The solution of economic problems remained the most important task for Soviet society. In the organization of economic development of this period, two periods are clearly distinguished, which seriously differed from each other in methods, goals and final results.
1953-1957 Economic course of G.M. Malenkov After Stalin's death the new economic course of the USSR was associated with the name of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR G.M. Malenkov(1953-1955). It consisted in the social reorientation of the economy, which meant shifting the center of gravity to the development of light, food industry, as well as Agriculture.
An attempt was made to solve the food problem and bring agriculture out of the crisis by increasing productivity (i.e., intensifying production) and using the factor of personal interest of the collective farmer. To this end, it was planned to reduce taxes on personal subsidiary plots, raise procurement prices for agricultural products, write off agricultural tax arrears to collective farms (1.5 billion poods of grain), increase personal plots. It was one of the variants of the new agrarian course.
Agricultural Transformation Agenda carried out N.S. Khrushchev, was somewhat different from the strategic plan of G.M. Malenkov. In addition to these measures, Khrushchev intended to ensure the rise of agriculture through the rapid expansion of sown areas through the development of virgin lands (an extensive path for the development of agriculture). Special attention he also paid attention to the processes of mechanization of agriculture, for which it was supposed in the future to turn the collective farms into large industrial-type farms.
In 1954, the development of virgin lands in the Trans-Volga region, Siberia and Kazakhstan began. With the participation of 300 thousand volunteers, mostly young people, 42 million hectares of new land were developed.
The purchase prices for agricultural products were doubled, the debts of collective farms for agricultural tax of previous years (1.5 billion poods of grain) were written off, and expenditures on the social development of the village were increased several times. Taxes on personal subsidiary plots were abolished, which were allowed to be increased five times. In 1958, mandatory deliveries of agricultural products from household plots were abolished, and taxes on it were reduced.
On the initiative of N.S. Khrushchev, the criteria for planning in agriculture were changed, the collective farms received the right to amend their charters.
For 1953-1958 the growth of agricultural production amounted to 34% compared with the previous five years. In order to solve the food problem, the area under corn was increased: from 1955 to 1962. from 18 to 37 million ha.
Administrative and economic reform. In 1957, N.S. Khrushchev tried to decentralize the management of industry, to create a new organizational and economic structure built on the management of industry not according to sectoral (through ministries), but according to the territorial principle.
In order to limit the possibility of interference of local party apparatuses in economic activity, economic councils who were directly subordinate to the Union Ministry. 141 all-union and republican ministries were abolished and 105 economic councils were created instead.
The reorganization of the management system gave certain results: industrial specialization, intersectoral cooperation increased, and the process of technical reconstruction of the economy took place. Expanded rights and economic powers union republics. However, the reform as a whole not only did not introduce any qualitative changes in economic conditions, but also gave rise to a certain disunity in the sectoral mechanism of the Soviet economy.
Social politics. The economic policy of the post-Stalin leadership, despite the contradictions, had a pronounced social orientation. In the mid 50s. A program of measures aimed at raising the living standards of the population was developed.
The salaries of workers in industry were regularly raised. The real incomes of workers and employees increased by 60%, of collective farmers - by 90% (since 1956, collective farmers were transferred to a monthly advance payment of wages). The law on old-age pensions for workers and employees doubled their size and lowered the retirement age. The working week was reduced from 48 to 46 hours, and compulsory state loans were abolished. Trade unions have gained greater rights in production.
Housing construction has become one of the important achievements of social policy. From 1955 to 1964 the urban housing stock increased by 80%, 54 million people received new apartments. The material base of education, health care, and culture was strengthened.
1958-1964 At the end of the 50s. a transition was made from five-year to seven-year planning (1959-1965). Since that time, the process of displacing economic incentives in the development of the economy by administrative coercion began. V agriculture this trend is most pronounced.
Kolkhoz policy. Among the disproportions of the seven-year plan, the most severe was the crisis in agriculture. Farms experienced a constant lack of electricity, chemical fertilizers, seeds of valuable crops.
In order to industrialize agriculture, collective farms were enlarged (as a result, their number decreased from 91,000 to 39,000). In the course of extensive communist construction, with the aim of turning all property into public property, a massive transformation of collective farms into state farms took place. A characteristic feature was also the consolidation of collective farms at the expense of the so-called unpromising villages. In 1959, a forced purchase of all the equipment of the liquidated machine and tractor stations (MTS) by collective farms was carried out, which undermined the financial situation of rural producers, given that they also did not have enough technical personnel.
Did not give positive results corn epic, in 1962-1963. the crisis in the development of virgin lands worsened.
In order to achieve the tasks of communist construction as soon as possible, the authorities ordered attack on private farms. The land plots of the collective farmers were again cut down (from 1.5 acres per one collective farm yard in 1955-1956 to one hundred square meters in 1959-1960; in 1950-1952 there were 32 acres), cattle were forcibly redeemed. Against this background, a campaign of public condemnation of traders and money-grubbers, a struggle against the invaders of collective farm lands, unfolded. As a result, there was a decline in personal subsidiary farming. Collective farm workers turned into hired workers.
As a result of the difficulties that arose, the seven-year plan for the development of agriculture was not fulfilled: instead of the planned 70%, the increase in agriculture amounted to only 15%. The food problem in the country has worsened. The resulting food shortage caused a rise in prices, in particular for meat by 25-30%. The economic difficulties coincided with a bad harvest in 1963, which had disastrous consequences. As a result, the crisis in agriculture led to the first mass purchases of grain abroad (12 million tons).
Industry. In general, during the period under review, the average annual growth rate of industrial production in the USSR exceeded 10%, which was ensured solely due to the harsh methods of the command economy. Scientific and technological progress was considered one of the levers for the development of industry.
Further development administrative system. There has been a process development of vertical centralization economic councils (SNKh). In June 1960, the Republican Council of National Economy was created, in March 1963 - Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh). The system of national economic planning became progressively more complex.
The system of governing bodies of the agrarian sector has changed. From March 1962 created kolkhoz-sovkhoz administrations (KSU).
The administrative reform affected and structures of party organizations. In order to strengthen the role of the party in the development of agriculture in rural areas, district committees were abolished (their functions were transferred to party organizations of the Constitutional Court, party organizers in production); regional committees were divided according to the production principle - into industrial and agricultural. On the whole, the management restructuring reform retained the essence of the administrative and economic mechanism, the territorial management system led to sectoral imbalance and the growth of parochial tendencies of economic councils.
Reorganization of the administrative system became a permanent feature. Continuous shake-ups of the apparatus and personal displacements seriously disturbed party and government officials who were striving for the stability of their personal position. N.S. Khrushchev, on the other hand, declared his readiness to scatter everyone like kittens. It seemed to the apparatchiks that de-Stalinization did not bring the desired confidence in tomorrow. In bureaucratic circles, dissatisfaction with N.S. Khrushchev was growing, a desire to subordinate him to the apparatus. A major step along this path was the campaign against the creative intelligentsia, as a result of which Khrushchev the reformer lost firm support among them.
Dissatisfaction with Khrushchev was also expressed by representatives of all levels of the party apparatus (after its division into two independent systems and the formation of a kind of dual power). Therefore, a conspiracy against N.S. Khrushchev became inevitable.
Social politics. At first in the social sphere continued positive developments. The material situation of the population improved, and public consumption funds grew. By 1960, the transfer of workers and employees to a 7-hour working day was completed. The introduction of pensions for collective farmers was being prepared. The housing stock increased (for 1959-1965 - by 40%).
In the context of a slowdown in development and the growth of crisis economic phenomena social policy was not consistent. The government froze for twenty years payments on domestic loans issued before 1957 (in order to reduce the budget deficit). ).
It caused spontaneous actions of workers. In 1959, with the help of the troops, a 1,500-strong uprising of workers - builders of the Kazakhstan Magnitka (Temirtau) was suppressed. In 1962, a 7,000-strong workers' demonstration took place in Novocherkassk, also dispersed by troops using tanks (24 people died, 105 participants in the unrest were convicted). Working performances were held in many industrial areas - in Moscow, Leningrad, Donbass, Kemerovo, Ivanovo.
RESULTS. During the Khrushchev thaw, a serious modernization attempt. N.S. Khrushchev set the impetus for the development of political processes, embarking on the path of liberalization.
but use of the old political and economic mechanism in the course of the reforms predetermined their failure. Course N.S. Khrushchev was characterized by the absolutization of organizational factors, the solution of economic problems by administrative and political methods. The situation was aggravated by the absence of any scientific and managerial foundations for administrative reforms, the randomness and subjectivity of the transformations carried out in the administrative and economic system.
N.S. Khrushchev and the leadership of the party, remaining on the positions of the communist ideology and preserving many of the traditions of the Stalinist leadership, not only turned out to be unprepared, but also did not seek radical change.
After the failures of N.S. Khrushchev’s contradictory transformative activity, a fatigue syndrome arose in society, striving for sustainable forms of social and personal life. During this period, the party-state bureaucracy, thirsting for stability, came to the fore in the hierarchy of power, or nomenclature, which played a decisive role in the removal of N.S. Khrushchev in October 1964.
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but marked the end of that terrible era in which the country lived under Stalin.
The reforms were met with enthusiasm by the inhabitants of the USSR, and the population of "friendly countries", and even the states of the opposite camp - after all Soviet Union demonstrated the transition to a policy of peaceful coexistence.
And this despite the fact that Khrushchev's reforms were largely inconsistent, liberalization triumphed only partially.
Housing for the workers, land for the state
As it is customary to call the complex of reforms and the very era of the new leader, it took place under the slogan of returning to some communist origins, in relation to which Stalin committed a significant betrayal.
The government again began to build communism, abandoning the uniform Stalinist autocracy with obvious capitalist elements. And these reforms had both positive and negative effects.
- Mass construction of housing for workers began. Cities and urban-type settlements were adorned with complexes of slender five-story buildings, each of which contained a large number of apartments - small, artless, exactly the same. Pomp, artistry and individuality were now outlawed, but the people at that moment did not pay attention to this: their own apartment was the cherished dream of tens of millions of Soviet citizens, and now it has come true.
- The persecution of the private farms of the peasants began. They decided to take the land away so that people could work better on the collective farm and not waste time on their land, and taxes increased again. It was proposed to rent or sell livestock at the minimum price to collective farms and state farms. As a result, by the mid-60s, most of the rural population degraded to a low level - lower than in the early 1950s. Young people left for cities or virgin lands. Meat, milk and bread began to disappear from the shelves, there was not enough food and the threat introduction of cards. For the first time we bought grain from abroad.
- There was a division of regional committees into industrial and agricultural. This administrative reform led, however, to a massive deterioration in harvests.
- Began " corn campaign”, which had the goal of instilling this culture, then still outlandish, on the fields of the Soviet Union. The people fell in love with corn and later began to grow it on a large scale, but at that particular time the results were largely unsuccessful: out of 37 million hectares sown with corn, only 7 million had ripened.
- Exploration of the whole land. About 300,000 volunteers went to conquer and cultivate virgin lands (Kazakhstan, Siberia). A large crop was harvested only once - in 1956. The sun burned the crops, sandstorms blew off the fertile layer, the idea failed.
- Schools were reorganized, as a result of which the general labor school became a polytechnic. The reform turned out to be a failure and was canceled with the departure of Khrushchev.
Changes in the top leadership of the country. After the death of I.V. Stalin (March 5, 1953), a short period of "collective leadership" began. G.M. became the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Malenkov. L.P. was appointed his first deputy. Beria, who headed the Ministry of the Interior, merged with the Ministry of State Security. N.S. Khrushchev first served as secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, but in September 1953 he was elected to the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. A struggle for power developed between them. Khrushchev had the smallest chance of winning, but it was he who eventually became the leader of the country. What helped him to win the fight was that he led the party - the main element of the political system.
In June 1953. L.P. Beria was accused of "anti-Party activities" and arrested. The capture group was led by Deputy Minister of Defense G.K. Zhukov. Already in December 1953, Beria was shot. In 1955 G.M. Malenkov was removed from the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers.
Summer 1957 Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich made an attempt to remove Khrushchev from the post of first secretary of the Central Committee. With the help of G.K. Zhukov, Khrushchev retained power, while Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich were accused of creating an anti-party group and removed from their posts. A few months later, Khrushchev "thanked" Zhukov by removing him from the leadership of the army. In 1958, Khrushchev also headed the Council of Ministers of the USSR, becoming the sole leader.
At the XXII Congress of the CPSU, an important provision appeared in the Charter of the Party, according to which no one could hold an elected position in the Party for more than two consecutive terms, and the composition of the governing bodies must be updated by at least one third. If under Stalin the mass renewal of the managerial stratum took place through repressions, under Khrushchev it had to take place through elections.
At the turn of 1950-1960. The “thaw” was winding down, and the cult of personality of Khrushchev himself was growing. Ripe dissatisfaction with his policy due to the unsatisfactory results of the reforms.
