In many countries in the 1960s and 1970s, armed partisan struggle flared up. E. Che Guevara acted as its ideologist.
Ernesto Guevara de la Serna Che Guevara (1928-1967). Born in Argentina, in the family of an architect. Doctor by profession. In 1953-1955 he visited a number of Latin American countries, studied them socio-political conditions and problems of revolutionary movements. In 1956-1958. - one of the leaders of the Rebel Army in Cuba. President of the National Bank (1959-1961), Minister of Industry (1961-1965) in Cuba. In his books, he summarized the experience of the insurgency in Cuba and developed a strategy for the guerrilla movement in Latin America. He defended the idea of the emergence of a revolution from the "partisan hearth". The emergence of many such pockets, "many Vietnams", was, in his opinion, to ensure victory over both internal counter-revolution and the American military machine. Che Guevara himself, together with a group of Cubans, began an armed struggle in Bolivia in 1966, where he died in October 1967.
The guerrilla movements did not meet with broad popular support and were suppressed by the army, which received American assistance. Only in Nicaragua was the Sandinista National Liberation Front able to achieve victory, overthrowing the dictatorship of the Somoza oligarchic clan in 1979.
In 1970, the united left forces in Chile came to power through parliamentary means, creating the Popular Unity bloc. The government of the socialist Salvador Allende (1970-1973) carried out a radical agrarian reform, democratic social transformation, nationalized copper mines, fuel resources, many enterprises. But this disorganized it economic life country and in September 1973 was overthrown by a military coup. A policy of the same direction, but less radical in depth, was carried out by the military left-nationalist regimes established as a result of coups in Peru and Panama (1968), Ecuador and Honduras (1972), and Bolivia (1970). Lacking mass support, they were replaced a few years later by right-wing military dictatorships through military coups or reshuffles in the leadership of the army. Only the Panamanian regime survived until the end of the 80s, as it succeeded in the struggle for the return of the Panama Canal (the United States will transfer it to Panama on December 31, 1999)
The "left" of power in a number of countries at the turn of the 70s was replaced by an all-out offensive of right-wing military dictatorships by the mid-70s. In 1973 they were installed in Chile and Uruguay, in 1976 in Argentina, in 1964 in Brazil, and in 1954 in Paraguay. Thus, in the second half of the 70s among Latin American countries South America only Venezuela and Colombia retained democratic governments. A night of right-wing dictatorships has fallen over Latin America. Tens of thousands of people were killed or went missing, and many more were imprisoned for political reasons. The most bloody regimes were in Argentina and Chile.
In the economic sphere, the situation for Latin American regimes changed in the 1970s. Since 1969, the United States, having essentially abandoned the policy of the "Union for Progress", began to pursue the strategy of the "New International Division of Labor". It included such measures as: the accelerated development in Latin America of industries related to the processing of raw materials; the transfer from the United States of some labor-intensive intermediate stages of production (for example, the production of automobile engines); deployment in the region of production for the needs of the "third world" with a lower level of technology than for developed countries. This consolidated the peripheral nature of Latin American industry, but at a higher technical level. Most countries have taken advantage of these opportunities to move towards export-oriented industrialization. They opened the doors wide to foreign capital, which basically implemented the new strategy. At the same time, the states concentrated their efforts on the development of a number of branches of heavy industry, for which they took easily accessible foreign loans. The national bourgeoisie also developed production on the basis of foreign loans.
But of all governments, only the Chilean military junta, led by General Augusto Pinochet (1973-1989), took up a deep restructuring of the economy. Having suppressed any opposition with the help of cruel repressions, introducing corporate principles into the organization of society, it was one of the first in the world to introduce the neoliberal model economic development. Gradually, the privatization of state property was carried out, customs barriers and other barriers to foreign investment and the "free play of market forces" were eliminated. The standard of living of Chileans has fallen significantly. But the foundations were laid for the future effective growth of the economy, which began in the late 70s.
