In 1962, the Russians decided to place nuclear missiles in Cuba. However, the Americans found out about this, and only a few minutes remained before the nuclear apocalypse. At the center of these events was at that time a young and aspiring dictator Fidel Castro. He already had experience in the massacres of "opponents" and the elimination of former comrades-in-arms.

We must eliminate Fidel Castro and his brother Raul, Minister of Defense! This idea was first expressed by Colonel J. S. King, head of the Western Division of the CIA, on December 11, 1959, in a memorandum addressed to Director Allen Dulles and his deputy, Richard Bissell. King recalled that a left-wing dictatorship was being formed in Cuba: Castro had nationalized banks, industry and business, while supporting revolutionary movements in Latin America. In 1960, the CIA offered the Mafia $150,000 to kill Fidel. However, the mafia did not manage to get close to him.

The terror in Cuba was on the rise. Presumably, by the end of 1960, 15-17 thousand opponents of the new regime were executed. Hundreds of thousands of people fled to the United States. On December 1, 1961, Fidel Castro even proudly declared: "I am a Marxist-Leninist and will remain so until my last breath." Thus, he lost the support of most of the countries of Latin America, and in January 1962 the Organization of American States expelled Cuba from its ranks. In February, the US imposed an embargo on trade with Cuba.

It was in December that General Edward Lansdale, a veteran of the Vietnam Special Operations Forces, along with William K. Harvey and Samuel Halpern of the CIA, launched the sabotage operation Mongoose. Her goal was to send a terrorist group to Cuba and find a way to eliminate Fidel Castro. It was one of the 30 parts of the Cuban Project.

In addition, the CIA participated in the landing of 1,500 Cuban emigrants on the island on April 17, 1961 on the beach in the Bay of Pigs. From March 1960 they were trained in camps in Guatemala, Nicaragua and in the US-administered Panama Canal Zone. President Kennedy inherited this task after Eisenhower. However, Kennedy was skeptical about the landing in Cuba and ordered that American forces not interfere with the operation itself. Fidel Castro sent an army against the invading emigrants, which in three days smashed them to smithereens.

“The Bay of Pigs was a personal defeat for J.F. Kennedy,” Nalevka wrote. “The president took full responsibility, but until the end of his life he reproached himself for having given in to the authorities of the intelligence service.” CIA Director Dulles was forced to resign. Kennedy nominated John McCone, a Republican who had established himself as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Russian "students" and "economic experts" are going to Cuba

Missiles are being deployed in Cuba! On Sunday, October 14, 1962, a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft took 928 pictures over Cuba, in which experts saw one launcher and several more dismantled. One missile was even installed in a position near San Cristobal, a hundred kilometers southwest of Havana. 20 containers at the airfield in San Julian were hidden by Il-28 bombers, codified as Beagle. In 12 minutes of flight at an altitude of nine to ten kilometers, Major Richard S. Heiser covered about 90% of the territory.

Context

How the US played Russian roulette with nuclear war

The Guardian 17.10.2012

Lessons from the Caribbean Crisis

Slate.fr 10/16/2012

Sergei Khrushchev @ InoTV: "For my father, the Cuban Missile Crisis was an invitation to bargain"

BBC World 24.10.2007
When National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy broke the news to John F. Kennedy on Tuesday, October 16, 1962, at fifteen minutes to nine in the morning, the President did not believe it at first. Did Khrushchev go on such an adventure?

"The United States must eliminate this threat!" - decided Kennedy and immediately called the members of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Exkom). By noon, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, as well as some of their deputies, the director of the CIA with his specialists, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and various advisers arrived at the White House.

The content of the images was explained in detail by the Deputy Director of the CIA, General Marshall Carter. According to him, two types of Soviet medium-range missiles were visible. SS-4 is the code designation used in the Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (DIA), in NATO - Sandal, for the Russian P-12, the range of which reaches 630-700 nautical miles, that is, about 1.5 thousand kilometers. And the range of the SS-5/Skean or R-14 reaches 1,100 nautical miles, that is, 2,000 kilometers. In 10 to 20 minutes they would have destroyed all the American and Canadian cities in the east. 80 million victims!

Kennedy grew gloomy. Are the missiles ready to launch? Are there nuclear warheads? These two questions worried him the most.

Carter could only give him a vague answer: it looks like they want to deploy 16 to 24 SS-4s, and this will take from a week to two. So far, we have no evidence that nuclear warheads are also stored there, but we have no doubt that they have been brought or will be brought.

The situation in Cuba has changed radically. The USSR does not have enough intercontinental missiles that could threaten us - a maximum of a hundred, and we have seven thousand more. Therefore, the Union wants to turn the island into an unsinkable base, from where they can easily and quickly attack us.

Bundy, Director of Intelligence John McCone, Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor, and former Secretary of State Dean Acheson offered different solutions: either immediately bomb the missile sites, or send in the Marines, or do both!

Already on August 10, Kennedy received a warning from McCone that the USSR was going to deploy medium-range missiles in Cuba. The Americans had a fairly large intelligence network on the island, and its members reported the arrival of a large number of Russians with unknown cargoes, the marking of restricted areas, and some managed to hear mention of missiles. Then the president ordered the intelligence service to verify this information in every possible way. At the end of August, a U-2 aircraft flew over Cuba.

All these are just defense missiles. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who participated in the meeting of the US National Security Council on August 17, agreed on this opinion. McCone insisted on his own. Not! These are medium range missiles.

He knew this for sure, because the CIA and British MI6 received their description from Agent Gero, colonel of the Soviet military intelligence service GRU Oleg Penkovsky.

He managed to photograph the instructions for the R-12 and R-14 missiles, which described the maintenance and the period required to install these missiles. So the CIA knew exactly what types of missiles looked like and what properties they had, as well as methods for disguising them, including containers for transporting them. The agent had access to many secret military documents and took pictures as much as he could, and passed the films to his contacts or talked about the details with American and British intelligence officers during his business trips to the West. Thanks to the fact that many editions of the military magazine were also copied, Western generals were aware of both the thought process and the strategy of the Soviets.

Indeed, the USSR has never deployed missiles of this type outside its territory, but they have Cuba under their control. And this time the USSR did just that, McCone believed.

However, neither the president nor the ministers wanted to believe the reports of these missiles. They still believed that it was only about anti-aircraft missiles.

Then 60-year-old McCone went to Seattle in the northeastern United States to get married there, and then went on a honeymoon trip to France.

Since the end of July, more than five thousand people from the Soviet Union and other countries of its bloc have come to Cuba, according to the final CIA report of August 22. Allegedly, they were all economic experts and students, but the secrecy around them raised suspicions that their tasks were different. Many sailed on ships that were overloaded. Recently, 20 Soviet ships with military cargo have been seen.

New political trends

The United States still couldn't handle the humiliation of Soviet space superiority. The first man in the Universe in April 1961 was the Russian Yuri Gagarin. The first American John Glenn flew into space in February next year. In the summer of 1962, the USSR confirmed its superiority by sending two people on two spaceships one after the other.

The President placed special emphasis on modern combat missiles and nuclear weapons, as well as on expanding the traditional arsenal. These projects cost tens of billions of dollars. In addition, Kennedy changed his mind about nuclear war: instead of a crushing response, he preferred strikes against exclusively strategic enemy targets. The concept of flexible response has emerged.

“The United States has come to the conclusion that in a possible nuclear war, we should consider military strategy in much the same way as in conventional military operations in the past,” said Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. - During a nuclear conflict, the main goal should be to destroy the military potential of the enemy, and not its civilian population. Thus, we give a potential adversary the most powerful impetus of all possible in order to refuse to strike at our cities.

The USSR should have known that if it surpassed NATO forces in one area of ​​weapons, this would immediately entail a reaction at the highest level, which could eventually lead to nuclear war. “NATO has repeatedly stated that it will never use military force first, nevertheless, the alliance will not give in to the USSR and will not refuse to use nuclear weapons first if the alliance is attacked,” wrote British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in her memoirs “ Years in Downing Street.

Kennedy confirmed his acceptance of a nuclear first strike in March 1962 in Newsweek magazine: "Let the USSR not think that the United States will not strike first if American vital interests are threatened."

The USSR did not give up. In mid-1961, in the north, he tested a 50 megaton hydrogen bomb, that is, it was ten times more powerful than all warheads and bombs used in World War II.

In May or June 1960, GRU agent Murat obtained a copy of the November 1959 American plan for nuclear bombing of the Soviet Union and countries under its control, as retired Captain First Rank Viktor Lyubimov wrote in Military Parade magazine. The plan spoke of a planned NATO operation after this strike.

In February or March 1962, Murat stole even more detailed plan, according to which the Americans wanted to destroy 696 targets on the territory of the Warsaw Pact states.

The findings shocked the Soviet leadership. How can we prevent this? It would be convenient to make Cuba its unsinkable base, which cannot establish normal relations with the United States.

When Fidel Castro overthrew Batista, he acted not like a communist, but like a political simpleton. He wanted to maintain equal relations with the United States, but Washington could not understand this. Insensitive American policy gradually cut off Cuba from the Western world. The revolutionary leader was pressed by his left comrades, and Moscow opened its arms to him. In addition, Castro did not want to end up like the democratically elected President of Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz, who was overthrown by the generals in 1954 with the help of the CIA. Fidel liked power, and in order to stay at the helm, he liquidated his right-wing friends. The dictatorship of Batista was soon replaced by the left-wing dictatorship of Castro. For the Americans, he became enemy number one, because he stubbornly contradicted them and tried to infect the discontented in Latin America with revolutionary ideas.

Nevertheless, he did not dare to encroach on the American military base at Guantanamo, which is located in the north of the island. He only tried to democratically terminate the agreement of the beginning of the century on the lease of this territory.

Unofficial connection with the Kremlin

When Robert Kennedy, the president's brother, became Attorney General, he realized that the government needed to establish some kind of informal and quick connection with the Kremlin. As a rule, special services officers are suitable for such purposes. He knew from the FBI that Georgy Bolshakov, the head of the Soviet TASS news agency and then the embassy press attache, was in fact a GRU colonel who knew Khrushchev's son-in-law Alexei Adzhubei well. Bolshakov also occasionally met with Daily News editor John Goleman.

The minister asked the journalist to arrange a meeting for him with Bolshakov. When the colonel informed the leadership about this, such meetings were categorically forbidden to him. Did they put spokes in his wheels? Envy his connections? Probably all together.

On the morning of May 9, 1961, when Victory Day was celebrated in the USSR, Golman called Bolshakov to arrange a new meeting and said: "Now I will take you to the Minister of Justice." The agent could no longer refuse and spat on the prohibition of his superiors.

They went to the minister's private residence. Both Bolshakov and Kennedy probed the waters, talking about politics: about the situation in Laos, Cambodia and Cuba, about the upcoming meeting between John F. Kennedy and Khrushchev. The Russian spent five hours at the residence. The minister told him that only the president, who also approved it, knew about this meeting, and if a Russian diplomat wanted to call him, he could do it by office phone, giving the secretary or adviser his name. Who he is, they will know.

After returning to the embassy, ​​Bolshakov telegraphed to Moscow. The authorities were not happy. The leadership of the GRU was tormented by questions: why did Robert Kennedy choose Bolshakov? Why do Americans need such informal contact? “The situation when a member of the American government meets with our man, all the more secretly, knows no precedent,” the GRU generals wrote in an internal memorandum.

The second time the minister invited the Soviet diplomat on May 21, 1961 to his summer residence. Again, they talked about a range of political issues. Then they talked on the phone. It was a kind of preparation for the meeting between John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna. Despite the fact that the Soviet leader did not trust the intelligence reports too much, this time he considered them useful. Messages from Bolshakov were received by a group of advisers led by Anatoly Dobrynin, who were preparing materials for the meeting in Vienna.

However, Kennedy and Khrushchev did not find common language. The Soviet leader got the impression that the president was too young and soft and simply not ripe for such a post.

Nevertheless, Khrushchev realized how important this contact was, so he even sent unofficial messages to the White House through Bolshakov.

The ensuing series of about four meetings between the Minister of Justice and a GRU colonel took place from September 1961 to September 1962. Robert Kennedy gave Bolshakov the opportunity to talk to some White House advisers as well. Thus, he wanted to make it clear to the leadership of the USSR how politics is being done, and what kind of pressure and tricks the US political leaders have to resist.

Their relationship strengthened and became more and more personal. Sometimes the Russian and his wife spent the weekend with the Kennedy family outside the city, and in return they invited the family to a purely personal holiday - the wedding anniversary.

In early September 1962, shortly before Bolshakov left on vacation, the minister invited him to the White House and brought him to the president, who told the Russian that he was concerned about the number of Soviet warships in Cuba. American aircraft will cut off this supply route. When Bolshakov said that Khrushchev did not like the number of spy plane overflights, Kennedy promised to stop them. Robert Kennedy added that the military is putting pressure on his brother, and the Kremlin should take this into account.

In Moscow, Bolshakov learned that Khrushchev was also on vacation. He gave the General Secretary a message that he had important information for him from the White House, and Bolshakov was taken directly to Khrushchev in Pitsunda in the Crimea. The Kremlin leader was in good spirits: “Kennedy is president or not? If he is a strong president, he should not be afraid of anyone. After all, he has power in his hands, and even his brother is the Minister of Justice. Khrushchev misjudged the head of the White House, considering him an indecisive intellectual.

However, Khrushchev did not mention the deployment of missiles in Cuba in a conversation with Bolshakov. Even at the embassy in Washington, no one knew about it.

Suspicious undercover pictures

In early September 1962, Robert Kennedy met with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. The diplomat said that the weapons that Moscow sends to Cuba are of a defensive nature.

Pictures from a U-2 reconnaissance plane, taken on September 5, showed the installation of anti-aircraft missiles. But more people were present to serve them than is usually required.

On September 4, John F. Kennedy warned Moscow against deploying surface-to-surface missiles in Cuba. The Kremlin responded on September 11: we are not going to deploy strategic missiles outside Soviet territory. Bolshakov said the same thing to Robert Kennedy when he returned from vacation. At the same time, in early September, Soviet soldiers were already building nine positions for missiles: six for the R-12 and three for the R-14. The president sent a second warning on September 13. Even the September 19 CIA Special National Intelligence Evaluation stated that Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba were unlikely.

Despite this, the president finally gave the order to put 150,000 reserve troops on alert. At the same time, it was announced that large-scale exercises would take place in the Caribbean Sea in mid-October. Havana claimed that all this was just a front for an invasion operation. Moscow has reiterated that it is not sending nuclear weapons to Cuba.

At a UN meeting in New York, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko threatened the United States that if they attacked Cuba, they could provoke a war with the Soviet Union. His words were supported by Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos.

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara took another preventive step. On October 1, he discussed with the Chiefs of Staff and the commander of the Atlantic Flotilla, Admiral Robert Dennison, preparations for a blockade of Cuba, if necessary.

They were prompted to do so by a message from Colonel John R. Wright of the DIA that he relayed this morning: “We are aware of 15 locations where SA-2/Goa anti-aircraft missiles (Soviet designation S-75) are planned to be deployed. Since September 15, radio signals confirming the presence of SA-2 have been picked up by the antennas of the National Security Agency. In the central part of the province of Pinar dal Rio appeared closed area and the locals had to leave. We have unconfirmed reports of the presence of SS-4/Sandal medium-range missiles. One of our informants saw some long "cigars" on special chassis on September 12 at Campo Libertad near Havana."

The next day, the head of the intelligence department of the State Department, Roger Hilsman, sent out information that there were MiG-21 fighter jets and 16 Komar coastal patrol missile boats in Cuba.

However, footage taken from the U-2 from 5 to 7 October did not confirm the presence of offensive weapons. But in images from the Samos reconnaissance satellite on October 10, photo analysts from the National Image Interpretation Center (NPIC) saw the outlines of missile positions under construction in the western part of the island. We must go there again and as soon as possible!

However, new flights were postponed due to bad weather. Only on Sunday, October 14, pilot Major Richard S. Heiser was able to take to the skies. His pictures were analyzed on Monday. At half-past eight that evening, CIA Deputy Director Ray Kline called Bundy and Roger Hilsman with the shocking news that Cuba was deploying medium-range missiles.

They spoke an unprotected line, and Kline used code names that both officials understood. Hillsman briefed Secretary of State Dean Rusk. The President was on a campaign tour and Bundy only gave him the information in the morning. But Secretary of Defense McNamara presented pictures of San Cristobal as early as midnight.

Why are Soviet missiles deployed? On Tuesday at noon, the members of the Excom could not come to a consensus. Perhaps, by doing so, Khrushchev wants to strengthen his position before the next negotiations on the status of West Berlin? Or wants to threaten American territory?

Ambassador Thomas Thompson, who returned from Moscow three months ago and knew Khrushchev best of all, recommended giving the USSR time to think. Perhaps they want to take a better position before the negotiations on Berlin.

The President ordered U-2 flights to be carried out much more frequently: since the spring of 1962, the island was photographed, as a rule, twice a month, and now they must be photographed six times a day. So Kennedy wanted to capture every square meter Cuban territory. He repeated two questions: when will these missiles be ready to launch, and do they have nuclear warheads?

On Tuesday, October 16, politicians and generals could not agree on anything. Macken spoke about the situation with former president Eisenhower. The hero of the war, whom everyone respected, recommended the immediate launch of a naval and air operation.

Kennedy remained cautious: "I don't want to be the Tojo of the sixties!" Hideki Tojo was the Japanese prime minister who ordered the attack on Pearl Harbor without a declaration of war and was executed as a war criminal in 1948. The president feared most of all that the USSR, using violence, would seize West Berlin.

However, the president agreed to a partial mobilization of the armed forces. On Tuesday evening, the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions were put on alert, the air force stepped up the reserve, and the navy tightened control in the Caribbean. Later, two armored divisions and part of an infantry division were transferred to Florida. An infantry regiment and an artillery unit were withdrawn from Germany. In the south, the navy expanded its aircraft. All preparations were carried out in the strictest secrecy.

Bolshakov phoned Robert Kennedy with a comforting message from Khrushchev: "We will by no means send surface-to-surface missiles to Cuba." The ambassador himself did not even suspect that this was a lie, that the Kremlin had deceived him too.

On Monday, the planned exercise Fibriflex-62 began in the Caribbean off the island of Vieques. 40 warships with 4,000 marines practiced a strike against the notional dictator Ortsak, but in reality against Castro.

Photos of Soviet missiles stationed on the island. The White House discussed the "powerful" option for solving the problem, and his supporters convinced Kennedy to start a massive bombardment of Cuba as soon as possible, followed by landing of sea and air assault forces on the island.

critical phase. World on the brink of nuclear war

As Commander-in-Chief, President John F. Kennedy, under pressure from the military, ordered DEFCON-2 to put the U.S. Armed Forces on "Combat Readiness #2". This meant that his next order would begin full-scale hostilities or war with the USSR and its allies. On the evening of October 22, the President of the United States made a televised "Address to the American People." He stated that 250,000 ground troops, 90,000 marines and paratroopers are being prepared for the invasion of Cuba, an air force strike group capable of making 2,000 sorties on the day of the invasion is being prepared, the navy is pulling more than 100 ships of various types to the island. destination.

Panic began among the civilian population of the United States: people urgently bought food and bottled water, went on vacation and left American cities with their families. In rural areas, residents equipped basements and cellars in case of an atomic war, stocking food, water and basic necessities. Many American families left their homes and moved into basements, cellars and hastily made dugouts and dugouts. Schools, colleges and universities routinely conducted exercises on the topic: "How to behave in the event of an atomic explosion."

The Pentagon created a "ring" of blockade around the island of Cuba, which was formed by 25 destroyers, 2 cruisers, aircraft carriers, submarines and auxiliary vessels. Aircraft were constantly loitering in the air, including bombers with atomic bombs on board. American high-altitude U-2 reconnaissance aircraft continuously carried out photographic reconnaissance of the island and the adjacent waters of the Atlantic Ocean. All Soviet ships were escorted by surface ships, submarines and subjected to systematic overflights by helicopters and aircraft of the air force.

Such US actions did not go unnoticed by Soviet intelligence. Already on October 21, the GRU officer, the military attache in Washington, at a meeting with Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, announced that the units of the US armed forces stationed in the southern and southwestern states were put on high alert. Neither the attaché nor the ambassador were informed that the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces had deployed ballistic and tactical missiles and atomic warheads for them in Cuba.

From the evening of October 22, all members of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were transferred to the "barracks position" and were in the Kremlin in Moscow without a break.

With the sanction of Nikita Khrushchev and by order of the Minister of Defense, the Armed Forces of the USSR were also put on full combat readiness: the servicemen were raised on combat alert, regular weapons and ammunition were issued, equipment and weapons were brought to combat positions and dispersed, nuclear warheads were attached to missiles and torpedoes , atomic bombs were suspended from aircraft, atomic shells were taken out of warehouses to artillery positions in the Western direction. The USSR Navy began tracking American submarines and aircraft carrier formations in the waters of the World Ocean adjacent to the territory of the USSR. According to previously developed plans General Staff The Armed Forces of the USSR advanced to the shores of the United States atomic strike forces - bombers and submarines with atomic weapons on board. All formations of the Strategic Missile Forces were put on high alert for the immediate delivery of an atomic strike against predetermined targets in the United States, large American military bases, sea and land groups located in other countries. The strike forces of the armored forces, motorized infantry units and aviation of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany were to carry out an offensive from the territory of the GDR to West Berlin with the aim of occupying it within 2-4 hours.

Cuban Revolution

During the Cold War, the confrontation between the two superpowers, the USSR and the USA, was expressed not only in a direct military threat and an arms race, but also in the desire to expand their zones of influence. The Soviet Union sought to organize and support the so-called "liberation" socialist revolutions in various parts of the world. In pro-Western countries, support was provided to "people's liberation movements" of various kinds, often with weapons and sending military specialists, instructors and limited military contingents. In the event of the victory of the "revolution", the country became a "member of the socialist camp", military bases were built there, and significant resources were invested. The help of the Soviet Union was often gratuitous, which caused additional sympathy for him from the poorest countries in Africa and Latin America.