Industrial management reforms. In August 1953 G.M. Malenkov made a program economic reforms, the essence of which was the priority development of the light and food industry (group "B") and agriculture. Plans G.M. Malenkov caused dissatisfaction with the leaders of heavy industry. There was a sharp struggle for power in the top party leadership, and this dissatisfaction with N.S. Khrushchev decided to use to weaken the position of his opponent. G.M. Malenkov was accused of a dangerous underestimation of the development of heavy industry, and he was removed.
The main focus was still on the production of means of production - the "A" group. By the beginning of the 1960s. the share of group "A" in the total volume of the national economy began to be 75%. The production of building materials, mechanical engineering, metalworking, chemistry, petrochemistry, and electric power industry developed at an especially rapid pace.
In 1957 there was the abolition of the ministries, instead of them 105 economic councils were created. The essence of the reform was the transition from the sectoral to the territorial principle. The decentralization of industrial management significantly strengthened the economic role of the Union and Autonomous Republics, but at the same time made it difficult for all-Union ties, the coordination of enterprises located in different regions, and gave rise to a certain disunity.
The organization of economic councils gave some effect, then began to restrain production, since the petty tutelage of local leaders turned out to be worse than the petty tutelage of the branch ministries. In the early 1960s economic growth began to decline steadily.
The deteriorating economic situation prompted Khrushchev to embark on yet another major management reform. In 1962, according to the production principle, all the governing bodies were restructured from top to bottom. Party organizations, Soviets and executive committees were divided into industrial and rural ones. The division along the lines of production led to confusion, to an increase in the number of officials and a significant increase in administrative costs.
Reforms in agriculture. At the September (1953) plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, important decisions were made on the economic stimulation of agriculture. Purchasing prices for agricultural products increased depending on the type by 2-6 times. Taxes were reduced from private farms of peasants. Deliveries of tractors and agricultural machinery to the countryside have increased.
In 1954 land development began. to Kazakhstan and Western Siberia about 300 thousand volunteers and a lot of equipment were sent. These resources were detached from the old arable regions of Russia. In the early years, the virgin lands gave a good harvest. However, already in the late 1950s. soil erosion began, and crops fell.
In order to solve the fodder problem, the area under corn was increased by reducing the grain crops.
In 1953-1958. the increase in agricultural output amounted to 34% compared with the previous five-year period. However, since the late 1950s, as N.S. Khrushchev in power, there has been a turn to the old administrative methods of managing agriculture. The restriction of personal subsidiary plots began.
In 1958 MTS was reorganized, instead of which repair and technical stations (RTS) appeared. Machine and tractor stations were liquidated, and their equipment had to be redeemed by collective farms at a high price and in a short time. This ruined many collective farms.
By the early 1960s. the food problem has escalated again. The government's decision to stimulate the development of animal husbandry by raising retail prices for meat and butter (1962) caused acute dissatisfaction among urban residents. Rallies and demonstrations of protest were held in a number of regions, a demonstration of workers and employees of Novocherkassk was suppressed by the troops. There were casualties.
Fearing a further increase in social tension, the party and state leadership for the first time in the history of Russia and the USSR went to the purchase of grain in the United States, which marked the beginning of the country's growing dependence on food imports. An indicator of the crisis in agriculture was the failure of the tasks of the 7-year plan (1959-1965): the actual growth of agricultural production over the years of the seven-year plan amounted to 15% instead of the planned 70%.
The science. The high level of Soviet science contributed to the emergence of nuclear energy. In 1953, the first H-bomb. In 1954, the first nuclear power plant was launched in the city of Obninsk near Moscow. In 1959, the first nuclear icebreaker "Lenin" appeared. Then the first nuclear submarines were built. The world's first passenger jet aircraft TU-104 appeared.
In 1957, under the leadership of S.P. Korolyov, the first artificial satellite was launched, and on April 12, 1961, the first man on the planet, Yu.A., flew into space. Gagarin.
However, in general, the leadership of the USSR failed to ensure the full implementation of the scientific and technological revolution, which engulfed all the developed countries of the world, which in subsequent years led to the country's technical lag in the most promising areas.
Social sphere. In 1956, a law on state pensions was adopted. In accordance with it, the size of pensions for certain categories of citizens increased by 2 or more times. Collective farmers received a state pension only in 1964. Tuition fees in schools and universities were abolished. The scale of housing construction has increased.
Foreign policy. In his foreign policy course, N.S. Khrushchev was guided by the principle of peaceful coexistence of the capitalist and socialist systems. But it was not always respected. Breakthroughs in relations with the West gave way to crisis situations.
In 1958 The first visit of the head of the Soviet state to the United States took place. In 1963, an agreement was signed on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests in three areas - in the atmosphere, in space, under water.
In 1961. there was a second Berlin crisis, which resulted in the division of the city into West Berlin, surrounded by the famous Berlin Wall, and East Berlin, the capital of the GDR.
The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, which arose in connection with the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba, in close proximity to the United States, became especially acute, and brought the world to the brink of nuclear war.
To strengthen your position in the countries of the socialist camp, the Soviet Union used all possible levers - from financial, economic and technical assistance to forceful pressure. In 1955, a military-political union of the socialist countries of Europe (except Yugoslavia) was created - the Warsaw Pact Organization. In 1956, the Soviet Union crushed an anti-communist uprising in Hungary. In the late 1950s relations between the USSR and the largest socialist country, China, sharply worsened, caused by ideological differences and the divergence of the strategic interests of the two countries.
Much attention was paid to the development of relations with the states of the "third world" ( developing countries) - India, Indonesia, Burma, Afghanistan, etc. Trying to ensure its influence in these countries, the Soviet Union assisted them in the construction of industrial facilities. During the reign of N.S. Khrushchev, with the financial and technical assistance of the USSR, about 6 thousand enterprises were built in different countries of the world.
In 1964, against Khrushchev, a conspiracy in which Active participation accepted A.N. Shelepin, N.V. Podgorny, L.I. Brezhnev, V.E. Semichastny and others. At the October (1964) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, N.S. Khrushchev was accused of "voluntarism" and "subjectivism", removed from all posts and retired.
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Introduction
1 Path to power
2 Evaluation of N.S. Khrushchev
Conclusion
List of used literature
INTRODUCTION
Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev was born on April 4 (17), 1894 in the Kursk province, in the village of Kalinovka. His parents were simple peasants.
After the October Revolution, Khrushchev headed the Council of Mine and Factory Committees of the Trade Union of Metal Workers in the Mining Industry. In May 1921, he became a cadet at the Donskoy College. At the same time he studied at the working faculty. For his active and indefatigable character, courage and firmness, he was elected secretary of the party cell of the technical school. That was the first step on the path of his ascent to the political leadership of the country.
For the first time at the national level, it manifested itself in 1925, when Khrushchev was elected a delegate to the XIV Party Congress. On the recommendation of Kaganovich, in 1931 he was elected first secretary of the Bauman district committee of the party, then secretary of the Krasnopresnensky district committee, and already in 1932 - second secretary of the MK and MGK of the party. And already in 1935, Khrushchev took the post of first secretary of the MK and MGK.
This was a major appointment, since the Moscow region included the territories of the current Tula, Kaluga, Ryazan and Kalinin regions. With the death of Stalin, the period of the “pure” totalitarian regime ended in the country, and the “thaw” began. The era of Khrushchev and Nikita Sergeevich himself is an occasion for serious reflection. Today, fully armed with our own experience, we carry out certain transformations with incredible work.
How difficult and difficult was it for Khrushchev almost half a century ago? Comparing what we have done and what he has done, one is rather surprised not by the fact that he did not do something, but by how much he managed to do. Thus, the activities of Khrushchev and the assessment of his reforms are still quite relevant today.
The purpose of the work: a comprehensive study and generalization of literary sources on the topic, on their basis, the characterization and evaluation of Khrushchev's reform activities.
The work consists of an introduction, the main part, a conclusion and a list of references. The total volume of work is 20 pages.
1 THE WAY TO POWER
Khrushchev's career developed rapidly. It first appeared at the national level in 1925. Khrushchev was elected a delegate to the 14th Party Congress. At the congress, as is known, there was a sharp clash between Stalin and the "new opposition" led by Zinoviev and Kamenev. Khrushchev decisively took Stalin's side. Returning to his homeland, he spoke in a report at the plenum of the district party committee: "Our line is the line of the majority, that is, the party congress and the Central Committee."
L.M. played a significant role in Khrushchev’s career. Kaganovich, who at that time was a member of the Politburo, Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and First Secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee. It was he who took the initiative in Khrushchev's first major appointments. With his light hand, Nikita Sergeevich's great career began. Kaganovich showed the 36-year-old functionary to Stalin. The "Leader of the Peoples" smitten Khrushchev with his charm and intelligence, and he became the most faithful, devoted and diligent communist of Stalin's rule.
Khrushchev never completed his studies at the Industrial Academy, and on the recommendation of Kaganovich, in 1931 he was elected first secretary of the Bauman district party committee. Only a few months passed, and Khrushchev became secretary of the Krasnopresnensky district committee, and already in 1932 he was elected second secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee. At the XVII Congress of the CPSU (b), 39-year-old Khrushchev becomes a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Soon he was elected first secretary of the city committee and second secretary of the Moscow regional party committee. And in 1935, barely forty years old, Khrushchev took the post of first secretary of the Moscow Committee and the Moscow City Committee. This was a major appointment, since the Moscow region included the territories of the current Tula, Kaluga, Ryazan and Kalinin regions.
In September 1953 he became the first secretary of the Central Committee, initiating a new process in the life of Soviet society, called by the writer I.G. Ehrenburg "thaw". In 1956, at a closed meeting of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev delivered a report "On the cult of personality and its consequences." Khrushchev understood the urgent need for economic and social reforms and strove for this to be as complete as possible.
2 EVALUATION OF N.S.Khrushchev
The topic of Khrushchev's reforms is one of the most popular in journalism and historical research recent years. This popularity is not accidental. The very nature of the time, known for high-profile undertakings and equally deafening failures, the colorful personality of the protagonist of the era, which gives rise to the most controversial judgments, and finally, very close analogies with modernity - all this feeds scientific and public interest in the problems of the "great decade".
Khrushchev's time is one of the most significant and difficult periods in our history. Significant - because many great events took place during that period: this is an amnesty for prisoners in the Gulag, and a large number of other reforms; at that time, a man was first sent into space, and under Khrushchev, the world was brought to the brink of nuclear war. Difficult - because it concerns the decade, which at first was called "glorious", and then condemned as a time of "voluntarism" and "subjectivism". For a long, very long time it was not customary to talk about these turbulent years. For almost 20 years, there was a taboo on his name.
One can, of course, treat Khrushchev, his projects and ideas differently, evaluate the experience of social modernization accumulated at that time in different ways. However, with all the "pluses" and "minuses", the 50s - early 60s are interesting for contemporaries already because it was then that the elements of a new political culture, the culture of reformism, began to take shape. This process remained unfinished. What is best evidenced by the realities of today. The last circumstance is another reason to return to the experience of forty years ago.
N.S. Khrushchev, having become secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, got the opportunity to really influence the situation through the party apparatus. On his own initiative, he set the task of exposing the "cult of personality" and creating strong guarantees against its repetition. Khrushchev saw his mission as the leader of the country in giving peace and prosperity to the Soviet people.
The decision to move away from ideological dogmas and totalitarianism created an opportunity to do something for the common man.
Khrushchev's merit is that he was able to turn this possibility into reality.
The cessation of mass repression freed a person from every minute fear for his life. The person felt that he had some rights and some guarantees of these rights. For the first time during the years of Soviet power, the inhabitants of the village received passports and the right, while remaining serfs of the state, to get rid of their dependence on a particular collective farm. The worker received a real right to quit, as the eviction from the departmental square was canceled. The rehabilitation of entire nations has allowed hundreds of thousands of people to start a new life. And the rehabilitation of the victims of repression freed from double morality all those who hid the fate of their grandfather, father, brother, sister. The principle of material interest made it possible to connect one's life with one's own efforts, to determine one's own destiny. The value was not standard, but individuality.
The right to individual tastes was legalized, to« I am» different from« we» .
Khrushchev combined the traits of an apparatchik leader with those of a sincere populist. He himself once admitted that Stalin called him a populist. And Stalin cannot refuse the ability to evaluate personnel. Of all Stalin's entourage, Khrushchev knew the most real life, was close to the masses. And more importantly, he was inspired by the idea to benefit the people. He sincerely believed that the apparatus of state socialism had no other goals than concern for the welfare of the working people.
One of the key points of the new economic program was the solution of the food problem, and at the same time the solution of the question of bringing agriculture out of a protracted crisis. “If you call the most tragic times for the Soviet countryside - due to hopelessness and already complete abuse of all human feelings,” writes A. Adamovich, “these, in my opinion, are post-war, somewhere from 1946 to 1953.” Having exhausted the last reserves of enthusiasm, the village could rise only with the help of a full-fledged material incentive.
In 1959, at the 25th Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev came up with his most adventurous idea: to overtake and overtake the United States both in increasing industrial production and agricultural production per capita by 1970.
Perhaps the most acute among the problems that confronted him was the problem Agriculture. His position was such that in 1953 part of the food stocks from the strategic reserve had to be used. N.S. Khrushchev was the first among the leaders of the country to tell the truth about the plight of the Russian countryside. But his first attempts, even during Stalin's lifetime, to somewhat smooth out the anti-peasant orientation of agrarian policy were not crowned with success.
In September 1953, Khrushchev made a series of proposals for the development of agriculture that were important for that time at the Plenum of the Central Committee. An attempt was made to move from administrative to economic methods of farming in the countryside: if the country needed food, then the peasants had to be paid. The set of planned measures was aimed at solving two interrelated tasks: expanding the independence of collective farms and state farms and strengthening their economic interest. Purchasing prices for agricultural products were increased, advances were introduced for the labor of collective farmers (before that, payment was made to them only once a year). The development of private subsidiary plots by peasants began to be somewhat encouraged.
However, all these solutions could give a return only a few years later, and it was necessary to correct the grain economy immediately. In this regard, at the beginning of 1954, a decision was made on the mass development of virgin and fallow lands. The development of virgin lands was carried out by storm, without serious scientific study. It was mainly factory and factory youth from large industrial centers who went to the virgin lands on Komsomol vouchers, often not knowing how to approach the tractor. In winter, in severe frosts, with an icy wind, tents, wagons, temporary huts were set up in the steppe, equipment and fuel were brought in, and the development of endless fields untouched by the plow began.
Everything they had was sent to the virgin lands. All caterpillar tractors were sent only to Kazakhstan and Siberia. By 1965, the collective farms and state farms of Northern Kazakhstan had almost three times more tractors than in all the northwestern regions of the RSFSR, including the Karelian ASSR. For 1954-1961 more than 20% of all state investments in agriculture over these years have been invested in the development of virgin lands. It made it possible to create a large base for the production of strong and durum wheat varieties, which are essential in baking.
The development of virgin lands played an important role in the development of agriculture in Western and Eastern Siberia, where the sown area for the 50s increased by almost 10 million hectares. For the first time, new agrotechnical and soil protection systems were mastered in the virgin lands, such as the use of flat cutters to combat wind erosion of soils. In the Altai virgin lands, a slope farming system was mastered. People stopped at nothing to improve the food situation in the country.
But it was a pronounced extensive version of development. First, but very a short time virgin soil gave good harvest. The land, due to its age-old fertility, even without fertilization, gave birth well. In 1954, virgin lands produced over 40% of the gross grain harvest. This made it possible to improve the food supply of the population, but successes were only in the first years. But then droughts began, dust storms began, and the production of grain in the virgin lands turned out to be a risky business. Until now, virgin lands remain a zone of very unstable crops. The yield of grain crops on the newly developed lands remained low, land development took place in the absence of a scientifically based farming system. At the same time, the backlog of the old agricultural regions has intensified. 2/3 of the resources allocated at that time for the development of agriculture went to the uplift of virgin lands.
But the virgin lands did not justify the hopes for stable grain harvests. In lean years, in some areas, even seeds were not collected. The virgin lands, of course, delayed the transfer of agriculture to an intensive path of development.
The liquidation of the MTS in March 1958 had far-reaching consequences for the entire country. The existing system of maintenance of collective farm production through the MTS was far from perfect. Collective farms were the only enterprises in the country that did not themselves manage the machines - their main tools of labor. This created great inconvenience. Guardianship on the part of the MTS only tied the collective farms together. March 31, 1958 The Supreme Council The USSR adopted the Law on the reorganization of MTS and the sale of equipment to collective farms. The progressive reform was not well thought out, which ultimately led to a sharp drop in the rate of agricultural production. Instead of the 70% planned for the seven-year period (1959-1965), the real growth in gross output amounted to only 15%. The reform undermined the economy of collective farms. Having no choice, the collective farms bought the cars immediately and immediately found themselves in a difficult financial situation. Most of them drastically reduced wages per workday, economic incentives again ceased to operate.
Having visited the United States, Khrushchev believed that by focusing on corn, it is possible to dramatically increase the productivity of animal husbandry. His struggle for the introduction of corn in the country was in some cases anecdotal. In accordance with party directives, it was often sown where there could be no positive result.
The “corn campaign”, which was planted by force where it could not produce a crop, did not help Khrushchev. But it took several, years! But the irrepressible reformer finds another solution to the problem of the rise of animal husbandry. He carried out a decision according to which almost all personal large cattle. Khrushchev hoped that if he was in the public economy, in large livestock complexes, this would give a sharp increase in production.
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the illegal liquidation of personal livestock of rural residents began under the pretext of diverting them from work in the public economy. Personal livestock, mainly cows, was partially handed over to public herds for three years, and the main part was destroyed by the peasants. As a result, the country lost millions of livestock.
They bought up some cattle, but winter came, and it turned out: there was no fodder, no premises, a massive loss of livestock began. Someone suggested to the Soviet leader: several million horses devour such scarce feed. They exhausted most of the horses ... They began to drive powerful tractors over trifles ...
The idea with agro-cities also collapsed. The village was empty. Collective farms began to be enlarged into huge farms, but people immediately got lost in these rural conurbations, and there were even more impersonal farms. Endless resolutions, decisions, meetings, shake-ups of personnel did not give noticeable positive results. At that time they still could not understand that the Leninist socio-economic system itself had a very limited reserve for its reform. From the mid-1950s, a new stage in the consolidation of collective farms began. In 1957-1966 about 10,000 collective farms, which had already been enlarged earlier, were liquidated annually. At the same time, many collective farms "for strengthening" were transformed into state farms. By 1963, only 39 thousand collective farms remained instead of 91 thousand in 1955.
Khrushchev was inconsistent in the reforms that began after 1953. Instead of further weakening the guardianship of the peasants, increasing the material interest of the collective farmers, instructions "from above" were followed, which were in the nature of increasingly strict regulation. Peasants were ordered to plant corn and other innovations, which led to enormous losses. Government investment was gradually reduced. The village has become a testing ground for all sorts of hasty decisions and transformations.
The reforms shook the countryside, and despite all the inconsistency, new course in the village gave practical results.
Thus, after a long stagnation, significant growth began both in agriculture and in animal husbandry. The average annual growth rate of the industry approached the growth rate of agriculture. The application of the principle of material interest led to an increase in the living standards of collective farmers and state farm workers. From 1954 to 1956, an increase in the rural population was observed in the USSR - for the first time in post-war period. Thus, even the partial implementation of the reform in the 1950s ensured the highest growth in agricultural production since collectivization. By 1958 gross output had grown by more than a third.
On the whole, the major measures in the agrarian sector carried out in 1953-1958 can be summarized as follows:
Purchase prices were sharply increased (they did not compensate for all production costs, but became more reasonable);
Write off the debts of previous years;
Several times increased government spending on the needs of the countryside;
Abolished the tax on private household plots (personal subsidiary plots) and allowed to increase its size by 5 times;
Proclaimed the principle of planning from below;
They began to introduce pensions for collective farmers;
They began issuing passports to collective farmers;
Collective farms were given the right to amend their charters, taking into account local conditions.
However, the adherence of the country's leadership to certain stereotypes, ideological dogmas, boundless faith in the possibilities of the "collective farm system", prejudice against any personal property did not allow for effective reform of agriculture. Therefore, the result of the agrarian reform was disappointing: the crisis in agriculture deepened, the food problem in the country worsened. In 1963, the first purchases of grain abroad were made in the history of the USSR.
Khrushchev sought to decentralize control industry, as it became increasingly difficult to manage enterprises located on the periphery. It was decided that industrial enterprises should be managed not by ministries, but by local bodies - economic councils. Thus he hoped to rationally use raw materials, eliminate isolation and departmental barriers. In reality, however, the economic councils became simply diversified ministries and failed to cope with their tasks. The reform in industry was reduced to a bureaucratic reorganization, and the structure of production was influenced much more significantly by the transformations in agriculture.
Reform education was supposed to remove the contradiction that had arisen between the general desire for higher education and the needs of an extensive economy in new labor hands. In 1958, the Law was adopted on strengthening the connection between school and life and on the further development of the system of public education in the USSR, according to which the implementation of universal secondary education (eleven years) remained the most important task, but the secondary school acquired a "polytechnical profile". The system of "labor reserves" was liquidated, i.e. a network of paramilitary schools that existed for state account. They were replaced by ordinary vocational schools, which could be entered after the 7th grade. From the very beginning, the implementation of the reform ran into numerous difficulties. The material and technical base of the school turned out to be unprepared for the implementation of the tasks of industrial training. In the vast majority of schools, the choice of professions was small and most often had a random character. By the autumn of 1963, it became obvious that the secondary school was not suitable as the main source of replenishment of enterprises and construction sites with qualified personnel. Correspondence and evening forms of secondary education did not justify themselves either. In practice, the bulk of those wishing to receive a secondary education chose an eleven-year general education school. The general level of students' preparation has decreased. Decreased interest in the humanities. The result of the reform was also disappointing: the general educational potential of the society decreased, and from the autumn of 1963 the secondary school again became a ten-year one.
Of all the reforms carried out during Khrushchev's "Great Decade", the reforms in social sphere.
The other side of the success in the post-war reconstruction of the economy in the Soviet Union was the low standard of living and the extremely high rate of exploitation of workers. In order to create the appearance of material well-being in Moscow, Leningrad, and some other large industrial centers, goods and products produced in the country were brought there. In all sorts of ways, money was withdrawn from the village. The number of in-kind and monetary taxes from the population, and compulsory placement of loans increased. Within seven years after the monetary reform of 1947, mass reductions in retail prices for consumer goods were carried out. Their main goal was purely political: to demonstrate the "care" of the party and government for the people. Indeed, each new price cut was perceived by the masses with a sense of "deep satisfaction." For seven years, for many contemporaries, another regularity became obvious: after another price reduction, the amount of subscription to a state loan invariably increased, prices and wages of workers and employees decreased.
By 1953, such a social policy had logically resulted in a general shortage of elementary consumer goods and an increase in social inequality.
The civil sector of the economy had the greatest success in the area of housing construction, which began in the second half of the 1950s. In 1954, splendor and “decoration” in architecture were strongly condemned, and a transition began to the construction of houses using the industrial method. Numerous panel and block five-story houses appeared, which later received the name "Khrushchev". The war deprived millions of families of their homes, people lived in dugouts, in barracks, in communal apartments. Getting a separate well-appointed apartment for many was an almost unrealizable dream. These houses are still standing. Of course, from the position of today's time, they are inconvenient. Adjacent rooms, small kitchens, narrow corridor, lack of balconies in some houses. In Moscow, a decision was made to demolish Khrushchev's five-story buildings. Our country did not know the pace at which housing construction was carried out in the first half of the 1960s, neither before nor after that period.
At the 20th Congress, a broad program for raising living standards was put forward, including a reduction in working hours, mass housing construction, wage increases for low-paid workers and whole line other important changes. Their implementation in subsequent years was not consistent and did not have a comprehensive character.
Why did the reforms fail?N.S. Khrushcheva?
What is the significance of N.S.Khrushchev, who was the closest associate of Stalin, on the one hand, and the great reformer of the decade of the "thaw" - on the other hand?
The question posed in the historical literature is often covered too straightforwardly. Some authors emphasize that Khrushchev's reforms produced considerable positive results in the political, economic, social, spiritual and other spheres. Others emphasize the impossibility of reforming the socialist system and prove the inherent perniciousness of Khrushchev's reforms.
From the point of view of the development of the state, the period is characterized by an abundance of reforms, both reasonable and far-fetched. A common feature is the desire to detail the management of the state, which leads to the expansion of the rights of the union republics and local authorities and administration.
The main merit of N.S. Khrushchev was that, with all his inherent vigor, he destroyed the authoritarian system of government that had developed in the USSR during the thirty-year rule of Stalin. He was the first to begin a return to the Leninist norms of party life. This is N.S. Khrushchev began the democratization of society, involving wide sections of the population in governing the country. It was under him that the search for the optimal model of the economic mechanism began and was tirelessly carried out. The Soviet Union approached for the first time market relations and began to master the first of them. Under N.S. Khrushchev, in many ways, solved the most acute problem - housing. Agriculture began to rise, and industry made a powerful breakthrough.
Major changes in the decade under review were noted in foreign policy. It was at this time that the collapse of the colonial system began. The international communist and workers' movement began to rally around the CPSU. The tension in Europe was removed. The system of socialism was strengthened.
Board N.S. Khrushchev is rightly called the era of the "thaw". This is true not only for the foreign policy activities of the Soviet Union, but also for the internal life of the country. In the USSR, new relations were developing between people. There was a desire of N.S. Khrushchev to convince fellow citizens to live in accordance with the principles of the Moral Code of the builder of communism. For the first time, Soviet society also implemented political pluralism. Culture developed rapidly. New brilliant writers, poets, sculptors, musicians appeared.
