieffen plan assumed a similar method of fighting, calculated on the slowness of Russian mobilization and the superiority of the German military machine over the French one, which would make it possible to achieve decisive successes in a short time. In contrast to this, the obligation of active assistance against Germany was imposed on the Russian army.
In 1901 we pledged to go over to the offensive on the 18th day of the war, and on the 28th to concentrate 800,000 people against East Prussia. Later, realizing the difficulties of Russian mobilization, the French abandoned the idea of a complete synchronization of the actions of both allied armies. Already in 1910, they demanded that only two conditions be met: 1) peacetime measures should create the impression of a major Russian offensive into Germany; 2) in the first days of the war, the position of the Russian troops should have confirmed these German fears and prevented them from being thrown out of East Prussia additional forces to the west.
As a result, at the meetings of 1912 and 1913, chaired by the chiefs of the general staffs of Russia and France, Generals Zhilinsky and Joffre, an obligation was reached to concentrate a total of up to 800,000 people against Germany (which, in fact, turned out to be unrealistic, and even half of this number was not sent to East Prussia) and act in main parts after the 15th day of mobilization.
With the outbreak of war, the Russians planned to launch an invasion of East Prussia with the forces of two armies. The first was to advance from across the river. Neman, the second - because of the river. Narev. Acting around the Masurian Lakes on both sides, as a result, they had to take the enemy in giant "pincers" and destroy.
In the directive of the commander-in-chief of the North-Western Front Ya.G. Zhilinsky on August 13 (July 31), the 1st Army was ordered to advance on the Angeburg-Insterburg front (i.e., bypassing the Masurian Lakes from the north), and the 2nd Army - on the Rudzhany-Passenheim front, further to Seeburg, Rastenburg. The goal was to defeat the enemy, "cut off from Konigsberg and capture his retreat to the Vistula." Moreover, the 1st Army was ordered to cross the border on August 17 and pull back the enemy troops, covering their left flank as deep as possible and cutting off the enemy from Konigsberg, and the 2nd Army - on August 18-19, in order to strike the enemy rear. Note that not all divisions managed to concentrate on time, so the remaining (mostly secondary) arrived at the front gradually already during the operation. The main drawback of the directive was the direction of the strike of the 2nd Army, which led not to the encirclement of the enemy, but to his displacement from the province. The assumption that the enemy was located "undoubtedly behind the line of lakes" was also erroneous. This gross miscalculation caused and still causes angry responses from many military historians, because, remaining "beyond the line of lakes", even in fortified positions, the Germans risked ending up in a strategic "bag".
In reality, the Germans intended to keep an active defense with the forces of the 8th Army (commander - General M. von Pritwitz, chief of staff - General Count Waldersee) and try to break the enemy armies one by one. East Prussia especially for these purposes had a sufficiently developed network of railways, which made it possible to maneuver forces. In case of danger of encirclement, it was even allowed to move beyond the river. Vistula, in order to save the troops, for at that time Germany dealt the main blow to France, planning to force her to surrender "by the autumn leaf fall".
And both Russian armies were separated from each other by the Masurian Lakes, and therefore success directly depended on the efficiency of the advancing troops and the coordination of actions. It was not for nothing that commanders were appointed: the 1st (so-called Neman) army was headed by Adjutant General P.K. von Rennenkampf, 2nd - General A.V. Samsonov.
PC. von Rennenkampf became famous as a dashing cavalry commander in the Chinese campaign of 1900 and the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, for which he was awarded the Order of St. Stanislaus 1st Art. and the golden weapon. In 1905-06. commanded the 7th and then the 3rd Siberian corps. At the head of a punitive expedition at the beginning of 1906 he participated in the suppression of revolutionary uprisings in the region of Chita and Irkutsk, for which he won awards, the gratitude of the emperor (and at the same time the hatred of the liberals). At the end of 1906 he was appointed commander of the 3rd army corps, and in 1913 he became commander of the troops of the Vilna military district. “This is an appointment by many,” wrote General V.I. Gurko, - was criticized because of the not better reputation of the general from the point of view of morality, but at the same time and was welcomed as the appointment of a person capable of serving the motherland with dignity in the event of war ... everyone who had to communicate with him was inevitably imbued with the conviction that all his sympathies were given to Russia, especially her army, in which he served for forty years and gained a reputation as a brilliant military leader. " The image of a general who existed in high society is well illustrated by an episode from N.N. Wrangel (the brother of the “black baron”), where he retold a rumor about Colonel Vedenyapin: “For several days he did not sleep or eat, burdened with incredible, unbearable work ... At the last minute, he received an order from the Army Commander to blow up some bridge after crossing through him the Germans. Half-dead from fatigue, he did not quite accurately understand the meaning of the order and blew up the bridge before the enemy crossed it. General Rennenkampf called on Colonel Vedenyapin and ordered him to shoot himself, which the colonel did. "
A.V. Samsonov was no less famous person. He gained fame during the years of the Russian-Japanese war, as evidenced not only by the awards, but also by the enormous popularity among the troops, which turned him into a hero. “General Samsonov is with us, // God bless him! // He is an eagle in front of the regiments, // We are always glad to him, ”the soldiers sang in one of the Siberian Cossack divisions. After the end of hostilities, A.V. Samsonov became chief of staff of the Warsaw Military District (so that the theater of the upcoming military operations in 1914 knew), in 1907 he was appointed as the Chief Ataman of the Don Cossack Army, and in 1909 - the Turkestan Governor-General, Commander of the Turkestan Military District and military order chieftain of the Semirechensk Cossack army. True, the general was sick with asthma and before the outbreak of the First World War was being treated at a resort.
It is worth saying a few words about Ya.G. Zhilinsky. During the Japanese campaign, he served as chief of the Viceroy's Field Headquarters in the Far East, then was at the disposal of the Minister of War. Already in peacetime he commanded a cavalry division and an army corps, then for three years (before he became commander of the Warsaw Military District and Warsaw Governor General in March 1914) he headed the General Staff, although, in fact, he was more of a diplomat than commander.
As you can see, the most famous generals at that time were chosen as the commanders of the armies, whose competence few doubted. Therefore, reproaches that at the head of the Russian troops in East Prussia were random people, without experience in commanding troops, are speculation and do not correspond to reality. And who at the beginning of the war had the proper experience of commanding armies in a combat situation? Take the same General A.A. Brusilov. For 23 years he worked in the officer's cavalry school (four years as its chief), then in 1906 he was given command of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Division, then - the 14th Corps. In 1912 he became assistant to the commander of the Warsaw Military District, and from 1913 - the commander of the 12th corps. One cannot say that this general had experience in commanding an army, but he was able to prove himself as a talented commander from the very first days of the war.
By the way, the Germans had even less "experience" in driving troops in a combat situation than the Russians, who had the Russo-Japanese war behind them. Even in terms of service record, many German generals lagged behind. M. von Pritwitz from 1906 to 1913 was the commander of the 16th corps, and on the eve of the war he was in the "great position" of the inspector general of the 1st army inspection. E. Ludendorff made his career at the German headquarters, where, by the way, he participated in the development of the Schlieffen plan, and also made every effort to prepare the army for war. And the "savior" P. von Hindenburg got to the front when he was already in retirement. During his tenure, he also did not rise above the corps commander.
At the beginning of the operation in the aggregate of the army of the North-Western Front (and it had about 296 battalions (about 19 divisions) , 196 squadrons (about 9.5 cavalry divisions) and 1,140 guns) outnumbered the Germans. But the enemy (having approximately 192 battalions and 95 squadrons with 1,131 guns), skillfully maneuvering, tried to achieve superiority in the necessary sectors of the front, not only in number, but also in firepower. However, we must not forget that the Germans actively used the Landwehr formations, which were inferior in strength and training to the troops of the first line. Interestingly, the Russian command assessed the enemy's forces at three or four corps, several reserve divisions and land assault brigades, which somewhat diminished, but, in general, corresponded to the real situation (1st, 17th, 20th army and 1st reserve corps, 3rd and 35th reserve, 1st landwehr divisions, 2nd, 9th, 6th, 70th and 5th landwehr brigades, 1st cavalry division and some other fortress formations ).
The first border clashes occurred shortly after the official declaration of war. For example, on August 3, the Russian cavalry entered Eidtkunen. Subsequently, battles raged in this area. On August 9, the 2nd Guards Cavalry Division of General G.O. Rauch took Shirvindt. And on August 14, the 1st Cavalry Division of V.I. Gurko raided the town of Markgrabov. In the border period of the war, unfortunately, it was not possible to prevent the enemy from mobilizing, or to obtain accurate information about him, but Gurko's raid was able for some time to mislead the command of the 8th Army about the main strike of the 1st Russian army.
It is also interesting that on August 12 (July 30), not far from the border with East Prussia, the Cossack Kuzma Firsovich Kryuchkov performed the famous feat, for which he became the first knight of St. George in the outbreak of the war. Together with his comrades (V.A.Astakhov, I.N.Schegolkov and P.P. Ivankov), he entered into battle with a German patrol, numbering 27 people, of whom he personally killed 11 soldiers, receiving 16 wounds. In one day, a simple Cossack turned into a national hero. The name of K.F. Kryuchkov thundered all over Russia, they wrote about him in books, brochures and posters, articles and notes were published, poems were dedicated to him. F.I. Shestakov wrote: “Don Cossack Kryuchkov is daring! // Barely over the Russian land // The thunder of bloody war rang out, // How worthy are you with new glory // I managed to glorify my dear Don ”.
The full-scale invasion of East Prussia began on August 17, when the 1st Army (6.5 infantry and 5.5 cavalry divisions with 402 guns) of General P.K. von Rennenkampf, stationed on the territory of present-day Lithuania, crossed the border. The Russian troops had not completed their mobilization and were not fully prepared for the offensive: after all, they had not yet established either communications or rear services. However, the decision to start the operation was made not only because of the desire to seize the initiative, the hope of a quick victory, but also under pressure from France, whose armies were retreating under the powerful pressure of the Germans, who were rapidly moving towards Paris.
But one should not consider the unfolding events in East Prussia as a kind of weak-willed appendage to the battles in France, when the Russian command, only because of the demands of the allies, throws more than two dozen divisions to certain death. As events will show, the 1st and 2nd armies had every opportunity to defeat the enemy. If successful, the danger from the north for the Russian troops fighting in Poland was removed, and the road to Berlin was also opened. It is not difficult to understand the position of the allies, against whom the entire striking power of the Kaiser's armies was deployed. And the defeat of France for Russia would have irreparable consequences. Moreover, many people forget that at this time in the west the Germans were just beginning to cover the left flank of the French, who, by the way, underestimated the enemy grouping deployed there and were themselves active in Alsace and Lorraine. The situation had not yet become critical, and our allies still cherished the hope of a successful outcome. Therefore, the statements of some historians that the Russian armies launched an offensive due to the critical situation in the west (or even more so the tales of "tearful kneeling" of the allied ambassadors) are at least inaccurate.
Despite the fact that the operation really depended on the efficiency and coordination of the actions of both armies, the probability of its success was relatively high, especially if the Russian command had been more attentive to the preparation of the offensive (as well as to its implementation). The ease with which, or rather, carelessness, it reacted to the battles in East Prussia, confirms that already on August 26 (when P.K. General Danilov at headquarters, General Danilov, in his "Memorandum" considers clearing East Prussia from the enemy only a matter of time. And at the same time, a conflict begins between the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Headquarters and the high command of the North-Western Front (of course, in the person of Y. G. Zhilinsky) over the future governor-general of the province. Judging by how the East Prussian operation was being prepared in August 1914, it is difficult to say that the command was really afraid of defeat. Otherwise, it would not have pulled out units from the 1st and 2nd armies from the very beginning of mobilization. Otherwise, it would not have been left in fortresses, incl. and in Warsaw, large forces. Otherwise, it would not have begun an offensive without fully preparing the troops. Otherwise, it would not have begun to simultaneously form the 10th Army for a direct attack on Berlin. And finally, otherwise it would not have been so sure that after the very first defeat the Germans would want to leave all of East Prussia. Here, most likely, we are dealing with excessive self-confidence, bordering almost on recklessness, and frivolity at the same time, with the desire to carry out grandiose plans, even with a vain and blood-hot desire to envelop ourselves in the glory of the saviors of Paris and once again get the keys to Berlin, which undoubtedly intertwined with a sense of duty to the allies. You should not cover up stupidity and mistakes with generosity. And the myth of "the selflessness of the Russian troops sacrificing themselves in the name of saving France" was most likely invented after the fact to justify in the eyes of the public the death of the Russian armies ).
However, let us return to the study of the operation. 8th German army was concentrated in the area of the river. Angerapp, hoping to lure the enemy as far as possible (in this case, the troops of P.K. von Rennenkampf), then, bypassing the right flank, defeat it before the other Russian army (General A.V. Samsonov) has time to enter the rear. The reinforced 20th corps of General F. von Scholz was supposed to interfere with the latter, covering the southern borders of the province.
The operation, which ended in defeat for the attackers, "did not go well" from the very first days. Units of the 1st Army crossed the border unevenly. As a result, the central 3rd Army Corps (25th and 27th Infantry Divisions) of General N.A. Epanchina moved forward and in the Stallupenen area was unexpectedly attacked by the 1st German corps of General G. von François. To the order to retreat from the army commander, he arrogantly replied: "Tell General von Pritwitz that General von François will stop fighting when he defeats the Russians." This incredible self-confidence, based on the incorrect assumption that the strike will fall on the right flank of the enemy army, almost turned into a tragedy, because wasting forces in small battles on the eve of a common battle is not only pointless, but also dangerous.
Particularly stubborn battles began on the front of the 27th division, which at first began to push the enemy back. Unexpectedly, in the afternoon, the Germans attacked the flank and rear of the left-flank 105th Orenburg regiment, which was marching without proper reconnaissance and initially confusing the enemy with units of the neighboring 40th division, which actually broke away and acted without communication with its neighbor on the right. The Germans defeated the Orenburgers, thereby upsetting the entire offensive: the fleeing soldiers panicked some other regiments. The commander of the 27th division, General A.M. Adaridi had to gather troops at the border.
At the same time, the Germans tried to cover the right flank of the 25th division (advancing to the right of the 27th), but met with a tough rebuff. And the neighboring Russian 29th division immediately came to the rescue, which pressed the enemy and herself hung over his flank, and took the first trophies from Bilderweichen: 7 guns, 12 charge boxes and 2 machine guns. Their loss is explained by the premature withdrawal of the German infantry (a rare case of German sluggishness), and not by the heroic actions of the Russian troops. In addition, they managed to capture both German prisoners, mostly wounded, and the quartermaster supplies.
At this time, M. von Pritwitz once again gave the order to retreat, and G. von François began to retreat to Gumbinnen. After a while, he could have been surrounded by the combined cavalry corps of Khan of Nakhichevan (more than 3 cavalry divisions). True, being on the right flank, General Nakhchivansky on August 17 did not know anything about the ongoing battle at all, and on that day he limited himself to knocking out the German cavalry division from Pilkallen. But directly above the left flank of H. von François's corps, the 29th division was already hanging. Be that as it may, the Germans managed to safely retreat, largely due to the slowness and indecision of the Russians.
What is the result of the described battle, albeit a small one, but the first major collision with the enemy? The total losses of the 27th division were 63 officers and 6664 soldiers; The 1st Army suspended the offensive until the middle of the next day, and the Germans, most importantly, finally established the true direction of the enemy's movement (at the headquarters of the 8th Army, it was initially assumed that P.K. von Rennenkampf would direct the attack a little further south). At the same time, stopping the Russians was not in the interests of the Germans, who intended to lure the enemy as deeply as possible and then inflict a crushing defeat on him before they themselves received a blow from the south to the rear. However, oddly enough, the Stallupenen battle, which was fought by the Russian divisions without coordination (i.e., without participation) on the part of the army commander, was de facto a success for the Germans. If it were not for the tragedy with the 105th regiment and the more confident actions of the 29th division, the corps of G. von François would have been defeated (and so the losses amounted to over 1200 people), and the subsequent successes of the enemy would have been simply impossible.
Having resumed the offensive, the 1st Russian army began to move forward, reaching the end of August 19 to Goldap and Gumbinnen. PC. von Rennenkampf wanted to set a day for the next day, but M. von Pritwitz had other plans for August 20: fearing an early invasion of the 2nd Russian army, he decided to defeat the Russians.
The first clashes in certain sectors of the front began the day before, but the battle itself, which went down in history as Gumbinnensky (or Gumbinnen-Goldapsky), unfolded on August 20. Directly on the battlefield (if we consider that part of the forces of the 1st Army did not take part in it at all), the Germans had superiority both in manpower and in the number of guns.
The 1st Corps of General G. von François managed to defeat the right-flank 28th Division of General N.A. Lashkevich (from the 20th corps of General V.V.Smirnov), which was forced to retreat, having suffered considerable losses.
It would be interesting to dwell on the next seemingly ordinary combat episode. In the area of Ushballen, units of the 111th Infantry Regiment were defending, which had been attacked by the enemy in the morning. As the head of the 28th Russian division, General Lashkevich, wrote: “By 7 o'clock. 30 am in the morning enemy artillery fire concentrated mainly on my right flank in the Ushballen area .... The position of the right flank is very serious. The reserve has almost completely used up, now (8 hours 35 minutes in the morning) the strongest artillery cannonade is going on along the entire front. " At 10 o'clock the Germans finally broke our defenses, and the regiment began to retreat. Then the division chief gave the following order: "Not an inch back!" However, this not only did not change the situation, but also led to the fact that the most valiant companies were surrounded and perished.
But after the withdrawal of the entire 28th division, the enemy could not develop the offensive. The neighboring 29th Russian Infantry Division of General A.N. Rosenschild-Paulina, as a result of skillful command, was able to repel all attacks and not allow herself to be bypassed from the right flank. And in the afternoon, units of the 28th division unexpectedly launched a counterattack, which caused confusion and even panic in the German units, which, however, was quickly suppressed.
However, the 1st German Cavalry Division raided the rear of the Russian army, bypassing its right flank, managed to defeat the army headquarters, thereby disrupting the command of the troops, for this reason, General P.K. von Rennenkampf did not actually intervene in the course of the battle until the evening. The successes of the German cavalry became a reality due to the absence of the troops of Oranovsky and Nakhichevan on our right flank. What's the matter? Where were more than 3.5 cavalry divisions, of which two were guards?
The day before, on August 19, the cavalry corps of Khan Nakhichevan was sent across the river. Inster in the direction of Insterburg. But it was not possible to complete the task completely. At the creek Inster, in the Kraupischken area, the cavalrymen encountered the 2nd Landwehr Brigade. A stubborn battle ensued, especially near the village of Kaushen, where the regiments of both guards cavalry divisions fought. By evening, the enemy was defeated and retreated. It was in this clash that the famous feat of captain Baron P.N. Wrangel: he, together with his 3rd Squadron of the Life Guards Cavalry Regiment, in a dashing attack captured the village of Kaushen and captured two enemy guns, the limbs of which were destroyed by the artillery fire of the battery of Colonel Prince Eristov. But the guard suffered considerable losses in this battle: 81 people were killed, 293 were wounded and 22 were missing. The Germans killed 66 soldiers, 122 were wounded, and 30 captured. The Russians captured 2 guns and 4 ammunition boxes.
However, Nakhichevan Khan arbitrarily took the divisions to the rear, motivating the decision with sensitive losses and unwillingness to risk, for which he almost paid with his position. However, the head of a separate cavalry brigade, General N.A. Oranovsky (by the way, the younger brother of the chief of staff of the front V.A.Oranovsky), due to the fact that his troops did not provide assistance to the 28th division on August 20, was removed from command. But let's return directly to the course of the Gumbinnen battle.
A rather unclear situation also developed on the left flank of the 1st Army, where units of the 4th Army Corps were located: during heavy battles at the end of the day, neither side was able to gain the upper hand, although the Germans still slightly pressed the left flank, which gave would have an advantage the next day.
But the most stubborn battles took place in the center, where from the very morning the 3rd Russian corps of General N.A. Epanchina (former director of the Corps of Pages, son of Admiral Alexei Pavlovich), withstood the attacks of the troops of the 17th German corps of General A. Mackensen. Numerous attacks in the first half of the day were repulsed, and in the second, the Russians themselves launched a counteroffensive. Unable to withstand the onslaught, the enemy left the battlefield, covering the retreat with artillery fire. During a short pursuit, the 27th Russian division took 12 guns, 25 charging boxes, 3 serviceable and 10 wrecked machine guns, 2,000 rifles and about 1,000 prisoners.
In the evening, M. von Pritwitz, having received a message about the difficult situation at the front and that the 2nd Russian Army of General A.V. Samsonov had already crossed the border, suddenly panicked and ordered to retreat. PC. von Rennenkampf did not pursue. He immediately canceled the first orders to drive the enemy, because the troops were tired, they also suffered losses (in the 28th division they accounted for up to 60% of the personnel, considering that only 12 battalions could participate in the battle), the rear was not adjusted. It is known that there is only one step from victory to defeat, and none of the Russian generals could be sure of the success of the pursuit. It is doubtful that any units other than the divisions of Nakhichevan, Gurko and Epanchin (27th Infantry Division) could physically pursue. And if you take into account the huge expense of artillery, it becomes clear: it would be suicide to rush after the enemy. General P.K. von Rennenkampf apparently understood this perfectly, in contrast to his subsequent critics.
M. von Pritwitz, impressed by the enemy's successes, at first decided to leave all of East Prussia in order only to save the troops. In contrast, the quartermaster of the army Grunert and the head of the operational department M. Hoffmann argued that the situation on the battlefield was favorable, and if the battle was continued the next day, the enemy could be defeated. But M. von Pritwitz insisted on withdrawing. If the Germans had decided to attack on August 21, they would have been completely defeated. After all, the Russian cavalry on August 20 rested in the rear and the next day could change the situation, being on the battlefield.
Soon the commander of the 8th Army calmed down, saw that there was no need to leave East Prussia, and was about to attack the Russian Narev army, agreeing with a similar proposal by M. Hoffmann. But it was too late…. The high command did not need panic in the east. M. von Pritwitz and Count Waldersee unexpectedly lost their posts. They even learned about it later than the generals subordinate to them.
The new commander (the official appointment came in the afternoon of August 22) was General P. von Hindenburg, summoned from retirement, and the position of chief of staff was taken by one of the most talented German generals E. Ludendorff, who had already distinguished himself by taking the strongest Belgian fortress of Liege. Chief of General Staff G. von Moltke (de facto commander-in-chief, Kaiser Wilhelm II was considered nominal) in a letter to E. Ludendorff said: "Maybe you will still save the situation in the East." In the established duet, both in August 1914 and later, General E. Ludendorff took the lead: it was he who made the greatest contribution to the upcoming victories.
The newly minted commanders arrived at the theater of operations in the afternoon of August 23 and immediately began to transfer the entire 8th Army against the troops of General A.V. Samsonov, leaving before P.K. von Rennenkampf a small barrier.
The redeployment of all forces against the advancing army of Samsonov, as has already been seen, cannot be called an invention of either E. Ludendorff, or, moreover, P. von Hindenburg: they began to prepare it already under M. von Pritwitz. Moreover, even before the war, at the staff games, a similar plan of action was developed (a crushing blow to the Narev army). But one thing - in peacetime and during maneuvers, and another - after the defeat at Gumbinnen. And here it is impossible not to recognize the merit of the new commanders of the 8th Army: they, taking advantage of the mistakes and miscalculations of the enemy, firm and sufficiently skillful leadership (although also not without errors) managed to achieve success. And the Russian generals made enough mistakes and miscalculations.
After the Germans retreated from Gumbinnen, the 1st Army stood for two days in occupied positions, establishing control and work of the rear, but giving the enemy the opportunity to successfully retreat, mistakenly assuming that he was retreating to the borders of the r. Inster. The order for the army of August 22 said: "On August 7 the enemy was repulsed along the entire front, retreated several miles back and strengthened."
Although, to be very precise, small battles took place on the front of the 4th corps, which, as a result, took the city of Darkemen on the morning of August 22. By the way, on the same day from the 2nd Army P.K. von Rennenkampf was given the right-flank 2nd Army Corps of General S.M. Scheidemann. And on August 23, the entire 1st Army moved on the offensive, but it lost contact with the enemy, and it was not possible to restore it.
Her attention was more focused on the Konigsberg fortress. The next day the Russians occupied Insterburg, in the evening of the 25th - Velau, by the end of August 27 they came close to the river. Deim (although the 2nd Guards Cavalry Division entered the area earlier). The left-flank 2nd corps, which the commander of the 1st army began to attract to the main troops, was first in the area of Letzen and Angeburg, and on August 27, the vanguards occupied Rastenburg and Luisengoff. The 1st cavalry division of V.I. Gurko, whose parts at the same time (August 27) collided with the enemy at the station. Korshen, and one of the reconnaissance squadrons entered Russel.
PC. von Rennenkampf acted on the orders of J.G. Zhilinsky of August 26, who prescribed: “1) the imposition of a part of the forces on Konigsberg, approximately two corps, until they are replaced by reserve divisions; 2) the pursuit by the rest of the army of that part of the enemy's troops, which, without hiding in Konigsberg, would have begun to retreat to the Vistula. "
As you can see, the Russian command did not know about the transfer of the main forces by the enemy against A.V. Samsonov. In the 1st Army, reconnaissance, despite the large masses of cavalry, was rather poorly organized. The headquarters received fragmentary information about the retreat of the Germans to Rastenburg and Konigsberg, but, as on August 26 (when the first attacks against the troops of A.V. Samsonov began) P.K. von Rennenkampf reported to J.G. Zhilinsky: “there have not yet been reports of where the broken parts of the 1st and 17th corps had gone”.
However, the Germans really retreated in the indicated directions, only the Russian command incorrectly interpreted the incoming information. Having drunk on the first successes, it did not fully realize that the enemy's actions were not flight, but the fulfillment of a clear plan, when the entire 8th Army should appear on the front of the 2nd Russian Army, which these days was developing an offensive in order to cover the enemy.
At the disposal of A.V. Samsonov had more troops than P.K. von Rennenkampf (counting from the left flank to the right, the forces were located as follows: 15th and 6th cavalry divisions, 1st, 23rd, 15th, 13th and 6th army corps, 4th cavalry division), but they were also not fully prepared for the offensive. There was a special disarray in the rear, so there is nothing surprising that sometimes the troops had to starve, or rather eat "local means". In addition, the 1st Army Corps, although it was subordinate to General A.V. Samsonov, but was not a member of the army and was supposed to be in the Soldau area, providing the left flank of the army. By the beginning of the operation, one division from the 23rd corps was at the front. Another, the 3rd Guards, arrived only a week later, although she managed to take part in the Battle of Tannenberg.
More: at the suggestion of the allies, the Russian command was hooked on the idea of a direct attack on Berlin through Poznan. For this, a new army was urgently formed in the Warsaw area, which included the corps previously intended for the offensive in East Prussia. Thus, without concentrating all forces in one direction, the front command made a rather serious blunder.
It is worth saying a few words about the headquarters of the 2nd Army. If the headquarters of the Vilna Military District formed the headquarters of the 1st Army, then the headquarters of the Warsaw Military District is the headquarters of not only the 2nd Army, but the entire North-Western Front. It is clear that the best officers Ya.G. Zhilinsky took it to himself, and the 2nd Army had to be content with what was left. Or they had to appoint officers from other districts there. As they say, the world is on a string. As a result, the headquarters of the 2nd Army, which was entrusted with a serious task, was made up of people who did not work together, did not make up, figuratively speaking, a single whole.
Moreover, General Ya.G. Zhilinsky in every possible way urged this army, which already had to go through wooded, swampy and sandy areas north of the river. Narew, no convenient roads. It is impossible not to mention the disagreements between the front commander and A.V. Samsonov. The latter believed (as many researchers believe, quite justifiably) that it is necessary to advance not strictly to the north, but to the west, in order to cover the enemy deeper. Already initially A.V. Samsonov began to deviate somewhat to the west of the direction outlined by the commander-in-chief of the front, however, thereby stretching the front.
On August 23, the commander of the 2nd Army presented to the front headquarters ideas on how to transfer the blow to the west, to the Alleystein-Osterode railway branch. This would have helped to cover the enemy deeper, and the decision itself responded to the evolving situation. And the troops could be based on the railway from Mlava, which would have helped to better arrange the rear. However, this proposal was rejected. Although at the same time on August 23 at 4:20 pm A.V. Samsonov received from Ya.G. Zhilinsky news that “the German troops after heavy fighting, which ended in victory over them by the army of gene. Rennenkampf, hastily retreat, blowing up bridges behind them. In this regard, it was ordered to advance on the Sensburg-Allenstein front. Such a compromise was unlikely to be fully consistent with the situation.
The position of the commander-in-chief of the front is quite understandable. He feared the separation of the 1st and 2nd armies from each other and wanted the inner flanks to close as soon as possible. However, interaction could be ensured at the expense of not only the 2nd army, but also the 1st. At the time when Ya.G. Zhilinsky allowed the 2nd Army to postpone the blow to the west (August 25), he riveted the attention of the troops of P.K. von Rennenkampf to the Konigsberg Fortress (August 26). In addition, the orders of Ya.G. Zhilinsky led only to the ousting of the Germans from East Prussia, and also put the central corps of A.V. Samsonov in an extremely dangerous position in the event of a strike on the left flank of the army and a breakthrough to the rear. In general, fortresses like magnets attracted the attention of the Russian command, playing a cruel joke with them, forcing them to pay too much attention to them. In parallel, General N.V. Ruzsky on the Southwestern Front, leading an offensive towards Lvov, trying to capture it (instead of striking further north, threatening the flank and rear of the Austrians).
On August 23-24, in the Orlau-Frankenau region, a battle broke out between the 15th corps of General N.N. Martos (with the assistance of the 13th corps, which did not take direct part in the battle) and the 20th German corps, which, as a result of a bloody battle, was thrown back, having suffered defeat.
However, continuing the offensive, the commander of the 2nd Army began to ask the front headquarters for the opportunity to strike at the Allenstein-Osterode railway branch. After all, the enemy withdrew to the north-west, and in the north-east, according to intelligence, there are no German forces! You need to chase the enemy, not hit an empty space! The front command had to admit this fact, therefore, on August 25, A.V. Samsonov launched an offensive in the direction he had demanded earlier. But the blow was delivered in a rather strange way: with only 2.5 corps forces, while two other corps and three cavalry divisions only supported the offensive. This happened largely due to the not fully thought out orders of the front command (and the army as well). As a result, the army was stretched out.
In addition to the "static" 1st corps (by the way, the fault is for the most part of the Headquarters), Ya.G. Zhilinsky also demanded the right-flank 6th Army Corps of General A.A. To send Blagoveshchensky together with the 4th Cavalry Division to cover the direction from Allenstein to the Masurian Lakes, which tore these troops away from all other units, making the right flank a convenient target for the enemy. However, on August 26, Ya.G. Zhilinsky, apparently realizing his mistake, allowed the commander of the 2nd Army to use the 6th corps at his own discretion, but as events will show, it was already too late.
Moving almost blindly, A.V. Samsonov did not know that the enemy had already concentrated the main forces in front of him. Largely based on inaccurate information from the front headquarters about the situation and being blindly urged forward by it, the army command did not fully understand the situation. The commander, however, based on mostly erroneous information, rightly feared for the left flank. He was less optimistic about the situation and eventually made the decision to strengthen the left flank with about 1.5 divisions (which would clearly not be enough to delay the enemy), continuing the general offensive: he was strictly forbidden to stop, and of all the options, the chosen one seemed optimal (taking into account the orders above). To the 1st building L.K. Artamonov were sent: the 1st rifle brigade, the heavy artillery division of the 23rd corps and the 9th engineer battalion, and then to General L.K. Two more neighboring cavalry divisions (6th and 15th) were subordinated to Artamonov. Probably, transferring the blow to the Allenstein-Osterode front, the army commander not only planned to pursue the retreating enemy, but also to assist the left flank: attacking against Artamonov, the Germans themselves could receive a blow to the flank of the advancing group. It seemed that it was only necessary to "put the squeeze" on the enemy, then he, already defeated by the 1st army, and also battered in battle on August 23-24, would completely leave the province.
However, by August 26, the 2nd Army was tired after long days of movement, serious problems had already arisen with the supply, because they did not have time to completely arrange the rear. Some units were starving, or rather tried to feed on local means. All suggestions for a day trip to Ya.G. Zhilinsky rejected it.
And the high command was optimistic, and the further from the front line, the more. So, on August 26, in a conversation with the headquarters of the North-Western Front, Quartermaster General of the Headquarters Yu.N. Danilov generally conveyed that the supreme commander-in-chief wants to "end East Prussia as soon as possible." Without establishing clear control, which should have been expressed in raising awareness of what was happening in all higher authorities, the command of the front (and Headquarters at the same time) drew in their heads an illusory "picture of the world" that they did not want to destroy and which dominated the situation, giving rise to the wrong orders and pushing thousands of Russian soldiers to their death. The general euphoria could not be broken even by alarming abrupt messages about the movement of the Germans and the appearance of new units, which came both to the front headquarters and to the General Headquarters. Although it cannot be said that the generals were not aware of what was happening, so, according to the memoirs of Yu.N. Danilov, these days the headquarters was worried about the right flanks, as well as the remote and insufficiently active position of the 1st Army. But this, apparently, did not change the general picture.
Speaking about the reasons for the defeat of the 2nd Army, we note that the indiscriminateness of the nearby superiors also played a role: orders for further movement were sent quite late, if not in the morning of the next day, as a result, the regiments not only delayed in their performance, but also did not always have time to choose a successful path. ... Moreover, the unreliability of Russian radio (many messages were transmitted in plain text) helped the Germans to correctly navigate the current situation: the Germans managed to intercept Russian telegrams, from where they learned about the plans and dispositions of the enemy. And this is not the only case throughout the war. So the enemy began the Tannenberg battle with fairly accurate information about the enemy's intentions. The military luck of P. von Hindenburg and E. Ludendorff in this operation could have been the envy of Napoleon himself!
Note that at this time in Koblenz, where the German Headquarters was located, the events in East Prussia were quite seriously evaluated. After all, the fate of Europe (if not the whole world), as the Germans believed, was now being decided in the west, in battles against France, Belgium and England. And the capture of East Prussia with a further attack on Berlin could confuse all the cards. In this regard, G. von Moltke on August 26 gave the order to transfer to the east the Guards Reserve and 11th Corps, which were freed after the fall of one of the strongest Belgian fortresses of Namur. The 8th Cavalry Division also began to move to the east.
On August 26, the Germans, with two corps and one Landwehr brigade, attacked the 6th corps, located in the area north of Bischofsburg. As a result, the Russian 4th Infantry Division was defeated, and the rest of the troops began to retreat. A.A. Blagoveshchensky not only could not stop the outgoing formations and took them to Bischofsburg, but the next day he retreated to Ortelsburg. Thus, the right flank was exposed. The neighboring 13th corps was not notified of this, and the army headquarters learned about the withdrawal only in the middle of 27 August. In addition, in the center that day, the 2nd Infantry Division (from the 23rd corps, marching between the 1st and 15th corps) was defeated and began to withdraw, which nevertheless managed to stop in the area of dd. Janishkau and Scottau. The next day, one part of it tried to hold on to a new position near Frankenau, and the other, exhausted, in disarray, under the impression of yesterday's battle, but without pressure from the enemy, retreated to Neidenburg (where, by the way, the army headquarters was located). Only on August 28 these regiments were able to be put in order and sent to the held lines.
On August 27, decisive battles unfolded on the left flank of the army in the area of Uzdau, where the 1st corps of General L.K. Artamonov. The reinforced 1st German corps was advancing against him. The first battles began the day before, but only the next day they continued with renewed vigor. The Germans soon succeeded in occupying Uzdau, but at the same time the enemy crushed their right flank. It seemed that great success had been achieved. However, the unexpected happened: the Russians began to retreat.
Historians argue about the reasons for the withdrawal. Some argue that L.K. Artamonov corps just chickened out. Others argue that German radio operators were working here, who sent a false order to withdraw. In which, by the way, there are many reasons to believe (for it is not clear what L.K. Artamonov was afraid of), because earlier, the Germans had already passed similar "orders", trying to upset the offensive of the 2nd Army.
As a result, parts of the 1st corps were mixed, some of them ended up by the end of August 27 not only at Soldau (although some regiments were still able to take up defenses here), but even further south. However, even in the middle of the day L.K. Artamonov reported that he "stands like a rock." Although quite possible, this reflects a complete misunderstanding of the situation at the front of their corps. When in the evening A.V. Samsonov learned about the retreat of the corps, he dismissed the commander from his post, appointing General A.A. Dushkevich. However, the Germans, who themselves suffered losses and were quite upset, did not immediately believe in such a success, thinking that the Russians had positions well prepared for defense, and therefore did not dare to rush into pursuit.
In general, as noted above, although the 1st corps was subordinate to the commander of the 2nd army, it was not part of it. It was forbidden to move the corps north of Zoldau (which was actually done by A.V. Samsonov) without the special permission of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, vl. book Nikolai Nikolaevich. He put at the disposal of Ya.G. Zhilinsky this connection on August 26. Permission to use them in the current operation from the front commander followed the next day, but it came to the army headquarters only on August 29 and could hardly change the situation. However, A.V. Samsonov did not stand on ceremony with this ban, moving the corps to Uzdau. In addition, it was really dangerous to move the corps deeper, because it could lead to the complete defeat of the 2nd Army.
And what about that day, August 27, when the troops of L.K. Artamonov rolled back to the border, what happened in the center? The 15th corps fought stubborn (and relatively successful) battles in the area of the village of Mühlen. And the 13th corps of General N.A. Klyuev, having sent one brigade to Hohenstein to help his neighbor on the left, spent most of the day marching to Allenstein, which took in the evening. Apparently, despite the fact that A.V. Samsonov did not have so many forces to strike, the 13th corps generally "skipped" two days of the battle, having no serious clashes with the enemy. Not finding the enemy and not knowing about the position of the 6th corps (neighbor on the right), N.A. Klyuev on the evening of August 27 received an order to provide more effective assistance to N.N. Martos. To do this, the 13th corps in the morning marched to the area west of Hohenstein, however, thereby exposing its rear to attack from those enemy forces that threw back A.A. troops on August 26. Annunciation.
Interestingly, 13th Corps reconnaissance found these troops. Our planes reported that two columns were moving from the east with forces per division each. The pilots could not figure out whether it was Russians or Germans, but everyone decided that this was the 6th corps, which was supposed to approach Allenstein.
As a result, by the end of the second day of the battle, the left flank of the 2nd Army rolled back. With the retreat of the troops subordinated to General L.K. Artamonov, the central corps that had pulled ahead (whose commanders were not aware of the unfolding events) found themselves in a particularly difficult situation. In general, the army split into three groupings, conducting unrelated battles along a wide convex front (with flanks near the border, and the center - in the depths of East Prussia).
August 28 A.V. Samsonov, realizing that the situation was difficult, but poorly understanding the situation, made a gross mistake: he decided to organize an offensive with central corps (due to a misconception about the location of the enemy, the general thought that the blow would have to be on the flank) and for this he went to the headquarters 15th corps, having removed the telegraph apparatus. As a result, the army lost control as a whole and lost contact with the front command.
And it finally, by the night of August 28, more or less figured out what was happening. Comparing their "picture of the world" and the facts, the command, apparently, saw a sharp contrast, which made it possible to quickly understand what a difficult situation it had driven the troops of A.V. Samsonov. As a result, Ya.G. Zhilinsky sent an order to P.K. von Rennenkampf to rush to the aid of a neighbor, and then (as soon as the situation on the flanks of the 2nd Army became clear) ordered the commander of the 2nd Army to withdraw to the border. But this telegram never reached him.
PC. von Rennenkampf began to deploy the corps and sent the cavalry of Nakhichevan and Gurko to the enemy's rear, and in the afternoon of August 29 he showed his readiness to personally organize an offensive in the flank and rear of the enemy. To do this, under his own responsibility, the commander of the 1st army wanted to violate the order of the supreme commander-in-chief to move the 2nd corps to the Graevo area, wishing to use it in a general strike. True, an order was soon followed to remain in place, tk. at the front headquarters they thought that the troops of A.V. Samsonov retreated to the border. The real situation was clarified only by the night of August 30, but it was too late. The cavalry, on the other hand, made a raid, but could not provide special assistance to the perishing, although it caused a lot of anxiety and panic among the Germans.
Nevertheless, for A.V. Samsonov on the morning of August 28, not all was lost. The Germans had not yet completely defeated the flanks, and the central divisions so far not only held out, but also successfully repelled the onslaught in some areas. For example, in the morning at Waplitz, the 41st German division was defeated.
It was also possible to withdraw the central corps, simultaneously providing auxiliary blows from the flank units. In addition, two days later P.K. von Rennenkampf would be directly supportive. Unfortunately, time was lost. Lack of firm command, accurate information about the enemy, well-established communications and mistakes played their part. But, speaking of the shortcomings, in no case should one forget about a rather strong and successful opponent.
Now it is easy to condemn the actions of Russian generals, but, as E. Ludendorff wrote, “an uninitiated person too easily begins to imagine that in a war everything goes as if an arithmetic problem is being solved with certain data. But war is anything but a mathematical problem ... People who criticize the commander, but themselves did not participate in the war in a leading position, must first study military history. I can only wish that someday they had to fight on their own. They would be frightened by the lack of clarity of the situation and the enormous demands that this responsible task poses. " But still: the generals are at the head of the armies in order to be able to figure everything out and lead the troops to victory. The Germans succeeded, and A.V. Unfortunately, Samsonov did not.
When he arrived at the location of the 15th corps, he was disappointed: the soldiers fought with their last strength. Despite the fact that on 28 August, units of the 13th corps managed to defeat one Landwehr division at Hohenstein, the general situation did not improve. The Russians also suffered losses, with difficulty repulsing the advancing enemy.
As a result, General A.V. Samsonov, seeing that there could be no talk of any decisive offensive either in the flank, or in the forehead, or anywhere else, in the evening of the same day ordered to retreat. But then the 1st German corps took Neidenburg, finding itself in the rear of the center of the 2nd Army (5 infantry divisions).
True, there was still no complete encirclement. The corps, located on the left flank of the German army, due to the disagreement between the commanders and the disputes over who is in charge here, were more trampled on the spot, and therefore the exit to the southeast of Hohenstein was not closed. And in the center, the Germans did not have much success. And with the receipt of news about the movement of P.K. von Rennenkampf, the headquarters of the 8th Army, already fearing an attack on the rear, decided to send two left-flank corps to Allenstein to cover the operation. Then, having understood the situation more clearly, they decided that one would be enough (after all, the enemy was not yet surrounded). But due to the lack of communication, the order did not reach him and therefore on August 29 he continued to act in accordance with the previous order. As a result, five divisions of the 2nd Army got into the "cauldron".
They failed to make a withdrawal and break through to the border. The Russian rearguards, in some areas showing quite stubborn resistance, were eventually defeated. The retreating columns were attacked, finally scattered, captured or destroyed. A.V. Samsonov wandered for a long time, then, falling into despair, on the night of August 30, shot himself.
Attempts from other units to provide assistance were unsuccessful. Although on the morning of August 30, the detachment of General L.O. Sirelius (from the 1st Corps) took Neidenburg with a sharp throw, which caused confusion among the enemy and forced him to draw up his forces to repel the attack. Unfortunately, the actions of the encircled and the detachment that broke through were not coordinated, and therefore did not bring the desired result. Already on August 31 L.O. Sirelius retreated to Mlawa. About 20,000 people were able to get out of the “boiler”. All others were captured or killed. The total losses of the army, including killed, wounded and prisoners, amounted to about 90,000 people. However, these figures are the subject of discussions by many researchers.
Having won and having received two corps and a cavalry division from the western front, the Germans decided to defeat the troops of von Rennenkampf, by the way, also significantly replenished with reserves. So, on the right flank, a new 26th Army Corps was formed from the secondary divisions. Several more divisions were in the rear.
As a result, the command of the 8th Army will receive accusations that it pursued narrow national interests, clearing all of East Prussia from the enemy, thereby not trying to help the Austrian allies in their battle for Galicia with a direct blow to the south on Sedlec in the rear of the armies of the Russian South -western front. Purely theoretically, with the death of the 2nd Army, this road was opened, but such an operation was an even greater gamble than the Russian offensive in East Prussia with the abandonment of large forces in the rear and fortresses and the parallel formation of the 10th Army for a direct attack on Berlin. Only a part of the 2nd Army was defeated, its flank formations remained in order and had the opportunity, with proper control, to offer decisive resistance. The Russians still had a small 10th Army ready to strike at the flank of the Germans. In addition, trying to rehabilitate himself and change the situation in his favor, P.K. von Rennenkampf. In the event of an attack on Sedlec, the Germans had no strength left to defend the province, which meant at least its loss. Naturally, P. von Hindenburg and E. Ludendorff abandoned such an adventure.
At the end of August, the chief of staff of the 1st Army, General G.G. Mileant and Quartermaster General General K.K. Byows called for a withdrawal to the Insterburg line, which would give the army more maneuverability and stability. The chief of staff of the front V.A. Oranovsky. However, P.K. von Rennenkampf decided to remain in his positions, in which he was supported by J.G. Zhilinsky. The main reasoning was that the withdrawal could negatively affect the morale of the troops. Further events will show that the chiefs of staff were right, but in the current situation, the logic of P.K. von Rennenkampf had a rational grain. It should be noted that at the same time in the area of Suwalki and Byala, the troops of the 10th Army were gathering, which in case of danger, as P.K. von Rennenkampf and assured J.G. Zhilinsky, could help his left flank. And around September 14, it was planned to launch a new offensive. But the enemy did not hesitate: he himself was concentrating against the 1st Army.
The Germans intended to cover the left flank of von Rennenkampf with a bypass group, cut off his retreat with a quick offensive and, pressing him to the swampy terrain of the lower reaches of the Neman, destroy. The Germans managed to achieve not only a numerical superiority in the direction of the main attack, but also an overwhelming fire superiority almost along the entire front (1086 guns for the Germans against 724 for the Russians).
Already on September 7, parts of the bypass group (1st, 17th Army Corps, 3rd Reserve, 1st and 8th Cavalry Divisions, covered from the south by parts of the Landwehr) came into contact with the left flank 43rd Infantry Division, next to with which units of the second-order 76th division (302nd regiment with 76th artillery brigade) fought. The 3rd reserve division had already reached the Byala area, pushing back parts of the 22nd corps (or rather, its 1st Finnish division). Initially, the presence of heavy artillery by the Germans against the right flank (in the area of the Deim River), as well as an intercepted false telegram, forced P.K. von Rennenkampf think that the main enemy forces are concentrated there. Yes, and the Headquarters itself recommended paying attention to the Tilsit-Memel area, fearing surprises from there. Only the next day did a "strong offensive" emerge against the left flag.
Benckheim ordered the 72nd division at dawn on the 27th of August. I order you to be extremely stubborn, "wrote the commander of the 1st Army on September 8 (26 August) to the commander of the 2nd corps, General V.A. Slyusarenko, whose troops valiantly held back the enemy. Also P.K. von Rennenkampf dispatched the 54th division to the Darkemen area while expecting the neighboring 10th Army to provide assistance. But its troops (22nd Corps and scattered units of the 3rd Siberian) were themselves very upset and could not advance. When it finally became clear on September 9, P.K. von Rennenkampf reacted quickly: he ordered the 20th corps (three divisions) to be transferred from the right flank to the left, and began to pull the cavalry there, thus saving the troops from the upcoming Tannenberg. Attempts on the part of the hastily put in order of the 2nd Army to provide support were also unsuccessful. However, the Germans themselves acted not without mistakes and not decisively enough, fearing to run into large Russian forces, a ghost that hovered in front of the command of the 8th Army, which did not allow them to reach a O more.
For example, on September 11, the battered parts of V.A. Slyusarenko unexpectedly counterattacked and were even partially supported by the neighboring 4th corps of General Aliyev, which came as a complete surprise to the enemy. The chief of staff of the 8th Army E. Ludendorff recalled in his memoirs: “The biggest misunderstanding was the statement of the XI Army Corps on September 11 that it was attacked by superior enemy forces ... Therefore, we had to decide the XVII and I Army Corps to move further north than it was supposed initially. A few hours later, it turned out that the report of the XI Army Corps was erroneous. But the order was given to the enveloping wing. Later, the buildings were again turned to their former directions, but at least half a day was lost. " As a result, as M. Hoffman, Chief of the Operations Directorate of the 8th Army headquarters more definitely wrote, "this caused an absolutely unnecessary suspension in the pursuit, and this loss of time could no longer be made up."
After a series of fierce battles of P.K. von Rennenkampf withdrew from East Prussia by 13 September. By September 19, the 1st Russian army was on the river. Neman. The 2nd and 10th armies (the latter were commanded by General V.E.Flug) these days took up defenses along the river. Narev and Beaver, respectively. The Germans advanced into the territory of the Russian Empire, taking Augustow and Suwalki. The total losses of the 1st Army, according to some estimates, amounted to about 150 guns and 80,000 people. Although this figure includes many lightly wounded, who soon returned to duty. It is doubtful enough that the 1st Army suffered almost the same losses as the defeated troops of A.V. Samsonov.
Despite the fact that the Russians were defeated, the undertaken offensive pulled off part of the German forces from the western front to the eastern, thereby weakening the pressure on France and making an important contribution to the victory of the Anglo-French in the Battle of the Marne (September 5-12, 1914) , as a result of which the German troops moving to Paris were stopped. The German plan for a lightning war failed. The merit of the Russian offensive in the fact that it pulled off part of the enemy forces was later noted by many Western military leaders, participants in the Marne battles, and historians. Although, of course, the general reasons for the defeat of the Germans were much deeper than simply the lack of two corps and one cavalry division in the west, transferred to the eastern front. And statements that the fate of Paris was decided in the fields of East Prussia look somewhat strange.
For the failure of the operation in East Prussia, Ya.G. Zhilinsky was replaced by General N.V. Ruzsky, who managed to distinguish himself in the parallel battle of Galicia, where he successfully commanded the 3rd Army. And for P.K. von Rennenkampf was not found guilty, and he retained his post.
After the expulsion of the Russians, the Germans transferred the main forces to Poland to help the defeated Austrians, leaving only small units under the command of General R. von Schubert (up to 100,000 people) on the East Prussian front. His army was tasked with covering the borders of the province and conducting demonstrative actions, which, by the way, was done with success.
On September 25, the enemy began demonstrative battles near Sopotskin, the next day he attacked Druskeniki (territory of the Russian Empire). The Russian forces of the 1st and 10th armies went over to the offensive and in early October found themselves near the borders of East Prussia. "The water in the Neman turned red from enemy blood", "the German battle ended with the complete victory of our valiant troops and the defeat of the army of General Hindenburg", "the bloody battle on the banks of the Neman is one of the largest in the era of a real war," it was then written about these battles. Subsequent researchers were more skeptical. The First August operation was dubbed a "strategic misunderstanding" already in 1919. Maybe this is said a little loudly, but really, these demonstrative actions of the German army for a short time were able to mislead the Russian command, at least N.V. Ruzsky. Or, it can be assumed, he tried to act only in the narrow interests of his front.
Even at a meeting of the Russian command in Kholm on September 22 (9), where Vl. book Nikolai Nikolaevich, and N.V. Ruzsky, and the commander-in-chief of the Southwestern Front N.I. Ivanov, it was decided to concentrate two corps near Warsaw. However, N.V. Ruzsky did not comply with this order. Soon, clearly representing the impending danger, the Headquarters decided to concentrate the entire 2nd Army in the Warsaw area, but the commander-in-chief of the North-Western Front again showed persistence. On September 29, he reported to the Headquarters: “Although there is reason to assume that the forces of the Germans in front of the front of the 1st and 10th armies are about 3-4 corps, however, this cannot be said for certain…. I believe that only in two or three days it will be possible, both by military operations and by means of reconnaissance, to more or less accurately establish the enemy forces acting against these .... I believe that the transfer of corps of the 2nd army to the Vistula is still somewhat premature. " To this, General Yanushkevich, Chief of Staff of the Headquarters, pointed out that the events on the left bank of the Vistula are now of decisive importance, and against the 1st and 10th armies there are mainly landwehr units, so that the transfer of the 2nd army should be carried out immediately. The order of October 1 stated that “the armies of the Northwestern Front are tasked with ensuring at all costs the right flank and rear of the armies of the Southwestern Front from the enemy operating from East Prussia. At the same time, the commander-in-chief of the armies of the North-Western Front should be ready to allocate at least two more field corps to support the troops operating on the Vistula. "
The 2nd corps was assigned for the transfer only the next day. And about another dispute ensued. On this occasion, a conversation took place between General Yu.N. Danilov (Quartermaster General of the Supreme Command Headquarters) and General M.D. Bonch-Bruyevich (quartermaster general of the headquarters of the North-Western Front), where the latter asked to suspend the advance of the 4th corps (from the 1st army) to Warsaw. M.D. Bonch-Bruevich noted that “the front is just embarking on offensive operations, the first success of which, as the experience of the struggle in Galicia has shown, is of particular importance. From this point of view, it is completely undesirable, in the interests of the common cause and tasks of the North-Western Front, to weaken the latter in the period before September 27 and 28 ... ". And this is despite the fact that Yu.N. Danilov once again pointed to the front headquarters “in its place”: “… on the banks of the Vistula the fate of the first period of the campaign, and maybe the whole war, will be decided… Everything else should be subordinate to the chief. The task of the North-Western Front is narrowed down to the limits of only unconditional support, in a broad sense, of the right flank and rear of the operation and of covering the railway lines ... This task, of course, is of paramount importance, but it must be solved with the least forces. " However, the question of sending the 4th corps was finally decided on October 5th.
Moreover, the headquarters of the North-Western Front did not abandon attempts to go on the offensive deep into East Prussia, wishing to build on the August success (apparently, rather relative). Although there is nothing to be surprised if the Directive on the 2nd Army dated October 4 (September 21) noted the state of affairs: "Before the front of the 1st and 10th armies, the Germans, defeated in the last battles, hastily retreat and indiscriminately retreat abroad." Apparently, at the front headquarters, someone really wanted to repeat the Galician success. However, the reality turned out to be much more complicated. For example, in the Shirvindt area from 5 to 12 October, units of the 3rd corps tried to bypass the left flank of the Germans. Despite the numerical superiority and replenishment of reserves, the so-called Kronensky detachment (from the 3rd corps) operating here, having suffered heavy losses, was stopped and moved away from the border. In addition, during these battles on October 10 near the village of Sharvinishki, the prince of imperial blood, Oleg Konstantinovich, the son of Grand Duke Konstantin Konstantinovich, president of the Imperial Academy of Sciences and a famous poet (under the pseudonym K.R.), was mortally wounded.
The battles in other sectors of the front also did not meet with success (apparently, the "disorderly retreat" was greatly exaggerated), so the offensive was soon suspended, withdrawing the troops somewhat back to more successful positions. One of the results was the displacement of General V.E. Flug from the post of commander of the 10th Army and his replacement by General F.V. Sievers.
The East Prussian theater of operations became secondary. The main battles took place on the Vistula and Sana'a, i.e. in Poland, therefore the main task of the 1st and 10th armies was "to support the general operation on the Middle Vistula from the side of the enemy operating from East Prussia." October 14 N.V. Ruzsky in the order to the commander of the 2nd Army, General S.M. Scheidemann was informed that "in East Prussia on the Vladislav front up to Johannisburg, apparently, there are no more than three corps supported by the Landsturmen units." In addition, various units were constantly "pulled out" from the troops on the East Prussian border.
The halt of the armies in the first half of October was temporary, only for internal regrouping. On October 20, General N.V. Ruzsky set the task of the 10th Army with the assistance of the troops of P.K. von Rennenkampf to master the Masurian Lakes. General F.V. Sivers to conduct not a frontal offensive, but to bypass the lakes did not meet with the approval of the front commander.
But on October 20, the Germans themselves began to attack the Grajevo area and the very next day they captured this point. However, on October 22, the corps of the 10th Army went on the offensive. The vanguards of the Germans retreated to Lyk, but then, counterattacking, forced the enemy to stop.
The new commander of the 8th German Army, General G. von François (who replaced R. von Schubert on October 8), decided to demonstrate the presence of large forces in the province, knowing that the enemy was pulling divisions to the Vistula. Each corps was ordered to attack, and in the event of a strong rebuff, retreat to its previously occupied positions. So, on October 24, the 25th German reserve corps again went over to the attack on Grajevo, pushing back the Russian troops, to which the reinforcements then arrived, and together they not only threw the enemy back to the starting line, but were also able to move forward a little.
On October 25, the command of the 1st Russian army was transferred to Lodz, and all corps became part of the troops of General F.V. Sievers. Their total number, taking into account the understaffing, according to some estimates, was about 200,000 people (15.5 infantry and 8 cavalry divisions). The enemy had seven divisions, as well as several Landwehr and Landsturmen brigades.
Note that in parallel, major battles unfolded in the Warsaw direction. The Germans were defeated, and they began to hastily retreat.
And in East Prussia, the Germans continued to attack, trying to create the impression of having a large force. At the same time, having carried out a partial regrouping on the right flank, the 10th Army tried on October 29 to continue the offensive.
However, a shortage of ammunition soon became apparent. The very next day in the evening F.V. Sivers, seeing the futility of the attacks, decided to go on the defensive before receiving reinforcements and weapons.
But on the right flank it was possible to occupy the northern shore of the lake. Vishtynts and go to the border (the cavalry corps of V.I. Then F.V. Sievers decided to try to build on the success here. On October 31, Vladislavov was occupied, and on November 1, part of the Rominten Forest (2 guns were taken). At this time N.V. Ruzsky, seeing the weakness of the 10th army, decided to strengthen it with three new divisions and allowed one more (74th) to take from the garrison of the fortress of Kovno. Then F.V. Sievers gives the order to continue the offensive with the right flank, supporting him with attacks from other units.
The battles of the 10th Army in November 1914 were part of a general offensive into Germany. For this F.V. Sievers, according to the directive of November 2 (October 20), was required to capture the area of the Masurian Lakes, and then, together with the 1st Army, now located on the left, to establish themselves on the Lower Vistula. The Germans, assuming a further offensive by the Russians after their defeat near Warsaw, began to transfer some corps from East Prussia to the Thorn area, thereby weakening the position of the troops in the province.
The offensive against the German 8th Army located here, G. von François (who was soon replaced by General O. von Belov) began on November 3, but met with stubborn resistance. Then a brigade of the 68th Infantry Division tried to advance on Tilsit, depicting activity in this sector of the front, but already at the border crossing at Taurogen, it encountered the enemy and was unable to advance further. Soon the German resistance weakened, because the corps pulled back (1st and 35th reserve) were replaced by poorly trained landsturmen formations. All this allowed the cavalry corps of V.I. Gurko by November 16 to settle between Pilkallen and Malvishken, the 3rd corps of N.A. Epanchin - in the Stallupenen area, to the 20th corps - on the western edge of the Rominten Forest, the rest of the forces - at Kovalen - Olecko - about. Lashmade - Arsis.
Speaking of the battles in East Prussia, I would like to note that in November for some time the 1st Army occupied Soldau. At the same time, major battles took place in Poland on the fronts of the 5th, 2nd and 1st armies (the so-called Lodz operation). After the successful October battles near Warsaw, Russian troops, preparing for a general offensive in Germany, lost their offensive initiative, and the Germans attacked first (November 11), trying to encircle the 2nd Army. However, the detour group of General Schaeffer itself almost fell into the "cauldron" and with heavy losses was able to break through to their own. One of the reasons for the enemy's withdrawal was the mistake of P.K. von Rennenkampf, for which he was removed from command, and in the fall of 1915 he was generally dismissed from service. In the eyes of many, he was a German, and, therefore, a traitor (let's not forget the anti-German hysteria, raised in the press and in society at the beginning of the war). Prince Gabriel Konstantinovich wrote: “Rennenkampf was accused of failures at the front and of releasing the army of Hindenburg surrounded by us. Of course, opinions were divided, and some were against him, and others for. So, General Ermolinsky, who was at his headquarters, stood for him and argued that Rennenkampf was unjustly convicted. They said, among other things, that Rennenkampf was German and that his own brother was in command of the German troops against us. All these were idle inventions. "
Of course, the commander of the 1st Army, whose military leadership, it must be admitted, turned out to be far from being up to par on the fields of East Prussia, was not a genius military leader, but his language would not turn out to be a mediocrity. Among other things, according to eyewitnesses, P.K. von Rennenkampf was unable to arrange the normal work of his headquarters. Officer P.A. Ackerman, who served directly at the headquarters of the 1st Army, assessed the immediate environment not only as people far from the art of war, but also as intriguers: "The atmosphere of the headquarters has become, thanks to this, simply unbearable." Perhaps the general would have done better by commanding a corps or division. At least the complete defeat of P.K. von Rennenkampf somehow managed to escape. Although, of course, he, as a commander, bears a rather heavy burden of responsibility for defeat and heavy losses.
But back to the November events in East Prussia. Developing the offensive, the 10th Army (after regrouping again) reached the following areas by November 28: the cavalry corps of V.I. Gurko was west of Malvishken; detachment N.A. Epanchina (56th and 73rd divisions) - between Stallupenen and Gumbinnen; detachment V.V. Smirnov (25th and 27th divisions, as well as 20th and 22nd corps) - at the river. Angerapp, detachment of E.A. Radkevich (26th and 3rd Siberian corps with 84th division) - east of Letzen and on the isthmus between Lakes Spirding and Leventin. 4th and 15th cavalry divisions were in Byala and Kadzidlo.
The Germans, numerically inferior, had well-fortified positions, while the 10th Army (or, as it was called, the "East Prussian") lacked weapons, and the units were understaffed. At first, the wooded and swampy nature of the terrain interfered with the offensive, and when frosts struck, which, albeit slightly, but facilitated its conduct, it turned out that the soldiers did not have warm clothes.
Speaking about the position of the 10th Army, it should be noted that positional battles had a rather difficult effect on the morale of the soldiers, especially in the secondary units. The order issued on December 16 (3), 1914 stated that “lately there have been cases of surrender under such circumstances that make one assume that the surrender was deliberate. The perpetrators of such a shameful violation of duty and oath obviously counted on impunity, hoping that after the war it would be difficult to clarify the matter. In view of this, the Commander of the Army ordered in all units of the troops to keep the names of the lower ranks who surrendered, and these lists should be presented in the established order. " December 9 (November 25, O.S.) N.V. Ruzsky pointed out F.V. Sivers, as one of the reasons for the low morale of the soldiers (and as a consequence, the high level of surrender), for the distance of the commanders from the front line, and therefore ordered the chiefs of even large military formations to visit the front line, “to speak with the lower ranks to enter into their needs ". Moreover, at this time the first shoots of socialist propaganda appeared in the troops, the carriers of which arrived with marching reinforcements. Then, in order to "suppress this evil", an order was sent to the unit "to take the most severe measures, indicating to the troops that such propaganda plays not only into the hands of the enemy, but is also an instrument of his struggle against us."
The command of the 10th Army also tried to take care of intelligence, whose actions remained weak as before. The order of December 6 (19), 1914 stated that it was necessary “to organize constant reconnaissance of the enemy's location and searches for individual reconnaissance parties assigned to constantly disturb the enemy, destroy his barriers, get prisoners, etc. For such searches, I order to form in each regiment several parties - mostly of hunters - calculated so that searches could be conducted continuously. "
In December, the difficult situation with shells remained. In the order of December 5 (18) F.V. Sivers wrote that the stocks of artillery cartridges “are limited and can only be replenished to a certain extent, which is why the most careful and attentive attitude to the consumption of artillery cartridges is necessary…. Shoot artillery only when repelling large enemy attacks and at targets of exceptional importance. "
In December, the 10th Army (the periodic withdrawal of troops from which continued) actually remained at its former positions. The main attention was focused on the Letzen fortress, which several unsuccessful attempts were made to storm it.
For the new year 1915, the Russian command was making plans to launch a "third" offensive in East Prussia. For this, the formation of the 12th Army was in full swing. However, the position of F.V. Sievers remained heavy: the units were still understaffed, the forces were stretched out on a front of 170 km with practically no reserves. The army consisted of 11 infantry and almost 3 cavalry divisions (up to 170,000 people in total). Although, taking into account the shortage of up to 40%, some researchers believe that the real number in 11 divisions was lower, about 120,000 people.
And the Russian high command again dispersed its forces. Not choosing the main direction, it decided to simultaneously prepare an offensive on the Austro-Hungarian front. In turn, the Germans planned to defeat the right flank of the Russians (i.e., the 10th Army) with a joint blow from the 8th and 10th armies from East Prussia, where large forces were drawn. If at first the number of troops stationed here was about 100,000 people, by the beginning of February it was increased to 250,000 soldiers and officers.
While the concentration of new armies was going on, the Russian command decided to occupy the Lasdenen forests (the so-called Lasdenen operation) in order to improve the position of the right flank of the front (and the army as well) - the Verzhbolovsk group, General N.A. Epanchina. As a result of the fighting that began on January 25, these troops were only upset and suffered unnecessary losses, failing to reach their goal. After all, our generals did not know that large enemy forces were concentrated here. As noted in one of the orders dated December 24 (11), 1914: “The undoubtedly important matter of military intelligence is still not getting better. According to the reports of the military Headquarters, which are extremely meager and sometimes contradictory, it is not possible to form a complete picture of the location of the active enemy, which, of course, makes it extremely difficult for the high command. It is necessary, by all means, to overcome all difficulties and to put reconnaissance to the proper height. " However, the latter, as you can see, did not succeed. The Russian command remained in the dark about the enemy.
In general, the Russians were catastrophically "unlucky" in East Prussia. The Second Offensive also ended in disaster. On February 7, K. Litzmann's strike group of the 8th German army (commanded by General O. Belov) fell on the left flank of the 10th Russian. The next day, the 10th (new) German army of General G. von Eichhorn went on the offensive, bypassing the Russian right flank. The stencilled German plan - a strike on both flanks in order to encircle the center - was unraveled too late. This turned out to be fatal for the central 20th corps of General P.I. Bulgakov, who, as a result of a delay in positions and errors in management, was surrounded and, after fierce resistance, by February 21, almost completely died in the Augustow forests. Only a few units managed to break through; attempts to free the corps from the encirclement by fresh forces brought up here were unsuccessful.
Among the reasons for the defeat, in addition to the rather poor management of the corps, General P.I. Bulgakov, it should be noted the weak use (or rather, the inability to use) aviation in the 10th Army, which failed to organize aerial reconnaissance, and after the termination of communication with the 20th corps, which did not use the serf air detachments located at its location to search for it. However, the connection itself was also poorly arranged. During the retreat of P.I. Bulgakov removed the radio station and sent it forward along with the convoys, "thanks to which" the army headquarters could not contact him. As we remember, a similar mistake led to the defeat of the 2nd Army.
The Germans celebrated another tactical victory, but at the same time they failed to destroy the Russian army and enter the operational space. As a result of the relatively greater stability of the left-flank units, which actually did not allow the 8th Army to develop a wide offensive (as the troops of General G. von Eichhorn managed to do), and the heroic (which the Germans themselves recognized) resistance of the surrounded in the August forests, the Russian command managed to pull up reserves and stop the enemy.
In parallel, by mid-February, General von Pappritz (governor of Konigsberg), with the landsturm's formations and fortress artillery, took Taurogen during the battles north of Tilsit, pushing the enemy abroad.
The last battles in East Prussia took place in March 1915. General Potapov's detachment (4,000 militiamen with a battery and 10 machine guns) on March 17 unexpectedly invaded East Prussia and took Memel. This, according to M. Hoffmann, caught the German command by surprise. On March 20, a brigade of the 68th Infantry Division took Lauzargen. The Germans urgently had to transfer forces here. On March 21, Memel was returned, and on the 29th, the enemy managed to take Taurogen. As a result, the Germans completely cleared their territory of the enemy. And the 6th Cavalry Division was sent to this area, which covered the province from enemy "surprises", already operating on Russian soil.
In April, Russian Ilya Muromets bombers continued to raid cities in southern East Prussia. So, on April 20, "Ilya Muromets - Kievsky" attacked the Zoldau railway station, on which there were 15 trains. Half an hour later, another Ilya Muromets III raided the same station (commander - staff captain Brodovich). In total, both aircraft dropped 40 bombs, thirty of which weighed over 16 kg.
On April 24, two "Muromets" attacked the Neidenburg station. "Ilya Muromets - Kievsky" dropped eleven bombs of 16 kg and one - 82 kg. An hour later, "Ilya Muromets - III" continued bombing. As a result, the station was put out of action.
Unfortunately, it was not possible to go over to the "third offensive". During the First World War, this province was not a split nut. In May 1915, the enemy broke through the Russian front at Cape Gorlitsa. Thus began the Great Retreat. As a result, by the middle of autumn 1915 Poland, Lithuania, southern Latvia, Western Belarus and part of Galicia were lost. East Prussia had to be forgotten for a long time. Despite the displayed courage, courage, valor, the Russian troops suffered three crushing defeats at Tannenberg, on the Masurian lakes and in the Augustow forests. The enemy victories should not be exaggerated: none of them, for one reason or another, has been widely developed. But nevertheless, the damage to the Russian armies was quite sensitive: the heaviest losses fell primarily on the personnel, because at the beginning of the war (which was then supposed to be conducted only for a few months, not years), many non-commissioned officers were sent as ordinary soldiers, which led to them unnecessary death. And later, throughout 1915-16. in the Russian army there was a lack of a lower officer soldier.
Events in East Prussia exposed many of the shortcomings of the Russian army. Firstly, this is a rather weak management on the part of the senior command personnel, which manifested itself already in the very first battle at Stallupenen. General Ya.G. Zhilinsky. From the very beginning, the operational planning of the operation turned out to be not up to par, just as there was no clear understanding of the capabilities and position of the enemy (the naive assumption of the commander-in-chief of the North-Western Front that the enemy would be chained to the fortified area of the Masurian Lakes is striking). Nor does the Russian command honor the constant confrontation between Samsonov and Zhilinsky over the direction of the main attack.
Secondly, it is necessary to note the lack of artillery. The superiority of fire provided the Germans with victories in the fields of East Prussia. During the First World War, it was on artillery fire that a large share of losses fell. In general, if one German infantry division had about 14 batteries of divisional and corps artillery, then a Russian - only 7. Despite the fact that at the beginning of the war we had 8 gun batteries (Germans had 6 gun batteries), as the experience of battles showed, the presence of two extra guns did not increase the battery's firepower. The transition that took place during the war to 6 gun batteries did not in any way reduce the firepower of the line divisions. However, in contrast to the superiority in firepower, the Russians outnumbered the enemy. If the enemy had 12 battalion divisions, the Russians had 16. But the very first battles in East Prussia showed that unnecessary cluttering of the first line with people with sufficiently weak artillery leads only to unnecessary losses. Large formations of cavalry (the group of Khan of Nakhichevan), which did not give the troops the proper mobility, did not justify themselves either. However, the enemy himself often advanced in close formation, becoming an excellent target for Russian artillery.
Thirdly, the Russian command (and not only on the East Prussian front) was let down by the unreliability of the radio, through which operational orders were often transmitted in clear text, which allowed the enemy to be aware of all events on the wrong side. This facilitated the work of the German headquarters.
Fourthly, the Russian troops themselves very poorly organized reconnaissance and were never fully aware of all events. Immediately after the Battle of Gumbinnen, the enemy was lost; his appearance against the right flank of the 2nd Army came as a surprise. Air reconnaissance was able to report on the movements of some large forces, but for some reason everyone thought that these were our own troops. In September, the headquarters of the 1st Army was also unable to determine the main direction of the enemy strike. In the second half of September, the headquarters of the North-Western Front also did not immediately recognize that German activity in the Augustow forests was only distracting. And in February 1915, the command of the 10th Army was not able to find two large German groupings on the flanks in advance. And the weakness of intelligence means the blindness of the command in relation to the enemy. This was especially evident in August 1914. The quality of decision-making depends on the accuracy of the picture of what is happening, constructed in the head of the military leader. But let's not forget about the great role of prejudices and general mood, which force us to interpret what is happening and the scarce information in this very way, and not in any other way. Once a wrong conclusion (an incorrectly drawn "picture of the world" in the head), given a certain human warehouse and the lack of sufficient information, can have a decisive impact on all subsequent operational creativity. So, we can assume that the initially optimistic front command perceived the victory at Gumbinnen as a major success, this illusion determined both the interpretation of intelligence data and the subsequent decision-making regarding the army of A.V. Samsonov. The influence of this success is evidenced by at least the memoirs of Yu.N. Danilova: “The population left their homes and ... blocked the roads inland. It gave the impression of a complete evacuation of East Prussia by the Germans…. The impression of the victory of General Rennenkampf and the hasty retreat of the Germans was so strong that at one time even the idea of transferring the 1st Army to Warsaw arose. " Only the events on the flanks of August 27 became a "crisis blow" for the understanding at the front headquarters of everything that was happening: the discrepancy between the real and the conceivable "cold shower" poured Ya.G. Zhilinsky, as a result, he began to make the right decisions (but already belatedly). His picture of the world was able to overcome the harmful dependence on the original prejudices and transform, in accordance with reality. With the commander of the 2nd Army, it turned out more and more difficult. A.V. Samsonov, who initially understood the situation deeper, was not subject to the reigning optimism. Thus, the events of August 26-27 did not break his understanding of what was happening, but integrated into the general picture of the world (for they did not sharply contradict it), due to which he could not (or did not want) to recognize the real danger, and therefore decided on August 28 for the last time try your luck. Disassemble the situation more critically and in detail, abandoning all previous reflections, perhaps A.V. Samsonov would have found many other, more successful options for action.
Fifth, already in the winter of 1914/15. Russians began to suffer from an undersupply of units and a lack of weapons, and the morale of the troops began to gradually decline, although the defense of the 20th corps in the Augustow forests will make it possible to say that the strength, heroism and endurance of certain units were not to be occupied.
And finally, it should be specially noted that the reason for our failures lies not only in the shortcomings of the army system, but also in a sufficiently strong and decisive enemy, who, as a result, on his side, not only was able to provide fire and numerical superiority in the necessary sectors of the front at the right time, but also on whose side there was military success (in a number of cases it was the reverse side of Russian slowness, as under Stallupenen, or Russian miscalculations, as under Gumbinnen). At the same time, one cannot fail to note the courage, strength and training of Russian soldiers and officers, as well as sometimes skillful actions of divisional and corps commanders. However, individual tactical successes did not have the proper development.
As you can see, the defeats in East Prussia were not an absolute accident, but were a direct consequence of the vices of the entire Russian military machine as a whole. However, it should be admitted that in August, despite all the shortcomings, Russian troops had a chance to capture the province. And here many subjective factors played a role in the field of intuition and character of military leaders. This list should include: the slowness of the cavalry and a number of divisions in the battle near Stallupenen on August 17, the withdrawal of the cavalry by Nakhichevan after the Causen battle on August 19 (focusing on preserving its own forces), the indecisiveness of the 6th corps in the battles on August 26-27 and a belated report to army headquarters, misunderstanding of the situation A.V. Samsonov and the decision to launch an attack with the central corps, not the flank corps, and finally, the unwillingness of Zhilinsky and Rennenkampf to withdraw (contrary to the advice of the chiefs of staff) the 1st Army to the Insterburg line.
There is another subjective factor: the German command was superior to the Russian in terms of talent and energy. Indeed, almost none of the commanders of the armies, their chiefs of staff, corps and divisional commanders were able to advance into this war and win any significant victories in the future. PC. von Rennenkampf was retired, V.E. The flug did not rise above the corps commander, A.V. Samsonov and F.V. Sivers shot themselves altogether. ON. Yepanchin was also dismissed, although in 1916 he was reinstated and placed at the head of the division. They paid with the posts of L.K. Artamonov (although in 1917 he temporarily commanded one division), A.A. Blagoveshchensky, K.A. Kondratovich, as well as generals E.A. Kolyankovsky, N.N. Komarov and N.A. Oranovsky. Of the corps commanders, only V.V. Smirnov, who then commanded the 2nd Army (and temporarily even the Western Front), E.A. Radkevich - also raised to command the army. V.A. Slyusarenko remained throughout the war at the level of the corps commander (during the Lodz operation he unsuccessfully commanded the Lovichi detachment), however, temporarily leading the 5th Army several times. In principle, the Chief of Staff of the 27th Infantry Division L.A. Radus-Zenkovich: during the war years he consistently commanded a regiment, an infantry brigade, was the quartermaster general of the 6th Army, and during the revolutionary period became its chief of staff. CM. Scheidemann, even during the East Prussian battles, received the command of the 2nd Army, which he left after relatively unsuccessful battles near Lodz, receiving the 1st Turkestan Corps instead. After the October Revolution, he led the 10th Army. The only one who achieved full success was the commander of the 1st Cavalry Division V.I. Gurko (son of a field marshal and brother of a famous politician), whose military career was able to grow to the commander-in-chief of the armies of the Western Front in 1917. And on the eve of the February Revolution, he temporarily acted as chief of staff of the Headquarters (in fact, commander-in-chief under the weak-willed Nicholas II). Other cavalry chiefs G.O. Rauch, N.N. Kaznakov, Khan of Nakhichevan, Kh.Kh. Roop, E.A. Leontovich, as well as generals N.P. Reshikov, N.N. Korotkevich, A.A. Dushkevich, and F.I. Torklus did not rise above the corps commanders. The chiefs of staffs of the armies P.I. Postovsky, G.G. Mileant, S.D. Markov and A.P. Later, during the war, Budberg was commanded only by infantry divisions (with the exception of A.P. Budberg, he managed to get into the corps commander in 1917). The exception is I.Z. Odishelidze, after being chief of staff of the 10th Army in the fall of 1914, he found himself in the same position in the 1st Army. Subsequently, he commanded a corps, and in 1917 he was at the head of the 1st, 3rd and Caucasian armies. Career Ya.G. Zhilinsky continued as a diplomat (very good one), a representative of the General Headquarters at the Allied Council in France. Its chief of staff V.A. Oranovsky spent virtually the entire war as a corps commander. The fate of other commanders was no better: N.A. Lashkevich in the spring of 1915 was expelled for unsuitability; talented K.M. At the beginning of 1915, Adaridi retired himself (not without pressure from the corps commander N.A.Epanchin); by the end of 1914 N.K. Boldyrev. Generals P.I. Bulgakov, N.N. Martos, N.A. Klyuev, A.A. Ugryumov, A.N. Rosenschild-Paulin, I.F. Mingin, E.E. Fitingoff, A.B. Prezhentsov, E.F. Pestich, P.D. Schreider and M.I. Chizhov were captured, and generals V.K. Bel'gardt and N.I. Machugovsky are generally killed.
This contrasts with the German commanders. Generals P. von Hindenburg and E. Ludendorff became the most famous military leaders during the First World War. It is on them that a large share of all the successes of the German armed forces lies. The career of P. von Hindenburg, who became a national hero, continued after the war, when he was able to take the post of president of the Weimar Republic and actually bring A. Hitler to power. The head of the operational department M. Hoffman also left a mark in history as a fairly successful politician and military leader on the eastern front, in fact, the head of the German delegation at the negotiations in Brest-Litovsk in 1918. G. von Eichhorn subsequently successfully commanded armies and army groups, and in 1918 was the head of the occupation forces in Ukraine. The merits of A. von Mackensen include successes during the Gorlitsky breakthrough in May 1915, which crushed the Russian front, and the defeats of Serbia and Romania. O. von Belov left his name in history as a military leader, under whose leadership the successful Battle of Caporetto was fought in 1917, in which the Italian army suffered a crushing defeat. R. von Schubert, who later commanded the corps and the army on the western front (awarded the prestigious Order of Pour le Merite), also showed his talents. Unless G. von François did not rise above the corps commander, although he also showed himself as a gallant commander, having received the same order, and subsequently oak branches to him. F. Scholz during the war commanded a corps, an army and an army group (named after him "Scholz"). He successfully acted in the Narew operation and near Riga. General G. von Galvitz later was the commander of an army and an army group (also called "Galvits"), more or less successfully fought in the Eastern (during the Russian Great Retreat), Balkan (defeat of the Serbian front) and Western (in the area of the river. Somme) fronts.
NOTES
Valentinov N. Military agreements between Russia and foreign states before the war // Military history collection. M., 1919.V. 2.P. 114.
All materials on the battles in East Prussia, ever published in Russian, see: Pakhalyuk K. Fighting in East Prussia during the First World War. Index of literature. 2 ed. Kaliningrad, 2008.S. 383.
The rank of adjutant general is the rank of retinue, i.e. was given to those who were part of the Retinue of His Imperial Majesty. This title, which was considered honorary (because the owner thus became one of his Majesty's confidants), could be obtained by military ranks of the II and III classes according to the Table of Ranks (i.e. given to generals by combat arms or lieutenant generals) for special merits. In total, by the beginning of the First World War, 51 Adjutant Generals were in the Retinue. PC. von Rennenkampf became them in 1912, being already in the rank of cavalry general.
Scriabin A.A. The peaceful and combat past of L. Guards. Horse Grenadier Regiment. Paris, 1967.
For more details on the Gumbinnen battle, see: East Prussian operation: collection of documents. M., 1939.S. 186-209; A.P. Budberg Gumbinnen is a forgotten day of Russian glory. Paris, 1937; Vatsetis I.I. Fighting in East Prussia in July, August and early September 1914, M., 1923. S. 37-52; Radus-Zenkovich L. Sketch of the oncoming battle based on the experience of the Gumbinnenskoy operation in August 1914, M., 1921; Estreikher-Egorov R.A. Gumbinnen battle. (Active defense in an army operation). M., 1933; A.A. Yamanov Meeting engagement. M., 1959.S. 158-170; Combat operations of an infantry division. Collection of historical examples // Ed. ON. Talensky. Moscow: Military Publishing, 1941. V. 1.P. 17-37; Uspensky A.A. At war. East Prussia - Lithuania 1914-1915 Kaunas, 1932.S. 38-50; Kolenkovsky A. The agile period of the First Imperialist World War 1914, M., 1940. S. 184-187.
For more information about the Battle of Tannenberg, see: East Prussian operation: collection of documents. M .: Voenizdat, 1939.S. 276-322, 547-606; Elze W. Tannenberg... Das deutsche Heer von 1914. Seine Grundzuege und deren Auswikung im Sieg an der Ostfront. Breslau, 1928; Showalter D. Tannenberg. Hamden, 1991; BuchinskyNS. F. Tannenberg disaster. Sofia, 1939; Golovin N.N. From the history of the 1914 campaign on the Russian front. The beginning of the war and operations in East Prussia. Prague, 1926.S. 227-369; Groener W. Schlieffen's testament. M., 1937.S. 137-1 62; Evseev N.F. August battle of the 2nd Russian army in East Prussia (Tannenberg) in 1914. M .: Voenizdat, 1936; Salf A. Basic law and principles of armed struggle. Tannenberg disaster and its culprits. Revel, 1932; R.-P. A... The reasons for the failures of the 2nd army of General Samsonov in East Prussia in August 1914 (According to the note of General Klyuev) // Military collection. Belgrade, 1923. No. 4. S. 154-162; Rothermel Golovin N.N. Decree. Op. P. 392; East Prussian operation: a collection of documents. M., 1939.S. 390; François G. A critical study of the battle on the Masurian Lakes in September 1914 // War and Peace. Berlin, 1924. No. 12. S. 53-54.
See more details about the withdrawal of the 1st Army: East Prussian operation: a collection of documents. M .: Voenizdat, 1939.S. 21-23, 323-485; Larionov Ya.M. Notes of a participant in the world war: 26th infantry. division in the operations of the 1st and 2nd Rus. armies to the East. Prus. and Polsk. theaters at the beginning of wars: (Compiled by the diary and field documents). Harbin, 1936; François G. A critical study of the battle on the Masurian Lakes in September 1914 // War and Peace. Berlin, 1924. No. 12; Golovin N.N. From the history of the 1914 campaign on the Russian front. The beginning of the war and operations in East Prussia. Prague, 1926.S. 344-410; Rogvold V. Cavalry of the 1st Army in East Prussia (August-September 1914). L.-M., 1926.S. 123-144; Strategic outline of the 1914-1918 war. M .: VVRS, 1922. Part 1. The period from the declaration of war to the beginning of September 1914. The first invasion of East Prussia by the Russian armies and the Battle of Galicia. / Comp. Ya.K. Tsikhovich. S. 106-127.
One of the largest researchers of the Battle of Tannenberg, G.S. Isserson in 1926 generally wrote that it "did not even have any significant effect" on the course of the war. “We are not inclined to share the opinion that it decided the fate of the battle on the Marne, forcing the German command to transfer two corps from west to east. The bankruptcy of the German offensive against France in 1914 has deeper, albeit still poorly understood, reasons. Two corps on the right German wing could extend the Battle of Marne for another 2-3 days, bringing its crisis for the French to a higher tension, but they could not change the fate of this grandiose armies' engagement with the right shoulder, which was based on the distorted Schlieffen plan and its disfigured method of conducting the operation ". - Cm.: G.S. Isserson. Cannes of the World War (death of Samsonov's army) // Catastrophes of the First World War. M., 2005.S. 178.
X army in September 1914 // Military collection of the Society of Zealots of Military Knowledge. Belgrade, 1924. No. 5. S. 231-260; A brief strategic outline of the 1914-1918 war. Russian front. M .: Military Affairs, 1919. В.2. S. 24-47, 93-108, 180, 181, 204, 205-208, 210; Kamensky M.P. The death of the XX corps on February 8/21, 1915, M., 1921; Kolenkovsky A. Winter operation in East Prussia in 1915. M.-L., 1927; Holmsen I.A. World War. Our operations in Vost.-Prus. front in the winter of 1915 Paris, 1935; Belolipetskiy V.E. Winter actions of an infantry regiment in the Augustow woods (1915). Moscow: Military Publishing, 1940; Rosenschild-Paulin A.N. The death of the XX army corps in the Augustow forests: From the diary of the beginning. divisions // Military collection. Belgrade, 1924. 5.S. 261-288; Kochubei V."Verzhbolovskaya group" and the death of the XXth army corps in the Augustow forests // Military byl. 1962. No. 57. S. 3-16; Rothermel A. An attempt to escape the encirclement and the death of the 20th Russian corps on 21.2.15 // War and Revolution. 1935 January-February.
For the battles near Memel and the Russian air raids see: Holmsen I.A. Decree. Op. P. 257; Fedulenko V.V. The offensive of the 1st brigade of the 68th infantry [from] div [isii] to East [full-time] Prussia in March 1915 // Military byl. 1958. No. 28. S. 21-22; Hoffman M. Notes and diaries. L .: Krasnaya Zvezda, 1929.S. 71-72; Ludendorff E. Decree. Op. S. 133-135; Finne K.N. Russian air heroes I.I. Sikorsky. M., 2005.S. 75-88; Rokhmistrov V.G... Aviation of the Great War. M., 2004.S. 199-200, 210-211, 216-218.
Danilov Yu.N. Russia in the World War. Berlin, 1924, p. 144.
Konstantin Aleksandrovich Pakhalyuk is a leading specialist in the scientific sector of the Russian Military Historical Society.