The United States, in turn, followed similar tactics, also stimulating "revolutions" to establish democracy and supporting pro-American regimes. Usually, the preponderance of forces was on the side of the United States - they were supported by Western Europe, Turkey, some Asian and African countries, such as South Africa.

Initially, after the victory of the revolution in Cuba in 1959, its leader Fidel Castro did not have close relations with the Soviet Union. During his fight against the regime of Fulgencio Batista in the 1950s, Castro approached Moscow several times for military assistance, but was refused. Moscow was skeptical about the leader of the Cuban revolutionaries and about the very prospects of a revolution in Cuba, believing that the influence of the United States was too great there. Fidel made his first foreign visit after the victory of the revolution to the United States, but President Eisenhower refused to meet him, citing his busy schedule. After this demonstration of an arrogant attitude towards Cuba, F. Castro carried out measures directed against the dominance of the Americans. Thus, the telephone and electric companies, oil refineries, 36 largest sugar factories owned by US citizens were nationalized; the former owners were offered the corresponding packages of securities. All branches of North American banks owned by US citizens were also nationalized. In response, the United States stopped supplying oil to Cuba and buying its sugar. Such steps put Cuba in a very difficult position. By that time, the Cuban government had already established diplomatic relations with the USSR, and it turned to Moscow for help. In response to a request, the USSR sent oil tankers and organized the purchase of Cuban sugar and raw sugar. Specialists traveled to Cuba on long business trips various industries National economy USSR to create similar industries, as well as office work on the Island of Freedom. Soviet specialists built various facilities, for example, according to a special project, they made steam power plants with boilers using “sugar cane waste” fuel.

As an illustration, we can recall why one of the types of Cuban mineral water is called Tipaborjomi. Before the arrival of L. I. Brezhnev, another well was drilled, and a new drink was presented to the distinguished guest. He tried it and said: "Like Borjomi." That is, similar to such water from Georgia.

It can be considered that Cuba was the first country to choose the communist path without significant military or political interference from the USSR. In this capacity, she was deeply symbolic for Soviet leaders, especially for Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, who considered the defense of the island critical to the international reputation of the USSR and communist ideology.

Khrushchev probably believed that placing missiles in Cuba would protect the island from a second American invasion, which he considered inevitable after the failure of the landing attempt in the Bay of Pigs. The militarily significant deployment of a critical weapon in Cuba would also demonstrate the importance of the Soviet-Cuban alliance to Fidel Castro, who demanded material confirmation of Soviet support for the island.

US missile positions in Turkey

Number of US and USSR nuclear warheads without deployed

By 1960, the US had a significant advantage in strategic nuclear forces. For comparison: the Americans were armed with about 6,000 warheads, and in the USSR there were only about 300. By 1962, the United States was armed with more than 1,300 bombers capable of delivering about 3,000 nuclear charges to the USSR. In addition, 183 Atlas and Titan ICBMs were in service with the United States. (English) Russian and 144 Polaris missiles on nine George Washington and Ethen Allen-class nuclear submarines. The Soviet Union was able to deliver about 300 warheads to the United States, mainly with the help of strategic aviation and R-7 and R-16 ICBMs, which had a low degree of combat readiness and high cost creation of launch complexes, which did not allow for a large-scale deployment of these systems.

It was supposed to send a group of Soviet troops to Liberty Island, which should concentrate around five divisions of nuclear missiles (three R-12s and two R-14s). In addition to missiles, the group also included 1 Mi-4 helicopter regiment, 4 motorized rifle regiments, two tank battalions, a MiG-21 squadron, 42 Il-28 light bombers, 2 units of cruise missiles with 12 Kt nuclear warheads with a range of 160 km, several batteries of anti-aircraft guns, as well as 12 S-75 installations (144 missiles). Each motorized rifle regiment consisted of 2,500 men, and the tank battalions were equipped with the latest T-55 tanks. It is worth noting that the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba (GSVK) became the first army group in the history of the USSR, which included ballistic missiles.

In addition, an impressive grouping of the Navy was also heading to Cuba: 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers, 12 Komar missile boats, 11 submarines (7 of them with nuclear missiles). In total, 50,874 military personnel were planned to be sent to the island. Later, on July 7, Khrushchev decided to appoint Issa Pliev as commander of the group.

After listening to Malinovsky's report, the Presidium of the Central Committee voted unanimously in favor of carrying out the operation.

Operation Anadyr

After landing at an air base in south Florida, Heizer handed the film to the CIA. On October 15, CIA analysts determined that the photographs were of Soviet R-12 medium-range ballistic missiles ("SS-4" according to NATO classification). In the evening of the same day, this information was brought to the attention of the top military leadership of the United States. On the morning of October 16 at 8:45 a.m., the photographs were shown to the President. After that, on the orders of Kennedy, flights over Cuba became 90 times more frequent: from two times a month to six times a day.

US reaction

Development of possible countermeasures

After receiving photographs showing Soviet missile bases in Cuba, President Kennedy gathered special group advisers to a secret meeting at the White House. This 14-member group, which later became known as the "Executive Committee" (EXCOMM (English) Russian ), consisted of members of the US National Security Council and several specially invited advisers. Soon, the committee offered the president three possible options for resolving the situation: destroy the missiles with pinpoint strikes, conduct a full-scale military operation in Cuba, or impose a naval blockade of the island.

An immediate bombing attack was rejected out of hand, as was an appeal to the UN that promised a long delay. The real options considered by the committee were only military measures. Diplomatic, barely touched upon on the first day of the work, were immediately rejected - even before the main discussion began. As a result, the choice was reduced to a naval blockade and an ultimatum, or to a full-scale invasion.

However, on October 19, another U-2 flight revealed several more mounted missile sites, an Ilyushin Il-28 squadron off the northern coast of Cuba, and a battalion of cruise missiles aimed at Florida.

The decision to impose a blockade was made at the final vote on the evening of October 20: President Kennedy himself, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and US Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson voted for the blockade.

Quarantine

There were many problems with the naval blockade. There was a question of legality - as Fidel Castro pointed out, there was nothing illegal about planting rockets. They were certainly a threat to the US, but similar missiles were deployed in Europe aimed at the USSR: sixty Thor missiles in four squadrons near Nottingham in the UK; thirty medium-range Jupiter rockets in two squadrons near Gioia del Colle in Italy; and fifteen Jupiter missiles in one squadron near Izmir in Turkey. Then there was the problem of the Soviet reaction to the blockade - would an armed conflict begin with an escalation of response?

President Kennedy addressed the American public (and the Soviet government) in an October 22 televised speech. He confirmed the presence of missiles in Cuba and declared a naval blockade of 500 nautical miles (926 km) around the coast of Cuba, warning that the armed forces were "ready for any developments" and condemning the Soviet Union for "secrecy and misleading." Kennedy noted that any missile launch from Cuban territory against any of the American allies in the Western Hemisphere would be regarded as an act of war against the United States.

The Americans had strong support from their European allies. The Organization of American States also voted unanimously in favor of a resolution in support of the lockdown. Nikita Khrushchev declared that the blockade was illegal and that any ship under the Soviet flag would ignore it. He threatened that if the Soviet ships were attacked by the Americans, a retaliatory strike would follow immediately.

However, the blockade went into effect on 24 October at 10:00 am. 180 ships of the US Navy surrounded Cuba with clear orders not to open fire on Soviet ships in any case without a personal order from the president. By this time, 30 ships and vessels were going to Cuba, including Aleksandrovsk with a cargo of nuclear warheads and 4 ships carrying missiles for two IRBM divisions. In addition, 4 diesel submarines were approaching the Island of Freedom, accompanying the ships. On board the "Alexandrovsk" were 24 warheads for the IRBM and 44 for cruise missiles. Khrushchev decided that the submarines and four ships with R-14 missiles - Artemyevsk, Nikolaev, Dubna and Divnogorsk - should continue on their previous course. In an effort to minimize the possibility of a collision of Soviet ships with American ones, the Soviet leadership decided to deploy the rest of the ships that did not have time to reach Cuba home.

Meanwhile, in response to Khrushchev's message, the Kremlin received a letter from Kennedy, in which he pointed out that "the Soviet side broke its promises regarding Cuba and misled him." This time, Khrushchev decided not to go for a confrontation and began to look for possible exits from the current situation. He announced to the members of the Presidium that "it is impossible to store missiles in Cuba without going to war with the United States." At the meeting, it was decided to offer the Americans to dismantle the missiles in exchange for US guarantees to stop trying to change the state regime in Cuba. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Kozlov, Mikoyan, Ponomarev and Suslov supported Khrushchev. Gromyko and Malinovsky abstained from voting. After the meeting, Khrushchev suddenly turned to the members of the Presidium: “Comrades, let's go to the Bolshoi Theater in the evening. Our people and foreigners will see us, maybe this will calm them down.

Khrushchev's second letter

The arsenal of ICBMs was supplemented by the PGM-19 Jupiter IRBM, with a radius of 2400 km. 30 of these missiles were deployed in northern Italy and 15 in Turkey. Also, 60 PGM-17 Thor missiles were deployed in the UK, with similar characteristics.

The basis of the offensive power of the Air Force, in addition to ICBMs, was a huge fleet of strategic bombers - more than 800 B-52 and B-36 intercontinental bombers, over 2000 B-47 strategic bombers and about 150 supersonic B-58s.

To equip them, there was an arsenal of more than 547 AGM-28 Hound Dog supersonic missiles with a radius of up to 1200 km and free-falling nuclear bombs. US Air Force positions in Northern Canada and Greenland allowed for transpolar attacks against deep Soviet rear areas with minimal Soviet opposition.

It was 5 pm in Moscow when a tropical storm raged in Cuba. One of the air defense units received a message that an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was seen approaching Guantanamo Bay. The chief of staff of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division, Captain Antonets, called Pliev's headquarters for instructions, but he was not there. Major General Leonid Garbuz, deputy commander of the GSVK for combat training, ordered the captain to wait for Pliev to appear. A few minutes later, Antonets called the headquarters again - no one picked up the phone. When U-2 was already over Cuba, Garbuz himself ran to the headquarters and, without waiting for Pliev, gave the order to destroy the plane. According to other sources, the order to destroy the reconnaissance aircraft could have been given by Pliev's deputy for air defense, Lieutenant General of Aviation Stepan Grechko or the commander of the 27th Air Defense Division, Colonel Georgy Voronkov. The launch took place at 10:22 local time. U-2 pilot Major Rudolf Anderson was killed. Around this time, another U-2 was almost intercepted over Siberia, as General Curtis LeMay (English) Russian , chief of staff of the US Air Force, disregarded the order of the US President to stop all flights over Soviet territory.

A few hours later, two US Navy RF-8A Crusader photographic reconnaissance aircraft were fired upon by anti-aircraft guns while flying over Cuba at low altitude. One of them was damaged, but the pair returned safely to base.

Kennedy's military advisers tried to persuade the president to order an invasion of Cuba before Monday, "before it was too late." Kennedy no longer categorically rejected such a development of the situation. However, he did not leave hope for a peaceful resolution. It is generally accepted that "Black Saturday" October 27 is the day when the world was closest to a global nuclear war.

Permission

The dismantling of Soviet rocket launchers, their loading onto ships and their withdrawal from Cuba took 3 weeks. Convinced that the Soviet Union had removed the missiles, President Kennedy on November 20 gave the order to end the blockade of Cuba.
A few months later, American Jupiter missiles were also withdrawn from Turkey as "obsolete" (the US Air Force did not mind decommissioning these IRBMs, since by this time the US Navy had already deployed much more forward-based Polaris SLBMs that made Jupiter » obsolete).

Effects

The peaceful resolution of the crisis did not satisfy everyone. Khrushchev's removal a few years later can be partly attributed to irritation in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU regarding concessions to the United States made by Khrushchev and his inept leadership that led to the crisis.

The Cuban communist leadership regarded the compromise as a betrayal by the Soviet Union, since the decision that ended the crisis was made solely by Khrushchev and Kennedy.

Some US military leaders were also dissatisfied with the result. So the commander of the US Air Force, General Lemay (English) Russian called the refusal to attack Cuba "the worst defeat in our history".

At the end of the crisis, analysts from the Soviet and American intelligence agencies proposed establishing a direct telephone line between Washington and Moscow (the so-called "red telephone"), so that in case of crisis, the leaders of the superpowers would have the opportunity to immediately contact each other, and not use the telegraph.

Historical meaning

The crisis was a turning point in the nuclear race and the Cold War. The beginning of the détente of international tension was laid. In Western countries, an anti-war movement began, which peaked in the 1960s and 1970s. In the USSR, voices also began to be heard calling for limiting the nuclear arms race and strengthening the role of society in political decision-making.

It is impossible to state unequivocally whether the removal of missiles from Cuba was a victory or defeat for the Soviet Union. On the one hand, the plan conceived by Khrushchev in May 1962 was not carried through to the end, and Soviet missiles could no longer ensure the security of Cuba. On the other hand, Khrushchev obtained from the US leadership guarantees of non-aggression on Cuba, which, despite Castro's fears, have been observed and are observed to this day. A few months later, American missiles in Turkey, which, according to Khrushchev, provoked him to deploy weapons in Cuba, were also dismantled. In the end, thanks to technological progress in rocket science, there was no need to deploy nuclear weapons in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere in general, since after a few years the Soviet Union already had enough intercontinental missiles capable of reaching any city and military facility in the United States directly from the territory of the USSR.

Nikita Khrushchev himself, in his memoirs, assessed the outcome of the crisis as follows: “Now many years have passed, and this is already the domain of history. And I am proud that we have shown courage and foresight. And I think we won."

We, comrades, have supplied missiles, medium-range missiles in Cuba. Why did we put them up, what made us put them up? We argued that the Americans cannot stand Cuba, they say it directly, that they can devour Cuba. I spoke with the military, with Marshal Malinovsky. I asked: if we were in the place of America, we took a course to break such a state as Cuba, how much would we need, knowing our means? - A maximum of three days, and they would wash their hands. Comrades, this must be taken into account, because it is America that also has these opportunities. Therefore, we believed that Cuba could be saved only by placing missiles in Cuba. Then you touch it, so the hedgehog will curl up in a ball, and you won’t sit down. (Laughter) Apparently, they tried it once. (Laughter) These missiles are like hedgehog needles, they burn. When we made a decision, we discussed it for a long time and did not immediately make a decision, we postponed it twice, and then made a decision. We knew that if we set it up, and they would definitely find out, it would shock them. It's no joke to say that a crocodile has a knife under its belly! [...] As a result of the correspondence, we wrested a statement from the President of the United States that he, too, was not thinking of invading. Then we considered it possible to make a statement that we then also consider it possible to remove our missiles and Il-28. Was it a concession? It was. We gave in. Was there a concession from America? Was a public word given not to intrude? It was. So who gave in and who didn't? We never said that we would invade another country. America said that she would not tolerate a revolutionary Castro regime in Cuba, and then she refused. This means that it is clear that the other side has assumed an obligation that it did not recognize before the installation of our missiles in Cuba. So? VOICES: Yes. (Applause.) KHRUSHCHEV: There are smart people now, but there are always more smart people when the danger is over than at the moment of danger. (Laughter in the audience.) [...] And if we hadn't given in, maybe America would have given in more? May be so. But it could have been like a children's story when two goats met on the crossbar in front of the abyss. They showed goat wisdom, and both fell into the abyss. That's the problem.

Epilogue

Caribbean crisis in art

• Thirteen Days is a film by Roger Donaldson. Roger Donaldson ) (2000)
• "Fog of War" The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara ) is a film by Eroll Maurice. Errol Morris ) (2003).
• In 2004, the Japanese company Konami released the cult video game Metal Gear Solid 3, which was set against the backdrop of the Caribbean Crisis.
• "Prayers" () for baritone and chamber orchestra by the composer Luigi Dallapiccola. The score is defiantly dated to the day of Kennedy's address to the people.

• In light of these events, it was sometimes joked in the Soviet Union that the name of the island of Cuba stands for "Communism off the coast of America."

see also

• Black Saturday (1962)
• Rocket PGM-19 Jupiter, Jupiter
• Rocket R-12 (SS-4)
• Rocket R-14 (SS-5)

Notes

1. Kennedy Robert Thirteen Days: A memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. - W.W. Norton & Company, 1971. - P. 14. - ISBN 0-393-09896-6
2. Table of US Strategic Bomber Forces. Archive of Nuclear Data(2002). Archived from the original on August 28, 2011. Retrieved October 17, 2007.
3. Table of US ICBM Forces. Archive of Nuclear Data(2002). Archived
4. Table of US Ballistic Missile Submarine Forces. Archive of Nuclear Data(2002). Archived from the original on August 28, 2011. Retrieved October 15, 2007.
5. “Operation Anadyr: Figures and Facts”, Zerkalo Nedelya, No. 41 (416) October 26 - November 1, 2002
6. A. Fursenko. "Mad Risk", p. 255
7. A. Fursenko "Mad Risk", p. 256
8. Marshal Baghramyan. Love in the line of fire
9. Interview with Sidney Graybeal - 29.1.98 // The National Security Archive of the George Washington University
10. A. Fursenko, Mad Risk, p. 299
11. The Cuban Crisis: A Historical Perspective (Discussion) Hosted by James Blight, Philip Brenner, Julia Sweig, Svetlana Savranskaya and Graham Allison
12. Soviet Analysis of the Strategic Situation in Cuba October 22, 1962
13. A. A. Gromyko - "Memorable", book 1
14. K. Tariverdiev. Caribbean Crisis
15. The "Cuban Missile Crisis, October 18-29, 1962" from History and Politics Out Loud
16. Cuba and the United States: A Chronological History by Jane Franklin, 420 pages, 1997, Ocean Press
17. N. S. Khrushchev. Memories. Page 490
18. SM-65 Atlas - United States Nuclear Forces
19. David K. Stumpf: "Titan II: A History of a Cold War Missile Program", Univ. of Arkansas, 2000
20. Anatoly Dokuchaev But Kennedy suspected Khrushchev... Who ordered the shooting down of an American spy plane over Cuba? . "Independent Military Review" (August 18, 2000). Archived from the original on August 28, 2011. Retrieved February 22, 2009.
21. THIRTEEN DAYS. Robert McNamara responds to your questions (March 2001)
22. In particular, Academician A. D. Sakharov, one of the developers of Soviet nuclear weapons, made such a statement Reflections on progress, peaceful coexistence and intellectual freedom
23. Nikita Khrushchev - Voice from the past. Part 2.
24. final speech by N.S. Khrushchev at the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU on November 23, 1962.
25. (English)
26. SOVIETS CLOSE TO USING A-BOMB IN 1962 CRISIS, FORUM IS TOLD

Literature

• Lavrenov S.A., Popov I.M. The Soviet Union in local wars and conflicts. - M .: Astrel, 2003. - S. 213-289. - ISBN 5-271-05709-7
• Manoilin V.I. Basing of the Navy of the USSR. St. Petersburg: Neva Publishing House, 2004. - 320 p. - ISBN 5-7654-3446-0
• Mikoyan S. A. Anatomy of the Caribbean Crisis. , Academia Publishing, 2006. ISBN 5-87444-242-1
• Okorokov A.V. USSR in the struggle for world domination. Moscow: Yauza: Eksmo, 2009. - 448 p. - ISBN 978-5-699-37381-9
• The feat of P.L. "Strategic nuclear weapons of Russia", M.: IzdAT, 1998
• Feklisov A.S. Caribbean nuclear missile crisis / Kennedy and Soviet agents. Moscow: Eksmo: Algorithm, 2001. - 304 p. Cc. 234-263. - ISBN 978-5-699-46002-1
• Fursenko A., Naftali T. Mad Risk, publishing house ROSSPEN, 2006
• Allison, Graham and Zelikow, P. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Longman, 1999.
• Blight, James G., and David A. Welch. On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Hill and Wang, 1989.
• Brugioni, Dino A. Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Random House, 1991.
• Divine, Robert A. The Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: M. Wiener Pub., 1988.
• Fursenko, Aleksandr, and Naftali, Timothy; One Hell of a Gamble - Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy 1958-1964; W.W. Norton (New York 1998)
• Giglio, James N. The Presidency of John F. Kennedy. Lawrence, Kansas, 1991.
• Gonzalez, Servando The Nuclear Deception: Nikita Khrushchev and the Cuban Missile Crisis; IntelliBooks, 2002 ISBN 0-9711391-5-6
• Kennedy, Robert F. Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis; ISBN 0-393-31834-6
• May, Ernest R., and Philip D. Zelikow., eds. The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis. Concise Edition. New York: W.W. Norton, 2001.
• Nuti, Leopoldo (ed.) I "Missili di Ottobre": La Storiografia Americana e la Crisi Cubana dell'Ottobre 1962 Milano: LED, 1994.
• Thompson, Robert S. The Missile of October: The Declassified Story of John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis.
• Diez Acosta, Tombs. October 1962: The "Missile" Crisis As Seen From Cuba. Pathfinder Press, New York, 2002.

Links

• Memoirs of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev about the Cuban Missile Crisis
• Photocopy of the first page of a letter from N. S. Khrushchev to President Kennedy on October 24, 1962. Storage of the National Library of Congress USA.
• Appeal of N. S. Khrushchev to D. F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis. 10/27/1962 and D. Kennedy's answer to N. S. Khrushchev. October 28, 1962
• Caribbean crisis . Essay by M. Statkevich 2004
• Caribbean crisis: turning point. Behind the scenes of history. Article by I. Khlebnikov in the journal Obozrevatel.
• Lavrenov S. Ya, Popov I. M. The Soviet Union in local wars and conflicts. Caribbean crisis: the world is on the brink of disaster

After the end of hostilities in Korea, another clash of ideologies (capitalist and socialist), which brought the world to the brink of nuclear war, occurred in 1962. We know these events under the name of the Caribbean Crisis.

Despite the fact that the United States at the turn of the twentieth century. They helped Cuba get rid of Spanish domination, included (under pressure from the Americans) in the Cuban constitution, the "Platt Amendment" allowed the Americans to interfere in the internal affairs of the country. In 1934, this amendment was canceled, but in the south of the country, in Guantanamo Bay, the US military base remained (and is still there). The Americans controlled 80% of local industry, 90% of mining and 40% of sugar production.

In 1952, Fulgencio Batista y Saldívar came to power in Cuba as a result of a military coup, and two years later organized his own presidential elections. With the help of the United States, Batista banned all political parties and established a dictatorial regime in the country.

Since 1956, a detachment of revolutionaries led by a young lawyer Fidel Castro Ruz entered the arena of political and armed struggle (they attacked the Moncada barracks in the city of Santiago de Cuba). The rebels hoped that their actions would cause popular uprising that will sweep away the Batista regime. However, real popular support for this group began in the spring of 1957, when Fidel Castro issued the "Manifesto on the Fundamentals of agrarian reform". He promised the peasants the entire land of the island, and in the areas controlled by his supporters began the confiscation of latifundia and the distribution of land plots to farm laborers and small tenants.

As a result of these measures, by the end of 1957, Castro was able to transform his small detachments into the Rebel Army.

After a two-year armed struggle, the dictator Batista fled Cuba, and on January 2, 1959, parts of Camilo Cienfuegos and Ernesto Che Guevara solemnly entered the capital. In February, the government was headed by Fidel Castro Ruz, and Oswaldo Doricos Torrado became president of the republic.

Castro was not a communist and came to power as a democratic leader. He carried out land reform, began to build schools, hospitals, residential buildings for the poor.

His revolution was not political, but social. But due to the fact that the United States actively supported Batista, this revolution took place under anti-American slogans, and the burning of the American flag became an obligatory part of any rally. Such an attitude towards the United States in the end could not but lead Cuba

to friendship with the Soviet Union and the choice of the socialist path for the further development of the country.

Watching the growing Soviet-Cuban ties (75% of Cuban exports "left" to the USSR), the D. Eisenhower administration decided to eliminate Castro by force. The CIA launched an active work among Cuban immigrants in Florida with the aim of physically eliminating Castro, but all three attempts failed. The activities of the CIA were reoriented to the preparation of the invasion by the forces of Cuban emigrants and mercenaries. An attempt to resolve the contradictions by political means was undertaken by Soviet leader Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, who in September 1959 met with President Eisenhower in the United States. Khrushchev’s peculiar rhetoric (“Do you want to impose an arms race on us? We do not want this, but we are not afraid. We will beat you! sausages from a machine gun...”) only led to an aggravation of relations and the deployment of American medium-range ballistic missiles in Turkey and Italy.

The next meeting of American and Soviet leaders in Paris was disrupted due to the flight of the American reconnaissance aircraft Lockheed U-2 on May 1, 1960 over the territory of the Soviet Union. The plane was shot down by a B-750 S-75 SAM missile by the crew of Major M. Voronov, the American pilot, Lieutenant Francis G. Powers, was captured (later he was exchanged for a Soviet intelligence officer).

The next contact at the XV session of the UN General Assembly also did not add warmth to relations between the superpowers. Pictures of the Soviet leader shaking his fist or banging his shoe on the pulpit, shouting "My soldiers will come for him!" - bypassed all Western newspapers. The proposed proposals for general disarmament and the granting of independence to the colonial countries and peoples put the Americans in a "very interesting" position.

In March 1960, Eisenhower signed an order directing the CIA to "organize, arm and train Cuban exiles as a guerrilla force for

overthrow of the Castro regime.

According to the plan of Operation Pluto, anti-government detachments (the so-called "Brigade 2506") were to land in Cuba and immediately form a "counter-government" that would turn to the United States for help.

When John F. Kennedy became president, the preparations for the operation were almost completed. The new president hesitated for a long time, considering what to do with Eisenhower's "legacy". On January 22 and 28, 1961, Kennedy held meetings with representatives of the Pentagon, the CIA and the new administration, during which he specified the tasks for preparing and conducting the operation.

In early April 1961, preparations were completed. "Brigade 2506" consisted of four infantry, motorized, airborne battalions and a battalion

heavy weapons. In addition, it included a tank company, an armored detachment and a number of auxiliary units.

On April 12, President John F. Kennedy publicly declared that the United States would not attack Cuba, but this was only a maneuver designed to lull vigilance.

Two days before the start of the invasion (i.e. April 15, 1961), the main landing force (five transports, three landing ships and seven landing barges) left the ports of loading and headed for the coast of Cuba. At the same time, US Navy ships rounded Cuba from the east and began deploying off its southern coast. Aircraft of the US Air Force (24 B-26 bombers, eight military transport C-46s and six C-54s) with Cuban identification marks, but with American pilots, attacked the most important communication centers, airfields and a number of settlements (including Havana ). American air raids on Cuba formed the main content of the first phase of Operation Pluto.

The second phase was the direct landing of troops. At 02:00 on April 17, submarine saboteurs from the US Special Forces (the so-called "seals") landed in the Playa Larga area. Following this, the landing began in the Playa Giron area. Shortly thereafter, paratrooper groups were thrown out with the task of cutting the roads leading from the coast of the Bay of Cochinos into the interior of the island.

On the morning of April 17, martial law was introduced in Cuba, and in the afternoon, the Cuban armed forces launched a counteroffensive. Cuban aviation, despite the dominance of the Americans in the air, shot down six enemy aircraft and sank the Houston transport ship, which carried an infantry battalion and most of the heavy weapons of the landing force. The Americans counted on the support of the "2506 Brigade" by local residents in the fight against the Castro regime, but the CIA did not take into account the strong anti-American sentiment in Cuban society.

At dawn on April 18, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba launched an offensive in all directions. At the same time, the Soviet Union's statement about its readiness to provide the Cuban people with "all necessary assistance" was brought to the attention of the American government.

On the night of April 19, an emergency meeting of President John F. Kennedy with the leaders of the CIA and the Pentagon took place at the White House. At this meeting, a decision was made - the United States cannot provide open support to Cuban emigrants.

On April 19, Cuban Air Force pilots and Soviet instructor pilots thwarted the strike of B-26 bombers: the Americans did not take into account the zone difference in time and the fighters from the Essex aircraft carrier were exactly an hour late for the rendezvous point. And bombers without fighter cover could not complete the task.

In the afternoon, the American command sent six destroyers and naval aircraft to the area of ​​​​the Bay of Cochinos to try to rescue the surviving landing parties, but Cuban patrol ships and aircraft drove the rescue boats away from the coast. On April 19, at 5:30 p.m., the last major rebel resistance point, Playa Giron, fell.

The main landing forces were defeated in less than 72 hours. In the battles, 12 American aircraft were shot down, five M-4 Sherman tanks, ten armored personnel carriers and all the light and heavy weapons of the 2506 brigade were captured. From the landing force, 82 people were killed. and 1214 people. got captured.

On July 20, 1961, a meeting of the US National Security Council was held, the contents of which became known only in 1994, when James Galbraith (the son of a famous economist) published "Records ..." made by Colonel Howard Barris, assistant to Vice President Lyndon Johnson. The meeting discussed the possibility of delivering a preemptive nuclear strike against the USSR. John F. Kennedy, who recently took office as President of the United States, only welcomed the "nuclear hype" from the highest echelons of power in the Pentagon. However, despite the overwhelming superiority of the United States, it was decided, in order to further increase the gap, to wait a few years, and even then "wipe the communists off the face of the earth."

In February 1962, under US pressure, Cuba was expelled from the Organization of American States (OAS). The US Air Force and Navy are invading the airspace and territorial waters of the Republic.

The failure of Operation Pluto and the US provocations in 1962 brought the positions of the USSR and Cuba even closer. In mid-1962, an agreement was signed on the supply of Soviet weapons. Cuban pilots went to Czechoslovakia to master Soviet aircraft.

At the end of June in Moscow, the ministers of defense of Cuba and the USSR, Raul Castro and Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky, signed a secret agreement on the deployment of Soviet troops on the territory of the Republic of Cuba. After that, the main operational department of the General Staff, under the leadership of Colonel General Semyon Pavlovich Ivanov, began developing the preparation and conduct of the Anadyr event - this was the code name for the operation to transfer troops to Cuba.

In all documents, the operation was coded for a strategic exercise with the redeployment of troops and military equipment to various regions of the Soviet Union. By June 20, the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba (GSVK) was formed, under the command of General Issa Aleksandrovich Pliev.

The group included: the 51st missile division, formed on the basis of the 43rd missile division stationed in Ukraine, and which included six

missile regiments; four motorized rifle regiments, one of which was commanded by the future Minister of Defense of the USSR Dmitry Timofeevich Yazov; two anti-aircraft missile and artillery divisions; fighter and helicopter regiments; two regiments of front-line cruise missiles, also equipped with nuclear warheads. The total number of personnel was to be 44 thousand people.

The first unit of the missile troops arrived in the Cuban port of Casilda on September 9 on the ship "Omsk". To deliver troops to the island, 85 ships made 180

flights until the US imposed a naval blockade. The soldiers and officers were not told anything about the purpose of their journey. Parts were loaded onto ships with all their supplies, even taking boots and winter guard coats.

The servicemen were placed in the holds, from which it was strictly forbidden to leave. The temperature in them reached 50°C, people were fed twice a day and only at night. The dead were buried according to the maritime custom - sewn into a tarpaulin, they were lowered into the ocean.

Such precautionary measures gave the result - American intelligence did not notice anything, noting only an increase in the flow of Soviet ships to Cuban ports. The Americans became seriously worried after reports from their agents about the movement of tractors with huge containers along the night roads of the island. Reconnaissance planes swirled over Cuba, and in the resulting pictures, the astonished Americans saw missile positions under construction.

On October 23, 1962, President John F. Kennedy signed a directive imposing a maritime quarantine on Cuba. The next day the American sailors

began to search the ships going to the island. Due to the blockade, R-14 missiles did not hit Cuba.

By October 27, three regiments of the missile division were already ready to deliver a nuclear missile strike from all of their 24 starting positions. At the same time, the Strategic Missile Forces, the country's Air Defense Forces, and Long-Range Aviation were put on full alert; in increased combat readiness - ground forces, part of the forces of the Navy.

In conditions of complete secrecy, almost the entire 51st missile division of General I.D. Statsenko, 42 Il-28 bombers, 40 MiG-21 fighters, two air defense divisions (Tokarev and Voronkov), armed with 144 air defense systems S -75, and mobile installations of first-generation anti-ship cruise missiles began to run along the coast.

Within the reach of our bombers and ballistic missiles was the territory of the United States up to the Philadelphia-St. Louis-Dallas-El Paso line. Under

a possible strike hit Washington and Norfolk, Indianapolis and Charleston, Houston and New Orleans, the Air Force bases at Cape Canaveral and the entire territory of Florida.

It was a worthy response to the deployment of American Jupiter medium-range missiles based on Turkey and Italy, which could reach the territory of the USSR in a few minutes.

On October 14, an American U-2 photographed launch pads for launching medium-range ballistic missiles. Comparing the photographs with previously received undercover information about the arrival of “strange Russian weapons” on the island, the Yankees came to the conclusion that the Soviet Union had deployed R-12 missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba.

The deployment of nuclear weapons 90 miles from US territory was a very unpleasant surprise for the US government. After all, the approach of bombers with nuclear bombs was always expected from the Arctic - along the shortest distance through the North Pole, and all air defense systems and means were located in the north of the United States.

The states have brought their armed forces to a state of full combat readiness. Their Strategic Air Command was brought to a state of Defcon-3 - readiness for nuclear war.

On October 22, US warships (about 180 units) were ordered to detain and search all merchant ships en route to and from Cuba. Preparations were made for the landing of a 100,000-strong army. The plan of Operation Mongoose provided for the landing of troops on the northern and southern coasts of the island with a simultaneous strike from the American naval base in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba.

At 40 civilian airfields closest to Cuba, B-47 bombers with nuclear weapons on board were concentrated. A quarter of the Stratofortress B-52s were constantly in the sky. As it has already become known

in the 21st century, when the American scientific journal Bulletin of atomic scientists published declassified Pentagon documents, nuclear weapons were also deployed at Guantanamo Bay in 1961. Nuclear charges were brought to combat readiness and were located at this American naval base until 1963.

The Americans counted on the fact that the strike of 430 combat aircraft on Cuba would make it possible to suppress the Russian launch positions of the R-12 missiles before launch, and it took considerable time to prepare it - more than eight hours, because these liquid rockets had to be filled with fuel and oxidizer.

As a response, the Soviet Union also carried out measures aimed at increasing the combat readiness of the army and navy. A group of Soviet troops in Cuba receives the go-ahead to open fire to kill.

Simultaneously with these actions, the leader of the USSR (N.S. Khrushchev) issued a warning that the Soviet Union would accept all necessary measures to give a fitting rebuff to the aggressor. Soviet ships heading to Cuba began to be escorted by our submarines.

The Americans continued to prepare for the invasion operation and to fly their reconnaissance aircraft over Cuba. The crisis reached its peak on October 27, when our anti-aircraft gunners shot down a Lockheed U-2 reconnaissance aircraft piloted by Major Anderson with a S-75 Dvina missile. Pliev gave the order to the rocket men: to open fire when approaching foreign vehicles, and Garbuz and Grechko gave a direct order to destroy "target 33". The order was carried out by the 1st division of the anti-aircraft missile regiment under the command of Colonel I. Gerchenov. The first missile hit a reconnaissance aircraft at an altitude of about 20 km, while the second overtook the already falling car and turned it into a pile of scrap metal. The pilot of the plane was killed.

The world is on the brink of nuclear war. Americans still call this day "Black Saturday". The threat of war became a reality, many residents of Washington began to leave the city. However, the exercises conducted by the Americans back in 1957 showed that more than 50% of the aircraft would be destroyed from the S-75 and S-125 missiles of the Soviet air defense during a massive raid, while the rest, according to the experience of World War II, would not dare to achieve their goals under such conditions. . Soviet batteries of Shkval rapid-fire anti-aircraft artillery mounts at that time shot down nine out of ten cruise missiles.

Not daring to start a nuclear war, J. Kennedy instructs his brother Robert to meet with the Soviet ambassador in Washington. Another attempt was made

get out of the crisis by political means.

It was not until the evening of October 28 that a compromise solution was found - the United States was withdrawing Jupiter missiles from the territory of Turkey, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, the Soviet Union was withdrawing its missiles from the territory of Cuba. J. Kennedy assured the Soviet Union and the world community that the United States would lift the naval blockade of Cuba and that their government would undertake not to carry out armed intervention against the Republic of Cuba. The military confrontation between the two world systems continued, but war was avoided. The common sense of the leaders of the two superpowers prevailed. Nobody wanted war, but it was more than ever possible.

Apparently, the “Caribbean lesson” was learned both in Moscow and in Washington and London. On August 5, 1963, the USSR, the USA and Great Britain signed an agreement in Moscow

on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water.

But even before these events, on the eve of May 1, 1963, F. Castro arrived in Moscow. During the visit, he visited a number of military units, visited the Northern Fleet, where he met with submariners who participated in the campaign to the shores of Cuba. On May 29, as a result of lengthy Soviet-Cuban negotiations, at the request of the Cuban side, a secret agreement was signed on leaving a symbolic contingent of Soviet troops, a motorized rifle brigade, on the "Island of Freedom".

The combat training activities of the Soviet troops in Cuba were not without casualties: 66 Soviet military personnel and three civilian personnel were killed

(died) under various circumstances related to the performance of military service duties.

The presence of Soviet soldiers and officers in Cuba repeatedly provoked protests from the White House administration. For a long time, Moscow denied the presence of “its own” military personnel on the island. Only in 1979 did L.I. Brezhnev admit that there was a brigade of Soviet military personnel in Cuba, which was a “training center for

training of Cuban military specialists.

After M.S. Gorbachev came to power in the USSR and announced a “new political thinking”, a course towards democratization and perestroika, pressure also increased on the issue of Soviet troops in Cuba. On the eve of the Soviet leader's visit to Cuba in April, Gorbachev receives a secret message from the President of the United States, which explicitly states: "The initiative of the Soviet Union and Cuba ... will pay off with serious dividends of the goodwill of the United States." Cuba, however, did not succumb to the pressure, and Castro's farewell to Gorbachev was very dry: if at the meeting they hugged, then, saying goodbye, they only shook hands coldly.

Bush Sr. during the "Maltese Munich" insisted on "reforming society", on Gorbachev "letting the satellites go their own way", and on the "withdrawal of Soviet troops from everywhere."

By order of Gorbachev, a brigade of 11 thousand people. within a month, she was hurriedly expelled to her homeland. This aroused quite legitimate bewilderment in F. Castro, who intended to link the withdrawal of Soviet troops with the liquidation of the American naval base of Guantanamo on the island. However, the first and last President of the USSR did not heed the opinion of the Cuban leader, since he personally promised US Secretary of State Baker to eliminate the Soviet military presence on the island "as soon as possible."

As a result, each of the parties received its "dividends" - in Havana, under the chairmanship of F. Castro in 1999, the IX meeting of the Ibero-American states was held, at which a declaration was adopted that called for Washington to abandon the Helms-Burton blockade law, and the initiative was rejected United States to create a "group of friends" who will be able to "come to the aid of various countries in the region in case of a threat to democracy in them." And Russia took part in the OSCE summit in Istanbul (November 17-18, 1999), which discussed the violation of human rights by the Russian Federation in Chechnya and where Russia had to make yet another concession.

Until recently, in Cuba, not far from the village of Lourdes, the only military facility of the Russian Federation functioned - the Center for Electronic and Radio-Technical Intelligence, which is jointly administered by the RF Ministry of Defense and FAPSI.

On October 18, 2001, the second President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, announced the liquidation by January 1, 2002 of this Center, which had been on the territory of the Republic of Cuba for so many years.

Alexander Fursenko - Yulia Kantor

And Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Alexander Fursenko is equally known both in our country and abroad as the largest researcher of one of the most painful subjects in post-war world history - the Caribbean crisis. The Duke of Westminster Award for Contribution to the Study of History was recently held at London's Whitehall. For the first time, this one of the most prestigious awards in the world scientific community was presented to a Russian academician Fursenko. At the end of November, an international conference will be held in Cambridge on the history of Soviet-British relations in the 20th century. The speaker from the Russian side will be Alexander Fursenko, the author of the famous monographs “Infernal Game. The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis 1958-1964" and "Khrushchev's Cold War. Inner History.

How do you see Khrushchev, because you worked with documents that make it possible to shed light on previously unknown personality traits of this politician? What made the biggest impression on you?
Khrushchev was emotional person prone to adventurism. But he was also a major statesman who cared about the national interests of the country, thought about the welfare of the people. He sincerely cared about people, sought to make their lives better. From the records of the Politburo minutes, sometimes laconic, sometimes detailed, we ourselves were surprised to learn that Khrushchev thought about such mundane things as underground passages, dry cleaners. Khrushchev dreamed of a large scale deal with the United States that would demilitarize the Cold War and allow him to redirect resources into the Soviet economy. In order to achieve this, he resorted to both threats and peaceful initiatives. I recently read documents from his personal archive: there are a lot of uncorrected transcripts. I will publish them exactly as they are, "uncombed" - just as he said. This is amazingly interesting. His vocabulary, style, humor, the very way of thinking - all this is important for understanding what was happening then, for recognizing Khrushchev himself. After all, he was a very interesting personality, although it is customary for us to portray him in a caricature, sometimes mockingly. But he did a gigantic deed for our country: being implicated in the crimes of the Stalinist regime, he was nevertheless not afraid to tell the truth. Not all, of course, but at least he outlined the path ...

Hell game

From the title of your and Timothy Naftali's sensational book in the scientific and political world “Infernal game. The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis 1958-1964 "sounds like an action movie ...
It does sound somewhat detective, but the English title of this book, published in the USA in 1997, is different. This is a reminder of John F. Kennedy, who in October 1962, before addressing the nation, addressed a small group of members of the Senate and the House of Representatives. He then said: “I know the places where there are Soviet missiles, and I can send bombers even now. But I'm not sure if these are all places where there are rockets. And in this sense, the bombing would be an insanely risky hellish game. In Russia, the book was published in 1999 under the title “Infernal game. The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis 1958-1964. In 2006, I corrected this free translation and republished it under a more accurate, in my opinion, title: “Mad Risk. The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

Your American opponents questioned several fundamental provisions of the monograph, in particular the question of the role of intelligence in the history of the crisis and its resolution...
Quite right. Prior to the publication of the book, it was believed that the events on the eve of Playa Giron were a failure for both our and Cuban intelligence. What the USSR could not know about the operation being prepared by the Americans. But in the archives of the Soviet Foreign Intelligence Service, I saw a report from Mexico, which said: one of these days there will be an invasion of Cuba. Mexico was the main KGB station in Latin America, and this report came from Guatemalan friends. Former KGB chief Shelepin wrote opposite the text of this telegram that arrived in Moscow: "That's right." And Castro was immediately sent a telegram from us, that is, he received our warning two days before the attack.

Or disagreements over the "ultimatum of Bulganin", which put an end to the Suez war. We, as you know, demanded a halt to military operations against Egypt, hinting at Britain's strategic missiles. In the West, many believe that this ultimatum was not as decisive as the Soviet side ascribed to itself. That England, France and Israel stopped the war mainly for financial reasons. Under pressure from Treasury Secretary Harold Macmillan, the government of Anthony Eden was forced to retreat from Egypt. Of course, the factors cited by the British were significant. But "Bulganin's ultimatum" worked too obviously to be denied! They tried to convince me that the British were not at all afraid of our ultimatum, they simply ignored it, because they knew that Soviet missiles could not reach London. And he reassured them, that is, allegedly influenced the situation, the American resident. Later, when the book came out, I received another confirmation of my point of view. Working in London in the archives of the joint intelligence committee, I found reports that the British, the Intelligence Service, knew the parameters of our missiles well before the Americans. The British clearly did not want a deep conflict with Khrushchev.

Which of the documents you introduced into scientific circulation made the greatest impression on the London Royal Institute of Military Research, which presented you with the Duke of Westminster Prize?
I think protocols from the Kremlin archives. Under my editorship, these documents saw the light of day for the first time, two volumes of uncorrected protocols and transcripts of meetings of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU have already been published, and a third is being prepared for publication. Both the British and the Americans, after reading the book, were dumbfounded to learn the exact number of troops deployed to Cuba during Operation Anadyr. (For the first time, I named this figure at a conference of participants in the Cuban crisis arranged in Moscow in January 1989. I was there thanks to Academician Primakov, and a Politburo resolution was necessary allowing my participation in the delegation.) There were more than 40,000 of our people there! The Americans did not know this. They did not know for a long time that we had nuclear warheads there. This is what we told them many years later.

Weakness as a secret

Is Khrushchev's voluntarist diplomacy the fruit of natural cunning, diluted with party-Soviet ideas about the style of behavior with the capitalists?
Voluntary diplomacy is a good term for Khrushchev's foreign policy. Sending rockets to Cuba was Khrushchev's adventure. But Khrushchev, as it turns out from the documents, did not even think of using these missiles. He wanted to scare the United States, to force him to speak with the USSR on an equal footing. When the acute phase of the conflict passed, he happily boasted: "We are in the world club." Well, yes, and very risky. The main thing is that Khrushchev was not an instigator of war. For example, he said that we make rockets like sausages. As funny as it sounds, that was a big exaggeration. When the Americans launched spy satellites, they couldn't find intercontinental ballistic missiles on our territory. But the fact is that there were only six or seven of them. The biggest secret was our weakness. He was bluffing in order to come to the UN session and from the podium effectively tell Kennedy about Soviet missiles and the conclusion of an agreement with Castro. I spoke to the military men whom he spoke to in the Kremlin before sending missiles to Cuba, in particular with General Garbuz, deputy commander of the Soviet group of troops in Cuba. He told them: "We want to throw a hedgehog in the pants of the Americans, but in no case are we going to use rocket weapons against America." This is confirmed by the minutes of the Central Committee. His words are recorded there: “We wanted to intimidate, but not unleash a war. But if they hit, we will have to respond and there will be a big war.

Playa Giron - locality in the Bay of Pigs ("Bay of Pigs") on the southern coast of Cuba. On April 17, 1961, the main forces of the specially formed "brigade 2506" were landed in the bay by the Americans. The landing was carried out under the cover of US ships and aircraft. On April 19, the Americans were defeated. These events have become one of the historical symbols of the Cuban revolution.

The Cuban Missile Crisis began on October 14, 1962 when the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft of the US Air Force, during one of the regular overflights of Cuba, discovered Soviet medium-range missiles R-12 and R-14 in the vicinity of the village of San Cristobal. By decision of US President John F. Kennedy, a special executive committee was created, which discussed possible ways problem solving. For some time, the meetings of the executive committee were secret, but on October 22, Kennedy addressed the people, announcing the presence of Soviet "offensive weapons" in Cuba, which immediately began to panic in the United States. A quarantine (blockade) of Cuba was introduced.
At first, the USSR denied the presence of Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba, then assured the Americans of their deterrent nature. On October 25, photographs of the missiles were shown to the world at a meeting of the UN Security Council. On October 27, an American U-2 aircraft was shot down. Supporters of the military solution to the problem urged Kennedy to start a massive bombardment of Cuba.
Nikita Khrushchev offered the Americans to dismantle the installed missiles and deploy ships still heading towards Cuba in exchange for US guarantees not to attack Cuba and remove its missiles from Turkey. Kennedy agreed, and the dismantling of the missiles began on October 28. The last Soviet missile left Cuba a few weeks later, on November 20, the blockade of Cuba was lifted. The Cuban Missile Crisis lasted 38 days.

The international politics of the 21st century are not super-bombs, but the super-reason of its diplomacy.

Leonid Sukhorukov

Never before have people prepared such powerful resources for battle. Opponents have never been ready to destroy each other completely - even if the whole world would suffer and it would become impossible to live in the affected territories. Never before have events been so dense: in terms of the mobility of the army and the promptness of diplomatic decisions, every day was like a year. And never did the mobilization of such huge reserves lead to such small casualties.

The constant brinkmanship of tensions was typical of the entire Cold War. But the most dramatic time, when the stakes were especially high, was only thirteen days in 1962. "Caribbean crisis".

Background: around and around

In the post-war period, the two main political poles - the USA and the USSR - pursued a policy of expanding their presence on the planet, but without seizing foreign territories and subsequent colonization: everyone was fed up with the horrors of World War II. Both "we" and "they" simply supported "no man's" territories or staged revolutions under suitable slogans - respectively, under "socialist" or "democratic". But there were also countries that were difficult to attribute to the political camp.

In 1959, when Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba, the island retained some independence. The new Cuban administration sought to nationalize industry and services, gradually getting rid of the presence of any American business. The states, in response, limited all relations with Cuba, which was in a very disastrous state after the revolutionary restructuring. It was difficult for the Cubans and the Union to establish close relations: the Kremlin was confident that the United States had a certain influence on Cuba, and at first it was hardly possible to talk about the accession of the Island of Freedom to the socialist world.

PGM-19 Jupiter. Such missiles were installed at the Turkish base.

But this situation did not last long. Reacting to Castro's anti-American sentiments, the United States refused to supply oil to the island and buy Cuban sugar, which meant that the country's economy was facing hard times. By that time, Cuba had already established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and the Cuban authorities turned to him for help. The answer was positive - the USSR sent tankers with oil to Cuba, agreeing to buy sugar at the same time. So the further vector of foreign policy (and after that of our own path of development) was predetermined and the path to interaction with socialist countries was chosen.

The beginning of the conflict, however, is not connected with Cuba. In 1961, the US began placing ballistic weapons at a Turkish missile base. It was about a relatively small arsenal - 15 medium-range missiles. But the territory that could be attacked by them turned out to be quite large, and it included the European part of the USSR, including Moscow. The flight time did not exceed ten minutes - the time during which it is almost impossible to take any reciprocal steps. The current situation rather worried the Soviet government.

The American side of the war did not plan; missiles were installed for strategic reasons - to show combat power, to protect yourself. However, there were no serious precedents that made such a step necessary at that time. In any case, a symmetrical answer suggested itself - for political reasons.

However, politics did not work out: Nikita Khrushchev, at that time the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, took these missiles as a personal insult. And Cuba has been asking the USSR for some time to increase its military presence on its territory. As a result, we came to the conclusion that it is possible to satisfy this desire to the fullest extent possible - to deploy our nuclear weapons in Cuba. Geopolitically, the idea made no sense: the deployment of nuclear missiles there ensured a certain nuclear parity - Soviet weapons threatened the United States in the same way that American weapons threatened the USSR. Among other things, it was a great opportunity, as Khrushchev said, "to give America a hedgehog: to place our missiles in Cuba so that America cannot swallow the Island of Freedom."

In May 1962, this decision was made in the Kremlin, not without some controversy, and Castro also supported it. The issue is transportation.

Operation Anadyr

It would be naive to believe that dozens of missiles could be quietly transferred to Cuba. But the Soviet government developed a number of measures that helped "blur" the picture of what was happening and mislead the intelligence of a potential enemy. To do this, in June, a program was prepared for the operation "Anadyr", which serves to cover up Soviet-Cuban interactions.

It was they - American reconnaissance aircraft Lockheed U-2 - in this story that brought the Soviets the most problems.

The equipment and missiles were delivered to six different ports, from Severomorsk to Sevastopol. 65 ships participated in the project, but on the ships, no one - up to the captains - was informed about the contents of the cargo upon departure. There was no clarity even with the destination: everyone was told that they had to move somewhere to Chukotka. For greater reliability, wagons of winter clothes were delivered to the ports.

Of course, the captains were provided with instructions on the route: each was given three sealed packages. The first one had to be opened after the ship left the territorial waters of the USSR. Inside contained an order to open the second package after the passage of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. In the second - to open the third after the passage of Gibraltar. And only the third, the last, named the destination: Cuba.

There were many precautions taken by the army command to ensure the safety of the operation. The packages contained instructions to avoid encounters with the NATO fleet. Machine guns were installed on ships in case of a possible attack, and small-caliber anti-aircraft guns were installed on ships with missiles. Missile boats carried on the decks of ships were sheathed in metal and wood - this made them inaccessible to infrared observations.

In a word, the transfer operation was thought out to the smallest detail. However, the plans of action directly in "Anadyr" - that is, in Cuba - were overly idealistic.

For example, dangerous and chemically aggressive rocket fuel components were problematic to store on the island. If under normal conditions the spill of these reagents was not something extraordinary, then in the heat it led to toxic fumes. The staff could only work in gas masks and overalls, which in a tropical climate caused particular difficulties.

The deployment of personnel also did not take into account weather conditions. Due to the ill-conceived organization of military camps, the work and rest of the personnel were extremely inconvenient: during the day - closeness, at night - midges. Trouble added and poisonous vegetation in the forests. High humidity had a bad effect on the health of people and the state of technology.

The US Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to take military action against Cuba.

But these are all trifles compared to the main miscalculation. The Soviet command decided that it was easy to install missiles covertly in Cuba - supposedly palm groves would greatly contribute to this. As it turns out later, this masking factor was not so reliable. Well, it would not have been possible to disguise the fleet in any way - if American intelligence, perhaps, would not have paid attention to several ships, then it was impossible not to notice the constant arrival of large military ships in several different Cuban ports. Union activities remained vulnerable to surveillance by American reconnaissance aircraft monitoring the immediate vicinity of the Cuban coast.

Mutual Assured Destruction

The theories of war in the 20th century seemed to strive to outdo each other in their inhuman ingenuity. Fortunately, a significant part of the "inventions" has never been implemented. Completely new prospects for war opened up after the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It turned out that only the psychological effect of such bombs is absolute. And combat - and even more so.

And here's the question - how might a confrontation between two powers look like, which, let's say, have an equal stock of nuclear weapons? So big that they can completely destroy the opponent. In the context of ideas about foreign policy that developed within the framework of the Cold War, there is only one possible outcome of such a hypothetical war - mutually assured destruction. And this is not a random term - the arsenal of world diplomacy has been replenished with a military doctrine under this name.

To the situation after such a collision - in the literal sense of the post-apocalyptic - one can confidently apply the words allegedly once again said by Khrushchev: "And the living will envy the dead." This phrase was often attributed to him by foreign journalists during the Cold War, although exact evidence has not been preserved. However, in any case, there is no doubt: they will really envy.

Not by the day, but by the hour

It is easy to imagine a person walking confidently on a tightrope for ten minutes; but it is unlikely that this could happen without problems for a couple of centuries.

Philosopher Bertrand Russell on nuclear war

U-2 is a key "character" in the Cuban Missile Crisis.

It was they - American reconnaissance aircraft Lockheed U-2 - in this story that brought the Soviets the most problems. Already in July, when Soviet troops were transferring missiles and equipment to Cuba, American intelligence noticed a massive movement of the fleet. In order to get more accurate information and take better pictures, U-2 pilots had to fly quite close to Soviet ships, and at extremely low altitudes. So low that on September 12, one of the aircraft, through the negligence of the pilot, crashed into the water surface and sank.

By that time, Soviet troops had already begun building a number of positions for missile systems, and US reconnaissance aircraft became aware of this almost immediately. However, the CIA did not find anything terrible in the photographs, and on September 4, President John F. Kennedy told Congress that the most dangerous - the nuclear missile threat - was not there. So you don't have to worry about anything. The next day, the previous reconnaissance flights were stopped right up to October 14 (previously, "scheduled" aviation inspections took place twice a month). Firstly, because there is no obvious danger - there is nothing to watch. Secondly, Kennedy was afraid that sooner or later the Soviet or Cuban troops would stop tolerating such undisguised air "peeping" and shoot down the plane - then conflicts could not be avoided. Thirdly, it was decided to do this simply because of adverse weather conditions.

But the States relaxed in vain - positions were built on the island for R-12 and R-14 medium-range missiles - up to 4000 km. All of them were ready to carry nuclear charges.

The next U-2 flight took place on October 14 and brought the United States an unpleasant surprise - photography captured not only bases, but also missiles. And by this time there were already enough of them on the island: the Soviet Union sent an arsenal of dozens of missiles with nuclear warheads there. This was established by the CIA specialists on October 15, and in the morning October 16 pictures were shown to the president. It was at this moment that a critical situation arose, which was later called the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The first picture of Soviet weapons in Cuba shown by Kennedy.

On a note: at this stage, there was also “support” from the Soviet side: Oleg Penkovsky, a Soviet GRU colonel, helped identify the missiles. In 1961, he gave the CIA a top-secret reference book with images of Soviet missiles. However, cooperation ended quickly - in 1962 he was arrested, and a year later he was shot. It is difficult to talk about the details here, the Penkovsky case is still classified.

Events began to develop at a dizzying pace - indeed, in terms of saturation and tension, each day was worth a whole year, and various accidents and misunderstandings threatened to lead to the instant death of tens of millions of civilians.

Realizing that he should keep his finger on the pulse, Kennedy ordered reconnaissance flights to be resumed and carried out as many as six times a day. By his decision, the Executive Committee was created - a group of advisers who discussed the solution to the problem and scenarios of events. The work of the committee continued 17 October. But a clear position has not yet been developed. However, they considered it necessary to urgently transfer the troops to increased combat readiness - which was done.

October 18 American intelligence assessed the capabilities of the weapons stationed on the island. It turned out that by the end of October - the beginning of November, up to 40 missiles could be used in the first strike against the United States, and the second was to be expected in a few hours. Missiles with a range of 2000 km could hit a significant part of the combat aviation potential of the south of the United States, and with a radius of up to 4500 km they would reach the northern bases of intercontinental missiles. In the same zone - most of the largest American cities.

The US Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to take military action against Cuba. Of the two options - a blockade or an air strike - the first was chosen: in order to avoid a harsh reaction from Moscow. And there was no certainty whether it would be possible to immediately destroy all Soviet missiles. After all, then the USSR would have responded with a nuclear strike.

The territory inside these circles in a few hours could turn into a complete radioactive hell.

October 18, White House. In talks with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin (left) and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko (right), Kennedy is cheerful, pretending not to know about missiles.

The same day was dedicated to the Moscow-Washington diplomatic talks. The Soviet side announced its peaceful intentions, but at the same time, its readiness to defend the Cuban allies. Kennedy also announced peace plans for Cuba, adding that he is doing his best to contain politicians demanding military intervention.

October 19 the Soviet government assumed that the crisis had subsided, but the United States began to prepare for decisive action more intensively. And by the evening The 20th of October The preparations of the Americans accelerated even more, the troops were transferred to the position of "military danger", combat aircraft - to a state of 15-minute readiness for departure. In Cuba, meanwhile, one missile regiment was put on full alert. The American press was full of conflicting rumors.

October 21 intelligence brought the Americans information about the deployment of five Soviet missile regiments (with 80 missiles) and two storage facilities for nuclear weapons in Cuba. The United States approved a plan for a naval blockade of Cuba. According to him, all ships approaching her were to be checked by control groups of US ships, and the detection of offensive weapons would lead to a ban on further advance. Refusal threatened the use of force up to drowning.

22 of October formations of the US Navy encircled Cuba, patrol and reconnaissance ships approached its territorial waters. 25% of all B-52 bombers with nuclear weapons are in the air, duty is around the clock. Prepared invasion force numbering 340 thousand people (ground forces, marines, landing). The armed forces are in a state of immediate readiness for combat. Aerial reconnaissance of Cuban territory is round-the-clock.

The large-scale preparation made a shocking impression on the country. Newspapers reported on the range of Soviet missiles capable of killing more than 80 million people. Panic arose - the inhabitants of the United States began to move to the north of the country, away from the threat.

The Cuban side was in full combat readiness. But the use of missile units is still strictly prohibited. General mobilization was scheduled for the next day.

October 23 The Kremlin was dismayed to learn that America had placed a naval blockade on Cuba and was ready for war, but more so because it was aware of the deployment of Soviet missiles. Hope for a covert completion of the operation collapsed completely. Khrushchev announced his readiness to strike back in the event of an attack by the United States, and in the event of an attack by Soviet ships. However October 24 blockade was introduced. Khrushchev was angry.

On the same day, US intelligence brought information about the accelerated camouflage of the launching positions of Soviet missiles. Measures were taken to intercept Soviet submarines.

the 25th of October The states are fully prepared for war. Khrushchev realized that drama was inevitable if he did not abandon his previous plans. The Kremlin promptly considered all possible solutions and their consequences.

It is interesting: after an emergency meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Khrushchev unexpectedly addressed the participants: “Comrades, let's go to the Bolshoi Theater in the evening. Our people and foreigners will see us, maybe this will calm them down.

Although the Americans knew everything and showed the Soviet diplomats in the United States the available photographs, Khrushchev’s correspondence up to October 26 Kennedy assured that there were no Soviet weapons in Cuba. However, on that day, Nikita Sergeevich, observing the Americans' rapid preparation for war, finally understood the need to open the cards and compromise. Moscow declared that if the United States promised to abandon intervention in Cuba and lift the blockade, then there would be no more Soviet nuclear weapons there. And in pursuit - one more condition: the elimination of the American missile base in Turkey.

The tone of the proposal was conciliatory, but the military preparations of the Soviet troops on the island continued.

At dawn 27th October The USSR was expecting a US air attack on the Cuban-Soviet formations, which - fortunately - did not follow. Kennedy was extremely cautious.

The situation remained extremely acute. Intensive negotiations continued. Although America insisted on removing the issue of Turkish missiles from them (explaining that the security problems of Europe and the Western Hemisphere are not connected), the framework for a compromise was outlined. It was the most intense day of the crisis, which nevertheless brought the most hope and productive solutions, but...

In the evening, one of the units of the Cuban air defense received a message about the approaching U-2. Due to a short-term inconsistency in the actions of the command, a hasty decision was made to attack it with anti-aircraft artillery. The plane was shot down and the pilot died. The situation escalated again, the US government expressed strong dissatisfaction with the incident; Kennedy, however, had the nerve not to order a military response.

The incident can be explained by the fact that this was the eighth violation of Cuban airspace in a day. Or a provocation from the Soviet side. Or with the American... The balance was clearly not on the side of the United States: almost at the same time, another U-2 was intercepted, but over Siberia. Shortly before this, in order to avoid unnecessary tension, the American command banned aerial reconnaissance over the USSR. According to the official version, the plane simply went off course due to bad weather. As soon as it became known about the intruder, Soviet and American fighters rushed towards him. Accompanied by them, he turned to Alaska. Fortunately, the Soviet military also had enough composure - and there were no fights.

The next day, October 28, in the course of negotiations, both sides came to diplomatic agreements.

The next day, 28 of October, during the negotiations both sides came to diplomatic agreements. The exchange of opinions and proposals took place both openly and strictly confidentially. The USSR agreed to the withdrawal of missiles (the dismantling of the launch sites began on the same day), the United States gave a guarantee of non-aggression against Cuba. There was no official agreement on Turkey, but it was clear to everyone that everything would be done in this regard to relieve tension.

As for the third party - Cuba, it, by and large, turned out to be just a pawn in a big game. Castro, feeling some resentment, told Khrushchev that he should have commented more clearly on his actions - the Cubans were very perplexed by the quick Soviet "rollback". However, this did not prevent further strengthening of Cuba's ties with the USSR and voluntary accession to the socialist world.

In any case, the global tragedy has passed. Unfortunately, there were no combat losses - the pilot of the downed U-2, Major Rudolf Anderson, became the only victim among the military. It is also known that due to the harsh conditions of service in Cuba, 57 Soviet soldiers died.

Ultimately, the USSR removed nuclear weapons from Cuba. The US did not encroach on it. A little later, NATO missiles were dismantled in Turkey - as "obsolete".

The implementation of plans for peace agreements took many months. But that's a different story - not so frightening and beyond the events of those troubling thirteen days.

Caribbean crisis in games

In the summertime under the shade of an acacia tree

It's nice to dream about deployment.

Kozma Prutkov

This story, like no other military crisis, was like a game - in which you need to act as efficiently as possible, trying to guess what is in the mind of a potential enemy.

Indeed, the Americans did not know until the last moment who could even give the order to attack. Khrushchev personally? One of his subordinates? Or maybe Fidel? The Kremlin, too, was unsure of Washington's plans—despite seemingly measured actions, there were serious arguments in the Executive Committee between supporters of intervention, pre-emptive attack, and diplomatic disputes.

By the way, only later it became known that the Americans were significantly mistaken in their assessment of both the types of weapons and equipment, and the number of troops in Cuba. So if the war had started then, the consequences would have been much more dramatic than imagined.

In the Caribbean crisis, when misunderstandings and accidents could turn into a nightmare, the most acute problem was the first step: an attempt to make the situation radically advantageous unbalanced the system and threatened mutual nuclear destruction. It is curious that such a situation in an abstract form was studied in game theory in 1950 by the famous mathematician John Nash, Nobel Prize winner in 1994.

It is symptomatic that in February of the same “crisis” 1962, programmer Steve Russell created a shooter spacewar! the world's first computer game. It was made for a computer PDP-1 with characteristics that are funny for our time (RAM - 9 kilobytes, a processor for 100 thousand operations per second). True, the plot was not connected with nuclear weapons.

The historical plot of the Caribbean crisis is popular in various areas of modern culture. Post-apocalyptic images of the consequences of the mutual destruction of states, "inspired" by the Caribbean crisis, are often used in computer and video games.

One of the most typical examples is the games of the series Fallout. Recall that the events there take place after the world war of 2077, during which the United States and China “exchanged” all their nuclear weapons, as a result of which there were almost no living things left in the world. The duration of the conflict, according to the plan, was only a couple of hours.

old strategy balance of power(Mindscape, 1985; reprinted later, but without fundamental differences), which was still published on floppy disks, was thematically closer to real politics. The player acts on behalf of either the President of the United States or the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The goal is simple - to perform certain foreign policy actions in relation to different countries. At the same time, it is necessary to earn maximum international prestige (points) and save the world from nuclear war in eight years (actually moves). But according to the plot, the story took place in the mid-late 1980s, when such a threat on a global scale had passed.

Actually, the Caribbean crisis is dedicated to the strategy, which is called - Caribbean crisis(1С, G5 Software, 2005). According to its plot, on October 27, 1962, the downed U-2 nevertheless became a pretext for war. The United States defeated Cuba, major cities and military bases of the USSR. In response, the Union launched nuclear strikes on America's largest similar facilities and Western Europe, destroying at the same time the ill-fated Turkish base. Survivors fight for scarce natural resources not contaminated by radiation...