During the years of N.S. Khrushchev space became Soviet. The first satellite of the Earth was ours, the first man in space was ours. And most importantly, at that time, nuclear parity was achieved between the USSR and the USA, which allowed the latter to recognize the strength of the Soviet Union and reckon with its opinion in solving all the most important world problems.
In general, the merits of N.S. Khrushchev could be listed for a long time. Only the most important ones are named here, but there were just as many miscalculations. A significant part of them was due to the most difficult of his surroundings and traits of his character.
During the de-Stalinization of the country, which began after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, totalitarianism was shaken in all spheres of life, but not crushed. The revival of the Soviets public organizations, a breakthrough into space and the rise of virgin lands, housing construction, a course towards peaceful coexistence with the West and other achievements were combined with manifestations of the post-totalitarian system. The party apparatus continued to exercise comprehensive control over the political, economic, ideological and cultural life of society. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU was still the "uncrowned autocrat". In the ruling party, contrary to its own rules, the Central Committee, the Politburo of the Central Committee, and the secretaries of the Central Committee remained outside criticism from below. No one dared even hint at the possibility of an intra-party opposition, and even more so, a multi-party system. In the electoral system, the practice of elections without a choice remained unshakable. The economy was dominated by the state and collective farm forms of ownership, the administrative-command system. The ideology did not allow ideas that differed in some way from the official Marxist-Leninist theory.
This was the main reason why the old economic mechanism remained in force, the strictest centralization in management. The country's economy developed along an extensive path. Since the late 1950s, the pace economic development slowed down significantly. In the late 50s - the first half of the 60s, there were a number of major failures in agriculture. The situation in the economy of 1959-1964 was in many respects reminiscent of the phenomena of the late 1940s and early 50s. This had a negative impact on the level of material well-being of the people, and on spiritual development countries ("thaw" was increasingly replaced by bitter frosts).
The main reason for the success of the reforms was that they revived economic methods guides national economy and started with agriculture.
The main reason for the failure of the reforms was that they were not supported by the democratization of the political system. Having broken the repressive system, they did not touch the main one - the administrative-command system. Therefore, already after five or six years, many reforms began to be curtailed by the efforts of both the reformers themselves and the powerful administrative and managerial apparatus, the nomenklatura.
The best thing Khrushchev could do was attack the Gulag system and free political prisoners. The most important event is the restoration of legality in the activities of state security agencies. The mass rehabilitation of people who were unreasonably repressed in the Stalin years began. Conditions are being created that guarantee the impossibility of a repetition of lawlessness.
In particular, Danilov S.Yu. and Nikitin V.M. give the following assessment of Khrushchev's reforms:
1. They were based on the voluntarism of the first person of the country.
2. According to their goals, they were utopian and did not take into account the true state of the economy.
3. In the chosen directions of achieving the goals, the economic policy was contradictory.
4. The methods of carrying out reforms were purely command-administrative, anti-democratic. The opinion of the masses was not actually taken into account.
All this led to the failure of Khrushchev's reforms and to the resignation of Khrushchev himself.
Among the factors directly responsible for the coup in October 1964 are the following.
1. Khrushchev lost the support of almost all social strata of Soviet society.
The workers were indignant at the rise in prices for meat and butter in 1962 and the shortage of goods, which led to the tragic events in Novocherkassk. The peasantry and workers of state farms were extremely dissatisfied with severe restrictions on personal subsidiary plots, undermining the economy of collective farms as a result of high costs for the accelerated purchase of MTS equipment, the line for the elimination of pure fallows and crops of perennial grasses, and a shortage of manufactured goods.
- The intelligentsia was protested by the renewed persecution of prominent writers and artists, the advantages for young production workers in entering universities and the decrease, in connection with this, in the level of training of specialists, as well as the use of people intellectual labor at physical work.
- Dosed liberalization caused outrage and orthodox conservatives.
The party apparatchiks were unhappy, firstly, with the division in 1962 of party organizations into industrial and rural ones, since, in their opinion, this created confusion and confusion, weakened the ties between industry and agriculture, and could also lead to the formation of a peasant party of the Socialist-Revolutionary type. Secondly, the party bureaucracy was seriously threatened by the norms introduced in 1961 at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU for the systematic renewal of all party organs. Thirdly, the nomenclature was irritated by frequent and harsh attacks on party officials.
- The leaders of industrial and agricultural enterprises opposed the administrative dictatorship and endless reorganizations.
- Regular military personnel could not forgive Khrushchev for the removal of G.K. Zhukov from the post of Minister of Defense, for a sharp reduction in the army without creating the necessary household base for retired officers.
Finally, over time, the people as a whole became irritated by the praise of Khrushchev, broadcast declarations about the imminent coming of communism, calls in the coming years to catch up with the United States in the production of milk, meat, butter per capita, especially since all this was in the late 50s years came into conflict with the general deterioration of the economic situation.
2. The masses, spiritually and psychologically, were not ready for fundamental transformations in the socio-political, economic and ideological spheres.
3. Even the dissidents, for the most part at that time, were not oriented towards capitalism and, for the most part, did not question the communist perspective. In connection with the failures of the Khrushchev reforms, many working people have an increased desire for the return of the rigid orders of the Stalinist period. The lack of democratic traditions among the masses and the conformism that had been nurtured by decades of Stalinist arbitrariness had an effect.
4. The main reformer himself - Khrushchev - for all the progressiveness of many of his steps, was the son of the Stalin era and could not immediately discard its prejudices, and partly its methods, methods of approach to business. Hence the half-heartedness, inconsistency, zigzags and fluctuations. In addition, he lacked theoretical training, a general culture. He relied mainly on the reorganization of structures administration, to preserve intact the existing forms of ownership, the established economic mechanism and the socio-political system.
And yet, despite the mistakes and miscalculations of N.S. Khrushchev went down in history as a prominent reformer who did an unusually lot of good deeds for the Soviet Union, marked by epoch-making events of our time.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion of this work, the following brief conclusions should be drawn.
The reign of N.S. Khrushchev is marked by both shortcomings and important events for the country.
He conceived huge reforms, in which, first of all, their diversity and their inconsistency are striking: concern for the implementation of the principle of material interest and the elimination of personal farms; rehabilitation of the victims of the personality cult and refusal to rehabilitate the leaders of the opposition to Stalin; the return of the Kalmyks to their native places and the denial of this to the Germans; the return of prisoners from the camps and the rejection of the trial of their executioners; raising wages and heading for free public consumption funds and the struggle for peace and the explosions of hydrogen bombs ...
The main reason for the defeat of the reforms is that they were not supported by the democratization of the political system.
The main reason for their success is that they revived the economic methods of managing the national economy.
Merit N.S. Khrushchev lies in the fact that for all his shortcomings, he turned out to be the only person in Stalin's entourage capable of making a radical turn in the policy of the CPSU, the Soviet Union. Only the fact that during the years of Khrushchev's power about 20 million people were rehabilitated, even if in most cases posthumously, only this fact will outweigh all his shortcomings and mistakes. The main result of the turbulent and controversial decade of Khrushchev's rule was the impossibility, the unthinkability of a return to Stalinism. It was during these years that the seeds of a new social and political thinking were thrown into the ground.
Assessment of the Khrushchev decade.
Positive factors: exposure of the personality cult, reform activities, social program, liberal cultural policy, new trends in foreign policy.
Negative factors: inconsistency in the liberalization of society, ill-conceived reformism, utopianism of some plans, own cult.
LIST OF USED SOURCES
1. Bokhanov A.N. History of Russia XX century: Tutorial/ A.N. Bokhanov, P.N. Zyryanov and others - M.: KSU, 1996.
2. Danilov S.Yu. Essays on the history of the Fatherland: Textbook / S.Yu. Danilov, V.M. Nikitin. - M.: Publishing house "Dashkov and K", 2000.
3. Emelyanov Yu.V. Khrushchev. Troublemaker in the Kremlin / Yu.V. Emelyanov. - M.: Dana, 2005.
4. Zelenin I.E. Agricultural policy N.S. Khrushchev and agriculture of the country // Patriotic history. - 2000. - No. 1.
5. History of the domestic state and law. Part 2: Textbook / Ed. O.I. Chistyakov. - M.: Publishing house BEK, 2007.
6. History of Russia IX-XX centuries. Course of lectures / ed. doc. ist. sciences, prof. B.V. Levanova. - M.: Zelo, 1996.
7. Medvedev R.A. N.S. Khrushchev: Political biography/ R.A. Medvedev. - M.: Book, 2000.
8. Naumov V.P. On the history of N.S. Khrushchev at the XX Congress of the CPSU // New and recent history. - 1999. - №4.
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Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev is the Soviet leader who, in mass consciousness associated with the "thaw" and "Khrushchev". However, not everyone knows that social and political reforms this Soviet leader, in fact, laid a "bomb" under the entire Soviet system and statehood.
The inability of our state and society to cope with the 1991 coup d'état, Gorbachev's mistakes during the "perestroika reforms" and the extremely weak capacity of the late Soviet government in principle are the legacy of Nikita Khrushchev.
Even the fact that quite quickly, ten years after coming to power, Khrushchev was overthrown by the method of a “quiet coup” did not help the USSR recover from the “reforms”. They laid such profound changes in society and the system of power.
Khrushchev's team
Having come to power in 1954, Nikita Khrushchev began to form his “team” in a very peculiar way. No, personnel renewal was necessary from a political point of view. Very many in the then nomenklatura treated the new general secretary very negatively.
But when selecting “new and loyal personnel,” Nikita Sergeevich, first of all, looked precisely at loyalty, often ignoring such a criterion as professionalism.
This system was once very accurately described by the Soviet economist Dmitry Shepilov: “Why is Minister X replaced by Y? Why is such a completely unsuitable person as a Zeta put in this important post?” - followed the answers: "Nikita Sergeevich worked with the player in Ukraine ... Zeta Nikita Sergeevich knows from joint work in the party's MC."
These relationships and the stake on loyalty immediately became a characteristic feature of the entire political system, down to the lowest party and political levels. Moreover, official reforms followed, which, in fact, leveled the concept of “political professionalism”.
school reform
We are talking, for example, about the so-called school reform and the law of December 24, 1958 "On strengthening the connection between school and life and on the further development of the system of public education in the USSR."
This law focused on labor education, and after school, graduates were required to work for two years in production and only then could continue their studies. The only problem was that the salary of even an unskilled worker was higher than the student stipend.
Therefore, the newly minted workers were not eager to continue their education. True, it was from these cadres that, as a result of yet another reform, the political elites Khrushchev period.
Milkmaids-record holders
At the initiative of Nikita Sergeevich, now, the main contenders for social lifts have come from working youth. Roughly speaking, a milkmaid-record holder who exceeded the norm of milk yield could easily become a deputy chairman of a collective farm and advance along the party line. And there were millions of such milkmaids, tractor drivers, miners and other young workers in the Land of Soviets. In general, there was someone to replace the "obsolete" party elite, which, according to Khrushchev himself, "was delayed at the fair."
As an increase in political knowledge, they, this new elite, were offered party courses, but not a systematic education. And these same “milkmaids” eventually came to power in the USSR. Yes, they were practitioners, but the theoretical baggage, knowledge of politics, these people had minimal.
From combiners to politicians
The most famous and sad example of such career growth was Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, who was an excellent combine operator and fell under Khrushchev's personnel and social reforms. And who would argue that he did great with the combine.
And since it turned out perfectly, both party and career growth went. Only not in his specialty, but precisely in the political sphere, which eventually led Mikhail Sergeevich to power in the USSR, in the country, about political structure which he understood very little. Therefore, he somehow did not work out with her.
Uneducated elites
In the same period, a peculiar system of "moral priorities" arose in the USSR. Now the same “working, working youth” had an extremely negative attitude towards educated specialists and professionals. Because those were just "theorists", while the new "elites" became the pure practitioners of socialism and communism. They literally built it with their own hands. This, however, had nothing to do with political literacy. However, Nikita Sergeevich was interested in this to a minimal extent.
In fact, it was under Khrushchev that the mechanism for promoting the most arrogant, assertive, but loyal and uneducated people to power, which in historiography is usually called "negative selection", was formed.
Already after the removal of Khrushchev from power, the new Secretary General, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, faced an acute personnel problem. Professionals from politics, really educated specialists, were a minority. In addition, Khrushchev's favoritism continued to prevail in the Soviet system. That is why these very rare specialists have already formed Brezhnev's gerontocracy, and after that “stagnation”. There was simply no adequate change, and I didn’t really want to let her into power.
But in the end, these same “Khrushchev cadres” got involved in their revenge after the death of Brezhnev, and then Andropov and Chernenko. And how this revenge ended, we all remember very well. It was a grandiose collapse of the greatest country.
It is worth noting that it was Khrushchev's generation of "promising cadres" that arranged this collapse. After all, both Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin are people who were fully formed in the USSR. They were born, raised, trained and brought up only according to Soviet patterns.
Even Brezhnev had three classes at a gymnasium in Tsarist Russia. And he, I must say, did not destroy the Soviet Union. Destroyed it completely Soviet people. And "thank you" for this, first of all, we can say to Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev.