Russia's Foreign Policy in the 1990s 8 page
country were not published. New newspapers and magazines are designed for a variety of tastes. Restored ties with Russia who had previously left her cultural figures. A huge amount of work to preserve the cultural heritage, the return of works of Russian art lost in different years was carried out by the Russian Cultural Foundation.
In literature, the development of domestic realistic traditions continued. V. Astafiev, V. Rasputin, M. Alekseev, Yu. Bondarev, G. Baklanov and others continued their work in this direction.
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At the same time, writers working in a postmodernist manner have gained great popularity. Among the most widely read are V. Voinovich, A. Bitov, T. Tolstaya, D. Prigov, V. Pelevin, V. Pietsukh, E. Popov, L. Petrushevskaya. The adherents of this direction are characterized by the rejection of sociality and moralism. The aesthetic value of literature comes to the fore. At the same time, the authors are skeptical about the possibility of the existence of a social ideal. Among the signs of this ʼʼliteraryʼʼ literature are: the insignificance of the place of action, the social affiliation of the characters, the aphorism of the text of the work, the absence of a definite idea, and the irony that pervades the entire work.
The new economic realities had a significant impact on the development of Russian cinema. The lack of government support led to a sharp decline in film releases. If in 1992 ᴦ. 178 films were shot, then in 1995 ᴦ. - only 46. This led to the fact that in the 90s the Russian film market was dominated by Western films. Both experienced and novice Russian directors are faced with the problem of the economic efficiency of cinema. The commercialization of this art form had an impact, first of all, on its problematics and style. If the ʼʼcrime-detectiveʼʼ features of the 90s found a sufficiently ʼʼcolorfulʼʼ reflection, then the question of a positive ʼʼhero of our timeʼʼ remains open. In the domestic cinematography, films directed by N. Mikhalkov, P. Lungin, V. Todorovsky, A. Rogozhkin, E. Ryazanov, S. Bodrov Sr., V. Khotinenko received a significant response. The country annually hosts the All-Russian Film Festival ʼʼKinotavrʼʼ in Sochi. In the late 1990s, the International Moscow Film Festival revived. Domestic television series have developed rapidly, but they do not differ in great thematic diversity.
Musical art has been further developed. On the one hand, connoisseurs of the classics had the opportunity to attend concerts by outstanding conductors and performers of symphonic works, opera and ballet performances. On the other hand, the 1990s became a time of rapid development of a new youth musical culture, characterized by great stylistic diversity and coverage of the widest audience.
Many bright theatrical productions appeared in this decade. Along with well-known theater groups, new theaters and studios were created. The theater performances were revived. The viewer was more often attracted by the original director's decisions, the play of old and new theatrical ʼʼʼʼʼ's. The variety of forms, styles and themes was also inherent in fine arts. On the whole, the development of culture reflected the incompleteness and inconsistency of the Russian transformations of the 1990s. The prospects for the spiritual and cultural progress of the country directly depend on the success of the initiated reforms.
Concept formation. The collapse of the USSR became the most important event in international life at the end of the 20th century, which had a huge impact on the system of international relations. To replace the bipolar world, the longstanding confrontation between the two social systems a different organization of international life was to come, reflecting the new alignment of forces and corresponding global challenges modernity.
In Russian society, understanding post-communist realities was not easy, discussions about foreign policy priorities were associated both with an assessment of the state of international relations and with fundamental ideas about the ways of Russia's future development. Some time in public consciousness euphoria reigned. Politicians expected that a radical turn from confrontation to rapprochement with Western countries would automatically change their attitude towards Russia, mobilize massive political support and economic assistance. Under these conditions, the stake was placed on accelerated integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures. In the first half of the 1990s, the policy was theoretically substantiated and implemented in practice. Atlanticism. At the root of the Atlantic foreign policy concept lay an orientation towards the Western model of development, a non-confrontational vision of modern international relations, a denial of the primacy of force in solving international problems, optimism in assessing the collapse of the USSR and in assessing the international situation. USA, Western Europe presented themselves as the main allies and partners both in the international arena and in carrying out democratic reforms in Russia.
In the West, the situation was perceived differently. Our country was considered the loser of the Cold War, they were in no hurry to establish a "strategic partnership", and even more so they did not see Russia as an equal ally. At best, she was assigned the role of a junior partner, while any manifestation of independence was seen as a relapse of the Soviet "imperial" policy. About ignoring
Russia's interests were evidenced by the advancement of NATO to its borders, counteraction to reintegration trends in the post-Soviet space. Russia remained fenced off from the West by visa and customs barriers, its markets protected by high tariffs, quotas and other regulations. All this had a sobering effect on the Russian political elite. The critical attitude towards Atlanticism among politicians began to sound louder in the middle - the second half of 1993 ᴦ.
In the mid-1990s, the conviction grew stronger that the only reliable guideline for foreign policy should be the firm defense of national interests. More realism appeared in assessing the consequences of the collapse of the USSR and the situation in the world. Ideas about the formation of a multi-polar world are being affirmed, in which not a single, even the most powerful power, is absolutely capable of dominating. An analysis of the reforms within Russia led to the conclusion that it was unproductive to copy Western experience without carefully taking into account the specifics of one's own country. Awareness of the geopolitical and cultural-historical identity of Russia revived interest in the ideas Eurasianism who were also involved in the justification of the foreign policy strategy.
Approval of ideas about the multipolarity of the emerging system of international relations, the departure from Atlanticism and the transition to a course towards multi-vector foreign policy was associated with the name of E. M. Primakov, who in 1996 ᴦ. after the resignation of A. V. Kozyrev, he headed the Russian Foreign Ministry.
The implementation of an effective foreign policy was also hampered by the unresolved number of important organizational problems. One of them was connected with the departure of experienced diplomats from the Foreign Ministry on the higher paying jobs in the private sector. This affected the work of the Foreign Ministry. Speaking at the collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October 1992 ᴦ., B. N. Yeltsin said: ʼʼIn Russia's foreign policy, unfortunately, there is a lot of improvisation, inconsistency and inconsistency. There are mistakes and miscalculations... The trouble is that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs follows the events and rarely foresees them. There is not enough information, there is not enough analysis and, most importantly, actions.. Where have the thinkers, analysts, practitioners gone - all of them turned out to be incapable in the new conditions?.. What worries? Russia is now perceived in the West as a state that says only "yes", a state that sometimes does not notice how others do not fulfill their obligations towards it, silently enduring grievances, even insultsʼʼ.
The changed external and internal conditions of Russia's existence posed new tasks in the field of coordination of international activities between its various subjects. General questions interstate relations was handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; military structures had their own vision of foreign policy; the emerging Russian business declared its priorities; subjects of the Federation also
significantly intensified foreign policy activities. Meanwhile, the country has not developed a single form of organized representation and coordination of the interests of all groups operating in this direction. So, in November 1993 ᴦ. the leadership of the Foreign Intelligence Service opposed the expansion of NATO to the East, and the Foreign Ministry said that this did not threaten Russia. It was in this connection that at the beginning of 1995, in his Address to the Federal Assembly, the president directly set the task of "improving the coordination of foreign policy activities". At the same time, created by B. N. Yeltsin at the end of 1995 ᴦ. The Foreign Policy Council has not fully coped with this task.
Russian-American relations. Relations with the United States occupied a key place in Russia's foreign policy in the 1990s. In general, they have changed markedly in better side. At the same time, Russian-American relations were a complex intertwining of interaction, the search for areas of common interests and disagreements on specific issues of international and bilateral relations. The interaction between the two states was influenced by differences in their economic and political capabilities. It was difficult for Russia to claim the role of a global power. In comparison with the USSR, it has a more modest economic potential. Its national income has halved during the crisis and, according to optimistic estimates, is 8-9% of the American one. Russia's military spending has decreased 10 times compared to the mid-1980s. At the same time, as a result of the disintegration of the USSR, it lost its former allies and did not acquire new ones, while the United States strengthened its leading position in the military-political blocs of Europe and Asia that survived the Cold War.
The new nature of Russian-American relations was reflected in two documents of 1992 ᴦ.: ʼʼDeclaration of the Presidents of Russia and the United Statesʼʼ and ʼʼCharter of Russian-American Partnership and Friendshipʼʼ. They provided for the refusal of the parties to consider each other as opponents; a shared commitment to human rights, economic freedom; US support for Russia's course to deepen reforms; continuation of the arms reduction process and cooperation in maintaining strategic and regional stability.
Russian-American political ties have significantly intensified. The meetings of the presidents of the two countries have acquired a regular character. Inter-parliamentary contacts have revived, interaction through other public institutions and departments. All this led to important results.
Cooperation in the field of arms reduction was actively developed. In 1992 ᴦ. the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-1), signed a year earlier, was ratified, and already in 1993, the START-2 Treaty was signed. The parties reached a framework agreement that provided for radical reductions in
offensive weapons of the USA and Russia by the beginning of the 20th century. Cooperation in the safe destruction of nuclear and chemical weapons, as well as issues of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology became the sphere of bilateral cooperation.
The start of market reforms in Russia opened up significant prospects for cooperation in the trade and economic field. A number of restrictions on the ʼʼ period were removed cold warʼʼ, a contractual and legal basis for economic interaction was created. The working mechanism for solving problems in this area was created in 1993 ᴦ. the intergovernmental Russian-American Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation (known by the names of its co-chairs as the ʼʼCommission of Gore-Chernomyrdinʼʼ). In total, more than 200 bilateral documents were signed in the 1990s, including major intergovernmental and interdepartmental agreements in various fields.
Russian-American cooperation has developed in settling acute regional problems. This concerned overcoming the consequences of the crisis in the Persian Gulf, the situation in Angola and Nicaragua. Russia and the US have been cooperating as co-chairs of the Middle East Peace Conference. The issue of limiting the supply of weapons to the Third World countries was discussed, and an intensive search was carried out to normalize the situation in Afghanistan, the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, El Salvador, and Cyprus.
In the mid-1990s, a certain evolution of Russian-American relations took place. Getting rid of the threat of communist restoration in Russia as a result of the presidential elections of 1996 ᴦ. led to a tougher dialogue between the American administration and Moscow on controversial issues. The United States sought to implement its plans for the restructuring of international relations in the spirit of monocentrism and American leadership. The intensification of Russian-American contacts in the first half of the 1990s did not lead to the removal of the contradictions that existed in their relations, many of which are very significant.
The United States increasingly moved away from supporting the traditional principles of international law, based on respect for sovereignty and non-interference in other people's affairs, towards the so-called "humanitarian intervention" under the pretext of protecting human rights and ethnic minorities. The legitimacy of ʼʼhumanitarian interventionʼʼ justified by Washington was called the ʼʼClinton doctrineʼʼ and was tested during an armed operation on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The NATO bombing of Belgrade led to a significant cooling of Russia's relations with the United States and its allies.
Russia opposed the building of the emerging system of international security on the basis of NATO, belittling the role of the UN and the OSCE in international affairs. The American side and its party
The blockers ignored Russia's objections to the intended expansion of the alliance to include former Warsaw Pact countries and some republics of the disintegrated USSR. The United States refused to recognize the territory of the former Soviet Union as a zone of Russia's priority interests, and integration impulses within the CIS were interpreted as a desire to revive the "Soviet empire". The American doctrine of maintaining "geopolitical pluralism" in the post-Soviet space was aimed at counteracting this. Increasingly sharp differences emerged in connection with the ABM Treaty (1972) and the US attempts to circumvent it and abandon the restrictions. Despite the positive dynamics of economic cooperation, discriminatory restrictions on Russian goods were not lifted in the United States, anti-dumping duties and quotas were maintained, and there were obstacles to the import of high-tech products into Russia. Washington's policy of ousting Russia from high-tech commodity markets has become more aggressive. On the whole, in the 1990s, a fairly well-oiled mechanism of interaction and overcoming differences took shape in Russian-American relations.
Russia and Europe. The European direction of Russian foreign policy in the 1990s was one of the priorities. On the one hand, the results of overcoming the Cold War were especially visible in Europe, which opened up favorable prospects for Russia to actively participate in the life of the continent. On the other hand, the profound changes taking place in Europe were capable of seriously complicating its objectively inevitable interaction with our country. Among them, the most significant are the unification of Germany; activation of integration processes in the western part of the continent; foreign policy reorientation of former Soviet allies; conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. The emergence of a new European policy in Russia was also complicated by the narrowing of the spatial area, a significant reduction in the economic and especially military potential of the state. All this contained the danger of pushing our country to the periphery of international political development.
For Russia, the most acute problem in the formation of European security was the question about the role of NATO in the new conditions. Initially, the notion was that given block expects the same fate as the Warsaw Treaty Organization, since the main object of confrontation of the alliance has disappeared. It was also expected that NATO would gradually transform from a predominantly military to a political security structure. In December 1991 ᴦ. 6. N. Yeltsin announced Russia's readiness to join this organization. At the same time, the development of events went according to the third scenario. There was a reorientation of NATO towards new military-strategic goals, a course was taken to expand the circle of participants
kov, there were claims for the exclusive right to make decisions on the most sensitive issues ensuring European security, incl. and around the UN. Russia sought to counteract these trends, but it took some time to do so.
In the second half of 1993 ᴦ., in connection with the discussion of the issue of expanding the alliance by including new members from among the countries of Central and of Eastern Europe(CEE), an anti-NATO campaign began in Russia, uniting the most diverse political forces for the first time. Western leaders were informed of Russia's strong objection to the inclusion of CEE states in NATO. The campaign fueled the sentiments of the former Soviet allies in favor of joining the alliance, but it also had a certain impact on Western countries. When discussing the issue of enlargement, they began to emphasize that it should not lead to the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe or the pushing of Russia. In this regard, it was supposed to solve two problems in parallel: the inclusion of new members in NATO and the development of relations with Russia.
It is important to note that in January 1994, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was adopted for cooperation with countries that are not members of the alliance. Moscow reacted with restraint to this project, joined it only in May 1995 ᴦ., but participated formally. The Russian leadership sought to provide their country with a special, more privileged status, but this was not achieved. The situation became seriously complicated after December 1996, when the NATO session authorized the start of the process of expanding the alliance. Russia was faced with a dilemma: either further active opposition to it (with all the political and military consequences that follow from it), or acceptance of its decision and an attempt to ensure a breakthrough in Russia-NATO bilateral relations.
Under the influence of the Russian Foreign Ministry headed by E. M. Primakov, the choice was made in favor of the second, more pragmatic option. As a result, in May 1997 ᴦ. parties signed the Founding Act on mutual relations, cooperation and security. The document defined the "goals and mechanism for consultation and cooperation, joint decision-making and joint action, which will form the core of the relationship between Russia and NATO" ʼʼ. The Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council was established. In this way, the political and legal foundations were laid for turning Russia-NATO relations into one of the central elements of European security.
At the same time, subsequent events showed that the parties interpreted the meaning of the agreements reached in different ways. If Russia was inclined to ensure that the created mechanism made joint decisions on security issues in Europe, then in NATO it was considered only as a forum for joint discussion of problems recommended
the provisions of which were not binding on the leadership of the alliance. These differences in positions were clearly manifested in connection with the events around Kosovo in 1999 ᴦ.
For Russia, it was especially painful that not just an act of aggression was committed against its historical ally, but that this was done despite its active objections. The bombing of Yugoslavia showed the unwillingness of the leaders of the leading Western countries to turn Russia-NATO relations into a significant component European security. Moreover, the alliance claimed the right to use force outside the member countries without the sanction of the UN Security Council. In the new ʼʼNATO Strategic Conceptʼʼ, approved at the anniversary summit of the alliance in April 1999, the organization's tasks for the first time included ʼʼcrisis response operationsʼʼ, not related to collective defense against external aggression.
Russia took an active part in European affairs within the framework of the All-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the most representative structure in terms of composition of participants and universal structure in terms of functions. Unlike other European associations, here it is a full member. On her initiative, the Charter for European Security was developed and approved at the OSCE summit in Istanbul (1999), which analyzed the challenges that the continent would face in the 21st century. The document reaffirmed the commitment to the Charter and the UN and did not include the issue of "new internationalism" on humanitarian grounds. Under the influence of Russia, antiterrorist problems were widely reflected in the Charter. Negotiations on the reduction of armaments were held within the framework of the OSCE. In 1999 ᴦ. a new version of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, important for Russia, was approved, which took into account the new realities that emerged after the end of the Cold War.
No less important for Russia was the expansion of ties with the European Union (EU) - perhaps the most influential organization within which the integration of the member states is carried out. The main area of integration development in the EU is the economy, but the unifying efforts are gradually spreading to other areas. In the 1990s, the EU acted as Russia's most important trade and economic partner. In 1997 ᴦ. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Russia came into force, opening up wide opportunities for attracting investments to our country.
In 1996.ᴦ. Russia has been admitted to the Council of Europe, an organization whose goal is to achieve the expansion of democracy and the protection of human rights, the development of cooperation on issues of culture, education, health, youth, sports, information, environmental protection. Focusing on high European standards is also important for a dynamically developing Russia.
On the whole, Russia's multilateral and bilateral relations with the European states developed dynamically, largely constructively, although differences persisted in some important approaches. Apart from international security issues, the partners did not always find a common language on Russia's internal problems. More often than others, the Chechen problem turned out to be at the center of discussions.
In the second half of the 90s foreign policy Russia has taken on a more balanced character.
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Russian diplomacy began to pay more attention not only to Western partners. Contacts with the countries of the Far, Middle and Near East, the states of Southeast Asia have become more active.
Relations between Russia and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have taken on a new character. In 1992 ᴦ. the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry A.V. Kozyrev formulated tasks for this direction as follows: ʼʼWith the Eastern European countries, Russia adheres to a different, fundamentally updated strategy of international relations. It is completely rid of the elements of arrogance and egocentrism inherent in the former USSR and is based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit. The strategic task at this stage is to prevent the transformation of Eastern Europe into a kind of buffer belt that isolates us from West. We are also striving to prevent Russia from being squeezed out of the Eastern European regionʼʼ. However, these issues were not resolved. According to experts, in the 1990s, the Eastern European countries became a "zone of cold and distrust" for Russia.
The leaders of the CEE states set as their main tasks the strengthening of economic and political integration with the West by gradually joining the European Union and joining NATO as the basis for ensuring their security. Initially, Russia did not see this as a big threat. So, in the Soviet-Polish declaration signed in August 1993, it was noted that Poland's intention to join NATO "does not contradict the interests of other countries, incl. and Russiaʼʼ, which was regarded by many as an agreement to expand the alliance at the expense of the CEE countries. This provision, however, caused a critical attitude among the majority of the Russian political elite and especially in the military environment. As a result, after some time B. N. Yeltsin sent a letter to the leaders of England and France. USA and Germany, where he actually disavowed his former position.
At the same time, the mechanism for involving new members in the alliance was launched after preparatory work 1992-1998. in April 1999 ᴦ. at the NATO anniversary summit in Brussels, the union accepted "first-line candidates" into the alliance. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary became them. Characteristically, this summit, timed to coincide with the 50th anniversary of the creation of this organization, was attended by the heads of all the states of CEE, the Baltics and
almost all the heads of the CIS countries with the exception of Russia and Belarus. Of particular concern to our country was the fact that the celebrations fell on the period when NATO aircraft (since March 24) launched missile and bomb strikes on the territory of the sovereign FRY. Approximation - happened and planned - of the borders of the alliance to the territory Russian Federation With a new interpretation of NATO's tasks, it caused justified alarm in the most diverse circles of Russian society.
In the 1990s, the scale of economic cooperation between Russia and the CEE countries was greatly reduced. Industrial cooperation turned out to be practically curtailed, ties were reduced mainly to trade, moreover, on a relatively modest scale. The exception was the Baltic countries, which received up to 60% of their foreign exchange earnings from Russian cargo flows. The establishment of new relations on a market basis was also hampered by such a ʼʼlegacy of the pastʼʼ as the problem of mutual debts. After moving in 1990 ᴦ. in mutual settlements with the CMEA countries from transferable rubles to hard currency, the USSR turned from a creditor of the Eastern European countries into their debtor. Russia, having assumed its debt obligations after the collapse of the USSR, turned out to be indebted to almost all the states of Eastern Europe. The amount of the debt varied from several tens of millions of Romanian transferable rubles to Czechoslovakia's $5 billion. All this blocked economic ties between the former allies. Only in the second half of the 1990s did negotiations on the procedure for repaying debts lead to constructive mutually acceptable agreements.
With the unequivocal economic aspiration of the CEE countries to the EU, here in this period there was an awareness of the complexity of integration into European structures. There has been a mutual decline that existed in 1991-1992. euphoria. A more rigorous consideration of their own capabilities and geo-economic processes led the leaders of these countries to declare their own special path to European integration and relations with neighboring countries, including Russia.
Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. The first two years of the existence of the Commonwealth were characterized by centrifugal tendencies, the rapid disintegration of the integrity of space former USSR. In 1993, with the liquidation of the single ruble zone, the common economic space ceased to exist. Political and legal systems developed in different directions. The new states actively established independent economic, political and military-political relations with third countries. By 1993 ᴦ. the division of the Soviet Army and the formation of the national Armed Forces were completed.
Russian policy towards the CIS countries in the 1990s was determined by the confrontation between two tendencies. Some politicians considered it necessary to preserve the Commonwealth as a cohesive geopolitical
political association with the dominant role of Russia. The preservation and strengthening of multilateral cooperation within the framework of the CIS was considered as the main direction Russian politics. Another approach proceeded from the recognition of the inevitability of geopolitical and geo-economic pluralism in the post-Soviet space, due both to the limited resources of Russia and its priority interest in integration into global economic processes. In the mid-90s, the first line dominated, which was determined by B. N. Yeltsin, who approved it by his decree in September 1995. document ʼʼStrategic course of Russia with the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent Statesʼʼ.
In January 1993 ᴦ. adopted the Charter of the CIS. The coordination of actions within the framework of the Commonwealth was carried out by the Council of Heads of State, the Council of Heads of Government, and the Council of Foreign Ministers. Council of Defense Ministers and the Council of Commanders of the Border Troops, the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, as well as through the bodies of sectoral cooperation. The Executive Secretariat of the CIS functioned in Minsk. In total, about 2,000 different agreements were signed within the Commonwealth in the 1990s, most of which have not been implemented.
By the end of the decade, it became obvious that within the framework of the CIS, it was possible to mitigate the consequences of the collapse of the USSR, but the integration goals were not achieved. Economic cooperation between Russia and the CIS countries has declined (the volume of foreign trade turnover has decreased; it was not possible to create either an Economic Union or even a free trade zone). Interaction in the military-political field was not crowned with success either: it was not carried out in in full The Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security (1992), the Russian military presence in the Commonwealth states was reduced, the concept of joint border protection turned out to be unrealized. In the political sphere, it was not possible to solve the main task set - to turn the CIS into a "political association" of states capable of claiming a worthy place in the world community. Moreover, within the CIS there was a process of formation of multidirectional coalitions, moreover, without the participation of Russia. There was no multilateral cooperation between the CIS countries in the humanitarian sphere either.
Russia's foreign policy in the 90s 8 page - concept and types. Classification and features of the category "Foreign policy of Russia in the 90s 8 page" 2017, 2018.
After the collapse of the USSR, Russia's foreign policy focused mainly on the West, rapprochement with the United States. Russia pursued a policy of concessions, went towards the strategic interests of Western countries. Russia's leaders did not want to put up with the loss of great power status and harbored illusions about the possibility of equal relations with the United States. President B.N. Yeltsin officially declared that Russian nuclear missiles were no longer aimed at targets in the United States. In signed during a visit to the United States B.N. Yeltsin's June 1992 declaration stated that "Russia and the United States of America do not consider each other as potential adversaries." In January 1993, a new treaty on the limitation of strategic offensive arms (START-2) was concluded between Russia and the United States, according to which by 2003 a reduction in the nuclear potential of both countries by 2/3 compared to the level determined by the START-1 treaty should be achieved. . Russia agreed to unilaterally withdraw from combat duty the SS-18 missiles, which formed the basis of the Soviet strategic potential.
Russian diplomacy in its decisions dutifully followed in the wake of US foreign policy. Russia supported economic sanctions against Iraq and joined the international economic sanctions against Yugoslavia. In many respects, such compliance of Russian diplomacy was also explained by the hopes for large-scale assistance from the West.
However, Russia's hopes failed to come true. The United States did not seek to consider our country as an equal partner. The United States remained the only superpower and sought to make the most of its position. In 1994, a number of former socialist countries, as well as the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), announced their intention to join NATO. Russia no longer had real levers of influence on the development of events. She was told that the North Atlantic Pact was not directed against any countries, but was a guarantee of common security in Europe. As a compromise, the Partnership for Peace program was proposed, which established the forms of military cooperation between the countries of the former Warsaw Pact and NATO. Russia has joined this program. However, this program did not in any way cancel NATO's expansion to the east.
In January 1996, instead of B. Kozyrev, E. Primakov became the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia. Under pressure from Russia, the UN Security Council lifted economic sanctions against Yugoslavia. Russia condemned the US bombing of Iraq in September 1996. Russian diplomacy tried to restore its positions in the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East.
Russia's economic ties with Western countries developed more successfully. At the first stages of the existence of independent Russia, they were carried out in the form of loans to Russia, humanitarian aid with food, medicines, etc. Of all the international economic organizations, only the International Monetary Fund (IMF) included Russia in its membership. As the position of the new leadership of the country strengthened, the emphasis increasingly shifted to establishing long-term economic cooperation and large-scale attraction of foreign investment. In June 1994, on about. Karfu (Greece), an agreement was signed between Russia and the European Community, according to which Russia was recognized as a country with a transitional economy. The agreement opened up opportunities for equal economic cooperation with Western Europe. In the same year, it was decided to expand the "seven" of leading European countries at the expense of Russia. At the same time, it was stipulated that Russia would take part only in the development of political decisions, and not economic ones. Thus, mutually beneficial partnership relations with the "far abroad" are gradually being established. However, due to objectively established reasons, the role of a supplier of fuel and raw materials was increasingly assigned to Russia. Even those relatively small positions in the world markets of high-tech products were lost, which Soviet Union. The main foreign economic task of the government - to achieve the rise of Russian industry by attracting highly efficient Western technologies and financing it through Western investments - was not fulfilled.
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§ 5. Foreign policy of Russia in the 90s
Concept formation
Russian-American relations
Russia and Europe
Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States
Russia and the Yugoslav Crisis
Russia and countries of the Asia-Pacific region
Concept formation
The collapse of the USSR became the most important event in international life at the end of the 20th century, which had a huge impact on the system of international relations. The bipolar world, the many years of confrontation between the two social systems, was to be replaced by a different organization of international life, reflecting the new balance of forces and corresponding to the global challenges of our time.
In Russian society, understanding post-communist realities was not easy, discussions about foreign policy priorities were associated both with an assessment of the state of international relations and with fundamental ideas about the ways of Russia's future development. For some time, euphoria reigned in the public mind. Politicians expected that a radical turn from confrontation to rapprochement with Western countries would automatically change their attitude towards Russia, mobilize massive political support and economic assistance. Under these conditions, the stake was placed on accelerated integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures. In the first half of the 1990s, the policy of Atlanticism received a theoretical justification and practical implementation. The Atlantic foreign policy concept was based on an orientation towards the Western model of development, a non-confrontational vision of modern international relations, a denial of the primacy of force in solving international problems, optimism in assessing the collapse of the USSR and in assessing the international situation. The United States and Western Europe were seen as the main allies and partners both in the international arena and in carrying out democratic reforms in Russia.
In the West, the situation was perceived differently. Our country was considered to have lost the Cold War, they were in no hurry to establish a "strategic partnership" and, all the more, they did not see Russia as an equal ally. At best, she was assigned the role of a junior partner, while any manifestation of independence was seen as a relapse of the Soviet "imperial" policy. The fact that Russia's interests were ignored was evidenced by NATO's advance towards its borders and opposition to reintegration tendencies in the post-Soviet space. Russia remained fenced off from the West by visa and customs barriers, its markets protected by high tariffs, quotas and other regulations. All this had a sobering effect on the Russian political elite. The critical attitude towards “Atlanticism” among politicians began to sound louder already in the middle - second half of 1993.
In the mid-1990s, the conviction grew stronger that the only reliable guideline for foreign policy should be a firm defense of national interests. More realism appeared in assessing the consequences of the collapse of the USSR and the situation in the world. Ideas about the formation of a multipolar world are being affirmed, in which not a single, even the most powerful power, is absolutely capable of dominating. An analysis of the reforms within Russia led to the conclusion that it was unproductive to copy Western experience without carefully taking into account the specifics of one's own country. Awareness of the geopolitical and cultural-historical originality of Russia revived interest in the ideas of Eurasianism, which were also involved in the justification of the foreign policy strategy.
The affirmation of ideas about the multipolarity of the emerging system of international relations, the departure from Atlanticism and the transition to a course towards a multi-vector foreign policy were associated with the name of E. M. Primakov, who in 1996, after the resignation of A. V. Kozyrev, headed the Russian Foreign Ministry.
The implementation of an effective foreign policy was also hampered by the unresolved number of important organizational problems. One of them was related to the departure of experienced diplomats from the Foreign Ministry to higher-paid positions in private business. This affected the work of the Foreign Ministry. Speaking at the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October 1992, B. N. Yeltsin said: “Unfortunately, there is a lot of improvisation, inconsistency and inconsistency in Russia's foreign policy. There are mistakes and miscalculations... The trouble is that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs follows the events and rarely foresees them. There is not enough information, there is not enough analysis, and most importantly, actions ... Where have the thinkers, analysts, practitioners gone - they all turned out to be incapable in the new conditions? .. What worries? Russia is now perceived in the West as a state that says only “yes”, a state that sometimes does not notice how others do not fulfill their obligations towards it, silently enduring insults, even insults.”
The changed external and internal conditions of Russia's existence posed new tasks in the field of coordination of international activities between its various subjects. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs dealt with general issues of interstate relations; military structures had their own vision of foreign policy; the emerging Russian business declared its priorities; the subjects of the Federation also noticeably stepped up their foreign policy activities. Meanwhile, the country has not developed a single form of organized representation and coordination of interests of all groups operating in this direction. Thus, in November 1993, the leadership of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) opposed the expansion of NATO to the East, and the Foreign Ministry declared that this did not threaten Russia. That is why in early 1995, in his address to the Federal Assembly, the President directly set the task of "improving the coordination of foreign policy activities." However, the Council on Foreign Policy, created by Boris N. Yeltsin at the end of 1995, did not fully cope with this task.
History of Russia from ancient times to the beginning of the 20th century Froyanov Igor Yakovlevich
Foreign policy of Russia in the 80-90s of the XIX century.
First post-war years in Russia there was no consensus on the further ways of developing foreign policy. There were still strong pro-German sentiments (encouraged by the new Minister of Foreign Affairs N.K. Girs), supported by the circles of landowners connected with trade relations with Germany. At the same time, representatives of the big commercial and industrial bourgeoisie preferred to establish close contacts with France. This rapprochement was supported by a number of major officials, diplomats, publicists (D.A. Milyutin, N.N. Obruchev, N.P. Ignatiev, M.N. Katkov and others). For the time being, however, Russia has been pursuing a cautious wait-and-see policy.
Meanwhile, the contradictions in Russian-German and Russian-Austrian relations, both in the political and economic spheres, gradually escalated. The dynastic union of the three emperors was increasingly conflicted national interest Russia. By the end of the 1870s, Germany began to put together the foundations of a military-political bloc in Europe (a secret agreement with Austria-Hungary in 1879), but at that time it was not yet going to break with Russia, fearing a Russian-French rapprochement. In 1882, Italy joined the Austro-German bloc.
In the second half of the 80s, in response to Russia's refusal to support Germany against France, Berlin took economic measures (the Russian-German customs war), but when Russian securities were thrown onto the German money market in 1887, they were bought up by Parisian bankers. Followed in 1888-1889. the placement of Russian loans in France strengthened Russian-French economic ties, which became one of the prerequisites for the formation of a future union (1893 convention).
The economic difficulties experienced by Russia and the regrouping of European powers did not allow Russian diplomacy to use its popularity in the Balkans to strengthen its positions there. After the Bulgarian crisis of 1885–1887 Russia has practically lost its political acquisitions in the region, and an Austro-German orientation is being established in Bulgaria.
In 1885–1895 as a result of the work of a special commission, the borders of Russia were determined in Central Asia, which softened the conflict that was brewing in relations between Russia and England, which was increasing its influence on the Asian continent.
In general, by the mid-90s of the XIX century. the regrouping of the forces of the European powers was almost completed.
From the book History of Russia XX - early XXI centuries author Tereshchenko Yury Yakovlevich4. Foreign policy during the war Soviet diplomats made their contribution to the overall victory. During the war years, they solved three main tasks: the creation of an anti-fascist coalition, the opening of a second front, post-war device peace. The creation of a coalition of anti-fascist powers, which
author Nikolaev Igor Mikhailovich From the book History. New complete reference student to prepare for the exam author Nikolaev Igor Mikhailovich From the book History. Russian history. Grade 11. A basic level of author§ 4. FOREIGN POLICY OF RUSSIA Growing contradictions in the Far East. At the end of the XIX century. the international situation in Europe was stable, but not cloudless. In particular, Russia has developed tense relations with Germany. Russia moved closer to France, as both
From the book History of Russia. XX - the beginning of the XXI century. Grade 11. A basic level of author Kiselev Alexander Fedotovich§ 4. FOREIGN POLICY OF RUSSIA Growing contradictions in the Far East. At the end of the XIX century. the international situation in Europe was stable, but not cloudless. In particular, Russia has developed tense relations with Germany. England was afraid of Russia's penetration into India.
From the book History of Russia from ancient times to the 16th century. 6th grade author Chernikova Tatyana Vasilievna§ 29. FOREIGN POLICY OF RUSSIA In the XVI century 1. Capture of KazanIn the east, Russia's neighbor was the Kazan Khanate. Kazan Tatars often raided Russia, taking away many people in full. Within the khanate there was a struggle for power between groups of murz (nobility). This
From the book History of Russia. XIX century. 8th grade author Lyashenko Leonid Mikhailovich§ 25 - 26. RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY THE STRUGGLE FOR THE RESPONSE OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE PARIS TREATY. The international position of Russia in the mid-1950s. was extremely difficult. Foreign policy isolation, loss of influence in the Balkans and the Middle East, the signing of the shameful Paris Treaty
From the book History of Russia in the XX - early XXI century author Milov Leonid Vasilievich§ 3. Domestic and foreign policy during the war years Mobilization National economy. The main factor in the radical turning point in the war on the Soviet-German front was the restructuring of the rear on a military footing, which was completed by mid-1942. It was switched to the production of military products
From the book Course of Russian History (Lectures LXII-LXXXVI) author Klyuchevsky Vasily OsipovichRussia's foreign policy in the 19th century The reign of Emperor Paul was the first and unsuccessful attempt to solve the problems late XVIII centuries. His successor was much more thoughtful and consistent in pursuing new beginnings, both in the external and in the internal.
From the book History of Russia author Munchaev Shamil Magomedovich§ 4. Foreign policy of Russia Turn of the XVII-XVIII centuries. is an important period in the history of Russian foreign policy. The vast territory of Russia was actually deprived of convenient sea routes. In these conditions, of paramount importance for the fates Russian state acquired
From the book History of Russia the author Ivanushkina V V54. Foreign policy of the USSR during the years of perestroika At the turn of 1987–1988. there is a new foreign policy doctrine, called "new political thinking". The main principles of the new foreign policy course were: 1) rejection of the fundamental conclusion about the split
author Nikolaev Igor MikhailovichForeign policy in the 20-30s By the beginning of the 20s Soviet Russia was in international isolation. With the exception of the border countries (Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Persia, and Afghanistan), no major European power recognized the Bolshevik government. FROM
From the book History of Russia from ancient times to the end of the 20th century author Nikolaev Igor MikhailovichForeign policy during the war "Whoever fights against Germany is a friend of England," said British Prime Minister Winston Churchill when he learned about the fascist attack on the USSR. The difficult situation on the fronts forced the Soviet leadership to forget for a while
author Barysheva Anna Dmitrievna63 THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE USSR IN THE PRE-WAR YEARS After Germany occupied the entire Czech Republic in 1939, the Soviet Union found itself in an extremely difficult situation. Negotiations between the military missions of Britain, France and the USSR were unsuccessful. A. Hitler, who had already decided to start a war with Poland,
From the book Domestic History. Crib author Barysheva Anna Dmitrievna67 THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE USSR IN THE POST-WAR YEARS The defeat of the countries of the continental axis in the war radically changed the balance of forces in the world. The USSR turned into one of the leading world powers, without which not a single issue of international life was resolved. However, domination and
From the book Course national history author Devletov Oleg Usmanovich11.3. Russia's foreign policy in the 1990s The collapse of the USSR had a huge impact on the system of international relations. The end of the Cold War put an end to years of confrontation between the two systems. Russia took the seat belonging to the USSR in the UN Security Council.
The main task of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation during this period was the creation new form cooperation with neighboring countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union.
Russian Federation and neighboring countries
Despite the generalization of interests and tasks, since 1993, the first contradictions appeared in relations between the countries of the post-Soviet space and Russia. First of all, they concerned the division of the property base of the Soviet army.
An attempt to create a single CIS army failed. The issue of dividing the Black Sea Fleet has become a subject of contention with the Ukrainian authorities. Agreements were reached only in 1997, when the Russian government was forced to make a number of significant concessions.
Tension in relations with Ukraine also arose on the issue of renunciation of nuclear weapons. Kyiv has long delayed the surrender of the nuclear potential, which was located on the territory of Ukraine. It was not until 1994 that a trilateral disarmament treaty was concluded between the United States, Ukraine, and Russia.
Friendly relations have been established with Belarus. A single economic space was created with the state, agreements were concluded that excluded possible conflicts in the sphere of the international community. In the second half of the 1990s, the governments of the two countries considered the option of a possible unification into a single union state.
Russian Federation and far abroad
Russia, which had the status of the legal successor of the USSR, in the first half of the 90s was forced to establish international ties that were severed during the Cold War. In 1992, the Declaration on the End of the Cold War was ratified between the Russian Federation and the United States. The states pledged de facto not to consider each other as opponents.
In 1994, treaties on partial disarmament were signed, the nuclear potential of world powers, including the Russian Federation, was significantly reduced. In 1996, the Russian Federation became a member of the Council of Europe. However, despite a noticeable thaw in relations, in 1997, the first contradictions arose between Russia and European states.
The Russian government did not support the entry of some Eastern European states(Poland, Czech Republic) to NATO. Disagreements intensified significantly after the introduction of NATO forces into the territory of Serbia.
As a counterweight to the NATO troops, the Russian government initiated the creation of a united paramilitary structure with the states of the post-Soviet space.
Despite the fact that such an army was still not created, Europe reacted very categorically: the IMF refused to pursue a further lending policy with the Russian Federation, membership in the Council of Europe was suspended. The official explanation for such harsh sanctions was the accusation of violation of human rights and freedoms in Chechnya by the Russian government.
The crisis in diplomatic relations was significantly aggravated by the Kosovo conflict in the first half of 1990. This was the first major confrontation between Russia and NATO since the end of the Cold War.