The war with Finland 1939-1940 is one of the shortest armed conflicts in history Soviet Russia. It lasted only 3.5 months, from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940. The significant numerical superiority of the Soviet armed forces initially predicted the outcome of the conflict, and as a result, Finland was forced to sign a peace agreement. According to this agreement, the Finns ceded almost a 10th part of their territory to the USSR and took upon themselves the obligation not to take part in any actions that threaten the Soviet Union.
Local small military conflicts were typical on the eve of the Second World War, and not only representatives of Europe took part in them, but also Asian countries. The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 was one of these short-term conflicts that did not suffer large human losses. Its cause was a single incident of artillery shelling from the Finnish side on the territory of the USSR, more precisely, on Leningrad region, which borders Finland.
It is still not known for certain whether the shelling took place, or whether the government of the Soviet Union decided to push its borders towards Finland in order to maximally secure Leningrad in the event of a serious military conflict developing between European countries.
Participants in the conflict, which lasted only 3.5 months, were only Finnish and Soviet troops, and the Red Army outnumbered the Finnish by 2 times, and by 4 times in terms of equipment and guns.
The initial goal of the military conflict on the part of the USSR was the desire to obtain the Karelian Isthmus in order to ensure the territorial security of one of the largest and most significant cities of the Soviet Union - Leningrad. Finland hoped for help from its European allies, but received only the entry of volunteers into the ranks of its army, which did not make the task any easier, and the war ended without the development of a large-scale confrontation. Its results were the following territorial changes: the USSR received
- cities of Sortavala and Vyborg, Kuolojärvi,
- Karelian Isthmus,
- territory with Lake Ladoga,
- Rybachy and Sredniy peninsulas partially,
- part of the Hanko peninsula for rent for a military base.
As a result, the state border of Soviet Russia was shifted 150 km towards Europe from Leningrad, which actually saved the city. The Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940 was a serious, thoughtful and successful strategic move on the part of the USSR on the eve of the Second World War. It was this step and several others taken by Stalin that made it possible to predetermine its outcome and save Europe, and perhaps the whole world, from being captured by the Nazis.
The Soviet-Finnish military conflict, which began on November 30, 1939, cannot be considered out of context historical events that took place in Europe after Munich agreement and the German invasion of Poland - on September 1, 1939, the Second World War began.
In an increasingly escalating situation, the Soviet leadership simply could not help but think about the state of its borders, including in the northwestern direction, since Finland was an unconditional military supporter of Nazi Germany. Back in 1935, General Mannerheim visited Berlin, where he held negotiations with Goering and Ribbentrop, which resulted in an agreement to grant Germany the right in the event of war to station its troops on Finnish territory. In exchange, the German side promised Finland Soviet Karelia.
In connection with the agreements reached, as a springboard for future hostilities, the Finns built an impenetrable chain of barrier structures on the Karelian Isthmus, called the “Mannerheim Line”. In Finland itself, the Finnish fascist organization “Lapuan Movement” actively raised its head, whose program included the creation of “Greater Finland”, which included Leningrad and all of Karelia.
Throughout the second half of the 30s, secret contacts between the highest Finnish generals and the Wehrmacht leadership were carried out; in August 1937, Finland hosted a squadron of 11 German submarines, and in 1938 it began direct preparation to the introduction of the German expeditionary force into Finland. By the beginning of 1939, with the help of German specialists, a network of military airfields was built in Finland, capable of receiving 10 times more aircraft than the Finnish Air Force had. By the way, their identification mark, as well as the tank troops, became a blue swastika. On the Finnish side, on the border with the USSR, all kinds of provocations, including armed ones, were constantly organized on land, in the sky and at sea.
In connection with the current situation and in order to secure the northwestern borders of the USSR, the Soviet leadership began to make attempts to persuade the Finnish government to mutually beneficial cooperation.
On April 7, 1938, the resident of the INO NKVD in Helsinki, Boris Rybkin, also the second secretary of the Soviet embassy in Finland, Yartsev, was urgently summoned to Moscow and received in the Kremlin by Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov. Stalin said that there was a need to start secret negotiations with the Finnish side, the main goal of which should be an agreement on moving the Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus away from Leningrad. It was proposed to interest the Finns by offering to transfer significantly larger territories in exchange, but in a different area. In addition, given that in the central part of Finland almost all the forest has been cut down and wood processing enterprises are idle, the Finns were promised additional supplies of wood from the USSR. Another goal of the negotiations was to conclude a bilateral defense treaty in case Germany attacked the USSR through the territory of Finland. At the same time, the Soviet side will give guarantees of the independence and territorial integrity of Finland. All upcoming negotiations, Stalin emphasized, must be exclusively secret.
On April 14, 1938, Rybkin arrived in Helsinki, immediately called the Finnish Foreign Ministry and asked to connect him with Foreign Minister Holsti, to whom he approached with a proposal for an immediate meeting, which took place on the same day. On it, Rybkin explained to the minister everything that Stalin had said and added that if Germany was allowed to freely land its troops on Finnish territory, then Soviet Union is not going to passively wait for the Germans to arrive in Rajek (now Sestroretsk, 32 km from Leningrad), but will throw his armed forces deep into Finnish territory, as far as possible, after which battles between German and Soviet troops will take place on Finnish territory. If the Finns resist the German landing, the USSR will provide Finland with all possible economic and military assistance with the obligation to withdraw its armed forces immediately after the end of the military conflict. Rybkin emphasized the need for special secrecy when considering this issue.
Holsti reported to Prime Minister Cajander about the conversation with Rybkin, but after discussing the situation, they decided to continue negotiations, but take the most wait-and-see approach to them, without promising anything. Rybkin went to Moscow with a report to Stalin, who at that time was satisfied at least with the very fact of starting negotiations with the Finnish side.
Three months later, on July 11, on the initiative of the Finnish side, Rybkin was received by Prime Minister Kajander, but no progress took place in the negotiation process, and, moreover, by entrusting its further management to cabinet member Tanner, the Finnish leadership demonstrated that it was not paying due attention to Soviet proposals, lowering their level and finally choosing delaying tactics.
However, on August 5, 10, 11 and 18, meetings between Rybkin and Tanner took place, during the latter of which the Soviet proposals were finally fleshed out.
1. If the Finnish government does not believe that it can conclude a secret military agreement with the USSR, then Moscow would be satisfied with Finland's written commitment to be ready to repel a possible attack and, for this purpose, to accept Soviet military assistance.
2. Moscow is ready to give consent to the construction of fortifications on the Aland Islands, necessary for the security of both Finland and Leningrad. But on the condition that the USSR will be given the opportunity to take part in their strengthening.
3. As a return favor, Moscow hopes that the Finnish government will allow the USSR to build defensive air and naval bases on the Finnish island of Sur-Sari (Gogland).
If the Finnish side accepts these conditions, the USSR guarantees Finland the inviolability of its borders,, if necessary, will provide it with weapons on favorable terms and is ready to conclude a profitable trade agreement with it that would favor the development of both Agriculture, and industry.
Tanner reported on the Soviet proposals to Prime Minister Kajader, and he found them unacceptable, which was reported to Rybkin on September 15: the Finnish side itself is not curtailing the secret negotiations, they are even ready to purchase some weapons, but the proposals on the Åland Islands and the island of Gogland are rejected without counter offers.
Stalin recommended that Rybkin continue the negotiation process, which he did until December 1938, and only when it finally became clear that the positions of the parties were too different, it was decided to recall him to Moscow and continue negotiations at the official level.
Such negotiations with Finland began in Moscow in March 1939. However, the exchange of views proceeded sluggishly, the Finnish government was increasingly inclined towards close cooperation with Nazi Germany, and no progress was achieved.
But the aggravation of the situation in Europe in connection with the outbreak of World War II forced the Soviet leadership to again urgently urge the Finnish side to continue negotiations, which began in Moscow on October 12. At them, the Kremlin sharply demanded that Finland fulfill the previously proposed conditions, and, above all, move the border from Leningrad in exchange for another territory. Stalin stated so directly: “We ask that the distance from Leningrad to the border line be 70 km. These are our minimum demands, and you should not think that we will reduce them. We cannot move Leningrad, so the border line must be moved "(the territorial waters of Finland almost reached the outer roadstead of the Leningrad port).
The Finnish government, and above all, President Kallio, who takes an irreconcilably tough pro-German position, hoping for help from Germany, which was secretly supplying the Finns with weapons, instructed their delegation, after its repeated departures and returns, supposedly for consultations in the chosen delaying tactics, to interrupt the negotiations on November 13 finally and leave, rejecting all fundamental Soviet proposals.
And a mutual assistance pact has already been proposed at various stages; rent, purchase or exchange for Soviet territory of islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland; exchange of Finnish territory on the Karelian Isthmus for a much larger part of Soviet territory in Eastern Karelia near Rebola and Porosozero (5529 sq. km versus 2761 sq. km); establishment of a Soviet air and naval base on the Hanko Peninsula, etc.
But everything is in vain. Even despite the fact that the USSR had already signed a non-aggression pact with Germany and reached agreements on spheres of influence. By the way, when the returning Finnish delegation crossed the border, the Finnish border guards opened fire on the Soviet border guards. After all this, at the military council, Stalin said: “We will have to fight with Finland,” and it was decided to ensure the security of the northwestern borders by force, and therefore, until the end of November, Soviet troops were hastily drawn up to the border.
On November 26 at 15.45, an incident occurred near the border near the village of Maynila with artillery shelling by Soviet troops, as a result of which, according to the official report, 4 Red Army soldiers were killed and 9 were wounded.
On the same day Soviet government sent a note of protest to the Finnish side and demanded, in order to prevent future similar incidents, to withdraw its troops from the border line by 20 - 25 km.
In a response note, the Finnish government denied the involvement of Finnish troops in the shelling of Mainila and suggested that “the matter is about an accident that occurred during training exercises on the Soviet side...” As for the withdrawal of troops, the note proposed “to begin negotiations on the issue on mutual withdrawal to a certain distance from the border."
In a new note dated November 28, the Soviet government qualified the Finnish response as “a document reflecting the deep hostility of the Finnish government towards the Soviet Union and designed to bring the crisis in relations between both countries to the extreme.” The note indicated that the proposal for a mutual withdrawal of troops was unacceptable for the USSR, since in this case parts of the Red Army would have to be pulled back to the suburbs of Leningrad, while Soviet troops did not threaten any vital center of Finland. In this regard, the Soviet government "considers itself free from the obligations assumed by virtue of the non-aggression pact..."
On the evening of November 29, the Finnish envoy in Moscow Irie Koskinen was summoned to the NKID, where Deputy People's Commissar V. Potemkin handed him a new note. It said that in view of the current situation, for which responsibility falls entirely on the Finnish government, “the USSR government came to the conclusion that it could no longer maintain normal relations with the Finnish government and therefore recognized the need to immediately recall its political and economic representatives from Finland.” It was a breakup diplomatic relations, which meant the penultimate step separating peace from war.
Early the next morning the last step was taken. As stated in the official statement, “by order of the High Command of the Red Army, in view of new armed provocations on the part of the Finnish military, troops of the Leningrad Military District crossed the border of Finland at 8 a.m. on November 30 on the Karelian Isthmus and in a number of other areas.”
The war began, later called the Winter War, which at that moment promised to be uncomplicated and end in two to three weeks. But due to underestimation of the enemy, who managed to increase the size of his armed forces from 37 to 337 thousand, his own insufficient combat readiness, excessive illusions about the “class solidarity of the Finnish workers,” who would almost come out with flowers to greet the soldiers of the Red Army, the war lasted 105 days , can hardly be considered completely successful for the Soviet side, and ended only on March 12, 1940 with the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty.
In general, along the entire front, 425 thousand Red Army soldiers acted against 265 thousand Finnish military personnel; on the impregnable “Mannerheim Line” on the Karelian Isthmus, 169 thousand Red Army soldiers acted against 130 thousand Finns.
Finnish casualties in the war: 21,396 killed and 1,434 missing. Our losses are significantly greater: 126,875 Red Army soldiers were killed, died or went missing.
As a result of the war, the Soviet Union acquired about 40 thousand square meters without any compensating exchange. km of Finnish territories (and it was proposed to give 5529 sq. km in exchange for only 2761 sq. km), including a naval base on the Hanko Peninsula. As a result, after the start of the Great Patriotic War Finnish troops were able to reach the line of the old state border only by September 1941.
The USSR also demanded an amount of 95 million rubles. as compensation, Finland had to transfer 350 sea and river vehicles, 76 locomotives, 2 thousand wagons and cars.
And it is very important that the Soviet troops acquired invaluable combat experience, and the command of the Red Army received reason to think about the shortcomings in the training of troops and urgent measures to increase the combat effectiveness of the army and navy. There was already a little over a year left until June 22, 1941, and Stalin knew about it.
Finland was included in the Soviet sphere of influence by secret protocols to the 1939 Soviet-German non-aggression pact. But, unlike other Baltic countries, it refused to make serious concessions to the USSR. The Soviet leadership demanded that the border be moved away from Leningrad, since it ran 32 km from the “northern capital”. In exchange, the USSR offered larger and less valuable territories of Karelia. Referring to the threat to Leningrad in the event of aggression from a potential enemy through the territory of Finland during the Second World War, the USSR also demanded the rights to lease the islands (primarily Hanko) to create a military base.
The Finnish leadership, led by Prime Minister A. Kajander and the head of the Defense Council K. Mannerheim (in his honor, the Finnish line of fortifications became known as the “Mannerheim Line”), in response to Soviet demands, decided to play for time. Finland was ready to slightly adjust the border so as not to affect the Mannerheim Line. From October 12 to November 13, negotiations were held in Moscow with Finnish ministers V. Tanner and J. Paasikivi, but they reached a dead end.
On November 26, 1939, on the Soviet-Finnish border, in the area of the Soviet border point Mainila, a provocative shelling of Soviet positions was carried out from the Soviet side, which was used by the USSR as a pretext for an attack. On November 30, Soviet troops invaded Finland in five main directions. In the north, the Soviet 104th Division occupied the Petsamo area. South of the Kandalaksha area, the 177th division moved to Kemi. Even further south, the 9th Army was advancing on Oulu (Uleaborg). By occupying these two ports in the Gulf of Bothnia, the Soviet army would have cut Finland in two. North of Ladoga, the 8th army advanced to the rear of the Mannerheim line. And finally, on the main direction 7, the army was supposed to break through the Mannerheim Line and enter Helsinki. Finland was to be defeated in two weeks.
On December 6-12, troops of the 7th Army under the command of K. Meretskov reached the Mannerheim Line, but were unable to take it. On December 17-21, Soviet troops stormed the line, but unsuccessfully.
An attempt to bypass the line north of Lake Ladoga and through Karelia failed. The Finns knew this territory better, moved faster and were better camouflaged among the hills and lakes. Soviet divisions moved in columns along the few roads suitable for the passage of equipment. The Finns, bypassing the Soviet columns from the flanks, cut them in several places. This is how several Soviet divisions were defeated. As a result of the battles between December and January, the forces of several divisions were surrounded. The most severe defeat was the 9th Army near Suomussalmi on December 27 - January 7, when two divisions were defeated at once.
Frosts hit, snow covered the Karelian Isthmus. Soviet soldiers died from cold and frostbite, since the units arriving in Karelia were not sufficiently provided with warm uniforms - they did not prepare for the winter war, counting on a quick victory.
Volunteers of various views went to the country - from social democrats to right-wing anti-communists. Great Britain and France supported Finland with weapons and food.
On December 14, 1939, the League of Nations declared the USSR an aggressor and expelled it from its membership. In January 1940, Stalin decided to return to modest tasks - not to take all of Finland, but to move the border away from Leningrad and establish control over the Gulf of Finland.
The Northwestern Front under the command of S. Timoshenko broke through the Mannerheim Line on February 13-19. On March 12, Soviet troops broke into Vyborg. This meant that Helsinki could fall in a few days. The number of Soviet troops was increased to 760 thousand people. Finland was forced to accept the conditions of the USSR, and they became stricter. Now the USSR demanded that the border be drawn near the line determined by the Treaty of Nystad in 1721, including the transfer of Vyborg and the Ladoga coast to the USSR. The USSR did not withdraw its demand for the lease of Hanko. A peace agreement on these terms was concluded in Moscow on the night of March 13, 1940.
The irretrievable losses of the Soviet army in the war amounted to more than 126 thousand people, and the Finns - more than 22 thousand (not counting those who died from wounds and diseases). Finland retained its independence.
Sources:
On both sides of the Karelian Front, 1941-1944: Documents and materials. Petrozavodsk, 1995;
Secrets and lessons of the Winter War, 1939-1940: According to documents from declassified archives. St. Petersburg, 2000.
In Russian historiography, the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940, or, as it is called in the West, the Winter War, long years was virtually forgotten. This was facilitated by its not very successful results and the peculiar “political correctness” practiced in our country. Official Soviet propaganda was more afraid than fire to offend any of the “friends,” and Finland after the Great Patriotic War was considered an ally of the USSR.
Over the past 15 years, the situation has changed radically. Contrary to the well-known words of A. T. Tvardovsky about the “unfamous war,” today this war is very “famous.” One after another, books dedicated to her are published, not to mention many articles in various magazines and collections. But this “celebrity” is very peculiar. The authors who have made denouncing the Soviet “evil empire” their profession cite in their publications an absolutely fantastic ratio of our and Finnish losses. Any reasonable reasons for the actions of the USSR are completely denied...
By the end of the 1930s, near the northwestern borders of the Soviet Union there was a state that was clearly unfriendly to us. It is very significant that even before the start of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. The identifying mark of the Finnish Air Force and tank forces was a blue swastika. Those who claim that it was Stalin who pushed Finland into Hitler’s camp through his actions prefer not to remember this. As well as why peace-loving Suomi needed a network of military airfields built by the beginning of 1939 with the help of German specialists, capable of receiving 10 times more aircraft than the Finnish Air Force had. However, in Helsinki they were ready to fight against us both in an alliance with Germany and Japan, and in an alliance with England and France.
Seeing the approach of a new world conflict, the leadership of the USSR sought to secure the border near the second largest and most important city in the country. Back in March 1939, Soviet diplomacy explored the question of transferring or leasing a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, but Helsinki responded with a categorical refusal.
Those who denounce the “crimes of the Stalinist regime” like to rant about the fact that Finland is a sovereign country that manages its own territory, and therefore, they say, it was not at all obliged to agree to the exchange. In this regard, we can recall the events that took place two decades later. When Soviet missiles began to be deployed in Cuba in 1962, the Americans had no legal basis for imposing a naval blockade of Liberty Island, much less launching a military strike on it. Both Cuba and the USSR are sovereign countries; the deployment of Soviet nuclear weapons concerned only them and was fully consistent with international law. Nevertheless, the United States was ready to start the 3rd world war, if the missiles are not removed. There is such a thing as a “sphere of vital interests”. For our country in 1939, a similar area included the Gulf of Finland and the Karelian Isthmus. Not even at all sympathetic Soviet power the former leader of the Cadet Party P. N. Milyukov, in a letter to I. P. Demidov, expressed the following attitude towards the outbreak of war with Finland: “I feel sorry for the Finns, but I am for the Vyborg province.”
On November 26, a famous incident occurred near the village of Maynila. According to the official Soviet version, at 15:45 Finnish artillery shelled our territory, as a result of which 4 Soviet soldiers were killed and 9 were wounded. Today it is considered good form to interpret this event as the work of the NKVD. The Finnish claims that their artillery was deployed at such a distance that its fire could not reach the border are perceived as indisputable. Meanwhile, according to Soviet documentary sources, one of the Finnish batteries was located in the Jaappinen area (5 km from Mainila). However, whoever organized the provocation at Maynila, it was used by the Soviet side as a pretext for war. On November 28, the USSR government denounced the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression treaty and recalled its diplomatic representatives from Finland. November 30th started fighting.
I will not describe in detail the course of the war, since there are already enough publications on this topic. Its first stage, which lasted until the end of December 1939, was generally unsuccessful for the Red Army. On the Karelian Isthmus, Soviet troops, having overcome the forefield of the Mannerheim Line, reached its main defensive line on December 4-10. However, attempts to break through it were unsuccessful. After bloody battles, the sides switched to positional warfare.
What were the reasons for the failures of the initial period of the war? First of all, underestimating the enemy. Finland mobilized in advance, increasing the number of its Armed Forces from 37 to 337 thousand (459). Finnish troops were deployed in the border zone, the main forces occupied defensive lines on the Karelian Isthmus and even managed to conduct full-scale maneuvers at the end of October 1939.
Soviet intelligence was also not up to the task, unable to identify complete and reliable information about Finnish fortifications.
Finally, the Soviet leadership had unreasonable hopes for “class solidarity of the Finnish working people.” There was a widespread belief that the population of countries that entered the war against the USSR would almost immediately “rise up and go over to the side of the Red Army,” that workers and peasants would come out to greet Soviet soldiers with flowers.
As a result, the required number of troops was not allocated for combat operations and, accordingly, the necessary superiority in forces was not ensured. Thus, on the Karelian Isthmus, which was the most important section of the front, in December 1939 the Finnish side had 6 infantry divisions, 4 infantry brigades, 1 cavalry brigade and 10 separate battalions - a total of 80 crew battalions. On the Soviet side they were opposed by 9 rifle divisions, 1 rifle-machine-gun brigade and 6 tank brigades - a total of 84 infantry battalions. If we compare the number of personnel, the Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus numbered 130 thousand, the Soviet troops - 169 thousand people. In general, along the entire front, 425 thousand Red Army soldiers acted against 265 thousand Finnish military personnel.
Defeat or victory?
So, let's sum up the results of the Soviet-Finnish conflict. As a rule, a war is considered won if it leaves the winner in a better position than he was before the war. What do we see from this point of view?
As we have already seen, by the end of the 1930s, Finland was a country that was clearly unfriendly towards the USSR and was ready to enter into an alliance with any of our enemies. So in this respect the situation has not worsened at all. On the other hand, it is known that an unruly bully understands only the language of brute force and begins to respect the one who managed to beat him. Finland was no exception. On May 22, 1940, the Society for Peace and Friendship with the USSR was created there. Despite persecution by the Finnish authorities, by the time of its ban in December of the same year it had 40 thousand members. Such massive numbers indicate that not only communist supporters joined the Society, but also simply sensible people who believed that it was better to maintain normal relations with their great neighbor.
According to the Moscow Treaty, the USSR received new territories, as well as a naval base on the Hanko Peninsula. This is a clear plus. After the start of the Great Patriotic War, Finnish troops were able to reach the line of the old state border only by September 1941.
It should be noted that if at the negotiations in October-November 1939 the Soviet Union asked for less than 3 thousand square meters. km, and even in exchange for twice the territory, as a result of the war he acquired about 40 thousand square meters. km without giving anything in return.
It should also be taken into account that at the pre-war negotiations, the USSR, in addition to territorial compensation, offered to reimburse the value of the property left by the Finns. According to the calculations of the Finnish side, even in the case of the transfer of a small piece of land, which they agreed to cede to us, we were talking about 800 million marks. If it came to the cession of the entire Karelian Isthmus, the bill would already run into many billions.
But now, when on March 10, 1940, on the eve of the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty, Paasikivi started talking about compensation for the transferred territory, remembering that Peter I paid Sweden 2 million thalers under the Treaty of Nystadt, Molotov could calmly answer: “Write a letter to Peter the Great. If he orders, we will pay compensation.".
Moreover, the USSR demanded an amount of 95 million rubles. as compensation for equipment removed from the occupied territory and damage to property. Finland also had to transfer 350 sea and river vehicles, 76 locomotives, 2 thousand carriages, and a significant number of cars to the USSR.
Of course, during the fighting, the Soviet Armed Forces suffered significantly greater losses than the enemy. According to the name lists, in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. 126,875 Red Army soldiers were killed, died or went missing. The losses of the Finnish troops, according to official data, were 21,396 killed and 1,434 missing. However, another figure for Finnish losses is often found in Russian literature - 48,243 killed, 43 thousand wounded.
As it were, Soviet losses several times higher than the Finnish ones. This ratio is not surprising. Let's take for example Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 If we consider the fighting in Manchuria, the losses of both sides are approximately the same. Moreover, the Russians often lost more than the Japanese. However, during the assault on the Port Arthur fortress, Japanese losses far exceeded Russian losses. It would seem that the same Russians and Japanese soldiers, why is there such a difference? The answer is obvious: if in Manchuria the parties fought in open field, then in Port Arthur our troops defended the fortress, even if it was unfinished. It is quite natural that the attackers suffered much higher losses. The same situation arose during the Soviet-Finnish War, when our troops had to storm the Mannerheim Line, and even in winter conditions.
As a result, Soviet troops acquired invaluable combat experience, and the command of the Red Army had reason to think about shortcomings in troop training and about urgent measures to increase the combat effectiveness of the army and navy.
Speaking in Parliament on March 19, 1940, Daladier declared that for France “The Moscow Peace Treaty is a tragic and shameful event. This is a great victory for Russia.". However, one should not go to extremes, as some authors do. Not very great. But still a victory.
1. Units of the Red Army cross the bridge into Finnish territory. 1939
2. A Soviet soldier guarding a minefield in the area of the former Finnish border outpost. 1939
3. Artillery crew at their gun in a firing position. 1939
4. Major Volin V.S. and boatswain I.V. Kapustin, who landed with troops on the island of Seiskaari to inspect the coast of the island. Baltic Fleet. 1939
5. Soldiers of the rifle unit are advancing from the forest. Karelian Isthmus. 1939
6. Border guard outfit on patrol. Karelian Isthmus. 1939
7. Border guard Zolotukhin at the post at the Finnish outpost of Beloostrov. 1939
8. Sappers on the construction of a bridge near the Finnish border post of Japinen. 1939
9. Soldiers deliver ammunition to the front line. Karelian Isthmus. 1939
10. Soldiers of the 7th Army fire at the enemy with rifles. Karelian Isthmus. 1939
11. A reconnaissance group of skiers receives an assignment from the commander before going on reconnaissance. 1939
12. Horse artillery on the march. Vyborg district. 1939
13. Fighter skiers on a hike. 1940
14. Red Army soldiers in combat positions in the area of combat operations with the Finns. Vyborg district. 1940
15. Fighters cooking food in the forest over a fire during a break between battles. 1939
16. Cooking lunch in field conditions at a temperature of 40 degrees below zero. 1940
17. Anti-aircraft guns in position. 1940
18. Signalmen restoring the telegraph line destroyed by the Finns during the retreat. Karelian Isthmus. 1939
19. Signal soldiers are restoring the telegraph line destroyed by the Finns in Terijoki. 1939
20. View of the railway bridge blown up by the Finns at Terijoki station. 1939
21. Soldiers and commanders talk with residents of Terijoki. 1939
22. Signalmen on the front line negotiations near the Kemyarya station. 1940
23. Rest of the Red Army soldiers after the battle in the Kemyar area. 1940
24. A group of commanders and soldiers of the Red Army listens to a radio broadcast at a radio horn on one of the streets of Terijoki. 1939
25. View of Suojarva station, taken by Red Army soldiers. 1939
26. Red Army soldiers guard a gasoline pump in the town of Raivola. Karelian Isthmus. 1939
27. General form the destroyed "Mannerheim Fortification Line". 1939
28. General view of the destroyed “Mannerheim Fortification Line”. 1939
29. A rally in one of the military units after the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line during the Soviet-Finnish conflict. February 1940
30. General view of the destroyed “Mannerheim Fortification Line”. 1939
31. Sappers repairing a bridge in the Boboshino area. 1939
32. A Red Army soldier puts a letter in a field mail box. 1939
33. A group of Soviet commanders and soldiers inspects the Shyutskor banner captured from the Finns. 1939
34. B-4 howitzer on the front line. 1939
35. General view of the Finnish fortifications at height 65.5. 1940
36. View of one of the streets of the city of Koivisto, taken by units of the Red Army. 1939
37. View of a destroyed bridge near the city of Koivisto, taken by units of the Red Army. 1939
38. A group of captured Finnish soldiers. 1940
39. Red Army soldiers at a captured gun left behind after the battles with the Finns. Vyborg district. 1940
40. Trophy ammunition depot. 1940
41. Remote-controlled tank TT-26 (217th separate tank battalion of the 30th chemical tank brigade), February 1940.
42. Soviet soldiers at a captured pillbox on the Karelian Isthmus. 1940
43. Units of the Red Army enter the liberated city of Vyborg. 1940
44. Red Army soldiers at fortifications in Vyborg. 1940
45. Ruins of Vyborg after the fighting. 1940
46. Red Army soldiers clear the streets of the liberated city of Vyborg from snow. 1940
47. Icebreaking steamer "Dezhnev" during the transfer of troops from Arkhangelsk to Kandalaksha. 1940
48. Soviet skiers are moving to the forefront. Winter 1939-1940.
49. Soviet attack aircraft I-15bis taxis for takeoff before a combat mission during the Soviet- Finnish war.
50. Finnish Foreign Minister Vaine Tanner speaks on the radio with a message about the end of the Soviet-Finnish war. 03/13/1940
51. Crossing the Finnish border by Soviet units near the village of Hautavaara. November 30, 1939
52. Finnish prisoners talk with a Soviet political worker. The photo was taken in the Gryazovets NKVD camp. 1939-1940
53. Soviet soldiers talk with one of the first Finnish prisoners of war. November 30, 1939
54. Finnish Fokker C.X aircraft shot down by Soviet fighters on the Karelian Isthmus. December 1939
55. Hero of the Soviet Union, platoon commander of the 7th pontoon-bridge battalion of the 7th Army, junior lieutenant Pavel Vasilyevich Usov (right) discharges a mine.
56. The crew of the Soviet 203-mm howitzer B-4 fires at Finnish fortifications. 12/02/1939
57. Red Army commanders examine the captured Finnish Vickers Mk.E tank. March 1940
58. Hero of the Soviet Union, senior lieutenant Vladimir Mikhailovich Kurochkin (1913-1941) with the I-16 fighter. 1940
The Soviet-Finnish or Winter War began on November 30, 1939, and ended on March 12, 1940. The reasons for the start, course and results of the war are still considered very controversial. The instigator of the war was the USSR, whose leadership was interested in territorial acquisitions in the Karelian Isthmus region. Western countries almost did not react to the Soviet-Finnish conflict. France, England and the United States tried to adhere to a position of non-interference in local conflicts, so as not to give Hitler a reason for new territorial seizures. Therefore, Finland was left without the support of its Western allies.
Reason and reasons for the war
The Soviet-Finnish war was provoked by a whole complex of reasons related, first of all, to the protection of the border between the two countries, as well as geopolitical differences.
- During 1918-1922. The Finns attacked the RSFSR twice. To prevent further conflicts, an agreement on the inviolability of the Soviet-Finnish border was signed in 1922; according to the same document, Finland received Petsamo or the Pecheneg region, the Rybachy Peninsula and part of the Sredny Peninsula. In the 1930s, Finland and the USSR signed a Non-Aggression Pact. At the same time, relations between the states remained tense; the leadership of both countries feared mutual territorial claims.
- Stalin regularly received information that Finland had signed secret agreements on support and assistance with the Baltic countries and Poland if the Soviet Union attacked one of them.
- At the end of the 1930s, Stalin and his circle were also concerned about the rise of Adolf Hitler. Despite the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact and the secret protocol on the division of spheres of influence in Europe, many in the USSR feared a military clash and considered it necessary to begin preparations for war. One of the most strategically important cities in the USSR was Leningrad, but the city was too close to the Soviet-Finnish border. In the event that Finland decided to support Germany (and this is exactly what happened), Leningrad would find itself in a very vulnerable position. Shortly before the start of the war, the USSR repeatedly appealed to the leadership of Finland with a request to exchange part of the Karelian Isthmus for other territories. However, the Finns refused. Firstly, the lands offered in exchange were infertile, and secondly, in the area that interested the USSR, there were important military fortifications - the Mannerheim Line.
- Also, the Finnish side did not give its consent to the Soviet Union leasing several Finnish islands and part of the Hanko Peninsula. The USSR leadership planned to place its military bases in these territories.
- Soon the activities of the Communist Party were banned in Finland;
- Germany and the USSR signed a secret non-aggression pact and secret protocols to him, according to which Finnish territory was to fall into the zone of influence of the Soviet Union. To some extent, this agreement freed the hands of the Soviet leadership with regard to regulating the situation with Finland
The reason for the start of the Winter War was. On November 26, 1939, the village of Mainila, located on the Karelian Isthmus, was shelled from Finland. The Soviet border guards who were in the village at that time suffered the most from the shelling. Finland denied its involvement in this act and did not want the conflict to develop further. However, the Soviet leadership took advantage of the current situation and declared the start of war.
There is still no evidence confirming the guilt of the Finns in the shelling of Mainila. Although, however, there are no documents indicating the involvement of the Soviet military in the November provocation. The papers provided by both parties cannot be considered as unambiguous evidence of anyone’s guilt. Back at the end of November, Finland advocated the creation general commission to investigate the incident, but the Soviet Union rejected the offer.
On November 28, the leadership of the USSR denounced the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact (1932). Two days later, active hostilities began, which went down in history as the Soviet-Finnish war.
In Finland, the mobilization of those liable for military service was carried out; in the Soviet Union, the troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet were brought into full combat readiness. A broad propaganda campaign was launched against the Finns in the Soviet media. In response, Finland began to carry out an anti-Soviet campaign in the press.
From mid-November 1939, the USSR deployed four armies against Finland, which included: 24 divisions (the total number of military personnel reached 425 thousand), 2.3 thousand tanks and 2.5 thousand aircraft.
The Finns had only 14 divisions, in which 270 thousand people served, they had 30 tanks and 270 aircraft.
Course of events
The Winter War can be divided into two stages:
- November 1939 – January 1940: the USSR advanced in several directions at once, the fighting was quite fierce;
- February - March 1940: massive shelling of Finnish territory, attack on the Mannerheim Line, Finnish surrender and peace negotiations.
On November 30, 1939, Stalin gave the order to advance on the Karelian Isthmus, and on December 1, Soviet troops captured the city of Terijoki (now Zelenogorsk).
In the occupied territory, the Soviet army established contacts with Otto Kuusinen, who was the head of the Finnish Communist Party and an active participant in the Comintern. With Stalin's support, he proclaimed the creation of the Finnish Democratic Republic. Kuusinen became its president and began negotiations with the Soviet Union on behalf of the Finnish people. Official diplomatic relations were established between the FDR and the USSR.
The Soviet 7th Army moved very quickly towards the Mannerheim Line. The first chain of fortifications was broken through in the first ten days of 1939. The Soviet soldiers were unable to advance further. All attempts to break through the next lines of defense ended in losses and defeats. Failures on the line led to the suspension of further advance into the interior of the country.
Another army - the 8th - was advancing in the north of Lake Ladoga. In just a few days, the troops covered 80 kilometers, but were stopped by a lightning attack by the Finns, as a result of which half of the army was destroyed. Finland's success was due, first of all, to the fact that Soviet troops were tied to the roads. The Finns, moving in small mobile units, easily cut off equipment and people from the necessary communications. The 8th Army retreated with casualties, but did not leave the region until the very end of the war.
The most unsuccessful campaign of the Red Army during the Winter War is considered to be the attack on Central Karelia. Stalin sent the 9th Army here, which successfully advanced from the first days of the war. The troops were tasked with capturing the city of Oulu. This was supposed to cut Finland into two parts, demoralize and disorganize the army in the northern regions of the country. Already on December 7, 1939, the soldiers managed to capture the village of Suomussalmi, but the Finns were able to encircle the division. The Red Army switched to a perimeter defense, repelling attacks by Finnish skiers. Finnish detachments carried out their actions suddenly, and the main striking force of the Finns were almost elusive snipers. The clumsy and insufficiently mobile Soviet troops began to suffer enormous human losses, and equipment also broke down. The 44th Infantry Division was sent to help the encircled division, which also found itself surrounded by Finnish forces. Due to the fact that the two divisions were under constant fire, the 163rd Rifle Division gradually began to fight its way back. Almost 30% of the personnel died, more than 90% of the equipment was left to the Finns. The latter almost completely destroyed the 44th division and regained control of the state border in Central Karelia. In this direction, the actions of the Red Army were paralyzed, and the Finnish army received huge trophies. The victory over the enemy raised the morale of the soldiers, but Stalin repressed the leadership of the 163rd and 44th rifle divisions of the Red Army.
In the area of the Rybachy Peninsula, the 14th Army advanced quite successfully. During short term soldiers captured the city of Petsamo with its nickel mines and went straight to the border with Norway. Thus, Finland was cut off from access to the Barents Sea.
In January 1940, the Finns encircled the 54th Infantry Division (in the Suomussalmi area, in the south), but did not have the strength and resources to destroy it. Soviet soldiers were surrounded until March 1940. The same fate awaited the 168th Infantry Division, which tried to advance in the Sortavala area. A Soviet tank division also fell into Finnish encirclement near Lemetti-Yuzhny. She managed to escape from the encirclement, losing all her equipment and more than half of her soldiers.
The Karelian Isthmus became the zone of the most active military operations. But by the end of December 1939, the fighting here stopped. This was caused by the fact that the leadership of the Red Army began to understand the futility of attacks on the Mannerheim line. The Finns tried to use the lull in the war to maximum advantage and go on the attack. But all operations ended unsuccessfully with huge casualties.
By the end of the first stage of the war, in January 1940, the Red Army was in a difficult situation. She fought in unfamiliar, practically unexplored territory; moving forward was dangerous due to numerous ambushes. In addition, the weather made planning operations difficult. The position of the Finns was also unenviable. They had problems with the number of soldiers and lacked equipment, but the country's population had enormous experience in guerrilla warfare. Such tactics made it possible to attack with small forces, inflicting significant losses on large Soviet detachments.
Second period of the Winter War
Already on February 1, 1940, on the Karelian Isthmus, the Red Army began a massive artillery shelling that lasted 10 days. The purpose of this action was to damage the fortifications on the Mannerheim Line and the Finnish troops, to exhaust the soldiers, and to break their morale. The actions taken achieved their goals, and on February 11, 1940, the Red Army began an offensive into the interior of the country.
Very fierce fighting began on the Karelian Isthmus. The Red Army first planned to deliver the main blow to the settlement of Summa, which was located in the Vyborg direction. But the USSR army began to get stuck on foreign territory, suffering losses. As a result, the direction of the main attack was changed to Lyakhde. In the area of this settlement, the Finnish defenses were broken through, which allowed the Red Army to pass through the first strip of the Mannerheim Line. The Finns began to withdraw their troops.
By the end of February 1940, the Soviet army also crossed Mannerheim’s second line of defense, breaking through it in several places. By the beginning of March, the Finns began to retreat because they were in a difficult situation. Reserves were depleted, the morale of the soldiers was broken. A different situation was observed in the Red Army, the main advantage of which was its huge reserves of equipment, materiel, and replenished personnel. In March 1940, the 7th Army approached Vyborg, where the Finns put up stiff resistance.
On March 13, hostilities ceased, which was initiated by the Finnish side. The reasons for this decision were as follows:
- Vyborg was one of the largest cities in the country, its loss could have a negative impact on the morale of citizens and the economy;
- After the capture of Vyborg, the Red Army could easily reach Helsinki, which threatened Finland with a complete loss of independence and independence.
Peace negotiations began on March 7, 1940 and took place in Moscow. Based on the results of the discussion, the parties decided to cease hostilities. The Soviet Union received all the territories on the Karelian Isthmus and the cities: Salla, Sortavala and Vyborg, located in Lapland. Stalin also achieved that the Hanko Peninsula be given to him on a long-term lease.
- The Red Army lost about 88 thousand people killed, dying from wounds and frostbite. Almost 40 thousand more people were missing, and 160 thousand were injured. Finland lost 26 thousand people killed, 40 thousand Finns were injured;
- The Soviet Union achieved one of its key foreign policy objectives - ensuring the security of Leningrad;
- The USSR strengthened its position on the Baltic coast, which was achieved through the acquisition of Vyborg and the Hanko Peninsula, where Soviet military bases were moved;
- The Red Army gained vast experience in conducting military operations in difficult weather and tactical conditions, learning to break through fortified lines;
- In 1941 Finland supported Nazi Germany in the war against the USSR and allowed German troops through its territory, who managed to establish a blockade of Leningrad;
- The destruction of the Mannerheim Line was fatal for the USSR, since Germany was able to quickly capture Finland and enter the territory of the Soviet Union;
- The war showed Germany that the Red Army was in difficult weather conditions is unfit for combat. The same opinion was formed among the leaders of other countries;
- Finland, under the terms of the peace agreement, had to build a railway track, with the help of which it was planned to connect the Kola Peninsula and the Gulf of Bothnia. The road had to go through locality Alakurtia and connect with Tornio. But this part of the agreement was never implemented;
- On October 11, 1940, another agreement was signed between the USSR and Finland, which concerned the Åland Islands. The Soviet Union received the right to establish a consulate here, and the archipelago was declared a demilitarized zone;
- The international organization League of Nations, created following the First World War, excluded the Soviet Union from its membership. This was due to the fact that the international community reacted negatively to the USSR intervention in Finland. The reasons for exclusion were also the constant aerial bombing of Finnish civilian targets. Incendiary bombs were often used during raids;
Thus, the Winter War became the reason for Germany and Finland to gradually move closer and interact. The Soviet Union tried to resist such cooperation, restraining the growing influence of Germany and trying to establish a loyal regime in Finland. All this led to the fact that with the outbreak of World War II, the Finns joined the Axis countries in order to free themselves from the USSR and return lost territories.