After World War II, throughout Latin America, numerous military coups d'état, especially from the early 1960s to the late 1970s, displaced legitimately elected civilian governments. Conciliation systems have been superseded by bureaucratic authoritarian ones. Military coups took place in societies where weak civilian institutions were unable to establish their influence over the military. In China and Vietnam, the communist parties controlled the army. As Mao said, "a rifle gives birth to power." But "our principle is that this rifle is in command of the party, and the rifle will never be allowed to command the party"6. In Latin America, the situation was the opposite: since the time of the Spanish settlers early XVI V. The army played a dominant role in political life. Even in the 20th century political parties and social groups seldom gained sufficient power to resist active military interference in the implementation of policy. Nevertheless, in the last century social pluralism has maintained a stronger position here than in China or Vietnam. In countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, conciliatory and bureaucratic authoritarian regimes alternated intermittently. The coups that took place between 1964 and 1973, which overthrew legitimately elected civilian governments, were aimed at strengthening the capitalist economy and ousting from the political arena the left forces that supported socialist, communist and populist programs. These upheavals were preceded by increased structural, cultural and behavioral conflicts.
The civilian pro-government coalition was too weak to prevent military intervention. The armed forces had the ability to disobey the orders of civilians. They kept the repressive forces under control, acted in secret, were good specialists and organizers, which is necessary for the management of bureaucratic institutions. Civic organizations such as political parties, legislatures and the courts, due to disunity, often could not resist them. Influential social groups (business corporations, landowners, religious figures) were wary of civilian politicians and welcomed the rise to power of the military. If a coup aimed at overthrowing a legitimately elected government received support from the TNC or the US government, then such assistance led to the collapse of the conciliation system.
Crises of legitimacy undermined the structural power of conciliatory regimes and increased the chances of the rise of bureaucratic authoritarian systems. Violent conflicts between groups of influence, resulting in violence and political unrest, made conciliation systems vulnerable. Legitimately elected rulers were unable to reconcile conflicting interests. It was difficult for them to forge a consensus among the various groups sharing political power among themselves. In addition, they did not have the repressive forces to suppress the anti-pluralist opposition, which considered the conciliation system illegal.
With the legitimacy of elected civilian officials declining, military leaders concluded that they had neither the will nor the power to protect the interests of the armed forces. The cost of civilians being in power outweighed any benefits of their rule. The conciliatory policy endangered corporate, class and ideological interests. Whenever the presidential guard, workers' militia and other associations began to pose a threat to the corporate interests of the military, a coup took place. Corporate interests included independence in military appointments, the awarding of officer ranks, the development of defensive strategies, the development of military training programs, the maintenance of order and national security. Often, personal interests merged with corporate ones: the military wanted to receive large budget allocations not only for armaments and combat training, but also for higher salaries, cars, pensions, medical care and housing. In the coups that took place in Brazil and in the "southern cone" (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay), in addition, class interests were involved. Most senior officers came from aristocratic landowning families or families that belonged to the highest echelon - industrialists, civil servants and military officials. In their opinion, the radical Marxist parties and trade unions threatened the security of both the capitalists and the nation as a whole. The armed forces, whose duty it was to protect the nation from an external and especially an internal enemy, believed that legitimately elected civilian politicians who promised the introduction of egalitarianism were endangering not only economic growth and capitalism, but also civil unity and the Christian faith.
Thus, material interests merged with spiritual, moral and ideological values. The fact that civilian leaders could not defend these interests and values increased the likelihood of a coup.
The crisis, generating deinstitutionalization, forced to turn to the bureaucratic authoritarian system. Torn apart by violent conflicts, the South American countries did not have the procedural consensus needed to reconcile diverse interests and values. Army officers did not consider themselves bound by law to obey elected civilian leaders. With little dependence on legal norms for civilian control, the armed forces carried out a coup whenever their interests were infringed.
The behavioral crisis also heightened the likelihood of a military coup. Weak civic leaders couldn't offer public policy capable of dealing with problems such as high level inflation, economic stagnation, foreign trade deficit and political violence in the country. Focused on maintaining political order and economic growth, the military often staged a coup that brought technocrats, professionals, and managers to power. Together with the military elite, such civilian technocrats tried to force out of the political arena radical trade unions, as well as those political parties that organized social activities during the reign of the conciliation regime. Although ordinary citizens rarely took part in coups, their weak support for the civilian governments in power spurred the military into action.
The coups that took place in Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay from 1964 to 1976 have general principles transition from conciliatory to bureaucratic authoritarian regime. Civilian governments collapsed because they could not create a strong coalition around themselves that would force the military to reckon with the conciliation system. Government institutions, political parties and social groups (landowners, business associations, religious leaders) are weakened by fragmentation. Instead of rallying around the incumbent civilian administration, many factions supported the military. This situation deprived the government of the ability to make decisions. The president usually faced opposition from a hostile congress. The institution of presidential power wielded neither the repressive nor the consensual power necessary to contain the military: In Chile, a court upheld the coup that toppled President Salvador Allende (1973). Neither Allende nor the presidents of Brazil (1964), Argentina (1976), and Uruguay (1973) could rely on cohesive political parties to organize support for the regime and build coalitions with sympathetic groups. The disunity of the labor movement deprived the civic leaders of such a source of support as the solidarity of the working class. The business associations in these countries were on the side of the organizers of the coup. The landowners rejected land redistribution programs put forward by Salvador Allende and Brazilian President Joao Goulart. Catholic Church in Chile and especially in Argentina welcomed the coming to power of the military, believing that army officers would restore order and adhere to the principles of Christianity in their policies. Presidents Allende and Goulart faced strong opposition from MNCs and the United States government; these foreign institutions claimed that left-wing movements constituted a threat to capitalism, pursued misguided socialist policies, and threatened the West with "communist" aggression. From the early 1960s to the mid 1970s, the US government provided the Argentine military with weapons and military advisers, and provided technical training for the army. This strengthened the resolve of the military elites to overthrow the civilian presidents, unable to provide a rapid pace of economic modernization and to give the nation a government that would guarantee its security.
When the political process reached an impasse, deinstitutionalization increased the likelihood of a coup. Most Latin American countries, including the four mentioned above, suffered from personal government. Even in the face of fragmentation, the president wielded more power than the legislature or judiciary. The political process was based on patron-client relationships. The president acted as a super-patron distributing political support in exchange for resources (patronage, loans, contracts, licenses). State institutions remained weak. The personal connections of the authorities played a greater role than the norms of civil society. Viewing conflicts of interest as illegitimate, many Latin American elites have never developed credible procedural consensus as a means of reconciling differences. Laws could not protect the civil administration from the arbitrariness of the military. For many civilians who supported the putschists, a military coup seemed the most effective and legitimate way to suppress illegitimate conflicts.
Deinstitutionalization and the failure of government institutions were reinforced by the military elites' contempt for the legitimacy of conciliation systems. From their point of view, they did not take into account the corporate, personal, class and ideological interests of the armed forces and their allies. Claiming that the damage from the rule of civilian administrations exceeded the benefits of such rule, the military saw this as a basis for seizing supreme power. Following the Prussian tradition, the Chilean, Argentinean and Brazilian militaries believed that the presidents threatened their corporate autonomy by taking the side of the conscripts, as opposed to the officers. military service privates, organizing a workers' militia and interfering with the decisions of army officials. Although the threat to corporate interests was a more important motive for the coup than personal interests, they believed that their rule would ensure an increase in government spending on their salaries, pensions, housing and health care.
Class interests also served as a motive for the coup in all four countries. Supporters of accelerating economic growth, reducing inflation and implementing modernization with the help of state support for the development of private enterprise and investment by foreign corporations, the initiators of the coup feared the threat to capitalist development from the left movement. According to the military and their civilian business allies, the radical unions demanded too much high salaries. Brazilian and Chilean peasant associations seized land; land redistribution policy threatened the interests of large landowners. Under the leadership of young people, guerrilla movements were organized against a weak conciliatory government, for example: the Left Revolutionary Movement in Chile, the Peronist Movement, which had a leftist character, and the Trotskyist Popular Revolutionary Army of Argentina, the Uruguayan National Liberation Movement (Tupama-ros) and radical Catholic groups in Brazil. Assuming that these movements were associated with the left-wing factions of political parties - socialists, communists, Peronists - the military considered them to be a threat to national security.
