In 1945, the most "bloody" war of the 20th century ended, which caused terrible destruction and claimed millions of lives. From our article you can find out what losses suffered by the countries participating in the Second World War.
Total losses
62 countries were involved in the most global military conflict of the 20th century, in 40 of which hostilities were directly conducted. Their losses in World War II are primarily calculated in the number of casualties among the military and civilians, which amounted to about 70 million.
Financial losses (the price of lost property) of all parties to the conflict were significant: about $ 2,600 billion. Countries spent 60% of their income on supporting the army and conducting military operations. The total expenditure reached $ 4 trillion.
World War II led to enormous destruction (about 10 thousand large cities and towns). In the USSR alone, more than 1,700 cities, 70 thousand villages, 32 thousand enterprises were affected by the bombing. The opponents destroyed about 96 thousand Soviet tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, 37 thousand armored vehicles.
Historical facts show that it was the USSR of all the participants in the anti-Hitler coalition that suffered the most serious losses. To clarify the death toll, special measures were taken. In 1959, a population census was carried out (the first after the war). Then the figure of 20 million victims was announced. To date, other specific data are known (26.6 million), announced by the state commission in 2011. They coincided with the figures announced in 1990. Most of the dead were civilians.
Rice. 1. The destroyed city of the Second World War.
Human sacrifice
Unfortunately, the exact number of victims is still unknown. Objective reasons (lack of official documentation) complicate the count, so many continue to be listed as missing.
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Before talking about the dead, let us indicate the number of people called up to serve by states, whose participation in the war was key, and who were injured during the hostilities:
- Germany : 17 893 200 soldiers, of which: 5 435 000 wounded, 4 100 000 were in captivity;
- Japan : 9 058 811: 3 600 000: 1 644 614;
- Italy : 3,100,000: 350,000: 620,000;
- the USSR : 34 476 700: 15 685 593: about 5 million;
- United Kingdom : 5 896 000: 280 thousand: 192 thousand;
- USA : 16 112 566: 671 846: 130 201;
- China : 17 250 521: 7 million: 750 thousand;
- France : 6 million: 280 thousand: 2 673 000
Rice. 2. Wounded soldiers during the Second World War.
For convenience, we present a table of losses of countries in World War II. The number of deaths in it is indicated, taking into account all causes of death, approximately (average figures between the minimum and maximum):
|
Country |
The dead military |
Dead civilians |
|
Germany |
About 5 million |
About 3 million |
|
United Kingdom |
||
|
Australia |
||
|
Yugoslavia |
||
|
Finland |
||
|
Netherlands |
||
|
Bulgaria |
In 1993, after the collapse of the USSR, the first public Soviet statistics of losses during World War II appeared, created under the leadership of General Grigory Krivosheev on the orders of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Here is an article by the St. Petersburg amateur historian Vyacheslav Krasikov about what the Soviet military leader's genius actually calculated.
The topic of Soviet losses in World War II still remains taboo in Russia, primarily due to the unwillingness of society and the state to look at this problem in an adult way. The only "statistical" research on this topic is the work published in 1993 "The classification is removed: Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in wars, hostilities and military conflicts." In 1997, the English-language edition of the study was published, and in 2001, the second edition of "Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in Wars, Military Operations and Military Conflicts" appeared.
If you do not pay attention to the shamefully late appearance in general of statistics on Soviet losses (almost 50 years after the end of the war), the work of Krivosheev, who headed the team of employees of the Ministry of Defense, was a big furor in the scientific world did not produce (of course, for the post-Soviet autochthons, it became a balm for the soul, since it brought Soviet losses on a par with German ones). One of the main sources of data for the team of authors under the leadership of Krivosheev is the General Staff fund in the central archive of the Russian Ministry of Defense (TsAMO), which is still classified, and where access to researchers is closed. That is, it is objectively impossible to verify the accuracy of the work of military archivists. For this reason, in the West, the scientific community, which has been dealing with the problems of losses in World War II for almost 60 years, reacted coolly to the work of Krivosheev and was simply not even noticed.
In Russia, there have been several attempts to criticize Grigory Krivosheev's research - critics reproached the general for methodological inaccuracies, the use of unverified and unsubstantiated data, purely arithmetic inconsistencies, and so on. As an example, you can see. We want to offer our readers not so much another criticism of Krivosheev's work itself, but an attempt to put into circulation new, additional data (for example, party and Komsomol statistics), which will shed more light on the size of the total Soviet losses. Perhaps this will contribute to their further gradual approximation to reality and the development of a normal, civilized scientific discussion in Russia. The article by Vyacheslav Krasikov, which contains all the links, can be downloaded in full. All scans of the books he refers to are
Soviet historiography: how many are unforgotten?
After the war, civilized countries usually comprehend the course of battles, subjecting them to critical discussion in the light of the enemy's documents that have become available. Such work, of course, requires maximum objectivity. Otherwise, it is simply impossible to draw the right conclusions so as not to repeat past mistakes. However, the works that were published in the USSR in the first post-war decade cannot be called historical research even with great stretch. They consisted mainly of clichés on the inevitability of victory under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, the initial superiority of Soviet military art and the genius of Comrade Stalin. Memoirs during the lifetime of the "leader of the peoples" were almost never published, and the little that came out of print looked more like science fiction. In such a situation, the censorship had no serious work to do. Unless to identify those who are not diligent enough in the work of worship. Therefore, this institute was completely unprepared for the surprises and metamorphoses of Khrushchev's tumultuous "thaw".
However, the information explosion of the 50s is not the merit of Nikita Sergeevich alone. The above described blissful idyll was destroyed by banal human ambition.
The fact is that in the West, the process of comprehending the recent hostilities proceeded in a normal, civilized way. The generals talked about their achievements and shared smart thoughts with the public. The Soviet military elite, of course, also wanted to participate in such an interesting and exciting process, but the "Kremlin highlander" did not like this kind of occupation. But after March 1953, this obstacle disappeared. As a result, the Soviet censorship was immediately ordered to publish translations of some works on the Second World War, written by former opponents and allies. In this case, they limited themselves to only cuts of particularly unpleasant pages and editorial comments that helped Soviet readers to "correctly" understand the work of foreigners "prone to falsification". But when, after this, a large number of their own gold-run authors were allowed to publish their memoirs, the process of "comprehension" finally got out of control. And it led to results completely unexpected for its initiators. Many events and figures became public knowledge, which, complementing and clarifying each other, formed a completely different mosaic than the previously existing picture of the war. That is just one threefold increase in the official figure of the total losses of the USSR from 7 to 20 million people.
Of course, the writers themselves understood "what's what" and tried to keep silent about their own failures. But something was reported about such moments in the combat path of the former comrades-in-arms. In this connection, there were also side effects. Such as the public scandal with written complaints against each other in the CPSU Central Committee of Marshals Zhukov and Chuikov, who did not share the victorious laurels. In addition, any seemingly pleasant fact can destroy the myth that has been created over the years in one fell swoop. For example, information flattering for high-ranking "home front workers" that Soviet industry was constantly producing more technology than the German one, inevitably cast doubt on the general's bragging about victories "not by number, but by skill."
Thus, military-historical science has made, on the scale of the Soviet Union, a giant step forward. After that, it became impossible to return to the Stalinist times. Nevertheless, with the coming to power of Brezhnev, they again tried to streamline matters in the field of coverage of the events of the Great Patriotic War.
Thus, by the mid-1980s, the intellectual environment of the Russian historiography of World War II was finally formed. Most of the specialists who are developing this topic today are nourished by its traditions. Of course, it cannot be argued that all historians continue to cling to the stereotypes of "the times of Ochakov and the conquest of the Crimea." Suffice it to recall the "perestroika" euphoria of disclosures that ended in a grandiose scandal in 1991, when, to appease the generals from history, who literally went into "protective" hysteria, the editorial board was purged with a new 10-volume "History of the Great Patriotic War", since its authors wanted to rise to objective analysis carried out according to Western scientific standards. As a result, the “rootless cosmopolitans” were excommunicated from the archives, as well as the corresponding organizational conclusions. The head of the Institute of Military History, General DA Volkogonov, was relieved of his post, and most of his young assistants were dismissed from the army. Control over the work on the preparation of a 10-volume edition was tightened, for which the tried and tested marshals and generals were involved in it. Nevertheless, a fairly large amount of statistical information on this topic during the post-war decades managed to break through the archival doors. Let's try to systematize it.
Official Soviet figures
If we closely follow the history of how the “numerical equivalents” of the victims of World War II changed in the USSR, we will immediately find that these changes were not in the nature of disorderly digital chaos, but obeyed an easily traceable relationship and strict logic.
Until the end of the 80s of the last century, this logic boiled down to the fact that propaganda, albeit very, very slowly, but gradually gave way to science - albeit overly ideologized, but based on archival materials. Therefore, Stalin's 7,000,000 total military losses of the USSR under Khrushchev turned into 20,000,000, under Brezhnev in "more than 20,000,000", and under Gorbachev in "more than 27,000,000". The figures of the losses of the Armed Forces danced in the same direction. As a result, already in the early 60s, it was officially recognized that more than 10,000,000 soldiers died at the front alone (not counting those who did not return from captivity). In the 70s of the last century, the figure “more than 10,000,000 killed at the front” (not counting those killed in captivity) became generally accepted. She was quoted in the most authoritative publications of the time. As an example, it is enough to recall the article by the corresponding member of the Academy of Medical Sciences, Colonel-General of the Medical Service E.I. ".
By the way, in the same year another "landmark" book was presented to the readers' judgment - "The Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945", where the numbers of army losses and Red Army soldiers killed in captivity were published. For example, in German concentration camps alone, up to 7 million civilians (?) And up to 4 million Red Army prisoners perished, which gives a total of up to 14 million Red Army soldiers (10 million at the front and 4 million in captivity). Here, apparently, it is also appropriate to remind that at that time in the USSR each such figure was official-state - it necessarily passed through the strictest censorship "sieve" - it was repeatedly checked and often reproduced in various reference and information publications.
In principle, in the USSR in the 70s, in fact, it was recognized that the losses of the army who died at the front and in captivity in 1941-1945 amounted to approximately 16,000,000 - 17,000,000 people. True, the statistics were published in a somewhat veiled form.
Here in the 1st volume of the Soviet Military Encyclopedia (article "Combat losses") it says: " So, if in the 1st world war about 10 million people were killed and died from wounds, then in the 2nd world war only the losses of those killed on the fronts amounted to 27 million people.". These are precisely army losses, since the total number of those killed in World War II in the same publication is determined at 50 million people.
If we subtract from these 27,000,000 losses of the Armed Forces of all participants in the Second World War, except for the USSR, then the remainder will be about 16-17 million. It is these figures that are the number of soldiers killed (at the front and in captivity) recognized in the USSR. It was then possible to count “everyone except the USSR” using Boris Urlanis’s book “Wars and the Population of Europe”, which was first published in the Union in 1960. Now it is easy to find it on the Internet under the title "History of War Loss".
All of the above statistics on army losses were repeatedly reproduced in the USSR until the end of the 80s. But in 1990, the Russian General Staff published the results of its own new "revised" estimates of irrecoverable army losses. Surprisingly, they somehow mysteriously turned out not more than the previous "stagnant" ones, but less. Moreover, less cool - almost in 2 times... Specifically - 8 668 400 people. The answer to the puzzle is simple - during the period of Gorbachev's perestroika, history was again politicized to the limit, turning into a propaganda tool. And the "big stripes" from the Ministry of Defense decided to improve the "patriotic" statistics in this manner "on the sly".