Ideological values merged with capitalist interests, thereby intensifying the military opposition to the civilian government. The "enemy within" became associated with atheism, infidelity, and dishonor. Seeing themselves as guardians of national security and defenders of internal order, the armed forces justified coups as the only way to preserve Christian, Western, capitalist civilization.
Weak civilian government and the refusal of the masses to support the conciliation regime also contributed to the upheavals in Latin America. Political "patrons" bargained for government benefits for their "clients", but there were few active politicians supporting them and an effective coalition did not work out. Viewing politics as a game that cannot be won, the civilian politicians in power could not find a compromise and formulate a policy capable of satisfying the interests of various groups. Low growth, falling output, declining real incomes, and inflation prevented them from playing a winning game that generated enough money to subsidize government support. The coups were preceded not only by economic stagnation, but also by widespread violence. Political assassinations, bank robberies and child abductions testified to the inability of civilian governments to resolve conflicts by peaceful means. Leftist guerrillas fought with right-wing paramilitary organizations. Society polarized, but not into the poor and the rich, but into supporters of the government and their socially diverse opponents Supported by the leading opposition organizations and certain categories of the population, the armed forces that overthrew the conciliation systems took upon themselves the obligation to ensure the development of capitalism while maintaining the existing political order.
Elimination of dictatorial regimes and the establishment of a constitutional order in a number of countries in the region
At the turn of the 1980s, the crisis of military-dictatorial regimes in Latin America was reflected. Its development was facilitated by the deepening contradictions between the modernized and traditional sectors of the economy, the large social costs of the right-wing neoliberal development option, which increased tension in society, economic crisis the beginning of the 80s, the problem of external debt .. Strikes and demonstrations of workers began to grow rapidly demanding changes in social and economic policy, the cessation of repression, the restoration of democratic freedoms. The middle strata, small and medium entrepreneurs joined the struggle for democratic changes. Human rights organizations and church circles became more active. Restored their activities of the party and trade unions. In Uruguay in 1980, 60% of the participants in the referendum organized by the dictatorship voted against the regime. The financial-industrial elite, having strengthened its position, also began to gravitate toward liberal forms of government. Popular uprisings against dictatorships "from below" and the counter efforts of liberalization supporters "from above" became two components of the democratization process that had begun. Washington's criticism of terrorist regimes (since 1977) was also significant.
Democratization processes in South America accelerated the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship and the victory in 1979 of the revolution in Nicaragua. In 1979 in Ecuador and in 1980 in Peru, moderate military regimes handed over power to elected constitutional governments. In 1982, constitutional government was restored in Bolivia, and a left-wing coalition government with Communist participation came to power. Dictatorships have given way to democratic, constitutionally elected regimes. After the defeat of Argentina in the war with Great Britain (1982), which arose due to a dispute over ownership Falkland Islands, the military regime discredited itself and was forced in 1983 to transfer power to a civilian government. Military regimes were also liquidated in Brazil (1985), Uruguay (1985), Guatemala (1986), Honduras (1986), Haiti (1986). In May 1989, general elections were held, in which General A. Rodriguez, an associate of Stroessner, was elected president, who then left him and led the February coup. Paraguay's transition to constitutional government.
The longest-running dictatorship in South America was in Chile. But under pressure from the opposition on March 11, 1990, the military regime of General Pinochet handed over power to a civilian government. On this day with political map South America's last dictatorship has disappeared. In Central America, the traditional foundations of society have undergone less change than in the leading group of Latin American states. Less mature here was the social and political structure society, authoritarian forms of power took root more strongly (the exception was Costa Rica). The small, weak states of Central America early became the object of US expansion and were heavily dependent on the North American power. Washington attached particular importance to protecting its strategic interests in the subregion. Not surprisingly, the struggle for change in Central America has taken on a particularly fierce and persistent character.
The coming to power of newly elected democratic governments did not lead to fundamental changes in economic policy. They kept the course Active participation their countries in the international division of labor, the course towards integration into the world economy. On present stage an important role is played by the emphasis on the development of market structures of the economy, the privatization of the public sector, as well as the desire to make the economy more socially oriented. Most Latin American states have managed to achieve success in economic development, but external debt has become a serious problem for their further growth. In terms of economic development, the region occupies an intermediate position between the countries of Asia and Africa, on the one hand, and industrially developed countries, with another. Differences in the levels of economic development continue to exist between the countries of the region. In Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, significant social inequalities persist among different segments of the population. Nearly half of Hispanics are beggars.
The new stage in the development of the Latin American countries is characterized primarily by the fact that in the conditions of the termination of “ cold war» The United States is less afraid of the growing influence of hostile powers in Latin America. Becoming more tolerant of social experiments in this area of the world. The experience of Cuba, where the production of GNP (gross national product) per capita by the mid-1990s. turned out to be almost twice lower than in most Latin American countries, also weakened the influence of socialist ideas.
Thanks to the development integration processes on the South American continent, rising living standards have increased the capacity of domestic markets, which creates the prerequisites for more stable development. Late 1980s - early 1990s. (this period is called the “lost decade” for solving the problems of modernization) democratic regimes intensively developed social sphere leading to a slowdown in economic growth. But by the mid-1990s. in most countries, the pace of economic development has increased again. In the 1980s-1990s. the average annual growth rate of GNP in Latin America was only 1.7%, in 1990-1995. they increased to 3.2%.
In the late 1990s the crisis that hit the newly industrialized countries of Asia also affected Latin America.
At the same time, since the economies of the Latin American states were more developed, the depth of this crisis turned out to be less for them, it did not spread to the political sphere.
From 1980 to 1995 Brazil's external debt fell from 31.2% of GNP to 24%. A sharp increase in debt was observed only in Mexico (from 30.5% to 69.9% of GNP).
From the end of World War II to the 1990s, political regimes in many states of Latin America turned out to be short-lived. The only exception was Mexico, where, after the state revolution of 1917, representatives of democratic forces came to power, which until the end of the century had no serious political opponents.
Democracy in Latin America
In Latin American countries, attempts have been repeatedly made to introduce the European model of democracy, in particular: the creation of a bloc of national-patriotic forces and the national bourgeoisie, a gradual increase in the level of social and economic protection, which was accompanied by the modernization of industry. Such aspirations to create a democratic state were crowned with success only in Argentina, with the coming to power of the government of J. Perron in 1946.
The period of leadership of the Peronist party went down in the history of Argentina as a time of prosperity - a liberal political system was actively introduced in the state. social politics, the nationalization of strategic industrial facilities, a five-year economic development plan was established. However, as a result of a military coup in 1955, H. Perron was overthrown.
The example of Argentina was followed by Brazil, whose government made repeated attempts to legal and economic transformation the life of society. However, because of the threat of repeating the scenario of the Argentine coup, the president of the country in 1955 committed suicide.
The main shortcoming of the democratic regimes of Latin America was that in many ways they resembled the fascist system of Italy in the mid-1920s. All liberal transformations were essentially implemented by well-concealed totalitarian methods. In some areas of public policy, democratic leaders largely copied the development models of Nazi Germany.
A striking example is the activity of trade unions in Argentina, which protected the labor rights of representatives of the titular nation only. Moreover, in post-war period, the democratic states of Latin America became a haven for some fascist leaders persecuted by the world community. This indicates, first of all, that the Latin American democrats did not shy away from totalitarian systems, in particular, fascism.
military coups
From the mid-1950s until the end of the 1970s, rigid military dictatorships were established in most Latin American states. Such a radical change in state structure were the result of growing popular dissatisfaction with the ruling elite, which was taken advantage of by militaristic political forces.
It has now become known that all military coups in Latin America were carried out with the consent of the US government. The justification for the establishment of military regimes was the dissemination among the masses of information about the threat of war on the part of the communists. Consequently, military dictators had to perform the function of protecting countries from the de facto non-existent aggression of communist states.
The most bloody military coup was the coming to power of A. Pinochet in Chile. Hundreds of thousands of Chileans protesting against Pinochet were placed in a concentration camp that was set up in the center of the capital Santiago. Most citizens were forced to seek political asylum in the states of Europe.
A classic military dictatorship was also established in Argentina. As a result of the military coup in 1976, the highest power in the state began to belong to the members of the Junta, headed by General H. Videla.