Therefore, no explanation for such a strange arithmetic metamorphosis followed. On the contrary, soon these 8,668,400 (again, without explanation) were "detailed" in the reference book "The secrecy label has been removed", which was then supplemented and republished. And what is most striking - the Soviet figures were instantly forgotten - they simply quietly disappeared from the books published under the patronage of the state. But the question to the logical absurdity of such a situation remains:
It turns out that in the USSR, for 3 decades, they tried to "blacken" one of their most important accomplishments - the victory over Nazi Germany - they pretended that they fought worse than they actually did and published for this false data on army losses, overestimated by two times.
And the real "nice" statistics were kept under the heading "secret" ...
A secrecy stamp that eats the dead
Analyzing all the amazing data of Krivosheev's "research", you can write several solid monographs. Various authors are most often carried away by examples of parsing the results of individual operations. These are, of course, good illustrative illustrations... However, they question only partial figures - against the background of general losses, they are not very large.
Krivosheev hides the bulk of his losses among the “re-conscripted”. In the "Vulture of secrecy" he indicates their number as "more than 2 million", and in "Russia in the wars" he generally throws out an indication of the number of this category of conscripts from the text of the book. He simply writes that the total number of mobilized people is 34,476,700 - excluding those who have been recruited again. The exact number of re-conscripts - 2,237,000 people - was named by Krivosheev in only one article published in a small-circulation collection sixteen years ago.
Who are “re-called”? This, for example, when a person was seriously wounded in 1941 and after a long treatment was "written off" from the army "for health." But, when in the second half of the war, human resources were already coming to an end, the medical requirements were revised and lowered. As a result, the man was again recognized as fit for service and drafted into the army. And in 1944 he was killed. Thus, Krivosheev takes this person into account in the mobilized only once. But from the ranks of the army he "takes out" twice - first as a disabled person, and then as a killed person. Ultimately, it turns out that one of the "withdrawn" is hiding from the account in the amount of total irrecoverable losses.
Another example. The man was mobilized, but soon transferred to the NKVD troops. A few months later, this part of the NKVD was transferred back to the Red Army (for example, on the Leningrad Front in 1942, an entire division was transferred from the NKVD to the Red Army at once - they just changed the number). But Krivosheev takes this soldier into account in the initial transfer from the army to the NKVD, but does not notice the return transfer from the NKVD to the Red Army (since those recruited from him are excluded from the list of mobilized). Therefore, it turns out that the person is again "hidden" - in the army of the post-war period, in fact, is, and Krivosheev is not taken into account.
Another example. The man was mobilized, but in 1941 he disappeared without a trace - he remained surrounded and "got accustomed" to the civilian population. In 1943, this territory was liberated, and the "Primak" was again drafted into the army. However, in 1944 his leg was blown off. As a result, disability and write-off "clean". Krivosheev subtracts this person from 34,476,700 as many as three times - first as a missing person, then among 939,700, called up in the former occupied territory of the encircled people, and also as a disabled person. It turns out that it "hides" two losses.
It can take a long time to list all the tricks used in the reference book to "improve" statistics. But it is much more productive to recalculate the numbers that Krivosheev proposes as the base ones ourselves. But to count it in normal logic - without "patriotic" craftiness. To do this, let us again turn to the statistics, which are indicated by the general in the already mentioned small-circulation collection of losses.
Then we get:
4.826.900 - the number of the Red Army and the RKKF on June 22, 1941.
31.812.200 - The number of mobilized (together with re-called) for the entire war.
In total - 36,639,100 people.
After the end of hostilities in Europe (at the beginning of June 1945), there were 12,839,800 people in the Red Army and the RKKF (along with the wounded in hospitals). From here you can find out total losses: 36.639.100 – 12.839.800 = 23.799.300
Next, let's count those who, for various reasons, left the Armed Forces of the USSR alive, but not at the front:
3.798.200 - charged for health reasons.
3.614.600 - transferred to industry, MPVO and VOKHR.
1.174.600 - transferred to the NKVD.
250.400 - Transferred to the Allied Army.
206,000 - expelled as unreliable.
436.600 - convicted and sent to places of detention.
212.400 - no deserters found.
Total - 9.692.800
Let's subtract these "living" from the total losses and thus find out how many people died at the front and in captivity, and were also released from captivity in last weeks war.
23.799.300 – 9.692.800 = 14.106.500
To establish the final number of demographic losses incurred by the Armed Forces, it is necessary to subtract from 14,106,500 those who returned from captivity, but did not get into the army for the second time. With a similar purpose, Krivosheev deducts 1,836,000 people registered by the repatriation authorities. This is another trick. In the collection "War and Society", prepared by the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Russian History, an article by V. N. Zemskov, "Repatriation of Displaced Soviet Citizens," is published, which reveals in detail all the constituent figures of prisoners of war that are of interest to us.
It turns out that 286,299 prisoners were released on the territory of the USSR even before the end of 1944. Of these, 228,068 people were re-mobilized into the army. And in 1944-1945 (during the period of hostilities outside the USSR), 659,190 people were released and mobilized into the army. Simply put, they have already been taken into account among the re-called.
That is, 887.258 (228.068 + 659.190) former prisoners at the beginning of June 1945 were among the 12.839.800 souls who served in the Red Army and the RKKF. Consequently, from 14.106.500 it is necessary to deduct not 1.8 million, but approximately 950.000, freed from captivity, but not mobilized a second time into the army during the war.
As a result, we get no less than 13,150,000 servicemen of the Red Army and the Red Army, who died in 1941-1945 at the front, were taken prisoner and were among the "defectors". However, this is not all. Krivosheev also "hides" the losses (killed, died in captivity and defectors) among those written off for health reasons. Here, "The classification has been removed" p. 136 (or "Russia in the wars ..." p. 243). In the figure of 3.798.158 discharged disabled people, he also takes into account those who were sent on leave for injury. In other words, people did not leave the army - in fact, they were in its ranks, and the reference book excludes them and thus “hides” at least several hundred thousand killed.
That is, if we proceed from the figures that Krivosheev himself proposes as the initial basis for calculations, but to handle them without generals' tampering, then we will get not 8,668,400 dead at the front, in captivity and "defectors", but about 13,500. 000.
Through the prism of party statistics
However, the data on the number of those mobilized in 1941-1945, which Krivosheev declared as the "base" figures for calculating losses, also seem to be underestimated. A similar conclusion suggests itself if you check the directory with information from the official statistics of the CPSU (b) and the Komsomol. These calculations are much more accurate than army reports, since in the Red Army people often did not even have documents and even posthumous medallions (the Interpreter's blog partially touched upon the related topic of tokens in the Red Army). And the Communists and Komsomol members were taken into account incomparably better. Each of them necessarily had a party card in hand, regularly participated in party meetings, the minutes of which (indicating the number of the "cell") were sent to Moscow.
These data went separately from the army data - along a parallel party line. And this figure in the Khrushchev-Brezhnev USSR was published much more willingly - the censorship treated it more leniently - as indicators of ideological victories, where even losses were perceived as proof of the unity of society and the people's devotion to the socialist system.
The essence of the calculation boils down to the fact that the losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in terms of the Komsomol and Communists are known quite accurately. In total, by the beginning of the war in the USSR, there were a little less than 4,000,000 members of the CPSU (b). Of these, 563,000 were in the Armed Forces. During the war years, 5,319,297 people joined the party. And immediately after the end of hostilities, about 5,500,000 people consisted of its ranks. Of which 3,324,000 served in the Armed Forces.
That is, the total losses of the members of the CPSU (b) amounted to more than 3,800,000 people. Of which about 3,000,000 died at the front in the ranks of the Armed Forces. In total, about 6,900,000 communists passed through the Armed Forces of the USSR in 1941-1945 (out of 9,300,000 who were in the party during the same period of time). This figure consists of 3,000,000 dead at the front, 3,324,000 who were in the Armed Forces immediately after the end of hostilities in Europe, as well as about 600,000 disabled people who were discharged from the Armed Forces in 1941-1945.
It is very useful here to pay attention to the ratio of the killed and the disabled 3,000,000 to 600,000 = 5: 1. And for Krivosheev 8.668.400 to 3.798.000 = 2.3: 1. This is a very eloquent fact. We repeat once again that Party members were taken into account incomparably more carefully than non-Party members. They were required to be issued a party card, in each unit (up to the company level) its own party cell was organized, which took into account each newly arrived party member. Therefore, the party statistics were much more accurate than the usual army statistics. And the difference in this very accuracy is clearly illustrated by the ratio between the killed and the disabled among non-party people and communists in official Soviet figures and among Krivosheev.
Now let's move on to the Komsomol members. As of June 1941, there were 1,926,000 people in the Komsomol from the Red Army and the RKKF. Still, at least several tens of thousands of people were registered in the Komsomol organizations of the NKVD troops. Therefore, it can be assumed that in total in the Armed Forces of the USSR by the beginning of the war there were about 2,000,000 members of the Komsomol.
More than 3,500,000 Komsomol members were drafted into the Armed Forces during the war years. In the Armed Forces themselves, over 5,000,000 people were admitted to the ranks of the Komsomol during the war years.
That is, in total, more than 10,500,000 people passed through the Komsomol in the Armed Forces in 1941-1945. Of these, 1,769,458 people entered the CPSU (b). Thus, it turns out that in total no less than 15.600.000 Communists and Komsomol members passed through the Armed Forces in 1941-1945 (about 6.900.000 Communists + more than 10.500.000 Komsomol members - 1.769.458 Komsomol members who joined the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks).
This is approximately 43% of the 36,639,100 people who, according to Krivosheev, passed through the Armed Forces during the war years. However, the official Soviet statistics of the 60-80s do not confirm this ratio. It says that at the beginning of January 1942, there were 1,750,000 Komsomol members and 1,234,373 Communists in the Armed Forces. This is a little more than 25% of the total armed forces, which numbered about 11.5 million people (together with the wounded who were being treated).
Even twelve months later, the share of Communists and Komsomol members was no more than 33%. At the beginning of January 1943, there were 1,938,327 Communists and 2,200,200 Komsomol members in the Armed Forces. That is, 1,938,327 + 2,200,000 = 4,150,000 Communists and Komsomol members from the Armed Forces, which had approximately 13,000,000 people.
13,000,000, since Krivosheev himself claims that since 1943 the USSR has supported the army at the level of 11,500,000 people (plus about 1,500,000 in hospitals). In mid-1943, the share of communists and non-party people did not increase very noticeably, reaching only 36% in July. At the beginning of January 1944, there were 2,702,566 communists and approximately 2,400,000 Komsomol members in the Armed Forces. I have not yet found a more accurate figure, but in December 1943 it was exactly 2,400,000 - the highest number in the entire war. That is, in January 1943 there could be no more. It turns out - 2.702.566 + 2.400.000 = approximately 5.100.000 Communists and Komsomol members from the army of 13.000.000 people - about 40%.
At the beginning of January 1945, there were 3,030,758 Communists and 2,202,945 Komsomol members in the Armed Forces. That is, at the beginning of 1945, the share of communists and Komsomol members (3,030,758 + 2,202,945) of the army was about 13,000,000 people, again, about 40%. It is also pertinent to recall here that the bulk of the losses of the Red Army and the RKKF (respectively, the number of those mobilized to replace them) fell on the first year and a half of the war, when the share of the CPSU (b) and the Komsomol was less than 33%. That is, it turns out that the average share of communists and Komsomol members in the Armed Forces during the war was no more than 35%. In other words, if we take as a basis the total number of Communists and Komsomol members (15,600,000), then the number of people who passed through the Armed Forces of the USSR in 1941-1945 will be approximately 44,000,000. And not 36.639.100, as indicated by Krivosheev. The total losses will increase accordingly.
By the way, the total losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR for 1941-1945 can also be roughly calculated if we start from the official Soviet data on losses among communists and Komsomol members, published in the 60-80s. They say that the army organizations of the CPSU (b) lost about 3,000,000 people. And the Komsomol organization is about 4,000,000 people. In other words, 35% of the army lost 7,000,000. Consequently, the entire Armed Forces lost about 19,000,000 - 20,000,000 souls (killed at the front, died in captivity and became "defectors").
Losses in 1941
Analyzing the dynamics of the number of Communists and Komsomol members in the Armed Forces, one can quite clearly calculate the Soviet front-line losses by the years of the war. They are also at least two times (more often more than two) higher than the data published in the Krivosheevsky reference book.
For example, Krivosheev reports that in June-December 1941, the Red Army irrevocably lost (killed, missing, dead from wounds and diseases) 3,137,673 people. This figure is easy to verify. The encyclopedia "The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" reports that by June 1941 there were 563,000 communists in the army and navy. It is further stated that in the first six months of the war, over 500,000 members of the CPSU (b) were killed. And that on January 1, 1942, there were 1,234,373 party members in the army and navy.
How do you know what meaning is hidden under "above"? The twelfth volume of "History of the Second World War 1939-1945" states that in the first six months of the war, more than 1,100,000 communists joined the army and naval organizations from the "civilian". It turns out: 563 (on June 22) + "more" 1,100,000 (mobilized) = "more" 1.663,000 communists.
Further. In the sixth volume "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945" from the plate "Numerical growth of the party" you can find out that military party organizations admitted 145,870 people to their ranks in July-December 1941.
It turns out: "More" 1.663.000 + 145.870 = "more" 1.808.870 communists were involved in the Red Army in June-December 1941. Now we subtract from this amount the amount that was on January 1, 1942:
"More" 1.808.870 - 1.234.373 = "more" 574.497
It was we who received the irrecoverable losses of the CPSU (b) - killed, prisoners, missing.
Now let's decide on the Komsomol members. From the "Soviet Military Encyclopedia" you can learn that in the army and navy at the beginning of the war there were 1,926,000 members of the Komsomol. The encyclopedia "The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" reports that in the first six months of the war, over 2,000,000 Komsomol members were drafted into the army and navy and indicates that, in addition, 207,000 people were admitted to the Komsomol already in the ranks of the Red Army and the RKKF. In the same place we see that by the end of 1941 the Komsomol organizations in the Armed Forces numbered 1,750,000 people.
We calculate - 1.926.000 + "over" 2.000.000 + 207.000 = "over" 4.133.000. This is the total number of Komsomol members who passed through the Armed Forces in 1941. Now you can find out the irrecoverable losses. From the total, we subtract what was available on January 1, 1942: "Over" 4.133.000 - 1.750.000 = "Over" 2.383.000.
We got the killed, missing, prisoners.
However, here the figure should be slightly reduced - by the number of those who left the Komsomol by age. That is, about one tenth of those remaining in the ranks. It is also necessary to take away the Komsomol members who joined the CPSU (b) - about 70,000 people. Thus, according to a very cautious estimate, the irrecoverable losses of the Red Army and the RKKF among the Communists and Komsomol members amounted to no less than 2,500,000 souls. And Krivosheev has the figure 3.137.673 in this column. Of course, together with non-party people.
3.137.673 - 2.500.000 = 637.673 - this remains with the non-partisans.
How many non-party members were mobilized in 1941? Krivosheev writes that by the beginning of the war there were 4,826,907 souls in the Red Army and the Navy. In addition, at the training camp in the ranks of the Red Army at that time there were another 805,264 people. It turns out - 4.826.907 + 805.264 = 5.632.171 people by June 22, 1941.
How many people were mobilized in June - December 1941? We find the answer in an article by General Gradoselsky, published in the Military Historical Journal. From an analysis of the figures given there, we can conclude that during the two mobilizations of 1941, more than 14,000,000 people came to the Red Army and the Red Army Corps (excluding the militias). And in total, 5,632,171 + more than 14,000,000 = approximately 20,000,000 people were involved in the army in 1941. This means that from 20,000,000 we subtract "more" 1,808,870 communists and about 4,000,000 Komsomol members. We get about 14,000,000 non-party people.
And, if you look at these figures through the statistics of losses of the Krivosheevsky directory, it turns out that 6,000,000 communists and Komsomol members irrevocably lost 2,500,000 people. And 14,000,000 non-party 637,673 people ...
Simply put, the losses of non-party people are underestimated at least six times. And the total irrecoverable losses of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1941 should not amount to 3.137.673, but 6-7 million. This is according to the most minimal estimates. Most likely more.
In this regard, it is useful to recall that the German Armed Forces in 1941 lost about 300,000 people in killed and missing on the Eastern Front. That is, for each of their soldiers, the Germans took at least 20 souls from the Soviet side. Most likely, more - up to 25. This is about the same ratio with which the European armies of the XIX-XX centuries beat African savages in the colonial wars.
The difference in the information that the governments gave to their peoples looks roughly the same. Hitler, in one of his last public appearances in March 1945, announced that Germany had lost 6,000,000 men in the war. Now historians believe that this did not differ much from reality, determining the final result of 6,500,000-7,000,000 dead at the front and in the rear. Stalin in 1946 said that Soviet losses amounted to about 7,000,000 lives. Over the next half century, the number of human losses in the USSR increased to 27,000,000. And there is a strong suspicion that this is not the limit.
“According to the results of calculations, during the years of the Great Patriotic War (including the campaign for Far East against Japan in 1945) the total irrecoverable demographic losses (killed, missing, taken prisoner and did not return from it, died from wounds, diseases and as a result of accidents) of the Soviet Armed Forces, together with the Border and Internal Troops, amounted to 8 million. 668 thousand 400 people ". Ratio with Germany and its allies 1: 1.3
Every time the next anniversary of the Great Victory approaches, the myth of our unthinkable losses is activated.
Every time, knowledgeable and authoritative people with numbers in their hands convincingly prove that this myth is an ideological weapon in the information and psychological war against Russia, that it is a means of demoralizing our people. And for each new anniversary, a new generation is growing up, which should hear a sober voice, to some extent neutralizing the efforts of manipulators.
WAR OF NUMBERS
Back in 2005, literally on the eve of the 60th anniversary of Victory, President of the Academy of Military Sciences, General of the Army Makhmut Gareev, who in 1988 headed the Defense Ministry's commission on assessing losses during the war, was invited to Vladimir Pozner's TV show "Vremena". Vladimir Pozner said: "This is an amazing thing - we still do not know exactly how many of our fighters, soldiers and officers died in this war."
And this despite the fact that in 1966-1968, the calculation of casualties in the Great Patriotic War was carried out by a commission of the General Staff, headed by General of the Army Sergei Shtemenko. Then, in 1988-1993, a team of military historians was involved in the mixing and verification of the materials of all previous commissions.
The results of this fundamental study of the losses of personnel and military equipment of the Soviet Armed Forces in hostilities for the period from 1918 to 1989 were published in the book “The secrecy stamp has been removed. Losses of the Armed Forces in Wars, Military Operations and Military Conflicts ”.
This book says: “According to the results of calculations, during the years of the Great Patriotic War (including the campaign in the Far East against Japan in 1945), the total irrecoverable demographic losses (killed, disappeared, were captured and did not return from it , died from wounds, diseases and as a result of accidents) of the Soviet Armed Forces together with the Border and Internal Troops amounted to 8 million 668 thousand 400 people. " The casualty ratio of Germany and its allies on the Eastern Front was 1: 1.3 in favor of our enemy.
In the same telecast, a well-known front-line writer entered the conversation: "Stalin did everything to lose the war ... The Germans lost a total of 12.5 million people, and we lost 32 million in one place, in one war."
There are people who, in their "truth", bring the scale of Soviet losses to absurd and absurd values. The most fantastic figures are given by the writer and historian Boris Sokolov, who estimated the total number of deaths in the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1941-1945 at 26.4 million people with German losses in Soviet-German front 2.6 million (that is, with a loss ratio of 10: 1). And all those killed in the Great Patriotic War Soviet people he counted 46 million.
His calculations are absurd: for all the years of the war, 34.5 million people were mobilized (taking into account the pre-war number of servicemen), of which about 27 million people were direct participants in the war. After the end of the war, the Soviet Army numbered about 13 million. Of the 27 million participants in the war, 26.4 million could not have died.
They are trying to convince us that "we filled the Germans with the corpses of our own soldiers."
LOSSES, COMBAT, NON-RETURNABLE AND OFFICIAL
Irrecoverable combat losses include those killed on the battlefield, who died from wounds during sanitary evacuation and in hospitals. These losses amounted to 6329.6 thousand people. Of these, 5226.8 thousand were killed and died of wounds during the stages of sanitary evacuation and 1102.8 thousand people died from wounds in hospitals.
Irrecoverable losses also include missing persons and prisoners. There were 3396.4 thousand of them. In addition, in the first months of the war there were significant losses, the nature of which was not documented (information about them was collected later, including from German archives). They amounted to 1162.6 thousand people.
The number of irrecoverable losses also includes non-combat losses - those who died from illness in hospitals, who died as a result of emergencies, who were shot according to the sentences of military tribunals. These losses amounted to 555.5 thousand people.
The sum of all these losses during the war amounted to 11 444.1 thousand people. From this number, 939.7 thousand servicemen were excluded, who were recorded as missing at the beginning of the war, but were recruited into the army in the territory liberated from the occupation for the second time, as well as 1836 thousand former servicemen who returned from captivity after the end of the war, - a total of 2,775, 7 thousand people.
Thus, the actual number of irrecoverable (demographic) losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR amounted to 8668.4 thousand people.
Of course, these are not final figures. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation creates electronic base data, it is constantly updated. In January 2010, Major General Alexander Kirilin, head of the RF Ministry of Defense Department for the perpetuation of the memory of those killed in the defense of the Fatherland, told the press that official data on the losses of our country in the Great Patriotic War would be made public by the 65th anniversary of the Great Victory. The general confirmed that at present the Ministry of Defense estimates the losses of servicemen of the Armed Forces in 1941-1945 at 8.86 million people. He said: "By the 65th anniversary of the Great Victory, we will finally come to the official figure that will be fixed in the government's normative document and communicated to the entire population of the country in order to stop speculation on the numbers of losses."
The works of the outstanding Russian demographer Leonid Rybakovsky, in particular, one of his last publications - "Human losses of the USSR and Russia in the Great Patriotic War", contain information close to real information about the losses.
Objective studies are also appearing outside the borders of Russia. For example, the well-known demographer Sadretdin Maksudov, who works at Harvard University and studied the losses of the Red Army, estimated the irrecoverable losses at 7.8 million people, which is 870 thousand less than in the book "The seal of secrecy has been removed." He explains this discrepancy by the fact that the Russian authors did not exclude from the number of losses those servicemen who died a "natural" death (this is 250-300 thousand people). In addition, they overestimated the death toll of Soviet prisoners of war. Of these, according to Maksudov, it is necessary to subtract the "naturally" dead (about 100 thousand), as well as those who remained after the war in the West (200 thousand) or returned to their homeland, bypassing the official channels of repatriation (about 280 thousand people ). Maksudov published his results in Russian in the article "On the front-line losses of the Soviet Army during the Second World War."
PRICE OF EUROPE'S SECOND COMING TO RUSSIA
In 1998, a joint work of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation “The Great Patriotic War. 1941 - 1945 "in 4 volumes. It says: "Irrecoverable human losses of the armed forces of Germany on the Eastern Front are equal to 7181.1 thousand troops, and together with the allies ... - 8649.3 thousand." If we count according to the same methodology - taking into account prisoners of war - then "the irrecoverable losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR ... exceed the losses of the enemy by 1.3 times."
This is the most reliable loss ratio at the moment. Not 10: 1, like other “seekers of truth”, but 1.3: 1. Not ten times more, but 30% more.
The main losses of the Red Army were at the first stage of the war: in 1941, that is, over 6 months of the war, 27.8% of the total number of deaths during the entire war accounted for. And for 5 months of 1945, which accounted for several large operations, - 7.5% of the total number of deaths.
Also, the main losses in the form of prisoners fell on the beginning of the war. According to German data, from June 22, 1941 to January 10, 1942, the number of Soviet prisoners of war was 3.9 million. At the Nuremberg trials, a document was read out from the Alfred Rosenberg apparatus, which reported that out of 3.9 million Soviet prisoners of war by the beginning of 1942 years remained in the camps of 1.1 million.
The German army was objectively much stronger at the first stage.
Yes, and the numerical advantage at first was on the side of Germany. On June 22, 1941, the Wehrmacht and the SS troops deployed a fully mobilized and combat experience army of 5.5 million people against the USSR. The Red Army had 2.9 million people in the western districts, a substantial part of whom had not yet completed mobilization and had not completed training.
It should also not be forgotten that, in addition to the Wehrmacht and the SS troops, 29 divisions and 16 brigades of Germany's allies - Finland, Hungary and Romania - immediately joined the war against the USSR. On June 22, their soldiers made up 20% of the invading army. Then they were joined by Italian and Slovak troops, and by the end of July 1941, the troops of the German satellites totaled about 30% of the invasion forces.
In fact, Europe's invasion of Russia (in the form of the USSR) took place, in many ways similar to the invasion of Napoleon. A direct analogy was drawn between these two invasions (Hitler even granted the "Legion of French Volunteers" the honorable right to start a battle on the Borodino field; however, with one major shelling, this legion immediately lost 75% of its personnel). Divisions of the Spaniards and Italians, divisions "Netherlands", "Landstorm of the Netherlands" and "Nordland", divisions "Langermack", "Wallonia" and "Charlemagne", division of Czech volunteers "Bohemia and Moravia", division of Albanians "Skanderberg" , as well as separate battalions of the Belgians, Dutch, Norwegians, Danes.
Suffice it to say that in the battles with the Red Army on the territory of the USSR, the Romanian army lost more than 600 thousand soldiers and officers in killed, wounded and captured. Hungary fought with the USSR from June 27, 1941 to April 12, 1945, when the entire territory was already occupied by Soviet troops. On the Eastern Front, the Hungarian troops numbered up to 205 thousand bayonets. The intensity of their participation in the battles is evidenced by the fact that in January 1942, in the battles near Voronezh, the Hungarians lost 148 thousand people killed, wounded and captured.
Finland for the war with the USSR mobilized 560 thousand people, 80% of the conscript contingent. This army was the most trained, well-armed and staunch among the allies of Germany. From June 25, 1941 to July 25, 1944, the Finns pinned down large forces of the Red Army in Karelia. The Croatian legion was small in number, but had a combat-ready fighter squadron, the pilots of which shot down (according to their reports) 259 Soviet aircraft, losing 23 of their aircraft.
Slovaks were different from all these allies of Hitler. Of the 36 thousand Slovak soldiers who fought on the Eastern Front, less than 3 thousand were killed, and more than 27 thousand soldiers and officers surrendered, many of whom joined the Czechoslovak army corps formed in the USSR. At the time of the start of the Slovak National Uprising in August 1944, all Slovak military aircraft flew to the Lviv airfield.
In general, according to German data, 230 thousand people were killed and died on the Eastern Front as part of the foreign formations of the Wehrmacht and the SS, and in the army of the satellite countries - 959 thousand people - only about 1.2 million soldiers and officers. According to a certificate from the USSR Ministry of Defense (1988), the irrecoverable losses of the armed forces of the countries officially at war with the USSR amounted to 1 million people. In addition to the Germans, among the prisoners of war taken by the Red Army, there were 1.1 million citizens of European countries. For example, there were 23 thousand French, 70 Czechoslovakians, 60.3 Poles, and 22 Yugoslavs.
Perhaps even more important is the fact that by the beginning of the war against the USSR, Germany occupied or actually brought under control the entire continental Europe. The territory of 3 million square meters was united by common power and purpose. km and a population of about 290 million people. As the English historian writes, "Europe has become an economic whole." All this potential was thrown into the war against the USSR, whose potential by formal economic standards was about 4 times less (and decreased by about half in the first six months of the war).
At the same time, Germany received through intermediaries also significant assistance from the United States and Latin America... Europe on a huge scale supplied German industry with labor, which made it possible to carry out an unprecedented military mobilization of the Germans - 21.1 million people. During the war, about 14 million foreign workers were employed on the German economy. On May 31, 1944, there were 7.7 million foreign workers in the German war industry (30%). Military orders from Germany were carried out by all large, technically advanced enterprises in Europe. Suffice it to say that the Skoda factories alone, in the year before the attack on Poland, produced as much war production as the entire British war industry. June 22, 1941 burst into the USSR war machine with an unprecedented amount of equipment and ammunition in history.
The Red Army, only recently reformed on a modern basis and just beginning to receive and master modern weapons, had in front of itself a powerful adversary of a completely new type, which was not found either in the First World War or in Civil wars, not even in the Finnish war. However, as events have shown, the Red Army had an exceptionally high ability to train. She showed a rare stamina in the most difficult conditions and quickly strengthened. The military strategy and tactics of the high command and officers were creative and had a high systemic quality. Therefore, at the final stage of the war, the losses of the German army were 1.4 times greater than those of the Soviet Armed Forces.
Who fought in numbers, and who - by skill. The monstrous truth about the losses of the USSR in World War II Sokolov Boris Vadimovich
The ratio of irrecoverable losses of the Soviet Union and Germany in World War II
The true size of the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces perished, including those who died in captivity, according to our estimate, may be 26.9 million people. This is about 10.3 times higher than the losses of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front (2.6 million dead). The Hungarian army, which fought on Hitler's side, lost about 160 thousand dead and killed, including about 55 thousand who died in captivity. The losses of another ally of Germany, Finland, amounted to about 61 thousand killed and deceased, including 403 people died in Soviet captivity and about 1 thousand people died in battles against the Wehrmacht. The Romanian army lost in battles against the Red Army about 165 thousand killed and deceased, including 71 585 killed, 309 533 missing, 243 622 wounded and 54 612 dead in captivity. 217,385 Romanians and Moldovans returned from captivity. Thus, of the number of missing persons, 37,536 people must be attributed to those killed. If we assume that about 10% of the wounded died, then the total losses of the Romanian army in the battles with the Red Army will amount to about 188.1 thousand dead. In the battles against Germany and its allies, the Romanian army lost 21,735 killed, 58,443 missing and 90,344 wounded. Assuming that the mortality rate among the wounded was 10%, the number of deaths from wounds can be estimated at 9 thousand people. 36,621 Romanian soldiers and officers returned from German and Hungarian captivity. Thus, the total number of killed and deceased in captivity from the number of missing Romanian military personnel can be estimated at 21,824 people. Thus, in the struggle against Germany and Hungary, the Romanian army lost about 52.6 thousand dead. The Italian army lost about 72 thousand people in battles against the Red Army, of which about 28 thousand died in Soviet captivity - more than half of the approximately 49 thousand prisoners. Finally, the army of Slovakia lost 1.9 thousand dead in battles against the Red Army and Soviet partisans, of which about 300 people died in captivity. On the side of the USSR, the Bulgarian army fought against Germany, losing about 10 thousand dead. Two armies of the Polish Army, formed in the USSR, lost 27.5 thousand dead and missing, and czechoslovak corps, who also fought on the side of the Red Army, - 4 thousand dead. The total casualties on the Soviet side can be estimated at 27.1 million servicemen, and on the German side at 2.9 million, which gives a ratio of 9.1-9.3: 1. V Soviet-Finnish war In 1939-1940, the ratio of casualties to the dead was 7.0: 1, not in favor of the Red Army (we estimate the Soviet casualties at 164.3 thousand people, and the Finnish ones at 23.5 thousand people). It can be assumed that this ratio was approximately the same in 1941-1944. Then, in battles with Finnish troops, the Red Army could lose up to 417 thousand killed and died from wounds. It should also be taken into account that the irretrievable losses of the Red Army in the war with Japan amounted to 12 thousand people. If we accept that in battles with the rest of the German allies, the losses of the Red Army were approximately equal to the losses of the enemy, then in these battles it could lose up to 284 thousand people. And in the battles against the Wehrmacht, the losses of the Red Army were supposed to be about 22.2 million killed and died from wounds against about 2.1 million killed and died on the German side. This gives a loss ratio of 10.6: 1.
According to Russian search engines, for one found corpse of a Wehrmacht soldier, on average, there are ten corpses of Red Army soldiers. This ratio is almost equal to our estimate of the ratio of the losses of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front.
It is interesting to trace at least an approximate ratio of losses of the parties over the years of the war. Using the ratio established above between the number of Soviet servicemen killed and killed in battles and based on the data given in the book by E.I. Smirnov, the number of Soviet soldiers killed by years can be distributed as follows: 1941 - 2.2 million, 1942 - 8 million, 1943 - 6.4 million, 1944 - 6.4 million, 1945 - 2.5 million It should also be borne in mind that about 0.9 million Red Army soldiers who were listed in irrecoverable losses, but later discovered in the liberated territory and recruited again, accounted for mainly in 1941-1942. Due to this, we reduce the losses of those killed in 1941 by 0.6 million, and in 1942 - by 0.3 million people (in proportion to the number of prisoners) and with the addition of prisoners we get the total irrecoverable losses of the Red Army by years: 1941 - 5, 5 million, 1942 - 7.153 million, 1943 - 6.965 million, 1944 - 6.547 million, 1945 - 2.534 million. For comparison, let's take the irrecoverable losses of the Wehrmacht ground forces by years, based on the data of B. Müller-Gillebrand. At the same time, we subtracted the losses incurred outside the Eastern Front from the total figures, roughly spreading them over the years. The following picture turned out for the Eastern Front (the figure of the total irrecoverable losses of ground forces for the year is given in brackets): 1941 (from June) - 301 thousand (307 thousand), 1942 - 519 thousand (538 thousand), 1943 - 668 thousand (793 thousand), 1944 (for this year, losses in December were taken equal to January) - 1129 thousand (1629 thousand), 1945 (before May 1) - 550 thousand (1250 thousand) ... The ratio in all cases is obtained in favor of the Wehrmacht: 1941 - 18.1: 1, 1942 - 13.7: 1, 1943 - 10.4: 1, 1944 - 5.8: 1, 1945 - 4, 6: 1. These ratios should be close to the true ratios of the irrecoverable losses of the ground forces of the USSR and Germany on the Soviet-German front, since the losses of the ground army amounted to the lion's share of all Soviet military losses and much larger than that of the Wehrmacht, and the German aviation and navy had the main irrecoverable losses in during the war, they were carried outside the Eastern Front. As for the losses of the German allies in the East, the underestimation of which somewhat worsens the indicators of the Red Army, it should be borne in mind that in the fight against them the Red Army suffered relatively much smaller losses than in the fight against the Wehrmacht, that the German allies did not actively act in all periods war and suffered the greatest losses as prisoners in the framework of the general surrender (Romania and Hungary). In addition, on the Soviet side, the losses of the Polish, Czechoslovak, Romanian and Bulgarian units operating together with the Red Army were not taken into account. So, in general, the relationships we have identified should be fairly objective. They show that the improvement in the ratio of irrecoverable losses for the Red Army has been happening only since 1944, when the Allies landed in the West and Lend-Lease assistance has already given the maximum effect in terms of both direct supplies of weapons and equipment, and the deployment of Soviet military production. The Wehrmacht was forced to throw reserves to the West and could not, as in 1943, unleash active operations in the East. In addition, the heavy losses of experienced soldiers and officers affected. Nevertheless, until the end of the war, the ratio of losses remained unfavorable for the Red Army due to its inherent vices (stereotyped, contempt for human life, inept use of weapons and equipment, lack of continuity of experience due to huge losses and inept use of marching reinforcements, etc.). ).
A particularly unfavorable ratio of casualties for the Red Army was in the period from December 1941 to April 1942, when the Red Army carried out its first large-scale counteroffensive. For example, the 323rd Infantry Division of the 10th Army of the Western Front alone lost 4138 people in three days of fighting, from 17 to 19 December 1941, including 1696 dead and missing. This gives an average daily level of casualties of 1346 people, including 565 irrecoverable people. The entire German Eastern Army, with more than 150 divisions, had an average daily casualty rate of only slightly higher for the period from December 11 to December 31, 1941 inclusive. On the day, the Germans lost 2,658 people, including only 686 - irrevocably.
This is simply amazing! One of our divisions lost as much as 150 German ones. Even if we assume that not all German formations in the last three weeks of December 1941 were in action every day, even if we assume that the losses of the 323rd Infantry Division in three-day battles were for some reason uniquely great, the difference is too striking and cannot be explained by statistical errors. Here we must talk about the errors of social, fundamental vices Soviet way waging war.
By the way, according to the testimony of the former commander of the 10th Army, Marshal F.I. Golikov, and in the previous days the 323rd division suffered heavy losses, and, despite the fact that Soviet troops, casualties were predominantly unaccounted for, most of whom were most likely killed. So, in the battles of December 11, during its turn south towards the city of Epifan and settlement Lupishki 323rd division lost 78 people killed, 153 wounded and up to 200 missing. And on December 17-19, the 323rd division, together with other divisions of the 10th army, successfully, by Soviet standards, attacked the German defensive line on the Upa River. And by the next line, the Plava River, the 323rd division was not yet the most battered of the divisions of the 10th army, which were fully staffed before the start of the Moscow counteroffensive. In the 323rd division, 7613 people remained, while in the neighboring 326th - only 6238 people. Like many of the other divisions involved in the counteroffensive, the 323rd and 326th divisions had just been formed and entered the battle for the first time. Lack of experience and internal cohesion of the units led to large losses. Nevertheless, on the night of December 19-20, two divisions took Plavsk, breaking through the enemy line. At the same time, the Germans allegedly lost more than 200 people only killed. In fact, given that at that moment most of the German divisions were operating in the Moscow direction, and Plavsk was defended by only one regiment, the losses of the latter could not exceed several dozen killed. The commander of the 323rd division, Colonel Ivan Alekseevich Hartsev, was considered a completely successful divisional commander and on November 17, 1942, he became a major general, in 1943 he commanded the 53rd rifle corps, safely ended the war, having been awarded the 1st degree order of Kutuzov, and died peacefully in 1961.
Let us compare the above monthly data on the irrecoverable losses of the Red Army for 1942 with the monthly data on the losses of the German ground army, calculated from the diary of the chief of the General Staff of the German ground army, General F. Halder. It should be noted here that the Soviet data includes not only losses in ground forces, but also losses of aviation and navy. In addition, the irrecoverable losses from the Soviet side include not only those killed and missing, but also those who died from wounds. In the data given by Halder, only losses are included in the killed and missing, relating only to the ground forces, without the Luftwaffe and the fleet. This circumstance makes the ratio of losses more favorable for the German side than it actually was. Indeed, taking into account the fact that in the Wehrmacht the ratio of wounded and killed was closer to the classic - 3: 1, and in the Red Army - closer to the unconventional ratio - 1: 1, and also taking into account that the mortality rate in German hospitals was much higher, than in the Soviet, since in the latter there were much fewer seriously wounded, the category of those who died from wounds accounted for a much larger share in the irrecoverable losses of the Wehrmacht than the Red Army. Also, the proportion of aviation and naval losses was relatively higher for the Wehrmacht than for the Red Army, due to the extremely large losses of the Soviet ground forces. In addition, we do not take into account the losses of the Italian, Hungarian and Romanian armies, which also makes the loss ratio more favorable for Germany. However, all these factors can overestimate this indicator by no more than 20–25% and are not able to distort the general trend.
According to the entries in F. Halder's diary, in the period from December 31, 1941 to January 31, 1942, German losses on the Eastern Front amounted to 87,082, including 18,074 killed and 7,175 missing. Irrecoverable losses of the Red Army (killed and missing) in January 1942 amounted to 628 thousand people, which gives a loss ratio of 24.9: 1. In the period from January 31 to February 28, 1942, German losses in the East amounted to 87,651 people, including 18,776 killed and 4,355 missing. Soviet losses in February reached 523 thousand people and turned out to be 22.6 times more than the German irrecoverable losses.
In the period from March 1 to March 31, 1942, German losses on the Eastern Front amounted to 102,194 people, including 12,808 killed and 5,217 missing. Soviet losses in March 1942 amounted to 625 thousand dead and missing. This gives us a record ratio of 34.7: 1. In April, when the offensive began to fade, but Soviet troops still suffered quite a few prisoner losses, German casualties amounted to 60,005 people, including 12,690 killed and 2,573 missing. Soviet losses this month amounted to 435 thousand dead and missing. The ratio is 28.5: 1.
In May 1942, the Red Army suffered heavy prisoner losses as a result of its unsuccessful offensive near Kharkov and the successful German offensive on the Kerch Peninsula, its losses amounted to 433 thousand people. This figure is most likely significantly underestimated. After all, the Germans captured almost 400 thousand prisoners in May, and compared with April, when there were almost no prisoners, the losses even decreased by 13 thousand people - with a drop in the index of those killed in battles by only three points. The losses of the German ground forces can only be counted for the period from May 1 to June 10, 1942. They amounted to 100,599 people, including 21,157 killed and 4212 missing. To establish the ratio of irrecoverable losses, it is necessary to add a third of losses in June to the Soviet May losses. Soviet losses this month amounted to 519 thousand people. Most likely, they are overestimated due to the inclusion of underestimated May losses in the June parts. Therefore, the total number of casualties in May and the first ten days of June of 606 thousand dead and missing seems close to reality. The ratio of irrecoverable losses is 23.9: 1, not differing fundamentally from the indicators of several previous months.
During the period from 10 to 30 June, the losses of the German ground forces in the East amounted to 64,013 people, including 11,079 killed and 2,270 missing. The ratio of irrecoverable losses for the second and third decades of June is equal to 25.9: 1.
In July 1942, the German land army in the East lost 96,341 people, including 17,782 killed and 3,290 missing. Soviet losses in July 1942 amounted to only 330 thousand people, and, most likely, they are somewhat underestimated. But this underestimation is largely offset by the more significant losses of the German allies who participated in the general offensive in the south that began at the end of June. The ratio of irrecoverable losses turns out to be 15.7: 1. This already means a significant improvement in this indicator for the Red Army. The German offensive turned out to be less catastrophic for the Red Army in terms of casualties than its own offensive in the winter and spring of 1942.
But the real turning point in the ratio of irrecoverable losses occurred in August 1942, when German troops attacked Stalingrad and the Caucasus, and Soviet troops - in the Rzhev region. Soviet prisoner losses were significant, and undoubtedly there was an underestimation of Soviet irrecoverable losses, but, most likely, it was no more than in July. In August 1942, the German army in the East lost 160,294 people, including 31,713 killed and 7,443 missing. Soviet losses this month amounted to 385 thousand dead and missing. The ratio is 9.8: 1, that is, an order of magnitude better for the Red Army than in the winter or spring of 1942. Even taking into account the likely underestimation of Soviet losses in August, the change in the ratio of losses looks significant. Moreover, the probable underestimation of Soviet losses was compensated for by a significant increase in the losses of the German allies - the Romanian, Hungarian and Italian troops, who actively participated in the summer-autumn offensive. The loss ratio is improving not so much due to the reduction of Soviet losses (although it, in all likelihood, took place), but because of the significant increase in German losses. It is no coincidence that it was in August 1942 that Hitler, according to W. Schellenberg, for the first time admitted the possibility that Germany would lose the war, and in September there followed the loud resignations of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Army F. Halder and the commander-in-chief of Army Group A operating in the Caucasus, Field Marshal V. Leaf. Hitler was beginning to realize that there was no way out of the impasse into which the German offensive in the Caucasus and Stalingrad was increasingly entering and that the growing losses would soon enough lead the Wehrmacht to exhaustion, but he could not do anything.
Halder's diary allows calculating the losses of ground forces only in the first decade of September. They amounted to 48 198 people, including 9558 killed and 3637 missing. Soviet losses in September amounted to 473 thousand dead and missing. These losses not only do not seem to be underestimated, but, on the contrary, rather underestimate the true size of Soviet losses in September by including earlier unaccounted losses, since this month, compared to August, the number of casualties in battles fell from 130 to 109. One third from 473 thousand . is 157.7 thousand. The ratio of Soviet and German irrecoverable losses in the first ten days of September 1942 is equal to 11.95: 1, which proves that the August trend of improving the ratio of losses continued in September, especially taking into account the overestimation of Soviet losses this month ...
In the further course of the war, the irrecoverable losses of the German land army, with rare exceptions, only grew. The number of Soviet prisoners of war dropped sharply in 1943, while German troops this year for the first time suffered significant prisoner losses on the Eastern Front as a result of the Stalingrad catastrophe. Soviet losses in killed after 1942 also experienced an upward trend, but the absolute value of the increase in killed was significantly less than the amount by which the average monthly number of Soviet prisoners decreased. According to the dynamics of the number of casualties in battles, the maximum losses in killed and dead from wounds were noted in July, August and September 1943, during Battle of Kursk and the crossing of the Dnieper (the index of the defeated in battles in these months is, respectively, 143, 172 and 139). The next peak of the Red Army's losses in killed and dead from wounds falls in July, August and September 1944 (132, 140 and 130). The only peak in casualties in 1941-1942 falls on August 1942 (130). There were some months when the ratio of irrecoverable losses was almost as unfavorable for the Soviet side as in the first half of 1942, for example, during the Battle of Kursk, but in most months of 1943-1945 this ratio was already significantly better for the Red Army than in 1941-1942.
A significant, by Soviet standards, improvement in the ratio of irrecoverable losses of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht and its allies, which began in August 1942 and continued until the end of the war, was due to several factors. First, the Soviet commanders of the middle and higher echelons, starting with the regimental commanders, acquired some combat experience and began to fight a little more competently, adopting a number of tactical techniques from the Germans. At a lower command level, as well as among rank-and-file fighters, there was no significant improvement in the quality of combat operations, since there was a large turnover of personnel due to huge losses. The improvement in the relative quality of Soviet tanks and aircraft, as well as an increase in the level of training of pilots and tankers, also played a role, although in terms of training they were still inferior to the Germans even at the end of the war.
But an even greater role than the growth in the fighting efficiency of the Red Army in the defeat of Germany on the Eastern Front was played by the decline in the fighting efficiency of the Wehrmacht. Due to the ever-growing irrecoverable losses, the share of experienced soldiers and officers was decreasing. Due to the need to replace the increasing losses by the end of the war, the level of training of pilots and tankers decreased, although it remained higher than that of their Soviet opponents. Even an increase in the quality of military equipment could not compensate for this drop in the level of training. But more importantly, starting in November 1942, after the Allied landings in North Africa, Germany had to send more and more aircraft and then ground forces to fight against the Western Allies. Germany had to make more use of its weaker allies. The defeat by the Red Army of significant Italian, Romanian and Hungarian troops in late 1942 - early 1943 and in the second half of 1944 - early 1945 significantly improved the ratio of irrecoverable losses in favor of the Soviet side and significantly increased the numerical advantage of the Red Army over the Wehrmacht. Another turning point here occurred after the Allied landings in Normandy in June 1944. It was from July 1944 that there has been a sharp increase in the irrecoverable losses of the German army, primarily prisoners. In June, the irrecoverable losses of ground forces amounted to 58 thousand people, and in July - 369 thousand and remained at such high level until the end of the war. This is due to the fact that Germany was forced to withdraw significant forces of ground forces and the Luftwaffe from the Eastern Front, thanks to which the Soviet numerical superiority in manpower increased to seven or even eight times, which made any effective defense impossible.
Explaining the enormous Soviet human losses, German generals usually point to the disregard for the lives of soldiers on the part of the high command, the weak tactical training of the middle and lower command personnel, the stereotyped techniques used during the offensive, the inability of both commanders and soldiers to accept independent decisions... Such statements could be considered a simple attempt to belittle the dignity of the enemy, who nevertheless won the war, if not for the numerous similar testimonies from the Soviet side. So, Zhores Medvedev recalls the battles near Novorossiysk in 1943: “The Germans had two defense lines near Novorossiysk, perfectly fortified to a depth of about 3 km. It was believed that artillery barrage was very effective, but it seems to me that the Germans quickly adapted to it. Noticing that the technique was concentrating and powerful shooting began, they went to the second line, leaving only a few machine gunners on the front line. We left and watched all this noise and smoke with the same interest as we did. Then we were ordered to go forward. We walked, were blown up by mines and occupied the trenches - already almost empty, only two or three corpses were lying there. Then the order was given - to attack the second line. It was then that up to 80% of the attackers perished - after all, the Germans were sitting in perfectly fortified structures and shot all of us almost point-blank. " American diplomat A. Harriman conveys Stalin's words that “in the Soviet Army one must have more courage to retreat than to attack,” and comments on it this way: “This phrase of Stalin shows well that he was aware of the state of affairs in the army. We were shocked, but we understood that this makes the Red Army fight ... Our military, who consulted with the Germans after the war, told me that the most destructive of the Russian offensive was its massive nature. The Russians walked wave after wave. The Germans literally mowed them down, but as a result of such pressure, one wave broke through. "
And here is the testimony of the battles in December 1943 in Belarus of the former platoon commander V. Dyatlov: "A chain of people in civilian clothes with huge" sidors "behind their back passed along the message. "Slavs, who are you, where are you from?" I asked. - "We are from Oryol region, replenishment." - "What kind of replenishment, when in civilian and without rifles?" - "Yes, they said that you will get it in battle ..."
The artillery strike on the enemy lasted about five minutes. 36 guns of the artillery regiment "hollowed out" the leading edge of the Germans. From the shells, the visibility became even worse ...
And here is the attack. The chain rose, twisting like a black curved snake. The second is behind her. And these black wriggling and moving snakes were so ridiculous, so unnatural on the gray-white ground! Black in the snow is a great target. And the German "watered" these chains with dense lead. Many firing points came to life. Heavy machine guns fired from the second line of the trench. The chains are laid. The battalion commander shouted: “Go ahead, your mother! Forward! .. Into the battle! Forward! I'll shoot you! " But it was impossible to get up. Try to tear yourself off the ground under artillery, machine-gun and automatic fire ...
The commanders still managed to raise the "black" village infantry several times. But it’s all in vain. The enemy's fire was so dense that, after running a couple of steps, people fell as if knocked down. We, the artillerymen, also could not reliably help - there was no visibility, the Germans masked the firing points, and, most likely, the main machine-gun fire was fired from the bunkers, and therefore the firing of our guns did not give the desired results. "
The same memoirist very colorfully describes the reconnaissance in force carried out by a battalion of penalties, so much praised by many memoirists from among the marshals and generals: “Two divisions of our regiment took part in a ten-minute fire raid - and that was all. After the fire, there was silence for some seconds. Then the battalion commander jumped out of the trench onto the parapet: “Guys! For the Motherland! For Stalin! Behind me! Hurray-ah-ah! " The penalties slowly climbed out of the trench and, as if having waited for the latter, threw up their rifles at the ready, ran. A groan or a cry with a drawn-out "ah-ah" poured from left to right and again to the left, then dying out, then intensifying. We also jumped out of the trench and ran forward. The Germans threw a series of red missiles towards the attackers and immediately opened powerful mortar and artillery fire. The chains lay down, lay down and we - a little behind in the longitudinal furrow. It was impossible to raise my head. How to pinpoint and who will pinpoint the enemy's targets in this hell? His artillery fired from closed positions and far from the flanks. Heavy weapons were also beating. Several tanks fired direct fire, their blank shells whirring overhead with a howl ...
Penalties lay in front of the German trench in an open field and in small bushes, and the German “threshed” this field, plowing the ground, bushes, and the bodies of people ... Only seven people left us with a battalion of penalties, but there were all together - 306. ”
Incidentally, there was no attack in this area.
We have a story about such senseless and bloody attacks in the memoirs and letters of German soldiers and junior officers. One unnamed witness describes the attack of the units of the 37th Soviet Army by A.A. Vlasov to the height occupied by the Germans near Kiev in August 1941, and his description in detail coincides with the story of the Soviet officer cited above. Here and useless artillery preparation past the German positions, and the attack in thick waves, perishing under German machine guns, and an unknown commander, unsuccessfully trying to raise his people and dying from a German bullet. Such attacks on a not very important height continued for three days in a row. The German soldiers were most struck by the fact that when the whole wave was dying, the lone soldiers still continued to run forward (the Germans were incapable of such senseless actions). These failed attacks nevertheless drained the Germans physically. And, as the German soldier recalls, he and his comrades were most shocked and depressed by the methodical nature and scale of these attacks: “If the Soviets can afford to spend so many people trying to eliminate such insignificant results of our advancement, then how often and how many will they attack people if the object is really very important? " (The German author could not imagine that otherwise the Red Army simply could not and could not attack.)
And in the letter of the German soldier home during the retreat from Kursk in the second half of 1943, it is described, as in the cited letter of V. Dyatlov, an attack of almost unarmed and uniformed reinforcements from the newly liberated territories (the same Oryol region), in which the overwhelming majority died participants (according to an eyewitness, even women were among the summoned). The prisoners said that the authorities suspected the inhabitants of cooperation with the occupation authorities, and mobilization served as a kind of punishment for them. And the same letter describes an attack by Soviet penalties through a German minefield to blow up mines at the cost of his own life (D. Eisenhower cites the story of Marshal G.K. Zhukov about this practice of Soviet troops in his memoirs). And again, the German soldier was most struck by the obedience of those mobilized and penalized. The prisoners of the penalty box, "with rare exceptions, have never complained about such treatment." they said that life is difficult and that "mistakes have to be paid." Such submission Soviet soldiers clearly shows that the Soviet regime trained not only commanders capable of giving such inhuman orders, but also soldiers capable of carrying out such orders unquestioningly.
The inability of the Red Army to fight otherwise than at the cost of a lot of blood is also evidenced by high-ranking Soviet military leaders. So, Marshal A.I. Eremenko characterizes the features of the "art of war" of the famous (deservedly so?) "Marshal of victory" G.K. Zhukov: "It should be said that Zhukov's operational art is 5-6 times superiority in forces, otherwise he will not get down to business, he does not know how to fight in numbers and builds his career on blood." By the way, in another case, the same A.I. Eremenko conveyed his impression of acquaintance with the memoirs of German generals: “The question naturally arises, why the Hitlerite“ heroes ”, who“ won ”our squad together, and five of them a whole platoon, could not complete the tasks in the first period of the war, when the undeniable numerical and was technical superiority on their side? " It turns out that the irony here is ostentatious, because A.I. Eremenko actually knew well that the German commanders did not exaggerate the balance of forces in favor of the Red Army. After all, G.K. Zhukov headed the main operations in the main directions and had an overwhelming superiority of forces and equipment. Another thing is that other Soviet generals and marshals could hardly have been able to fight differently than G.K. Zhukov, and A.I. Eremenko was no exception here.
We also note that the huge irrecoverable losses of the Red Army did not allow, to the same extent as in the Wehrmacht, and even more so in the armies of the Western Allies, to retain experienced soldiers and junior commanders, which reduced the cohesion and resilience of units and did not allow reinforcement soldiers to adopt combat experience from veterans , which further increased the loss. Such an unfavorable ratio of irrecoverable losses for the USSR was a consequence of the fundamental flaw of the communist totalitarian system, which deprived people of the ability to independently make decisions and act, taught everyone, including the military, to act according to a template, to avoid even reasonable risks and, more than the enemy, to be afraid of responsibility before their higher authorities.
As the former intelligence officer E.I. Malashenko, who rose to the rank of lieutenant general after the war, even at the very end of the war, Soviet troops often acted very ineffectively: “A few hours before the offensive of our division on March 10, a reconnaissance group ... captured a prisoner. He showed that the main forces of his regiment had been withdrawn 8-10 km in depth ... By phone, I reported this information to the division commander, and that information to the commander. The divisional commander gave us his car to deliver the prisoner to the army headquarters. Approaching the command post, we heard the rumble of the artillery preparation that had begun. Unfortunately, it was carried out on unoccupied positions. Thousands of shells delivered with great difficulty through the Carpathians (the case took place on the 4th Ukrainian front. - B.S.), were wasted. The surviving enemy stopped the advance of our troops by stubborn resistance. " The same author gives a comparative assessment of the fighting qualities of German and Soviet soldiers and officers - not in favor of the Red Army: “German soldiers and officers fought well. The rank and file were well trained, skillfully acted in the offensive and on the defensive. Well-trained non-commissioned officers played a more prominent role in battle than our sergeants, many of whom were almost indistinguishable from the rank and file. The enemy infantry constantly fired intensively, acted persistently and swiftly in the offensive, stubbornly defended and launched rapid counterattacks, usually with the support of artillery fire, and sometimes air strikes. The tankers also aggressively attacked, fired on the move and from short stops, skillfully maneuvered and conducted reconnaissance. If they failed, they quickly concentrated their efforts in the other direction, often striking at the joints and flanks of our units. The artillery quickly opened fire and sometimes conducted it very accurately. She had a lot of ammunition at her disposal. German officers skillfully organized the battle and controlled the actions of their subunits and units, skillfully used the terrain, and made timely maneuvers to an advantageous direction. With the threat of encirclement or defeat, German units and subunits made an organized retreat into the depths, usually to occupy a new line. The soldiers and officers of the enemy were intimidated by rumors of reprisals against the prisoners, they surrendered without a fight extremely rarely ...
Our infantry was less trained than the German one. However, she fought bravely. Of course, there have been cases of panic and premature withdrawal, especially at the beginning of the war. The infantry was greatly assisted by artillery, the most effective was the Katyusha fire when repelling enemy counterattacks and delivering strikes on areas of concentration and concentration of troops. However, artillery in the initial period of the war had few shells. It must be admitted that tank units did not always act skillfully in attacks. At the same time, in the operational depth during the development of the offensive, they showed themselves brilliantly. "
The exorbitantly large losses of the Soviet armed forces in the Great Patriotic War were recognized even then by some Soviet generals, although this was by no means safe. For example, Lieutenant General S.A. Kalinin, who had previously commanded the army, and then was engaged in the preparation of reserves, had the imprudence to write in his diary that Supreme High Command"Does not care about the preservation of manpower and allows large losses in certain operations." This, along with others, "anti-Soviet" statement cost the general a sentence of 25 years in the camps. And another commander - Major General of Aviation A.A. Tuzhansky - in 1942 he received only 12 years in the camps for a completely fair opinion about the reports of the Soviet Information Bureau, which "are intended only to calm the masses and do not correspond to reality, since they understate our losses and exaggerate the losses of the enemy."
It is interesting that about the same as in the Great Patriotic War, was the ratio of irrecoverable losses between the Russian and German troops in the First World War. This follows from a study carried out by S.G. Nelipovich. In the second half of 1916, the troops of the Russian Northern and Western Fronts lost 54 thousand killed and 42.35 thousand missing. The German troops operating on these fronts, and the few Austro-Hungarian divisions that fought on the Western Front, lost 7.7 thousand killed and 6.1 thousand missing. This gives a ratio of 7.0: 1 for both killed and missing. On the Southwestern Front, Russian losses amounted to 202.8 thousand killed. The Austrian troops operating against him lost 55.1 thousand killed, and the German troops - 21.2 thousand killed. The ratio of losses turns out to be very indicative, especially given the fact that in the second half of 1916, Germany had far from the best on the Eastern Front, mostly second-order divisions. If we assume that the ratio of Russian and German losses here was the same as on the other two fronts, then from the Russian South-Western Front, about 148.4 thousand soldiers and officers were killed in battles against the Germans, and about 54.4 thousand - in battles against the Austro-Hungarian troops. Thus, with the Austrians, the ratio of casualties was even slightly in our favor - 1.01: 1, and the Austrians lost much more prisoners than the Russians - 377.8 thousand missing against 152.7 thousand for the Russians throughout the South -Western Front, including in battles against German troops. If we extend these coefficients to the entire war as a whole, the ratio between the total losses of Russia and its opponents killed and those who died from wounds, diseases, and in captivity can be estimated as 1.9: 1. This calculation is done as follows. German losses on the Eastern Front of the First World War amounted to, including losses on the Romanian front, 173.8 thousand killed and 143.3 thousand missing. In total, according to official data, there were 177.1 thousand prisoners of war in Russia, of which more than 101 thousand people were repatriated by the end of 1918. Died in captivity until the spring of 1918, 15.5 thousand people. Perhaps some of the German prisoners were repatriated later or died. The official Russian number of German prisoners is probably overestimated at the expense of subjects of the German Empire interned in Russia. In any case, almost all of the missing German soldiers on the Eastern Front can be attributed to prisoners. If we assume that during the entire war there were on average seven Russian soldiers per one German soldier who died, the total losses of Russia in the fight against Germany can be estimated at 1217 thousand killed. The losses of the Austro-Hungarian army on the Russian front in 1914-1918 amounted to 311.7 thousand killed. The losses of the Austro-Hungarian missing persons reached 1194.1 thousand people, which is less than the Russian data on the number of Austro-Hungarian prisoners - 1750 thousand. The excess was probably formed due to civil prisoners in Galicia and Bukovina, as well as double counting in reports. As in the case of Germany, in the case of Austria-Hungary, you can be sure that almost all of the missing on the Russian front are prisoners. Then, extending the proportion between the Russian and Austrian killed, which was established by us for the second half of 1916, for the entire period of the First World War, the Russian losses killed in the fight against the Austro-Hungarian troops can be estimated at 308.6 thousand people. Losses of Turkey in the First World War by those killed by B.Ts. Urlanis is estimated at 250 thousand people, of which, in his opinion, the Caucasian front accounts for probably up to 150 thousand people. However, this figure has to be questioned. The fact is that the same B.Ts. Urlanis cites data that 65 thousand Turks were in Russian captivity, and 110 thousand in British. It can be assumed that the real combat activity in the Middle East (including the Thessaloniki front) and the Caucasian theaters of military operations differed in the same proportion, given that since the beginning of 1917 there were no active hostilities on the Caucasian front. Then the number of killed Turkish servicemen in hostilities against the Caucasian Front, as well as against Russian troops in Galicia and Romania can be estimated at 93 thousand people. The losses of the Russian army in the fight against Turkey are unknown. Considering that the Turkish troops were significantly inferior to the Russians in terms of combat capability, the losses of the Russian Caucasian Front can be estimated as half the Turkish losses - at 46.5 thousand killed. The losses of the Turks in the fight against the Anglo-French troops can be estimated at 157 thousand killed. Of these, about half died at the Dardanelles, where Turkish troops lost 74.6 thousand people, British troops, including New Zealanders, Australians, Indians and Canadians - 33.0 thousand killed, and French troops - about 10 thousand killed. This gives a ratio of 1.7: 1, close to what we assumed for the losses of the Turkish and Russian armies.
The total losses of the Russian army killed in the First World War can be estimated at 1601 thousand people, and the losses of its opponents - at 607 thousand people, or 2.6 times less. For comparison, let us determine the ratio of casualties killed on the Western Front of the First World War, where German troops fought with British, French and Belgian troops. Here Germany lost 590.9 thousand people killed before August 1, 1918. Over the last 3 months and 11 days of the war, German casualties can be estimated at about one quarter of the preceding 12 months of the war, taking into account that in November there were almost no hostilities. The losses of Germany in the period from August 1, 1917 to July 31, 1918, according to the official sanitary report, amounted to 181.8 thousand killed. Taking this into account, the losses in the last months of the war can be estimated at 45.5 thousand people, and all the losses of Germany killed on the Western Front - at 636.4 thousand people. The losses of the French ground forces in killed and died from wounds in the First World War amounted to 1104.9 thousand people. If we subtract from this number 232 thousand deaths from wounds, the death toll can be estimated at 873 thousand people. Probably, about 850 thousand people were killed on the Western Front. British troops in France and Flanders lost 381 thousand killed. The total losses of the killed British dominions amounted to 119 thousand people. Of these, at least 90 thousand died on the Western Front. Belgium lost 13.7 thousand people killed. American troops lost 37 thousand people killed. The total losses of the Allies killed in the West are equal to approximately 1,372 thousand people, and in Germany - 636 thousand people. The loss ratio turns out to be 2.2: 1, which turns out to be three times more favorable for the Entente than the ratio between Russia and Germany.
The extremely unfavorable ratio of losses between Russia and Germany is leveled out at the expense of the losses of the German allies. To get the general irrecoverable losses of Russia in the First World War, it is necessary to add to the losses of those killed by those who died from wounds, who died from diseases and died in captivity - respectively 240 thousand, 160 thousand (together with victims of suicides and accidents) and 190 thousand. human. Then the total irrecoverable losses of the Russian army can be estimated at 2.2 million people. The total number of Russian prisoners is estimated at 2.6 million people. In Russian captivity, about 15.5 thousand German and at least 50 thousand Austro-Hungarian soldiers, as well as about 10 thousand Turks, died. The total number of deaths from wounds in the German army is estimated at 320 thousand people. Considering that the Eastern Front accounts for about 21.5% of all killed German soldiers, the losses of Germany in the fight against Russia who died of wounds can be estimated at 69 thousand people. The number of deaths from disease and accidents in the German army is estimated at 166,000. Of these, up to 36 thousand people may fall on the Russian front. The Austrians lost 170 thousand people who died from wounds and 120 thousand people died from diseases. Since the Russian front accounts for 51.2% of all losses of Austria-Hungary (4273.9 thousand people out of 8349.2 thousand), the number of deaths from wounds and deaths from diseases related to the Russian front can be estimated at 87 thousand, respectively. . and 61 thousand people. The Turks lost 68 thousand deaths from wounds and 467 thousand deaths from diseases. Of these, the Russian front accounts for 25 thousand and 173 thousand people, respectively. The total irrecoverable losses of Russia's opponents in the First World War amounted to about 1133.5 thousand people. The ratio of total deadweight losses is 1.9: 1. It becomes even more favorable for the Russian side than the ratio only for the killed, due to the significant death rate from disease in the Turkish army.
The ratio of losses in the First World War was much more favorable for the Russian army than in the Second World War, only due to the fact that in 1914-1918, not German, but much less combat-ready Austro-Hungarian troops fought on the Russian front.
Such an unfavorable for Russia (USSR) ratio of losses in two world wars in relation to losses of German troops is explained primarily by the general economic and cultural backwardness of Russia in comparison with Germany and with the Western allies. In the case of World War II, the situation was aggravated due to the peculiarities of Stalinist totalitarianism, which destroyed the army as effective tool waging war. Stalin failed, as he urged, to overcome in ten years the lag behind the leading capitalist countries, which he defined as 50-100 years. But he completely remained in line with the late imperial tradition, preferred to win not by skill, but by a lot of blood, since he saw a potential threat to the regime in the creation of a highly professional army.
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On the eve of Victory Day, I would like to touch upon several important, fundamental issues. I will try to describe in general terms the pre-war potential of the USSR and Nazi Germany, and also give data on human losses on both sides, including the latest. There is also the latest data on the number of dead Yakutians.
The issue of losses in World War II has been discussed throughout the world for several years. There are various assessments, including sensational ones. Quantitative indicators are influenced not only by different methods counting, but also ideology, subjective approach.
The Western countries, led by the United States and England, tirelessly repeat the mantra that victory was “forged” by them in the sands of North Africa, Normandy, on the sea routes of the North Atlantic and with the help of bombing industrial facilities Germany and its allies.
The war of the USSR against Germany and its allies is presented to the western man in the street as "unknown." Some residents of Western countries, judging by the polls, in all seriousness claim that the USSR and Germany were allies in that war.
The second favorite adage of some Westernizers and home-grown liberal-democrats of the "Western wing" is that the Victory over fascism was "littered with the corpses of Soviet soldiers", "one rifle for four", "the command threw their soldiers on machine guns, retreating detachments were fired upon", " millions of prisoners ”, without the help of the allied troops, the victory of the Red Army over the enemy would have been impossible.
Unfortunately, after NS Khrushchev came to power, some of the Soviet commanders, in order to raise their role in the battle against the "brown plague" of the 20th century, described in their memoirs the fulfillment of the orders of the Headquarters of Commander-in-Chief IV Stalin, as a result of which the Soviet troops suffered unreasonably high losses.
And few people pay attention to the fact that during the period of active defensive and offensive battles, the main task was and is to achieve replenishment - additional troops from the reserve. And in order to satisfy the request, you need to provide such a combat note about the large losses of personnel of a particular military unit in order to receive replenishment.
As always, the truth is in the middle!
At the same time, the official data on the losses of the Nazi armies from the Soviet side were often clearly underestimated or, conversely, overestimated, which led to a complete distortion of the statistical data on the military losses of Nazi Germany and its direct allies.
The trophy documents available in the USSR, in particular, the 10-day reports of the OKW (the highest military command of the Wehrmacht), were classified, and only recently did military historians gain access to them.
For the first time, J.V. Stalin announced the losses of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War in 1946. He said that as a result of the German invasion, the Soviet Union irrevocably lost in battles with the Germans, as well as as a result of the German occupation and the deportation of Soviet people to German penal servitude, about seven million people.
Then N.S. Khrushchev, in 1961, having debunked the personality cult of Stalin, in a conversation with the Deputy Prime Minister of Belgium mentioned that 20 million people died in the war.
And, finally, a group of researchers led by G.F. Krivosheev estimates the total human losses of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War, determined by the demographic balance method, at 26.6 million people. This includes all those who died as a result of military and other actions of the enemy, who died as a result of military and other actions of the enemy, who died as a result of an increased mortality rate during the war in the occupied territory and in the rear, as well as persons who emigrated from the USSR during the war years and did not return after its end.
The data on the losses of G. Krivosheev's group are considered official. In 2001, the revised figures were as follows. Human losses of the USSR:
- 6.3 million military personnel killed or died from wounds,
- 555 thousand died of diseases, as a result of accidents, incidents, were sentenced to death,
- 4.5 million- were captured and disappeared;
Total demographic losses - 26.6 million human.
German casualties:
- 4,046 million servicemen died, died of wounds, disappeared without a trace.
At the same time, the irrecoverable losses of the armies of the USSR and Germany (including prisoners of war) - 11.5 million and 8.6 million (not counting 1.6 million prisoners of war after May 9, 1945), respectively.
However, new data is emerging now.
The beginning of the war - June 22, 1941. What was the balance of power between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union? What forces and capabilities did Hitler count on when preparing an attack on the USSR? How realistic was the Barbarossa plan prepared by the Wehrmacht General Staff for implementation?
It should be noted that in June 1941 the total population of Germany together with direct allies was 283 million people, and in the USSR - 160 million... Germany's direct allies at that time were: Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovakia, Finland, Croatia. In the summer of 1941, the personnel of the Wehrmacht was 8.5 million people, four army groups with a total of 7.4 million people were concentrated on the border with the USSR. Fascist Germany was armed with 5,636 tanks, more than 61,000 guns of various calibers, over 10,000 aircraft (excluding the weapons of allied military formations).
General characteristics of the Red Army of the USSR for June 1941... The total strength was 5.5 million troops. The number of Red Army divisions is 300, of which 170 divisions were concentrated on the western borders (3.9 million people), the rest were stationed in the Far East (which is why Japan did not attack), in Central Asia, and Transcaucasia. I must say that the Wehrmacht divisions were staffed according to wartime states, and each had 14-16 thousand people. Soviet divisions were staffed according to peacetime states and consisted of 7-8 thousand people.
The Red Army was armed with 11,000 tanks, of which 1,861 were T-34 tanks and 1,239 were KV tanks (the best in the world at that time). The rest of the tanks - BT-2, BT-5, BT-7, T-26, SU-5 with weak weapons, many vehicles were idle due to the lack of spare parts. Most of the tanks were to be replaced with new vehicles. More than 60% of the tanks were in the troops of the western border districts.
Soviet artillery represented powerful firepower. On the eve of the war, the Red Army had 67,335 guns and mortars. Katyusha multiple launch rocket systems began to arrive. In terms of combat qualities, the Soviet field artillery was superior to the German, but was poorly provided with mechanized traction. The needs for special artillery tractors were satisfied by 20.5%.
In the western military districts, the Red Army Air Force had 7,009 fighters, long-range aviation had 1,333 aircraft.
So, at the first stage of the war, the qualitative and quantitative characteristics were on the side of the enemy. The Nazis had a significant advantage in manpower, automatic weapons, mortars. And thus, Hitler's hopes to carry out a "blitzkrieg" against the USSR were calculated taking into account real conditions, the disposition of the available armed forces and means. In addition, Germany already had practical military experience gained as a result of hostilities in other European countries. Surprise, aggressiveness, coordination of all forces and means, clarity in the execution of orders general staff Wehrmacht, the use of armored forces on a relatively small sector of the front - this was a proven, fundamental tactic of actions of military formations of Nazi Germany.
This tactic has proven itself exceptionally well in military operations in Europe; losses in manpower of the Wehrmacht were small. For example, in France, 27,074 German soldiers were killed and 111,034 wounded. At the same time, the German army captured 1.8 million French soldiers. The war ended in 40 days. The victory was absolute.
In Poland, the Wehrmacht lost 16,843 soldiers, Greece - 1,484, Norway - 1,317 and 2,375 more died on the way. These "historic" victories of German weapons inspired Adolf Hitler indescribably, and they were ordered to develop a plan "Barbarossa" - a war against the USSR.
It should also be noted that the question of surrender Supreme Commander JV Stalin was never put, the Headquarters quite soberly analyzed and calculated the current martial law. In any case, in the first months of the war there was no panic in the main headquarters of the armies; alarmists were shot on the spot.
In mid-July 1941, the initial period of the war ended. Due to a number of subjective and objective factors, the Soviet troops suffered serious losses in manpower and equipment. As a result of heavy fighting, using air supremacy, the German armed forces by this time reached the borders of the Western Dvina and the middle reaches of the Dnieper, advancing to a depth of 300 to 600 km and inflicting major defeats on the Red Army, especially the formations of the Western Front. In other words, the priority tasks were completed by the Wehrmacht. But the tactics of the "blitzkrieg" still failed.
The Germans met with fierce resistance from the retreating troops. The NKVD troops and border guards were especially distinguished. For example, here is the testimony of a former German sergeant-major who participated in the attacks on the 9th outpost of the border town of Przemysl: “... The fire was terrible! We left many corpses on the bridge, but we never took possession of them right away. Then the commander of my battalion gave the order to wade the river to the right and left in order to surround the bridge and capture it intact. But as soon as we rushed into the river, the Russian border guards began to pour fire on us here too. The losses were terrible ... Seeing that the plan was thwarted, the battalion commander ordered to open fire from 80-mm mortars. Only under their cover did we begin to infiltrate the Soviet coast ... We could not advance further as quickly as our command wanted. The Soviet border guards had firing points along the coastline. They sat in them and fired literally to the last bullet ... Nowhere, never have we seen such stamina, such military tenacity ... They preferred death to the possibility of captivity or retreat ... "
Heroic actions made it possible to gain time for the approach of Colonel NI Dementyev's 99th Rifle Division. Active resistance to the enemy continued.
As a result of stubborn battles, according to US intelligence services, in December 1941 Germany lost 1.3 million people killed in the war against the USSR, and by March 1943, the Wehrmacht's losses amounted to 5.42 million people (information has been declassified by the American side in our time ).
Yakutia 1941. What was the contribution of the peoples of the Yakut ASSR to the struggle against fascist Germany? Our losses. Heroic fighters of the Land of Olonkho.
As you know, since 2013 the scientific work "History of Yakutia" is being prepared. Researcher at the Institute for Humanitarian Research and Problems of Indigenous Peoples of the North, SB RAS Marianna Gryaznukhina, the author of the chapter of this scientific work, which talks about the human losses of the Yakutians during the Great Patriotic War, kindly provided the following data: the population of the Yakut ASSR in 1941, on the eve of the war, was 419 thousand human. 62 thousand people were called up and went to the front as volunteers.
However, this cannot be called exact amount Yakutians who fought for their homeland. By the beginning of the war, several hundred people were doing military service in the army, a certain number studied in military schools. Therefore, the number of Yakutians who fought can be considered from 62 to 65 thousand people.
Now about the loss of life. V last years the figure is called - 32 thousand Yakutians, but it also cannot be considered accurate. According to the demographic formula, they did not return to the regions from the war, about 30% of those who fought were killed. It should be noted that 32 thousand did not return to the territory of Yakutia, but some of the soldiers and officers remained to live in other regions of the country, some returned late, until the 1950s. Therefore, the number of residents of Yakutia who died at the front is about 25 thousand people. Of course, this is a huge loss for the small population of the republic.
In general, the contribution of the Yakutians to the fight against the "brown plague" is enormous and has not yet been fully studied. Many became military commanders, showed military training, dedication, courage in battles, for which they were awarded high military awards. Residents of the Khangalassky region of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) remember the general with warmth Prituzov (Pripuzov) Andrey Ivanovich... Member of the First World War, commander of the 61st Guards Slavic Red Banner Division. The division fought through Romania, part of Austria and ended its journey in Bulgaria. The military general found his eternal peace in his native Pokrovsk.
How not to remember on the eve of Victory Day about the Yakut snipers - two of which were included in the legendary ten best snipers of the Second World War. This is Yakut Fedor Matveevich Okhlopkov, on the personal account of which 429 killed Nazis. Before becoming a sniper, he destroyed several dozen Nazis with a machine gun and an assault rifle. And Fedor Matveyevich received the Hero of the Soviet Union only in 1965. Legendary person!
Second - Evenk Ivan Nikolaevich Kulbertinov- 489 killed Nazis. Taught young soldiers of the Red Army to sniper. Originally from the village of Tyanya, Olekminsky district.
It should be noted that until the end of 1942, the Wehrmacht command missed the opportunity of a sniper war, for which it paid dearly. During the war, the Nazis began to hastily learn the art of sniper from captured Soviet military training films and memos for snipers. At the front, they used the same Soviet captured Mosin and SVT rifles. Only by 1944 did the military units of the Wehrmacht have trained snipers in their composition.
Our colleague, a lawyer, Honored Lawyer of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), has passed the worthy path of a front-line soldier Yuri Nikolaevich Zharnikov... He began his military career as an artilleryman, in 1943 he retrained as a T-34 driver, his tank was hit twice, the hero himself received severe concussions. On account of his dozens of military victories, hundreds of killed enemies, a large number of broken and burned heavy enemy equipment, including German tanks. As Yuri Nikolayevich recalled, the calculation of enemy losses was carried out by the commander of the tank unit, and his concern was the constant maintenance of the mechanical part of the combat vehicle. For military exploits Yu.N. Zharnikov was awarded many orders and medals, which he was proud of. Today Yuri Nikolaevich is not among us, but we, the lawyers of Yakutia, keep the memory of him in our hearts.
Results of the Great Patriotic War. Losses of the German Armed Forces. The ratio of losses of Nazi Germany and its direct allies with the losses of the Red Army
Let's turn to the latest publications of a prominent Russian military historian Igor Ludvigovich Garibyan, who did a tremendous statistical work, studying not only Soviet sources, but also trophy archival documents General Staff of the Wehrmacht.
According to the Chief of Staff of the High Command of the Wehrmacht - OKW Wilhelm Keitel, Germany lost 9 million soldiers killed on the Eastern Front, 27 million were seriously wounded (without the possibility of returning to service), disappeared, were captured, all this is united by the concept of “irrecoverable losses ".
Historian Gharibyan counted the losses of Germany according to 10-day reports of OKW, and the following data were obtained:
Killed Germans and Austrians during hostilities - 7 541 401 people (data as of April 20, 1945);
Missing - 4 591 511 people.
Total irrecoverable losses - 17,801,340 people, including disabled people, prisoners of war, who died from diseases.
These figures apply only to two countries - Germany and Austria. This does not include the losses of Romania, Hungary, Finland, Slovakia, Croatia and other countries that fought against the USSR.
Thus, the nine millionth Hungary lost 809,000 soldiers and officers, mostly young people aged 20 to 29, killed in the war against the Red Army alone. 80,000 civilians were killed in the fighting. Meanwhile, in the same Hungary in 1944, on the eve of the collapse of the fascist regime, 500,000 Hungarian Jews and Gypsies were exterminated, which the Western mass media prefer to “shyly” keep silent about.
Summing up, we must admit that the USSR had to fight virtually one-on-one (in 1941-1943) with all of Europe, except England. All factories and factories of France, Poland, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Italy worked for the war. The Wehrmacht was provided not only with military materials, but also with the human resources of Germany's direct allies.
As a result, the Soviet people, showing the will to Victory, mass heroism both on the battlefield and in the rear, defeated the enemy and defended the Fatherland from the "brown plague" of the 20th century.
The article is dedicated to the memory of my grandfather - Stroeva Gavril Egorovich, a resident of the Batamai village of the Ordzhonikidze region of the Yakut ASSR, the chairman of the Zarya collective farm, who died heroically in the Great Patriotic War in 1943, and all Yakutians who did not return from the war.
Yuri PRIPUZOV,
President of the Yakut Republican
Bar Association "Petersburg",
honored lawyer of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia).